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The concept of the ultimate (*don dam pa*, *paramārtha*) in the
"Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra": Analysis, translation, and notes.
(Volumes I and II)

Powers, Chester John, Ph.D.

University of Virginia, 1991

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UMI

THE CONCEPT OF THE ULTIMATE (*DON DAM PA, PARAMĀRTHA*) IN THE
SAMDHINIRMOCANA-SŪTRA:
ANALYSIS, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES
VOLUME I

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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPT OF THE ULTIMATE (*DON DAM PA*, *PARAMĀRTHA*) IN THE
SAMDHINIRMOCANA-SŪTRA

The *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is the primary scriptural basis for the Yogācāra school, one of the two main philosophical schools of Indian Mahāyana Buddhism (the other being Madhyamaka). This dissertation is a detailed examination of the concept of the ultimate as set forth in this text and contains materials from a wide range of commentarial literature from India, Tibet, and China. This topic is central to the sutra's presentation of hermeneutics, which is based on the understanding of the ultimate as outlined in the text, and figures prominently in the sutra's explication of the ideal worldview of someone who understands its thought.

The first part of the dissertation is an introduction to scholarly study of the text, focusing on Étienne Lamotte's French translation (Paris and Louvain, 1935), especially his contention that the text is a composite work consisting of diverse parts from different times and authors. My conclusion concerning Lamotte's contention is that it is plausible given the present state of knowledge concerning the text, but that he has not given sufficient evidence to fully support his contention.

The dissertation then discusses the various Tibetan and Chinese recensions of the sūtra, its position in the literature of Indian Buddhism and particularly the Yogacara school, and the two largest commentaries on the sutra, by Wonch'uk and Jang-chup-dzu-trül. There is a brief discussion of Wonch'uk's life and times, followed by an overview of his commentary and its unique aspects in relation to the other commentaries. This is followed by a discussion of who Jang-chup-dzu-trül might have been and an overview of the commentary attributed to him.

The next section discusses the meaning of the title of the sūtra and defends my rendering of this title as “*Sūtra Explaining the Thought*”. The argument is based primarily on the commentaries on the sūtra and on various Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese dictionaries that indicate the range of meanings of the terms I translate as “thought” (*dgongs pa, samdhi*) and “explaining” (*nges par 'grel pa, nirmocana*). I cite evidence for and against my translation, and argue that the final choices were based on the structure of the sūtra itself, in which Buddha repeatedly offers to explain of what he was thinking when formerly he made certain statements that are presented in the sūtra as being problematic.

This is followed by a discussion of the sūtra’s presentation of the ultimate, which is said to be “ineffable and of a non-dual character”, “a character that transcends all argumentation”, “a character that transcends sameness and difference”, and “a character that is everywhere of one taste”. The dissertation examines the ramifications of these characterizations and how the commentaries explain them. Near the end some discussions of the ultimate by contemporary scholars are discussed in relation to the sūtra.

Chapter three discusses theories about hermeneutics in the sūtra and examines the relation between reasoning, tradition, and implicit notions of authority in the text. The purpose of this section is to explicate what the sūtra and the commentaries say about hermeneutics, as well as ideas that they accept that are not explicitly stated, such as the idea that Buddha teaches each individual or group what is most beneficial and the idea that Buddha is omniscient and so his words can and should be accepted solely on the basis of his declarations. Such implicit notions concerning authority and tradition, in my opinion, are operative at a fundamental level in this text, and so an important concern of this chapter is to look behind the words of the text to find ideas that are left unsaid but are essential to understanding the underlying thought of the text.

The preface to the translation discusses the various Tibetan versions of the sūtra, the opinions of contemporary scholars concerning their relations, and my own observations based on my study of the *Samdhinirmocana*. This is followed by a translation of the sūtra, which consists of ten chapters of uneven length. In addition, numerous notes to passages in the text are provided. These are drawn from the commentaries, from treatises by Yogācāra authors, and from treatises and oral commentaries by scholars of the Ge-luk-ba school. The notes also contain speculations concerning the meanings of difficult passages and textual notes indicating the differences between the various Tibetan texts, with occasional references to relevant passages or terminological translations in the Chinese translations. The concluding section consists of a select bibliography.

Acknowledgements

The present work represents the fruits of six years of research which began as a graduate student at McMaster University in Ontario when I started reading Vasubandhu's *Madhyānta-vibhāga* and became interested in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. My M.A. studies were primarily focused on non-Buddhist systems of Indian philosophy, but at the completion of a Master's degree I decided to concentrate on the study of Buddhism. My search for a graduate program that could provide a comprehensive training in Buddhist studies led me to the University of Virginia, where I almost immediately began work on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought (saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra)* under the direction of Professor Jeffrey Hopkins. The primary reason for choosing to study this work was a desire to examine the thought of a basic Yogācāra text, and I intended to move on to study the writings of the great Indian masters Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In the course of studying the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, however, I became increasingly impressed by the depth of insight expressed in this work and by its analogies, which sometimes recast Buddhist concepts in ways that enabled me to make sense of doctrines that had seemed incomprehensible before. I soon realized that the study of this text required a great deal of effort and thought, and have since decided that the rewards obtained from this were worth the effort.

The research for this study was greatly aided by the many Western and Tibetan teachers whom I encountered at the University of Virginia and later in India under the auspices of a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies. The translation of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* was mostly completed prior to my arrival in India, and during a nine-month stay a draft translation of the remainder of the text was completed, after which I read through the voluminous commentaries of Wonch'uk and Jang-chup-

dzu-trül (*byang chub rdzu 'phrul*), translated excerpts from them, and translated the commentaries attributed to Asaṅga and Jñānagarbha with the help of Geshe Yeshe Thabkhe of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, U.P. Geshe Thabkhe was also kind enough to outline the Lō-ṣel-ling (*blo gsal gling*) College's tradition of commentary on Ḍzong-ka-bā's *Ocean of Good Explanations: Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of Afflicted Mentality and Basis-Consciousness* (*yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho*), which was helpful in understanding the psychology and epistemology of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.

After returning to the U.S., I began writing the introductory portions of this study and revising the notes to the translation. Although I had originally thought to keep these brief, during the course of studying the sūtra it became clear that the sūtra is very terse in places and enigmatic in others, but the commentaries provide important insights into the meaning of the text. In addition, my studies with a number of contemporary Tibetan scholars allowed me to gain a small access to the vast oral tradition that is preserved in Tibetan monastic universities. Many of the insights provided by these scholars illuminated obscure passages and facilitated understanding of not only the text itself but also its philosophical and religious context. The oral commentaries that I have found particularly pertinent have been included in the notes to the Translation.

Many people have generously shared their time and expertise to help me complete this work, and there is no practical way to acknowledge all of them. I will, however, take this opportunity to mention those who have been most influential and have provided the greatest help in bringing this work to its present level of completion. First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge the help of my advisor, Professor Jeffrey Hopkins of the University of Virginia, without whose guidance and help this study probably would never have been completed. For the way that he unstintingly shared his knowledge of and insight into Buddhist philosophy and his exceptional generosity

in making time in his busy schedule to work with me for innumerable hours I owe a debt of gratitude that can neither be adequately expressed nor repaid.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Professor Karen Lang of the University of Virginia, who made time to work on a reading course in Vasubandhu's *Madhyānta-vibhāga* and another one in Pāli, and who served on my Ph.D. dissertation committee. Thanks are also due to Professor Paul Groner of the University of Virginia, who introduced me to the mysteries of Buddhist Chinese and who served as another advisor on the dissertation committee, and to Dr. Elizabeth Napper, whose courses in literary and spoken Tibetan introduced me to the *Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*) of Ḍzong-ka-ba and the *Difficult Points Commentary* of Bel-jor-hlün-drup (*dpal 'byor lhun grub*), and whose own good explanations helped me to understand the workings of the Tibetan language.

I would also like to thank Professor E.D. Hirsch, who helped me to understand Western hermeneutics and analytical philosophy in a reading course and who served as a reader for this dissertation; Professor Ernst Steinkellner, who was kind enough to send a copy of his forthcoming article, "Who Was Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul?", which proved to be full of useful information and well-researched opinions; Professor Christian Lindtner, who read a draft copy of the translation and notes portion of this work and made a number of very helpful suggestions; Professor Helmut Eimer, who shared his vast knowledge of the Buddhist canon; Professor William Magee, who was of great help in overcoming computer problems; and Professor Krisna Sivaraman of McMaster University, who introduced me to the complexities of philosophical Sanskrit and who encouraged me to pursue studies in Buddhism. Thanks are also due to Professor Yoshihide Yoshizu of Komazawa University, who shared his insights into Chinese Buddhism in a reading course on the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* and who went to great trouble to obtain a photocopy for me of the text of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* brought to Japan by Ekai Kawaguchi and housed in the Toyo Bunko Library.

Professor Richard Martin of the University of Virginia was of great help in finding sources for this study, and he has been particularly helpful in tracking down some of the more obscure ones. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Interlibrary Loan Office of Alderman Library, especially Ms. Peggy Holley, who went to great lengths to obtain rare and obscure texts for this study. And a special word of thanks to my friend and teacher Georges Dreyfus (Geshe Sangyay Samdrup), the first Westerner to earn the Geshe degree and an accomplished scholar of both Buddhist and Western philosophy, who generously shared both his great knowledge of and insight into the dharma.

Among my Tibetan teachers, I would especially like to thank Geshe Yeshe Thabkhe of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, who patiently answered my questions and whose lucid explanations of texts helped me to understand both their thought and their philosophical background; Geshe Belden Drakba of Tibet House in Delhi, who spent a semester at the University of Virginia, during which he provided oral commentaries on Āl-jor-hlün-drup's *Commentary* and commented on the first two chapters of Wonch'uk's text; Geshe Jambel Tando, resident lama of the Jefferson Tibetan Society of Charlottesville, who explained countless difficult passages; the late Kensur Yeshe Thupten, former Abbot of Āo-śel-ling College, scholar of scholars, whose penetrating intellect opened up new avenues of understanding for me; Samdhong Rinpoche, Principal of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, who made the excellent resources of his school available; H.H. the Dalai Lama, who took time out of his busy schedule to answer some questions about the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*; and Khamtul Rinpoche, who gave me a Nying-ma perspective on the interpretation of Yogācāra texts.

Last but by no means least, I wish to thank my wife Cindy for her help and encouragement, as well as for her patience in coping with the long hours and limited finances associated with graduate school.

Abbreviations

A-ku Ā-lo-drö-gya-tso: A-ku Ā-lo-drö-gya-tso's (*a khu blo gros rgya mtsho*) *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel rin chan sgron me* (Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982).

Ā-bel-jor-hlün-drup: Ā-bel-jor-hlün-drup's (*dpal 'byor lhun grub*) *Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Buxador: Sera Monastery, 1968).

Bhāṣya: Asaṅga's *Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-bhāṣya*, Tohoku 3981.

Brief Expression: Ā-lo-sang-dā-ñang's (*blo bzang rta dbyangs*) *Brief Expression of the Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Three Vehicles According to the System of the Perfection Vehicle, Essence of the Ocean of Profound Meaning* (*Phar phyin theg pa'i lugs kyi theg pa gsum gyi sa dang lam gyi rnam bzhag pa mdo tsam du brjod pa zab don rgya mtsho'i snying po*): (1) *The Collected Works of Rje-Btsun Blo-Bzan-Rta-Mgrin*, New Delhi, Guru Deva, 1975, vol.IV, pp.65-190.

C: *Co ne* edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (from a microfilm obtained from the Library of Congress).

Compassion: *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* by Jeffrey Hopkins (London: Rider, 1980).

Compendium: *La Compendium de la Super-Doctrine d'Asaṅga* by Walpola Rahula (Paris, 1971).

D: *Sde dge* edition of the *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra*.

Dok: Stog Palace edition of the *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra* (Leh, Ladakh: Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1980, vol. *ja*).

Ādzong-ka-bā: Ādzong-ka-bā's (*tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa*) *Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*, Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1979).

Geshe Rabten: Geshe Rabten's *Drang nges rnam 'byed legs bshad snying po'i dka' gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo dga' ston* (Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grags, 1978).

Gung-tang: Gung-tang's (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me*) *Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel risom 'phro* (Sarnath: Guru Deva, 1965).

Jang.: Jang-chup-dzu-trül's (*byang chub rdzu 'phrul*) *Ārya-samḍhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna* ('*phags pa dgongs 'grel nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa*), Tohoku 4358, Peking 5845.

Jñānagarbha: Jñānagarbha's *Ārya-samḍhinirmocana-sūtre-ārya-maitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhāṣya* ('*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe'i bshad pa*), Tohoku 4033, Peking 5535.

K: Ekai Kawaguchi's edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (my version is a photocopy from the Toyo Bunko Library in Tokyo obtained by Professor Yoshihide Yoshizu of Komazawa University).

Kośa: *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* by Vasubandhu, tr. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1924).

L: Lhasa edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (from a microfiche distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. *mdo mnga*).

Lamotte: Étienne Lamotte's edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (Louvain and Paris, 1935).

LC #: Library of Congress number.

MCB: *Mélanges Chinoises et Bouddhiques*, Bruxelles.

ME: *Meditation on Emptiness* by Jeffrey Hopkins (London: Wisdom, 1983).

Meditative States: *Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism* by Lati Rinbochay, Denma Lcchö Rinbochay, Leah Zahler, and Jeffrey Hopkins (London: Wisdom, 1983).

MV: *Mahāvvyūṭpatti* (Tokyo, 1981).

N: Narthang (*snar thang*) edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (from a microfiche distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. 51).

P: Peking edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (#774, vol. 29).

Ser-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay: *Blo bzang phun tshogs, ser shul dge bshes: Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bris zab don gsal ba'i sgron me* (Mysore: Sera Byes Monastery, n.d.; LC #75-906392).

Siddhi: *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, by Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1925).

Somme: *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, by Étienne Lamotte (Louvain, 1973).

T: the Taishō edition of the Buddhist canon.

Théorie: *La Théorie du Tathāgata et du Gotra*, by David Seyfort Ruegg (Paris, 1969).

Tshig mdzod: *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (Chengdu, n.d., 3 vols.).

V: the edition of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* found in the Peking edition of the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (Peking vol. 110-111, #5539).

Wonch'uk: Wonch'uk's commentary on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, entitled *Ārya-samdhinirmocana-sūtra-ṭīkā* ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa), Tohoku 4016, Peking 5517, vol. 106.

I. Scope and Sources of this Study

The *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (*saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pā'i mdo*) is a seminal work of Mahāyāna Buddhism and is one of the main scriptural sources for the Yogācāra school of Indian Buddhism. It is the primary canonical *locus classicus* of the Yogācāra school,¹ and its discussions of hermeneutics, meditation, soteriology, eschatology, and epistemology have been influential in India, Tibet, Mongolia, China, and Japan. However, although it holds an important place in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, it has received very little attention from Western scholars. Since the publication of Lamotte's edited Tibetan version and French translation in 1935, there have been a few articles that discuss the sūtra, but thus far there has been no complete English translation or a comprehensive study of the whole text.² The present study will be limited to a translation of the sūtra and excerpts from the commentarial literature connected with it, along with an overview of the thought of the sūtra and its commentaries on the topics of the ultimate (*don dam pa*, *paramārtha*) and hermeneutics, and it is hoped that this work will add to what is presently known

¹See A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp. 430-31 and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 426-7. When I refer to 'the Yogācāra school' or 'the Yogācāras' in this study, I primarily refer to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and their commentators Sthiramati and Sumatīśīla.

²See Étienne Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, Explication des Mystères* (Louvain and Paris, 1935). The bibliography for this study lists all of the articles on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* that I have been able to locate.

about the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and that it will be of use to scholars who wish to pursue other related topics of research.

With respect to the text itself, we have very little reliable information. As Lamotte remarks, it represents an important stage in the development of Mahāyāna doctrine, and serves as a transition between the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Yogācāra school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.³ Since it refers to and discusses doctrines of the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, it must have been written sometime after at least the earliest of these, that is to say, after the first or second century A.D.⁴ It is quoted in several works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu,⁵ and it must have existed in much of its present form prior to Asaṅga, since he quotes most of the sūtra (except for the introduction and the colophons that conclude chapters) in his *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, *gtan la dbab pa'i bsdu ba*).⁶

³Ibid., p. 14.

⁴With respect to the development of early Mahāyāna, see Lewis Lancaster, "The Oldest Mahāyāna Sūtra", in *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 8 #1, 1975, pp. 30-41; and A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, pp. 373-5.

⁵For example, Asaṅga quotes most of the sūtra in his *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, *gtan la dbab pa'i bsdu ba*), and cites it in the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, *theg pa chen po bsdu pa*) and the *Compendium of Manifest Knowledge* (*abhidharmasamuccaya*, *chos mngon pa kun las btus pa*), and Vasubandhu cites it in his *Commentary on Maitreya's Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes* (*madhyānta-vibhāga*, *dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa*) and several other works. All the citations of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* that I have been able to identify are listed in the notes to the translation of the sūtra.

⁶See Lambert Schmithausen, "Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", in *German Scholars on India* (Bombay, 1976), p. 243, where he contends that the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* could not have existed prior to the end of the third century A.D., which seems reasonable to me given that it refers to the Perfection

The *Samdhinirmocana* was originally written in Sanskrit, but at the present time no Sanskrit manuscripts of the text have been found.⁷ It exists in Tibetan and Chinese versions, and Lamotte's study of the *Samdhinirmocana* includes a French translation, along with portions of a commentary attributed to Asaṅga.⁸ In addition, there are four commentaries on the sūtra in the Tibetan *Bstan 'gyur*, and a number of indigenous

of Wisdom Sūtras and that it is recognized as a sūtra and quoted as such by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who probably lived in the fourth or fifth centuries A.D. (see note 31). See also Schmithausen, pp. 240-1, where he states his opinion that the *Compendium of Ascertainments* is probably a composite work that contains materials from many different places and times. He thinks that the section that quotes the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* is a comparatively later portion, and he contends that the sūtra was probably written prior to the final redaction of the *Compendium of Ascertainments*.

Asaṅga's citation of the sūtra is in Peking vol. 111, and ranges from page 83b to 107d, and includes brief comments that preface the citation of each chapter. This text will be discussed in the section on Asaṅga, and all of its comments on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are translated in the notes to the translation. Lambert Schmithausen argues (*Ālayavijñāna*, Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987) that the *Compendium* is actually a composite work made up of materials from different periods, but admits that it could have been compiled or at least redacted in its final form by Asaṅga, and I do not think that he gives any reasons to think that its quotations of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* postdate him.

⁷See *Buddhist Text Information* #2, pp. 5-7, which provides a bibliography of extant materials on the sūtra.

⁸Lamotte's Tibetan version ranges from pp. 31-166, and his excerpts from Asaṅga's *Commentary* are scattered throughout the text. This work will be discussed in the section on Asaṅga.

Tibetan texts that discuss it in the Ge-luk-ba (*dge lugs pa*) and Nying-ma (*rnying ma*) schools.⁹

The earliest Chinese translation is by Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅) in 443-45 (T 678), but this translation is only a portion (the ninth chapter) of the text as it

⁹The *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* is one of the main bases of D̄zong-ka-ba's seminal treatise on Buddhist hermeneutics, *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*; Peking vol. 153, translated by Robert Thurman as *The Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and forthcoming from Jeffrey Hopkins in his *Reflections on Reality*). This work has spawned a number of sub-commentaries in the Ge-luk-ba school, and several examples are listed in the bibliography. For an extensive discussion of this literature, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*. There are at least two commentaries in the Nying-ma school, by Nyü-den Ka-tok-ken-bō (*nyus ldan ka' thog mkhan po*) and Do-drup-chen D̄en-bay-nyi-ma (*rdo grub chen bstan pa'i nyi ma*) that have been described to me by Khamtul Rinpoche (currently residing in Dharamsala), but I have not been able to locate copies of these texts.

In addition to these, there are five commentaries that are now lost that are listed by Ernst Steinkellner in his article "Who Was Byān chub rdzu 'phrul?" (forthcoming in the 1989 edition of *Berliner Indologische Studien*), another commentary by a Chinese teacher referred to as Rdzogs gsal [number 676 in the catalogue of Bu ston's *Catalogue of the Translations of Doctrine* (*chos bsgyur dkar chag*) compiled by Soshu Nishioka (*Tokyo Daigaku Bungakubu Bunka Koryu Kenkyu shisetsu Kenkyu Kiyō* #4, 1980, pp. 61-92; #5, 1981, pp. 43-94; #6, 1983, pp. 47-201); reported in Steinkellner, p. 290], the commentary attributed to *Byang chub rdzu 'phrul*, which is probably also an indigenous Tibetan commentary, and a text entitled *Bka' yang dag pa'i tshad ma las mdo btus pa* attributed to *Khri srong lde brtsan* (Peking 5839; Sde dge 4352), which is a commentary on the tenth chapter of the sūtra. As Steinkellner points out in his article (especially pp. 271-2), the number of commentaries extant or mentioned in catalogues indicates that the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* was very influential in Tibet, particularly during the early phases of the transmission of Buddhism.

exists today. The first Chinese translation of the sūtra that corresponds to its present form is by Bodhiruci (菩提流支) in 514 (T 675). In addition, there is a translation by Paramārtha (真諦) in 557 (T 677) that contains an introduction (which does not correspond to the introductions in the extant Tibetan texts) and the first four chapters, and there is a translation of the complete text by Hsüan-tsang (玄奘) in 647 (T 676).¹⁰ There is also an anonymous translation of chapter ten (T 679) later attributed to Guṇaprabha.¹¹

The fact that three of the early Chinese translations only contain portions of the final version of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* indicates to Lamotte that the text as it exists today is not a unitary work, but instead is a composite of shorter texts brought together by an anonymous redactor.¹² This is a plausible hypothesis, and it fits what we know of the sūtra, but it could also be the case that the sūtra was brought to China piecemeal and new portions were translated as they arrived. The Buddhist texts that came to China were brought there haphazardly, mostly carried by pilgrims who visited India and returned with texts that were of interest to an individual pilgrim or that were simply available. The spread of Buddhist literature to China was not an orderly one, and the mere fact that different portions of a text were translated at different times does

¹⁰See Lewis Lancaster, *The Korean Buddhist Canon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 67-8.

¹¹See Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 9.

¹²Lamotte (p. 17) states: “Malgré les efforts de B. et T. pour présenter cet ouvrage comme une œuvre une et homogène, un simple regard jeté sur tableau comparé des versions, nous révèle une collection de morceaux d'origine et de date différentes”.

not necessarily mean that that text is a composite, although it constitutes an important piece of evidence for that hypothesis.¹³

¹³Some of the problems involved with the transmission of Indian Buddhist works to China are described by Peter N. Gregory in his article "Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen" (*Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, I.1.2, pp. 232-3):

The hermeneutical problem with which Chinese Buddhists were faced was exacerbated by the fact that Buddhism did not come to China as a complete and coherently wrought system. The transmission of Buddhism to China took place over a period of centuries — centuries in which it continued to grow and change in profound ways. The process of transmission, moreover, occurred in a fragmented and haphazard manner. The order in which texts were translated into Chinese, for instance, bore no relation to the chronology of their composition. Later texts were often made available before the earlier texts upon which they were based, or to which they were a reaction. This meant that teachings were introduced divorced from both their historical and doctrinal context, making it even more difficult for the Chinese to arrive at an accurate understanding of them. Furthermore, the Indian and Central Asian missionaries who served as the vital link in this process of transmission, and to whom, perforce, the Chinese turned for authority, hailed from different Buddhist traditions and were themselves often at odds with one another in their interpretation of the various teachings which the Chinese were struggling to comprehend.

See also Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 365-386. As a possible corollary, it should be noted that many Buddhist texts have been translated piecemeal into Western languages, and there are numerous cases of translations that only contain a few chapters of a text. Two examples are Janice Dean Willis's translation of the "Tattvārtha" chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (entitled *On Knowing Reality*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) and translation of the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* by K. Régamy (Warsaw, 1938), which only contains a translation of three chapters. There are numerous examples of partial translations of Buddhist texts into Western languages, and I do not think that the

Lamotte thinks that the present version of the sūtra is a composite that is made up of portions of earlier texts of different origins and dates of composition (“*une collection de morceaux d’origine et de dates différents*”) but, as Paul Demiéville argues in a review article discussing Lamotte’s work,¹⁴ Lamotte’s contentions concerning the supposedly composite nature of the text go beyond what can be supported by the available evidence, and the mere fact that the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* does not exist in its present form in the earliest Chinese version does not prove that it is a composite work. A particularly persuasive piece of evidence adduced by Demiéville against Lamotte’s hypothesis is his mention of Wonch’uk’s statement that when Paramārtha decided to translate the sūtra he only translated the first four chapters because he just wanted to translate that portion of the text that focused on the ultimate (*don dam pa, paramārtha*). Because of this self-imposed limitation he left the rest of the text for later translators.¹⁵

In this study, however, I do not propose to answer the question of whether or not the *Samdhinirmocana* is a composite work. My concern is rather with the sūtra as it exists today in its Tibetan recensions and how the four commentaries in the Tibetan

fact that a text was translated partially in an early Chinese translation necessarily indicates that the text is a composite.

The mere fact that only certain chapters of a work were translated in an early translation might indicate that it was not yet completed, but could also indicate that either the translator did not have access to the complete text or that he only chose to translate a certain portion of it. It would not be surprising if some texts were copied in sections and brought to China, since before the advent of copying machines, typewriters, and computers each copy of a text was laboriously written by hand or, in the case of the Tibetan canon, printed from carved wood blocks.

¹⁴In an untitled review article, *Journal Asiatique* #228, 1936, p. 646.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 647-8.

Bstan 'gyur comment on it.¹⁶ The focus of this study will be the thought of the text as expressed by its Tibetan translations and how the four commentators interpret this thought, with particular emphasis on the discussions of the ultimate (*don dam pa*, *paramārtha*) and hermeneutics.

An exploration of philological questions concerned with the background of the text (for instance whether or not there are different strata of authorship and redactions and their relative historical positions) could yield valuable insights into the development of the text, but will not be the focus of the present work. There are two reasons why I have chosen to leave aside philological questions concerned with the development of the text: firstly, the purpose of this study is to look at the thought of the text in its Tibetan translations. It may be the product of more than one author and may have been redacted and translated by a number of people before it reached its present form, and each one may have left an imprint on the text, as Lamotte suggests. However, even if we determine that certain portions were composed at different times and adduce evidence that different redactors had a hand in determining the present versions of the sūtra, this does not entail that we have understood the meaning of the text. Indeed, such investigations would probably lead us farther and farther away from the meaning of the sūtra. Even if we do not know the identities of the creators of the present form of the sūtra, the text as it exists today in its Tibetan recensions is the result of an attempt to present meaningful statements about Buddhist philosophy and religious practice. Since the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* has been the focus of numerous commentaries and is a major scriptural source for the Yogācāra school, we know that Buddhist thinkers have perceived it as an important presentation of religious meanings. The author(s), redactor(s), and translator(s) may be anonymous, but the final product of their work is a

¹⁶These will be individually discussed later in this section.

document that presents a collection of meanings, and these meanings can in principle be understood and explicated.¹⁷ Taking this as a goal, the purpose of the introductory chapters of this dissertation will be to examine the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* in terms of some of the important topics presented in the text and to compare the words of the sūtra with the explanations of the commentators in an attempt to draw out the thought of the text in relation to that of the commentators.

The second reason why this study will leave aside the question of whether or not this is a composite work is that the commentators whose interpretations constitute a major focus of the introductory chapters uniformly assume that the sūtra is the product of one author, Śākyamuni Buddha, and this basic premise underlies all their

¹⁷This approach is often taken in Biblical hermeneutics, in which the identity of the author of a text may be uncertain, and there may be a number of people (usually anonymous) who had a hand in altering the text before it reached its final form. In both Biblical hermeneutics and Buddhist hermeneutics, however, the final text represents the attempts of one or more people to present a coherent and understandable statement of religious meanings, and the task of later exegetes (including contemporary scholars) is to determine what these meanings are, or at least to present plausible theories about what the author intended and how the audience to whom it was addressed understood it. In the case of Buddhist texts like the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, there is a living oral tradition of commentary on them that has been preserved in Tibet and that can be of great help to modern students of Buddhism seeking to understand what these texts have meant for those belonging to this tradition. A good statement of how Biblical hermeneutics seeks to understand the meaning of a text even if more than one person may have had a hand in its development can be found in Robert Morgan's *Biblical Interpretation* (Oxford, 1988), chapters 2 and 3 and Claus Westermann, ed., *Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics* (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1963), pp. 134-199.

explanations.¹⁸ For the sake of understanding their interpretations of the sūtra, it is necessary to realize that for these commentators the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* contains the pronouncements of a fully enlightened and omniscient being who is preaching a sūtra of definitive meaning (*nges pa'i don, nitārtha*) and who is definitively clarifying the thought behind his earlier teachings of interpretable meaning (*drang ba'i don, neyārtha*).¹⁹ Thus, for the sake of elucidating the principles of interpretation of the commentators and the conclusions they draw from the sūtra, this study will focus on the text in light of their perceptions of it and will relate their interpretations to the present versions of the sūtra.

The introductory chapters will be primarily concerned with the following topics as presented in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and as explicated by the commentators: the meaning of the title, the nature of the ultimate, and hermeneutics. The bulk of this dissertation will be an annotated translation of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* based mainly on the Stog Palace version (*Ḍok*) of the text.²⁰ This will be compared with the versions of the *Samdhinirmocana* found in Lamotte's edited version,²¹ as well as six

¹⁸This idea is discussed by Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 17, and can be seen in the works of both Yogācāra writers and their opponents. The Yogācāra writers, of course, take it to be a sūtra of definitive meaning, while their opponents (for instance Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* and Bhavya in his *Tarkajvālā*) contend that it requires interpretation, although they accept it as the word of Buddha.

¹⁹This idea is discussed by Ḍzong-ka-ba in his *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*) in the introductory section of the "Mind-Only" (*sems tsam*) chapters. See also Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 17.

²⁰In *The Tog Palace Edition of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978), vol. 63, pp. 1-160. This is discussed later in the Preface to the Translation.

²¹Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, pp. 31-166.

versions of the Tibetan Buddhist canon: *Them spangs ma*, Peking, *Sde dge*, *Snar thang* (Narthang), *Co ne*, and Lhasa.²² The notes to the translation are drawn from a variety of sources and are intended to bring out some of the issues that the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* raised for later Buddhist thinkers and to outline some of the explanations that they proposed. They are drawn from a wide range of commentary, including works by Indian, Tibetan, Korean, and Chinese thinkers. The broad scope of this commentarial material reveals different approaches to the thought of the text and indicates some of the issues that caught the attention of the commentators in the course of their attempts to understand and explicate the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.

This wide-ranging approach reflects my own study of the sūtra, which has included reading several different Tibetan versions of the text, the four commentaries in the Tibetan *Bstan 'gyur*, the Mind-Only (*sems tsam*) section of Ḍzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of the Good Explanations* and Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup's *Commentary*,²³ studies of these commentaries with contemporary Tibetan scholars of the Ge-luk-ba school,²⁴ a graduate seminar that dealt with the Mind-Only section of *The Essence of the Good Explanations* and a number of Ge-luk-ba commentaries,²⁵ and conversations with a Nying-ma scholar and with H.H. the Dalai Lama on some of the topics discussed in the

²²These are all discussed in the Preface to the Translation.

²³The version of Ḍzong-ka-ba's text I have consulted is from Sarnath, Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1979, and the version of Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup's text I have used is from Śe-ra Monastery, Buxador, 1968.

²⁴Most of these teachers are acknowledged in the section entitled "Acknowledgements" at the beginning of this work.

²⁵This was taught by Jeffrey Hopkins at the University of Virginia, Fall, 1986, and dealt primarily with the Ge-luk-ba literature that discusses Buddhist hermeneutics in the Mind-Only (*sems tsam*, *citta-mātra*) school, as well as articles by Western and Japanese scholars concerning that school.

sūtra.²⁶ In addition, my background reading for this project included a number of works by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Kamalaśīla, and works by Western and Japanese scholars of Buddhism.²⁷ Each of these has added to my understanding of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, and it is hoped that by looking at a range of opinions and approaches the reader will become acquainted with a number of perspectives, each of which reveals something of the meaning and significance of the sūtra.²⁸

²⁶The Nying-ma teacher is Khamtul Rinpoche, an unofficial tutor to H.H. the Dalai Lama, who instructed me on various aspects of the Nying-ma approach to Buddhist scholarship and meditative practice. The studies with him and the conversation with the Dalai Lama took place during the summer and fall of 1988, while I was in India under the auspices of a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies.

²⁷A select bibliography is provided at the end of this work.

²⁸In this study, the term “meaning” will refer to what the author of a text intended to say, what sort of thought he/she was trying to convey through the words of a text, and “significance” will refer to how this is apprehended at different times, how it becomes related to other contexts, for instance, alien cultures and later times, where a text that was intended for a particular audience comes to be interpreted in ways that were never intended by the original author(s). An example of this distinction could be, for instance, the difference between a commentary by a traditional Buddhist author like Wonch’uk or Asaṅga (who begin their works with the assumption that the author of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* is a fully enlightened Buddha, and whose commentaries are attempts to explicate the intention, the thought of the Buddha), and a critique of the same sūtra by a Marxist or feminist analysis of a Buddhist text, which might find examples of class struggle or class oppression (in the case of a Marxist analysis) or misogyny and denigration of women (in the case of a feminist analysis), but these implications were probably never intended or perceived by the author(s). The latter two types of analyses look at the significance of a text, but my main goal in this study will be the more mundane task of searching for clues about what the authors of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and its commentaries intended to mean with the words they

In order to have a manageable discussion of the sūtra, the introductory chapters will mainly focus on the text itself and its four canonical commentaries, and will not deal with the Tibetan commentarial literature, except tangentially. There are several reasons for this limitation: firstly, the sheer volume of the Tibetan literature presents a daunting obstacle to anyone attempting to discuss the issues that have caught the interest of the Tibetan authors. In the Ge-luk-ba school alone there are at least twenty commentaries on *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, which in turn bases its discussion of the Mind-Only (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*) school on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.²⁹ Secondly, the enormous task of presenting and explaining this literature has been undertaken by Jeffrey Hopkins, who has studied and discussed a vast range of the Ge-luk-ba literature.³⁰ Since his study mainly deals with the text as interpreted by D̄zong-ka-ba and his followers, it is hoped that the present study will complement Hopkins' work by presenting other aspects of commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.

wrote, to reappropriate their vision of the nature of reality in a way that hopefully both accords with their intentions and that is accessible to modern readers. For a discussion of the distinction between meaning and significance, see E.D. Hirsch, *The Aims of Interpretation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 1-16.

²⁹D̄zong-ka-ba indicates this in the table of contents (*sa bcad*) which opens *The Essence of the Good Explanations* at the beginning of the Mind-Only section (Sarnath edition, p. 1-2), and on p. 3 he remarks that this school "mainly relies on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*".

³⁰This has been presented in a forthcoming work entitled *Reflections on Reality*, which will contain an annotated translation of *The Essence of the Good Explanations* and a presentation of some of the important issues that have caught the attention of Ge-luk-ba scholars who have commented on D̄zong-ka-ba's work.

2. Commentaries on the Sūtra

In the Tibetan Buddhist canon there are a total of four commentaries on *The Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and another text (the *Compendium of Ascertainments*) that quotes most of the sūtra and comments briefly on it. These come from a wide variety of cultural and temporal milieux, beginning with the *Compendium of Ascertainments* and the short *Commentary*, both of which are attributed to Asaṅga, who lived in India around the third or fourth centuries A.D. and who is credited in Tibet with being the main founder of the Yogācāra school.³¹ The other Indian commentary by Jñānagarbha

³¹See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 365-7. With regard to Asaṅga's dates, see: A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., pp. 435-7; Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism: A Survey With Bibliographical Notes* (Hirakata, Kufs Publications, 1980), p. 264, where he places Asaṅga at 310-390 A.D.; Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 19-46; and Sylvain Lévi, *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* (Paris, 1911), pp. 1-7, where he provides a biography of Asaṅga that is drawn from the biographies of Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang, and Tāranātha.

The dates of his brother Vasubandhu have been the subject of much scholarly speculation. A few of the works that deal with the question of his dates are: Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1984 and *Vasubandhu: Three Aspects* (Ph.D Thesis, University of Wisconsin), 1969; D.R. Bhandarkar, "Who Was the Patron of Vasubandhu?", *IA*, 1912, pp. 1-3; Erich Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu*, Serie Orientale Roma, Rome, 1951; Naoya Funahashi, "The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the Time of Vasubandhu", in *IBK*, 20.1, 1971, pp. 321-326; Padmanabh Jaini, "On the theory of the two Vasubandhus", in *BSOAS*, 21, 1958, pp. 48-53; summarized in *PICO*, 24, Munich, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 552-554; T. Kimura, "The Date of Vasubandhu Seen from the *Abhidharmakośa*", in *Buddhist Studies in Honor of Charles Lanman*, Cambridge, MA, 1929, pp. 89-92; Marek Mejor, "A Contribution to the Biography of Vasubandhu

comes from a period just after the apogee of development of Mahāyāna thought, around the eighth century A.D., and is concerned only with the eighth chapter, which focuses on meditation. The commentary by Wonch'uk (Tibetan: Wen tshegs; Chinese: Yüan-ts'c, 圓測) was written in T'ang China by a Korean student of Hsüan-tsang (玄奘) who wrote in Chinese, but the only complete version of this text is in the Tibetan *Bstan 'gyur*. The final commentary, attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül in the Tohoku Catalogue,³² may have been written in Tibet, as Steinkellner suggests,³³ but it is difficult to place it because most of the evidence concerning the origin and authorship of this text is circumstantial.

Every author is influenced to a great extent by his/her culture and times, and this is true of the authors of the commentaries on *The Sūtra Explaining the Thought*. Where and when one lives determines many of one's attitudes and perspectives and will influence how one perceives a text. In preparing this study my own understanding of

from Tibetan Sources", in *TBS* vol. 2, 1984, pp. 159-174; G. Ono, "The Date of Vasubandhu seen from the History of Buddhist Philosophy", in *Buddhist Studies in Honor of Charles Lanman*, Cambridge, MA, 1929, pp. 93-94; Noël Péri, "À Propos de la date de Vasubandhu", in *BEFEO*, XI, 1911, pp. 339-390; Hajime Sakurabe, "On Frauwallner's Dating of Vasubandhu", in *IBK*, 1.1, 1952, pp. 202-208; Lambert Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in *Vimśatikā* und *Trimśikā*", in *WZKSOA*, 11, 1967, pp. 109-136; and J. Takakusu, "The Date of Vasubandhu", in *Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Lanman*, Cambridge, MA, 1929, pp. 78-83; "The Date of Vasubandhu 'in the Nine Hundred'", in *JRAS*, 1914, pp. 1013-1016; "The Life of Vasu-bandhu by Paramārtha", in *T'oung Pao*, ser. II, 5, pp. 269-296; reprint, E.J. Brill, Leyden, 1904; and "A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu", in *JRAS*, 1905, pp. 33-53.

³²See *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*, ed. Hakuju Ui et. al., Tokyo, 1934, p. 670, #4358.

³³This is reported by Lambert Schmithausen in *Ālayavijñāna*, op. cit., p. 577.

the differing perspectives of Wonch'uk, Jñānagarbha, and Asaṅga was enhanced by looking into their lives and times, which sometimes provided insights into why a particular commentator would be interested in specific issues and not others, why certain passages were selected for extensive commentary while others were only given short summaries, and how the commentaries were affected by the cultural and temporal situations of the authors. For these reasons, I thought that it would be helpful to provide short discussions of the backgrounds of the authors of the commentaries, along with brief introductions to the structures of the individual commentaries. The following sections provide condensed biographies of these authors, taken from both traditional and modern sources, and overviews of their texts.

a. Wonch'uk's *Extensive Commentary on the Profound Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (ārya-gambhīra-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra-ṭīkā, 'phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa)

Wonch'uk (613-696),³⁴ author of the largest extant commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*,³⁵ was a monk from Hsin-lo (新羅) in Korea who moved to Ch'ang-an (長安), then the capital of T'ang China. According to his memorial inscription at Hsi-ming (西明) Monastery,³⁶ he was born a prince of the Silla kingdom but renounced his royal heritage to become a monk. He travelled to Ch'ang-an, the capital of T'ang China, where he became one of the two main disciples of Hsüan-tsang (600-664),³⁷ the other being K'uei-chi (窥基, 632-682) of Tz'u-en (慈恩) Monastery.³⁸ Wonch'uk later became the abbot of Hsi-ming Monastery.

³⁴Regarding Wonch'uk's dates, see Hajime Nakamura, *Shin Bukkyō Jiten* (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1961), p. 60. See also the "Enjiki" entry in the Hobogirin catalogue.

³⁵This commentary is number 5517 in the Peking edition and number 4016 in the Sde dge.

³⁶Written by Sung-fu, entitled *Ta-chou Hsi-ming ssu ku ta-te Yüan-ts'e fa-shih fo she-li t'a-ming ping hsu*, n.d.; translated by Robert E. Buswell, unpublished manuscript, p. 1-6.

³⁷For information about his life, see: Stanley Weinstein, *Buddhism Under the T'ang* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 24-31; Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 235-38; and Jan Yun-hua, *A Chronicle of Buddhism in China, 581-960 A.D.* (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1966), pp. 20-21 and 33-4.

³⁸With respect to K'uei-chi, see: Stanley Weinstein, "A Biographical Study of Tz'u-en", in *Monumenta Nipponica*, 15.1-2, 1959, pp. 119-49; Alan Sponberg, *The Vijñaptimātratā Buddhism of the Chinese Monk K'uei-chi*, Ph.D. Dissertation,

He is described as being naturally astute, instantly apprehending the profound meaning of whatever texts he was taught, and he is said to have mastered the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma treatises, the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, as well as the main treatises of the Yogācāra school.³⁹

He came into conflict with K'uei-chi, whose school was later recognized as the orthodox tradition of the Yogācāra (Fa-hsiang, 法相) school in China.⁴⁰ In China,

University of British Columbia, University Microfilms, 1979; Kenneth Ch'en, op. cit., pp. 320-21; and Shotaro Iida, "The Three Stūpas of Ch'ang-an", in *Papers of the First International Conference on Korean Studies*, Seoul, The Academy of Korean Studies, 1980, pp. 486-7.

³⁹Wonch'uk has been the subject of several articles by Shotaro Iida, for example: "A Mukung-hwa in Ch'ang-an - A Study of the Life and Works of Wonch'uk (613-696)", in *Proceedings, International Symposium Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation*, Seoul, 1975, pp. 225-51; "The Three Stūpas of Ch'ang An", in *Papers of the First International Conference on Korean Studies*, Seoul, 1980, pp. 484-497; and "Who Can Best Re-turn the Dharma-cakra?", in *IBK*, 27.1, pp. 170-71.

⁴⁰See Shōju Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation of the *Chieh-shên-mi-ching-shu*", in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, ed. Leslie S. Kawamura and Keith Scott (Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, 1977), pp. 105-113. According to the *Hsu Kao-seng chüan*, ch. 4, *Taishō* 50, p. 457c (reported in W. Pachow, *A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahāyāna Buddhism*, in *Chinese Culture*, vol. XX.1, 1979, p. 22), there was an ongoing rivalry between Wonch'uk and K'uei-chi, and Wonch'uk is said to have bribed an attendant in order to overhear Hsüan-tsang's private instructions to K'uei-chi concerning the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*. He later publicly expounded the explanations that he had overheard, which angered and disgusted K'uei-chi. The same story, from the *Biographies of Eminent Monks of Sung*, is translated by Shotaro Iida in "The Three Stūpas of Ch'ang-an", p. 485. Iida thinks (pp. 486-8) that this story may have been untrue and that it may have been propagated by K'uei-chi or his followers in order to diminish the stature of Wonch'uk.

Wonch'uk's school came to be considered unorthodox and was superseded by that of K'uei-chi.⁴¹ As a result, Wonch'uk's commentary is not widely studied in East Asia, although it figures peripherally in the study of the Mind-Only (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*) system in the Ge-luk-ba school of Tibetan Buddhism, due to the fact that it is mentioned in many places in Ḍzong-ka-ba's *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, in which he refers to it as "The Chinese Great Commentary" (*rgya nag gi 'grel chen*).⁴²

The only complete version of Wonch'uk's work is found in the Tibetan *Bstan 'gyur*.⁴³ An incomplete Chinese version is found in the *Dai-nihon Zokuōkyō* (大日本續藏經),⁴⁴ which is missing the beginning of the eighth *chūan* and all of the tenth *chūan*. Originally consisting of ten *chūan*, and divided into seventy-five smaller sections (called *bam po* in the Tibetan versions), in the *Chin-ling-k'o-ching-ch'ü* (金陵刻經處) edition⁴⁵ there are only eight mostly complete *chūan* and an incomplete version of the eighth *chūan*. The missing portions have been reconstructed into Chinese based on the Tibetan versions by Shōju Inaba.⁴⁶

⁴¹See Iida, "Three Stūpas", pp. 484-6 and Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation", p. 105.

⁴²See, for instance, Samath edition, p. 5. This is one of Ḍzong-ka-ba's main sources, and he frequently refers to it. Sometimes he accepts Wonch'uk's explanations, and at other times he refutes Wonch'uk and advances his own. Most of Ḍzong-ka-ba's objections to Wonch'uk are indicated in the notes to the translation.

⁴³Tohoku #4016; Peking 5517, vol. 106.

⁴⁴*Dai-nihon Zokuōkyō*, *Shu ts'ang ching*, Hong Kong Reprint, 1922, vol. 106, 134.4-35.1.

⁴⁵Hong kong, 1922; see above note.

⁴⁶Shōju Inaba, *Enjiki Gejinmikyōsho Sanitsububan no kanbunyaku* (Kyoto, Hozokan, 1949; *Restoration of Yüan-tse's Chieh-shên-mi-ching-shu Through Its Tibetan Counterpart* (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1972); reviewed by Gadjin Nagao, in *Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan Kenkyū Nempō*, #9, 1972, p. 95. Inaba discusses his methodology in his article "On Chos-grub's Translation of the *Chieh-shên-mi-ching-shu*", op. cit., pp. 105-113.

The apparent reason for the propagation of his commentary in Tibet is his indirect connection with the translator (*lo tsa ba*) Chö-drup (*chos grub*; Chinese: Fa-ch'eng, 法成), who was a major translator of Chinese Buddhist texts into Tibetan. He lived in the area of Tun-huang (敦煌), in the Hsiu-to (修多) Monastery in Kan-chou (甘州) Province during the early part of the ninth century,⁴⁷ and the

⁴⁷See Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation", p. 105. According to Daishun Ueyama ("Donkō to Tonkō bukkyōgaku (T'an-k'uang and Buddhist Studies at Tunhuang)", in *Tōhō Gakuhō* #35, 1964), pp. 141-214, the reason for the popularity of Wonch'uk's work in the area of Tun-huang at this time was that it was propagated in that region by T'an-k'uang (曇曠), who hailed from Ho-hsi, studied in Chang-an, and then returned to Central Asia. For a discussion of this author, see W. Pachow, *A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahāyāna Buddhism*, in *Chinese Culture*, vol. XX.1, 1979, pp. 15-20. On p. 18 Pachow cites a biographical note by T'an-k'uang that states that he studied in Chang-an, where he became acquainted with the texts of the Yogācāra school, and then returned to the area of Tun-huang. According to Paul Demiéville ("Récents Travaux sur Touen-Houang", *T'oung-pao*, vol. LVI, 1970, pp. 29-30), he travelled to Chang-an in 735 and returned to Central Asia in 774. Pachow and Demiéville report (Pachow p. 21; Demiéville p. 29) that T'an-k'uang stayed in the Hsi-ming Monastery, which had been Wonch'uk's monastery, and this was presumably where he became acquainted with Wonch'uk's commentary. It is doubtful that he actually met Wonch'uk, since his probable date of birth was 705, nine years after Wonch'uk's death (see Pachow, p. 21). Demiéville thinks that 700 is a more likely date for his birth, but this would still be after Wonch'uk died.

As Pachow (pp. 62-3) points out, T'an-k'uang was one of the major Buddhist teachers of his day in the area of Tun-huang, and his propagation of the teachings of Wonch'uk was the probable reason that Fa-ch'eng decided to translate Wonch'uk's commentary. During his stay at the Hsi-ming Monastery, T'an-k'uang apparently became interested in the writings of Wonch'uk, later brought them back to Central Asia, and T'an-k'uang's prestige as a prominent Buddhist teacher probably led Fa-ch'eng to study and translate Wonch'uk's work. For more on T'an-k'uang, see Paul Demiéville,

colophon to the Tibetan translation of Wonch'uk's work indicates that Chö-drup was commissioned to undertake the task of translating it from Chinese into Tibetan by the King of Tibet,⁴⁸ who at that time would have been Rel-ba-chen (*ral pa can*, r. 815-841).⁴⁹ As Inaba points out,⁵⁰ Chö-drup was named the Chief Translator (*shu chen gyi lo tsa ba*) of Buddhist Texts by Rel-ba-chen, and the translation must have taken place during his reign, since his successor Lang-dar-ma (*glang dar ma*, r. 841-846) vigorously persecuted Buddhism.⁵¹

"Récents Travaux sur Touen-Houang", pp. 29-63, which summarizes several articles by Japanese scholars.

⁴⁸This is found on p. 349.8 of *Sde dge* vol. 118. The version used in this study is from the Karmapa Centre in Delhi (Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985).

⁴⁹See David Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 408-9 and 424-5; and Shōju Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation", p. 106. Chö-drup's translation is listed in the *Lhan dkar* catalogue, which was compiled before 824 (according to Zuihō Yamaguchi's study of this catalogue in *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Kiyō* #9, 1985, pp. 1-61), and so he must have completed it sometime between 815 and 824.

⁵⁰See Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation", pp. 106-7, and Hakuyu Hadano, "A Note on the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-vṛtti*", in *Acta Asiatica* 29, 1975, pp. 89-91.

⁵¹See Demiéville, "Récents Travaux", op. cit., pp. 44-5 and 47-63 and Inaba p. 106. This was during the eighty-six year period (from 762-848) that Tibet controlled Tun-huang. See David Snellgrove, *A Cultural History of Tibet* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 23 and 73; and Demiéville, "Récents Travaux", pp. 38-40. Chö-drup was one of the major Buddhist figures of his time, and in addition to the office of Chief Translator he also held the title of Master of the Long Lineage (*ring lugs pa*). This lineage is associated with the transmission of the written works of Buddhism and is contrasted with the Near Lineage (*nye brgyud* or *nye lugs*), the transmission of Buddha's teachings that is not bound by space and time, that is transmitted through revelation and inspiration. The Long Lineage, by contrast, consists of a series of

Wonch'uk's work is by far the largest known commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, and in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan 'gyur* it takes up all of two volumes and most of a third.⁵² It begins with a lengthy introduction, in which the author discusses such topics as the meaning of the title of the sūtra, the sūtra's system of hermeneutics (particularly the topics of the three wheels of doctrine and the three

teachers and students who pass on the written and oral traditions in a continuous line of descent. A person such as Chö-drup who had been recognized as a master of the Long Lineage would have been viewed as a successor to the line of textual transmission going back to the Buddha and, as such, would have great personal and religious authority due to his perceived connection with the orthodox lineage of transmission. During Chö-drup's lifetime, the title of *Ring lugs pa* (which was apparently a short form of *chos bcom ldan 'das kyi ring lugs kyi mdun sa*; see Hakuyū Hadano, "A Note on the *Āryalankāvatāra-vṛtti*", pp. 75-94, esp. pp. 89-90) indicated that its holder was the primary authority on Buddhist doctrine. The holder was the administrative head of the regional order of monks and had as an emblem of office the "Large Golden Letter", and this marked him as one of the most important figures in the social and political hierarchy of the region of Central Asia controlled by Tibet (see Hakuyū, p. 89, Demiéville, "Récents Travaux", pp. 49-50, and Giuseppe Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts II* (Rome: IsMEO, 1958, p. 56 note 2).

The first *Ring lugs pa* was Ye-shay wāng-bo (*ye shes dbang po*) of the Ba (*rba*) family, a pioneer of Buddhism in Tibet, and the second was Bel-yang (*dpal dbyangs*), also of the Ba family, who was appointed by King Tri-śong-day-dzen (*khri srong lde btsan*). See also Daishun Ueyama, "Donkō to Tonkō Bukkyōgaku (T'an-kuang and Buddhist Studies at Tun-huang)", in *Tōhō Gakuhō* 35, 1964, pp. 141-214, where he contends that Chö-drup was of Chinese origin, and not Tibetan as is generally accepted. This is reviewed by Zuihō Yamaguchi in *Tōyō Gakuhō* 1965, pp. 47-44 (reported by Nagao Gadjin, "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan", in *Acta Asiatica* 29, 1975, p. 121). Ueyama's arguments are summarized by Demiéville in "Récents Travaux", pp. 48-50 and 29-43, and Yamaguchi's article is summarized on pp. 43-44.

⁵²*Sde dge* vols. 118-120; the Peking version begins in vol. 106.

natures of phenomena), and the structure of consciousness, with a particular focus on the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*). After this the commentary begins with a line-by-line (and often word-by-word) commentary on the text. Wonch'uk's main text of the sūtra was probably Hsüan-tsang's translation, as is indicated by the many places where he comments on a term or phrase that is present in Hsüan-tsang's text but is not found in the Tibetan versions and the many places where he refers to Hsüan-tsang's translations of this and other texts.⁵³

Wonch'uk's commentary is very different from the other commentaries on the sūtra in terms of style. While the commentaries of Jñānagarbha, Asaṅga, and Jangchup-dzu-trül all seem mainly to expound the author's thoughts concerning passages and terms, Wonch'uk provides a wide range of opinions, and some passages have ten or more conflicting explanations reported. For instance, he frequently cites Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as well as Nāgārjuna, Bhavya, Sthiramati, and a number of sūtras and *śāstras*, and he also cites many opinions of scholars whom he does not identify (referred to as *kha cig* in the Tibetan versions).

His commentary is also an unusual work for a traditional scholar in that his citations of opinions and quotations generally refer not only to an author, but also often cite the work from which it comes, and in many places he indicates the Chinese translation that he was using.⁵⁴ This commentary is a massive compendium of Buddhist scholarship, and contains a wide range of opinions that reflects Wonch'uk's own encyclopedic knowledge of Buddhist literature.

⁵³Examples can be found in the notes to the translation.

⁵⁴Inaba ("On Chos-grub's Translation", p. 109) reports that in the Chinese text Wonch'uk even cites the volume number according to the Chinese canon of many of his sources, but these are omitted in the Tibetan translation since they would be unnecessary to Tibetan readers.

For example, in the opening section of his work (pp. 2-28), he quotes a total of thirty-one texts:

'Phags pa lang kar gshegs pa (*ārya-lankāvatāra-sūtra*; eleven times);

'Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa'i mdo (*ārya-vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*; six times);

Mdzod kyi bstan bcos (*[abhidharma-]kośa-śāstra*; six times);

Rnam par rig pa tsam du grub pa'i bstan bcos (*viññapti-mātrata-siddhi*; five times);

Bye brag tu bshad pa chen po'i bstan bcos (*mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*; four times);

Slob dpon Ngo bo nyid med kyis byas pa'i Theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i 'grel pa (*ācāryāsvabhāvasya-mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*; four times);

'Phags pa mi'i rgyal po'i mdo (four times);

Slob dpon Dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa'i 'Phags pa rdo rje gcod pa'i 'grel pa (*ācāryā-vasubandhor ārya-vajracchedikā-bhāṣya*; four times);

Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i 'grel pa (*prajñā-pāramitā-bhāṣya*; two times);

Rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa (*yogācāra-bhūmi*; two times);

Yang dag pa'i rigs pa'i bstan bcos (two times);

Dpyad pa dag gis bshad pa (two times);

Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa (two times);

'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa'i 'grel pa (*ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-vajracchedikā-bhāṣya*; two times);

Sems sna tshogs kyi bstan bcos (two times);

Sems sna tshogs kyi bstan bcos kyi 'grel pa (one time);

Bye brag tu bshad pa chen po'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel pa (*mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra-bhāṣya*; one time);

Shes pa bskyed pa'i bstan bcos (one time);

Chos mngon pa sna tshogs kun las btus pa'i bstan bcos (abhidharma-samuccaya-śāstra; one time);

Rigs pa'i bstan bcos (one time);

Gnas pa bcu bshad pa'i bstan bcos (one time);

'Phags pa sangs rgyas kyi sa'i 'grel pa (ārya-buddha-bhūmi-bhāṣya; one time);

'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa (ārya-prajñā-pāramitā; one time);

Bstan bcos shin tu rgyas pa brgya pa (one time);

'Phags pa gser 'od dam pa'i mdo (ārya-suvarṇa-prabhāsa-sūtra; one time);

Brtan pa'i blo gros kyi mdo (akṣayamatī[-nirdeśa]-sūtra; one time);

Yang dag pa'i bstan bcos (one time);

Chos bdun cu rtsa lngar 'dod pa'i bstan bcos (one time);

'Phags pa byams pas bstan pa'i gzhung (one time);

Khams chen po bstan pa'i mdo (one time);

Mdo sde 'phags pa sa bcu pa'i 'grel pa (ārya-daśabhūmika-sūtra-tikā; one time).

Wonch'uk's general approach is to cite a passage and then to preface his comments by dividing his explanation into sections.⁵⁵ He first places the passage he is discussing

⁵⁵This aspect of the structure of Wonch'uk's text is discussed by Ernst Steinkellner ("Who is Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul?", pp. 276-7), where he speculates that Wonch'uk's work may provide a key to determining the origin of the practice found among Tibetan authors of beginning texts with tables of contents (*sa bcad*) which divide their works into sections. Steinkellner writes:

To my knowledge ... nobody so far has a clear idea of where this most successful and influential technique of literary analysis originated. In texts from the early period of the second spread of the religion it is already present and the question is still unanswered as to whether it is a Tibetan invention or a heritage. I myself have always looked for possible Indian models, but in vain.... But in Yüan-ts'ê's text from the 7th century, translated in the early 9th

in the overall framework of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and then explains its meaning. The explanatory portion of his commentary is often drawn from other texts, mainly by Yogācāra authors, and among these he primarily relies on Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. His explanations are often compendia of opinions, and he may cite several interpretations, drawn from a variety of philosophical schools, and then he often indicates that he considers a particular one to be superior to the others.

His citations of Yogācāra authors are particularly interesting, because they indicate that Wonch'uk perceived the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* as the seminal work of the Yogācāra school, and his commentary tries to show the harmony between the teachings of the sūtra and the thought of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. He attempts to place the sūtra within the continuum of Yogācāra thought and to show the connections between the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and the writings of the Yogācāras. It should be added, however, that his sources are not limited to Yogācāra texts, for he cites Mādhyamaka writers such as Nāgārjuna, Bhavya, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, as well as non-Mahāyāna texts such as the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.⁵⁶

The amount of information Wonch'uk provides can at times be overwhelming, and in this study I have attempted to sort through this extensive work to find what I consider to be the most interesting explanations. The size of the commentary made reading it a daunting project, but a reader willing to take the time to sift through this text can find a wealth of information and many thought-provoking ideas. Explanations that I considered to be the most pertinent have been placed in the notes to the translation of

century it is in use, fully developed, just as we know it from the much later Tibetan texts, and throughout the whole text.

⁵⁶The sources on which Wonch'uk relies are indicated in the notes to the translation as he cites them, but are generally translated into Sanskrit or Chinese, which is more easily recognizable than the Tibetan.

the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, generally in the form of translations of the relevant passages, or as paraphrases when it was thought that Wonch'uk's explanations could be condensed without losing the intention of his commentary. Many of these paraphrases are drawn from large sections of commentary and reflect a thread of thought that runs through a long section in which many different texts and authors are cited. All page references, except where otherwise indicated, refer to the *Sde dge* version of the *Bstan 'gyur*. This is the main text used for translation of Wonch'uk's work and was read alongside the Peking version. Where titles of Sanskrit works or authors are mentioned, I generally translate the Tibetan into Sanskrit, and the first occurrence is followed by the Tibetan reading in parentheses.

b. Jñānagarbha's Commentary on Just the Chapter of the Superior Maitreya from the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought (*ārya-maitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhāṣya*, 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe'i bshad pa)

According to Tibetan historical literature, Jñānagarbha flourished in eastern India,⁵⁷ and he is associated with the philosophical lineage of Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita.⁵⁸ Tāranātha states that he was born in Oḍiśa and became a student of Śrīgupta in Bhaṃgala (Bengal).⁵⁹ He is also said to have been a Mādhyamika who followed the philosophical views of Bhavya and who had a vision of Avalokiteshvara. Tāranātha also asserts that Jñānagarbha was a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, along with Bhavya, Avalokitavrata,

⁵⁷Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism in India*, tr. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970), p. 260.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 252-3 and 260.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 252-3.

Buddhajñānapada, and Śāntarakṣita.⁶⁰ Ruegg places him in the eighth century and cites the historian Sum-ba-ken-bo's (*sum pa mkhan po*) assertion that he was a teacher of Śāntarakṣita.⁶¹

In the Ge-luk-ba school, he is classed as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, primarily on the basis of his *Differentiation of the Two Truths* (*satyadvaya-vibhaṅga*, *bden pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa*), which is known in Tibet as one of the "three [texts] illuminating Svātantrika" (*rang rgyud shar gsum*).⁶²

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 260. The *Blue Annals* (tr. George Roerich, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1949, p. 34) only mention him as belonging to the ordination lineage of Nāgārjuna, Bhavya, Śrīgupta, and Śāntarakṣita that was transmitted to Tibet by *Sba Ratna*.

⁶¹See David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p. 69 and n. 225. Malcolm Eckel (*Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, New York: SUNY, 1987, pp. 5-34) also places him in the eighth century, and J. Nagasawa thinks that he lived from 700-760 (*Daijōbukkō yuga-gyō shisō no Hattenkei tai*, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 4-16; reported in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, p. 143 n. 16). Ruegg notes (p. 69) that there were at least two other authors named Jñānagarbha, one of whom was a teacher of Mar-ba in the eleventh century, and the other a translator whose name appears in the colophons of several works translated into Tibetan. See also Shirō Matsumoto, "Jñānagarbha's Theory of Two Truths", in *Bukkō Gaku* #5, 1978, pp. 109-137, where he discusses the three Jñānagarbhas. This is reported in the preface to Jñānagarbha's commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* in the Otani University version of the *Bstan 'gyur* (*sems tsam* section, vol. 2 (bi), p. 8).

⁶²See Donald Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), pp. 21 and 446-7 n. 16 and Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School*, pp. 68-9, n. 223 (the other two works are Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*). It should be noted that this term could also mean "the three Eastern Svātantrikas", since *shar* can mean both "East" and "illuminate", "appear", "dawn".

Jñānagarbha, along with Candrakīrti, is classed by Ü-ñā-lo-ñel (*dbus pa blo gsal*) as a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika of a type called “Mādhyamikas who practice what is renowned in the world” (*'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa*).⁶³ In a study of the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*,⁶⁴ Mimaki provides a table for various identifications of Jñānagarbha's affiliation, according to which Jay-dzün-ñā,⁶⁵ Jam-ñang-shay-ñā,⁶⁶ Gen-dün-gya-tso,⁶⁷ and Pañ-chen Shākyā-chok-dēn⁶⁸ classify him as a Sautrāntika-

Jñānagarbha's treatise on the two truths is discussed by Jang-gya (*Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, Sarnath, Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970, p. 429.4), and he indicates that Jñānagarbha's reasonings are not accepted by Prāsaṅgikas, and so Jang-gya also does not use them in his chapter on Prāsaṅgika. The *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* and its auto-commentary (*vr̥tti*) are found in the *Sde dge* edition of the Tripiṭaka (vols. 3881-2) but not in the Peking edition.

⁶³*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, ed. and tr. Katsumi Mimaki (Tokyo: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, 1982), p. 27. He writes (p. 28):

Jñānagarbha est considéré comme appartenant à la fois à l'école des 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa et à l'école des Svatantrika. On peut le déduire de fait que sa *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* est citée pour appuyer l'opinion des Svātantrika, bien que son nom ne soit pas cité expressément sous les Svātantrika.

⁶⁴Ibid, pp. 27-8. As Dzong-ka-ñā notes, these distinctions were not felt by Jñānagarbha, nor by Bhavya, Śāntarakṣita, etc., who saw no difference in view of selflessness between their own school and that of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. See Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, p. 446 n. 16.

⁶⁵*Rje btsun pa chos kyi rgyal mtshan* of Se-ra Jay Monastery, 1469-1546, in his *Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag*. See also Ruegg, pp. 68-9, n. 223.

⁶⁶*Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, 1648-1722, in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*.

⁶⁷*Dge 'dun rgya mtsho*, 1475-1542, the second Dalai Lama, in his *Grub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru rdzings*.

Mādhyamika⁶⁹ and Bu-dön⁷⁰ and Go-ram-ba⁷¹ classify him as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika.⁷² Mimaki cites several different Presentations of Tenets (*grub mtha'*) of Ge-luk-

⁶⁸*Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan*, in his *Dbu ma rnam par nges pa'i chos kyi bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (cited in Mimaki p. 36).

⁶⁹*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, op. cit., p. 29. See also Lessing and Wayman's translation of Kay-drup's (*mkhas grub*) *Rgyud sde spyi rnam*, p. 90, where he is also identified as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika, and Ruegg, op. cit., pp. 68-9, n. 224. On p. 39, Mimaki writes:

Jñānagarbha est considéré normalement comme auteur des Sautrāntika-mādhyamika par les auteurs dGe lugs pa, tels que Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan et 'Jam dbyangs bžad pa. Quelques maîtres antérieurs qui prennent la même position d'après Śākya mchog ldan pourraient sans doute être dGe lugs pa. Par contre, des auteurs tels que Bu ston Rin chen grub et Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge, qui sont dans la filiation des Sa skya pa, prennent Jñānagarbha pour un auteur des Yogācāra-mādhyamika. Par ailleurs dBus pa blo gsal, et probablement aussi 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzañ, considèrent Jñānagarbha comme un auteur des 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa.

⁷⁰*Bu ston rin chen grub*, 1290-1364, in his *Chos 'byung*. See Eugene Obermiller's translation, (Heidelberg, 1931) part II, p. 135.

⁷¹*Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge* (1429-1489), in his *Rgyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgongs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na nyid spyi'i ngag gyis ston pa nges don rag gsal* (cited in Mimaki p. 32).

⁷²*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, pp. 29 and 34. For a discussion of the philosophical differences between Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas and Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, see Lopez, op. cit., pp. 68-9 and 76 and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 399-439. See also the short discussion of Olle Qvarnstrom, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: The Vedāntaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (Lund: Plus Ultra, 1989), pp. 96-98. According to the Ge-luk-ba system (as outlined by Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (*dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po*, 1728-1791) in his *Grub pa'i*

ba and Śa-ḡya (*sa skya*) authors which classify Jñānagarbha, and concludes that Geluk-ba authors generally classify him as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika,⁷³ but several Śa-ḡya authors (e.g., Bu-dōn and Go-ram-ba) classify him as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika.⁷⁴

According to the Tibetan doxographers, Jñānagarbha was a Mādhyamika who utilized both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra sources, and so for them there is no contradiction in his writing both a treatise presenting a Madhyamaka perspective on the two truths (*The Differentiation of the Two Truths*) and a commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (the main scriptural source for the Yogācāra school).⁷⁵ Several

mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1969), p. 55), a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika is a Mādhyamika who does not assert the existence of external objects but does assert the existence of self-knowers (*rang rig, svasaṃvedanā*). A Sautrāntika-Svātantrika is a Mādhyamika who does not assert the existence of self-knowers and who does assert that external objects exist by way of their own character (see Geshe Lhundrup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, New York, Grove Press, 1976, pp. 122-132 and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 361-3). According to these two definitions, it is difficult to place Jñānagarbha in either classification, because in his *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* he refutes an opponent who asserts the existence of self-knowers (see Tohoku 3882.4b.2), which would mark him as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika, but in his commentary on the *Samdhinirmocana* he agrees with the statement of the sūtra that external objects do not exist. This indicates that if the same Jñānagarbha wrote both texts he did not identify exclusively with either viewpoint. It is virtually certain that he did not identify himself as a Svātantrika, but simply as a Mādhyamika, and the lines of demarcation between schools was probably much more fluid at the time when he lived and wrote than the later Tibetan exegetes presented them.

⁷³*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, p. 34.

⁷⁴*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, pp. 32-3.

⁷⁵The Tibetan text of this work has been edited and translated into Japanese by Jōshō Nozawa (*Daijō Bukkyō yuga-gyō no Kenkyū*, Kyoto, Hōzōkan, 1957) on the

contemporary scholars, however, think that because there is a philosophical incompatibility between the two schools, accepting the Yogācāra position that all phenomena are cognition-only (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*) would preclude his accepting the Madhyamaka position that compounded phenomena do exist conventionally. This discrepancy is mentioned by Ruegg in *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India* and by Eckel in *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*.⁷⁶ Both indicate that they see a conflict between the thought of the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* and that of the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*. Ruegg, for example, points out that in the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* the author characterizes the doctrine of mind-only as a position that is inferior to the Madhyamaka understanding of selflessness⁷⁷ (while the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* defends the doctrine of mind-only without indicating that it should be viewed as inferior to the Madhyamaka view). Eckel speculates that the differences in philosophical outlook between the two works could be evidence that they were written by different authors,⁷⁸ but this alone is not, in my opinion, sufficient reason by itself to reject the notion that both texts are by the same author, since there are many cases of authors adopting different attitudes and perspectives in different works.⁷⁹

basis of the Peking (number 5535) and *Sde dge* (number 4033) texts. It is also listed in the *Lhan dkar* catalogue (number 532 according to Lalou's numbering) and *Bu ston's Chos bsgyur dkar chag* (number 2926 in Nishioka's edition of *Bu ston's* text; see note nine above).

⁷⁶See Ruegg, pp. 68-9 and Eckel, pp. 31-4.

⁷⁷Ruegg, p. 69.

⁷⁸Malcolm Eckel (*Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, New York: SUNY, 1987), pp. 5-34.

⁷⁹Although this is not the occasion to develop this idea fully, there is a basic problem in studies by contemporary scholars who try to decide that different texts could not have

An equally plausible explanation is that Jñānagarbha accepted the Mahāyāna idea that Buddha taught different (and often conflicting) doctrines to different audiences according to his understanding of what would be most beneficial to each listener, and so Jñānagarbha would feel no philosophical conflict in commenting on and defending different doctrines attributed to Buddha without rigidly adhering to just one position. This does not entail that he was inconsistent, or even that he necessarily changed his mind; rather, as Ruegg indicates,⁸⁰ Jñānagarbha states in the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* that Buddha taught different doctrines to different audiences due to his compassion and that he taught some people about the aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres, while he taught others that everything is mind-only, and to others he taught that all phenomena lack a self. Jñānagarbha indicates that he thinks that the doctrine of mind-only is inferior to the Madhyamaka understanding of selflessness, but he also thinks that it is a part of a progression of teachings given by Buddha leading up to the Madhyamaka view of selflessness:

In accordance with [their] thought — by way of progressively teaching (1) the aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres; (2) mind-only; (3) and the

been written by the same author on the basis of differences of thought or style. The problem with this approach is that it tacitly assumes that every author has a uniform philosophical view and writing style throughout his/her life, but this is patently false, as can be seen in any number of contemporary authors, who write from different perspectives and utilize different styles, adapting their writing to the needs of particular works. An example would be Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote in a variety of styles and genres. Many of the works known to have been written by Sartre would have to be rejected according to the implicit rules of the methodology of contemporary scholarship that holds that differences in thought and style necessarily indicate differences in authorship.

⁸⁰Ruegg, p. 69.

selflessness of all phenomena — [Buddha] completely refuted the apprehension of [truly existent] things.⁸¹

This statement appears to indicate that the author of the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* accepted the doctrine of mind-only as a part of a progression of teachings given by Buddha leading up to the teaching of the selflessness of all phenomena, and so it would not be inconsistent for the same author to write another text in which he commented on and defended statements attributed to Buddha expounding this position.

Both Eckel and Ruegg also point out that there were two other Jñānagarbhas referred to in Tibetan literature, one of whom was a teacher of Mar-ba the translator and another who translated the *Commentary on the Differentiation of the Two Truths* into Tibetan.⁸² Ernst Steinkellner⁸³ adds that Bu-dön's mention of the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*⁸⁴ occurs in the portion of his *Catalogue (dkar chag)* that mainly lists works by Tibetans. The author listed there is referred to as “*Shes rab snying po*”, but Steinkellner points out that this is a possible alternative spelling of Jñānagarbha.⁸⁵ He also mentions that none of the catalogues that mention this work list

⁸¹*Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* (*bden pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa*), Otani University Press *Sde dge, dbu ma* vol. 12, p. 13a.3-4: *bsam pa ji lta ba bzhin du phung po dang khamdang skye mched dang / sems tsam dang / chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa'i rim gyis dngos por 'dzin pa ma lus par sel bar mdzad*.

⁸²See David S. Ruegg, *Madhyamaka Literature*, p. 69. Steinkellner (“Who Was Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul”, op. cit., pp. 274-5) speculates that there may have even been two translators, one an Indian named Jñānagarbha and the other a Tibetan named *Ye shes snying po* (the Tibetan translation of Jñānagarbha).

⁸³Steinkellner (“Who Was Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul”, op. cit.), pp. 274-5.

⁸⁴In his *Chos bsgyur dkar chag* (number 2926 in Nishioka's numbering; see note nine).

⁸⁵Steinkellner (“Who Was Byañ chub rdzu 'phrul”, op. cit.), p. 275.

a translator, which is at least circumstantial evidence that the author might have been Tibetan.

In Tibetan Ge-luk-ba traditions, however, it is accepted that the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and the *Differentiation of the Two Truths* were written by the same person, the eighth century Indian master Jñānagarbha.⁸⁶ Steinkellner has provided some useful evidence supporting the thesis that the author of the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* was a Tibetan rather than an Indian, but since this evidence is circumstantial, it is not sufficient, in my opinion, to reject conclusively the tradition's attribution of both works to the same person.

Furthermore, although scholars such as Eckel, Ruegg, and Mimaki have indicated that they find a discrepancy between Jñānagarbha's Madhyamaka affiliation and his composing a commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, Tibetan doxographers of the Ge-luk-ba school would argue that there is no contradiction. For instance, in his *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, Ḍzong-ka-ba states that Svātantrikas (e.g., Bhavya, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla) rely on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and, according to his analysis, as a Svātantrika Jñānagarbha would also treat it as an authoritative scripture. According to Ḍzong-ka-ba, the Svātantrikas, beginning with Bhavya, accept the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* as a definitive teaching, but their interpretations differ from those of the Yogācāras:

Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (*dbu ma snang ba, madhyamakāloka*) explains in detail that Bhavya opened this system's path of commentary [in which it is held] that the meaning of the three natures described in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* as commented on by the

⁸⁶Bu-ḍōn's mention of this work in the section mainly devoted to indigenous Tibetan works may, however, indicate that he did not think that the Indian Jñānagarbha wrote this work.

Yogācāras is not the meaning of the sūtra but that it has the Madhyamaka meaning.⁸⁷

According to D̄zong-ka-ba's analysis of the Svātantrika system, Bhavya and his followers rely on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, but their readings differ from those of Yogācāra thinkers. Bhavya, for example, denies that Buddha teaches that external objects are mind-only, even though there are statements that seem to propound this in several sūtras, e.g., the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* (*Daśabhūmika-sūtra*), the *Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra* (*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*), and the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.⁸⁸

Although D̄zong-ka-ba contends that some sections of Bhavya's works "settle the meaning of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*", he does not cite any places where

⁸⁷*Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath ed., p. 130.8); adapted from a draft translation by Jeffrey Hopkins.

⁸⁸According to *Meditation on Emptiness* p. 361, Bhavya refuted the Cittamātra position that there are no external objects. He contended that Buddha never taught this, despite the fact that Buddha did say the words, 'Everything in the three realms is mind-only.' According to Bhavya, the words do not mean what they appear to say, and he contends that if one looks at the context it is clear that even on the occasions where Buddha makes statements that all phenomena are mind-only this is not what he means. This idea is discussed by Lō-sang-ḡñ-chok (*blo bzang dkon mchog*) in his word-commentary on Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Grub mtha' chen mo*, p. 192.3 and by D̄zong-ka-ba in his *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (Sarnath edition, p. 115.1). *Meditation on Emptiness* also states that Bhavya holds that all phenomena do not exist ultimately, but conventionally they do exist inherently or naturally. He is a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika because like a Sautrāntika he asserts the existence of objects that are external to perceiving consciousness. According to Tibetan doxographers, the definition of a Sautrāntika-Svātrantrika is: "a Mādhyamika who does not assert self-knowers and who asserts that external objects exist by way of their own nature" (from *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* by Sopa and Hopkins, p. 123).

Bhavya actually mentions the sūtra by name.⁸⁹ He does indicate, however, that Bhavya refers to doctrines presented in the sūtra and refutes the interpretations of Yogācāra

⁸⁹See, for instance, *Legs bshad snying po* pp. 109.14 (where Ḍzong-ka-ba states that Bhavya, settling the thought of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, indicates that other-powered phenomena have entityness in the sense of being established by way of their own character); p. 113.17 (where he states that Bhavya disagrees with the Yogācāras in that he thinks that “the meaning of the sūtra is that the emptiness of an ultimately [existent] entity of form and its production and so forth is the thoroughly established [nature]”); and p. 114.7 (where he indicates that Bhavya disagrees with the Yogācāras’ interpretation of the sūtra’s discussion of the idea that phenomena are not produced inherently). The latter passage illustrates how Ḍzong-ka-ba indicates that Bhavya relies on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* although he does not mention the name of the sūtra:

The Yogācāras also assert that the statements in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* concerning production by way of [the object’s] own nature and inherent production from other are of concordant meaning; and they assert that non-production of that [refers to] non-production under [the object’s] own power. Therefore, they assert that due to its non-existence it is not necessary that ultimate production not exist. [Bhavya] asserts that if other-powered phenomena were truly established, they would have to be established in accordance with how they appear, due to which the statement in the [*Samdhinirmocana*]-sūtra that [other-powered phenomena are] like magical illusions would not be correct. Therefore, he explains that their emptiness of inherent existence is the meaning of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* [adapted from a draft translation by Jeffrey Hopkins].

The passage in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* to which this passage probably refers can be found on p. 31 of the Translation (Ḍok p. 13.5, K p. 6b.7; Lamotte p. 38, P p. 4b.4, and D p. 9.1).

It is noteworthy, however, that if Bhavya actually relies on the sūtra he does not mention it by name. In the fifth chapter of his *Tarkajālā*, for instance, he discusses

authors, and D̄zong-ka-ba seems to think that the references are clear enough that there is no doubt that Bhavya is discussing the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*. He also points to several places where other Mādhyamikas, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, cite the sūtra to support their philosophical positions, which backs up his contention that the authors of the Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka treated the sūtra as an authoritative scripture. If, as he contends, Bhavya relied on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cited it as a scriptural source that supported their arguments, then this is good evidence for the Ge-luk-ba position that the sūtra is authoritative for this branch of Madhyamaka. Unfortunately, it still does not settle the question of the doctrinal affiliation of Jñānagarbha, because, according to the Ge-luk-ba doxographers, as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika he would have to assert the existence of external objects as Bhavya does, but in his commentary on the sūtra he indicates that he accepts the sūtra's statement that all phenomena are cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*):

This [passage] indicates that mind appears as an object of observation that is like an image; [and so Buddha] teaches, "It is not different from mind." By way of indicating the reason, [Buddha] says, "I explain that consciousness is thoroughly distinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation is

Yogācāra (the chapter is entitled "entry into ascertainment of suchness according the the Yogācāras", *rnal 'byor spyod pa pa'i de kho na nyid gyan la dbab pa la 'jug pa*), but never mentions the name of the sūtra, although he does mention the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* and Dignāga's *Ālambana-parikṣā* and quotes Vasubandhu's *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*. D̄zong-ka-ba's thought that Bhavya is referring to the *Samdhinirmocana* seems to be based on the fact that Bhavya utilizes and discusses terminology that is found in the sūtra (although he does not mention this as a source), and so the implication from D̄zong-ka-ba's viewpoint is that the textual referent of his terminology is clear enough that he did not need to mention the sūtra by name.

cognition-only.” An object of observation is an appearance of mind in the aspect of an object and, moreover, it is not different from cognition because it is observed simultaneously.⁹⁰

He then goes on to refute objections to the statement that objects of observation are cognition-only, and he states that in dreams one perceives images that one believes to be external objects, but these are simply mental creations. He does not attempt to argue that Buddha’s intention is not really to propound the idea that external objects do not exist. Rather, he accepts the sūtra passage as a straightforward statement that all objects of observation are cognition-only and argues against opponents who disagree with this contention. Moreover, his *Differentiation of the Two Truths* contains no unambiguous statement as to whether he accepts or rejects the existence of external objects, which leaves us with a somewhat frustrating lack of evidence for deciding whether or not the author of that work and the author of the commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* were the same person. If a major difference of opinion were found between these two works, this would be a good reason for rejecting the thesis that they were authored by the same person, but the texts do not seem to provide enough evidence to draw a conclusion. Moreover, D̄zong-ka-ba’s analysis indicates that Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas rely on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, and so Jñānagarbha’s purported Madhyamaka affiliation would not interfere with his composing a commentary on the sūtra.

⁹⁰Otani University Press, *sems tsam* vol. 2, #4033 (bi), p. 321b.4: *des 'di skad ston te / sems nyid gzugs brnyan lta bur dmigs par snang ste / sems dang tha dad pa ma yin no zhes ston to // rigs pa bstan pa'i phyir / rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no zhes ngas bshad do zhes gsungs so // dmigs pa ni yul gyi rnam par sems snang ba yin la / de yang rnam par rig pa dang tha dad pa ma yin te / cig car dmigs pa'i phyir ro.*

Thus, he could have written from a mainly Yogācāra point of view in his commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and from a mainly Mādhyamaka point of view in his *Differentiation of the Two Truths*. Whether or not he wrote both works, it is certain that he was not concerned with presenting either the Svātantrika position or that of any subdivision within Svātantrika, since these classifications were invented in Tibet and were not recognized by Indian authors such as Jñānagarbha.⁹¹ He undoubtedly only saw himself as a Mādhyamika and was probably not as concerned with fine points of doctrinal affiliation as either the Tibetan doxographers or contemporary scholars. As Donald Lopez has noted, the philosophical situation of India during Jñānagarbha's time was fairly fluid,⁹² with a great deal of interaction and debate between different philosophical schools, and most thinkers were probably concerned with presenting the most consistent and defensible position possible in a particular work, not with how later scholars would classify their doctrinal affiliation. In any case, the questions of the philosophical position of Jñānagarbha and of the authorship of the works attributed to him are too complex to settle here and require further study.

The Structure of the Commentary

As the title of his commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* indicates, Jñānagarbha only comments on the eighth chapter, "[The Questions of] Maitreya," which is primarily concerned with the topics of calm abiding (*zhi gnas*, *śamatha*) and

⁹¹For a discussion of these doctrinal classifications, see Olle Qvarnstrom, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: The Vedāntaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (Lund: Plus Ultra, 1989), pp. 96-98.

⁹²See Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, pp. 446-48 n. 16.

special insight (*lhag mthong*, *vipaśyanā*). In the Ōtani University version of the *Bstan 'gyur* (the main version utilized in this study) it comprises fifty-three pages and is divided into two sections.⁹³

Jñānagarbha's methodology involves first citing a passage and then explaining what it means. These explanations are often prefaced with short phrases that indicate the context of the passage and provide a transition from the explanation of one passage to the next. He often identifies the purpose for Buddha's speaking a particular phrase, and he also often sums up the main point of a section with a concluding remark about the intent of the section.

Unlike Wonch'uk, he seldom mentions any other texts or authors (the only exception being occasional mentions of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras), and his explanations seem to be indications of his own opinions. He states many qualms that could arise from his explanations or from Buddha's words, and he answers them by showing that the teachings of the chapter present a coherent system of meditative theory and epistemology.

c. Asaṅga: *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (*ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-bhāṣya*, 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa) and *The Compendium of Ascertainments* (*vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, rnam par gtan pa dbab pa'i bsdu ba).

According to Tibetan traditions, Asaṅga is one of the two great "openers of the chariot ways" (*shing rta srol 'byed*) who clarified Mahāyāna doctrines in accordance with

⁹³Ōtani University Press, *sems tsam* vol. 2, #4033 (*bi*), pp. 318b-345a.

earlier prophecies that foretold their coming.⁹⁴ The other “opener of the chariot ways” was Nāgārjuna, who developed and spread the Mādhyamaka school on the basis of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, while Asaṅga developed and spread the Yogācāra school, relying mainly on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.⁹⁵

According to Tibetan tradition, Asaṅga’s birth had been predicted in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the *Mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra* (Peking 162),⁹⁶ and during his lifetime he clearly defined the Yogācāra tenet system. In the Ge-luk-ba school, it is held that Śākyamuni Buddha taught four schools of tenets: the two Hinayāna systems of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika and the two Mahāyāna systems of Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra, but the two Mahāyāna systems did not flourish during his lifetime. Thus it

⁹⁴This idea is found in D̄zong-ka-ba’s *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*), pp. 3-4; translated in Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (unpublished manuscript), pp. 10-13. See also *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 358-9.

⁹⁵See *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 358-9.

⁹⁶The importance of their being prophesied is often mentioned in Ge-luk-ba treatises, e.g., *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, pp. 3-4. As Joe B. Wilson notes (in *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 208-9), this idea is discussed by Gung-tang (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me*, in his *Yid dang kun gzhi’i gnas rnam bshad pa mkhas pa’i ’jug mgog*, in *Guñ than gsun ’bum*, vol. 2, New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1972), p. 2a.2. The passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* in which Ge-luk-ba exegetes think that Asaṅga’s birth was predicted can be found in P.L. Vaidya’s edition (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967), p. 6.5; this is cited and discussed by Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 208-9. See also *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 358-60 and Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1976, p. 51).

was necessary for Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga to open broad paths for the chariots of these systems originally set forth by Buddha so that others could follow them.⁹⁷

In traditional biographies, Asaṅga is said to have been a third ground Bodhisattva,⁹⁸ and Tāranātha reports that in a previous life his mother had been a Buddhist monk who was a devotee of Avalokiteshvara who had hurt the feelings of another monk while debating with him, and Avalokiteshvara predicted that this would result in repeated births as a woman.⁹⁹ During one of these births, as a Buddhist laywoman named Prasannaśīla, she gave birth to Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and a third son named Viriñcinivatsa, all of whom entered the Buddhist order. Tāranātha reports that she gave birth to two great Buddhist scholars (Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) as a result of her prayer to Avalokiteshvara that she give birth to boys who would help to restore Buddhism in India.¹⁰⁰

The traditional accounts agree that Asaṅga was the eldest of the three brothers, Vasubandhu was the second, and that Viriñcinivatsa was the third. Tāranātha reports that Prasannaśīla was a Brahman woman of the Kauśika clan, but that the birth of Asaṅga was the result of a union with a Kṣatriya man, while the births of her other two

⁹⁷See *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 357-60.

⁹⁸This idea is mentioned in *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 359, Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism in India*, p. 166, and Bu-dōn's *History of Buddhism*, part I, p. 140. The attributes of this and the other grounds are described in chapter nine of the translation. Wonch'uk, however, refers to Asaṅga as a first ground Bodhisattva who directly realized the meditative stabilization (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*) of 'light of doctrine' and who directly perceived the face (or presence) of Maitreya and asked him to explain the Bodhisattva grounds (vol. 118.52.6).

⁹⁹Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism*, pp. 154-5.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 155-6. The three-fold destruction of the Dharma in India at that time is described by Bu-dōn, pp. 36-7.

sons were the result of later unions with a Brahman.¹⁰¹ The family lived in the region of present-day Peshawar, in a village called Puruṣapura in Gāndhāra.

Asaṅga showed an early predilection toward religious practice, and even as a child went to the forest to meditate on teachings he received from a tantric teacher named Jetāri. He received monastic ordination at an early age and soon demonstrated an unusual memory and great intelligence. He first studied under Sarvāstivādin teachers, and Paramārtha reports that he studied the Hīnayāna scriptures under an arhat named Piṇḍola and that he also read many Mahāyāna texts, including the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.¹⁰² Unable to fathom their profound meaning, he sought and received an initiation that began a search to find and receive teaching from the coming Buddha, Maitreya.

He left his teacher and went alone to a cave on a mountain named Kukkuṭapāda, where he remained in meditative seclusion for twelve years. According to Bu-dōn and Tāranātha, he first prayed to Maitreya and meditated for three years, but without success.¹⁰³ As he was about to leave his cave and give up his spiritual quest to find Maitreya, he noticed that some of the rocks outside his cave had been worn smooth by the wings of birds who made their nests on the mountain. He decided that if birds could gradually wear rocks in this way, this was a sign that through dilligent religious practice he could attain the difficult goal of gaining a vision of Maitreya.

Thus, he re-entered his cave and renewed his meditation, but after three more years had still not attained his goal. He again decided to give up his quest, but as he left the

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 155-6.

¹⁰²This is reported in Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, translated by J. Takakusu. See note 31, and see Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley, 1961), p. 31.

¹⁰³See Tāranātha pp. 156-9 and Bu-dōn p. 138.

cave he saw some stones that had been eroded by water and, taking this as a sign that he should not despair, he returned to his cave and his meditation.

After three more years, however, he still felt that he had not made significant progress, and again decided to renounce his quest. As he left his cave he saw a man who claimed to be making needles by rubbing iron with cotton and who showed Asaṅga some needles that he had made in this way. Asaṅga took this as another indication that he should not give up his quest, and so he returned to his meditation.

He persevered for another three years, but after a total of twelve years of meditation still had not attained his goal, and so he left his cave and went far away. As he was coming to a town, he saw a dog whose body was being eaten by worms and which was suffering horribly. He felt overwhelming compassion for the dog, but realized that if he removed the worms from the dog's flesh then they would die, but that if he did not then the dog would die. As a solution, he decided to cut off part of his own flesh so that the worms would be attracted to it and would leave the dog, and then he went into the town to buy a knife. He returned, knife in hand, but as he was about to cut off his flesh, the dog transformed into the luminous form of Maitreya. Asaṅga somewhat testily asked Maitreya why he had taken so long to show himself, to which Maitreya replied that up to this point Asaṅga's mental obstructions had been too powerful for him to be able to perceive Maitreya's exalted form. The combination of his twelve years of diligent practice and his intense compassion for the dog had finally brought him to a point where Maitreya was visible to him.¹⁰⁴

Maitreya went on to explain that he had been present in the cave with Asaṅga during his twelve-year meditative retreat and showed him the stains on his robe where Asaṅga had unknowingly thrown his garbage on him. He then informed Asaṅga that

¹⁰⁴See Tāranātha pp. 156-9.

he needed someone to expound Mahāyāna doctrine in the world, and he brought Asaṅga to Tuṣita heaven, where according to some accounts he spent six months, and according to others, fifty-three years. During this time, Maitreya extensively taught him the Mahāyāna doctrine, including the “Five Books of Maitreya,”¹⁰⁵ and Asaṅga quickly grasped intuitively the meaning of Maitreya’s teachings.

After his sojourn in Tuṣita he returned to India, where he began composing commentaries on Maitreya’s works as well as many independent treatises. Among these were the *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*vinīścaya-saṃgrahaṇī. gtan la dbab pa’i bsdu ba*), a section of the voluminous *Levels of Yogic Practice* (*yogācāra-bhūmi, rnal ’byor spyod pa’i sa*), and a commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.¹⁰⁶ In the *Compendium*, he devotes a section to a discussion of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, in which he quotes the entire sūtra, except for the introduction and the colophons that conclude chapters, and provides brief commentaries before each chapter concerning the main import of that chapter. These comments are all translated in the notes to the translation.

¹⁰⁵These are: (1) *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga*; (2) *Madhyānta-vibhāga*; (3) *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*; (4) *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*; and (5) *Mahāyānottara-tantra*. See *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 780-1.

¹⁰⁶This commentary (Peking 5481, *Sde dge* 3891) was translated into Tibetan around A.D. 800 by Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi, and Ye shes sde, and is said to consist of 220 verses in the *Lhan dkar* catalogue (number 534 according to the numbering of Marcelle Lalou — see “Les Textes Bouddhiques au temps du Roi Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan”, in *Journal Asiatique* #241, 1953, pp. 313-353) and *Bu ston’s Chos bsgyur dkar chag* (number 653 according to Nishioka’s numbering; see note nine above). It is also partially edited and translated by Lamotte (*Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, op. cit.). Portions of this text are found in appendices at the end of some chapters in Lamotte’s text.

Because of the fact that the *Compendium of Ascertainments* quotes most of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and comments on it, D̄zong-ka-ba contends that the composition of a separate commentary on the sūtra would have been redundant, since Asaṅga had already “extensively commented” on it. He adds that taking this to be a work by Asaṅga indicates “a great absence of analysis.”¹⁰⁷ He states:

In his *Compendium [of Ascertainments]*, Asaṅga quotes, except for the introductory chapter of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, most of the remaining chapters, and settles well the difficult points; hence, there also does not appear to be any need for this master’s composing a separate commentary.¹⁰⁸

In his *Commentary* on the difficult points of D̄zong-ka-ba’s text *Bel-jor-hlün-drup* echoes the same thought and adds that another reason to discount this commentary as a work of Asaṅga’s is that it conflicts with his other works, but he does not elaborate on his reason(s) for thinking this.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷*Legs bshad snying po*, Sarnath ed., p. 43; translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*, p. 87.

¹⁰⁸Sarnath ed., p. 87; tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*, p. 87. See also A khu blo gros rgya msho’s ‘s *Drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po’i dka’ ’grel rin chen sgron me* (Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982), p. 195.4, which also mentions a short ten-page commentary attributed to Asaṅga (which may be *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, which comprises eleven folios in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan ’gyur*), and he adds that the attribution of this commentary to Asaṅga is also incorrect.

¹⁰⁹*Bel-jor-hlün-drup*, pp. 44.7-46.7.

Alex Wayman thinks that the commentary to which D̄zong-ka-ba is referring is *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*,¹¹⁰ but if we look closely at D̄zong-ka-ba's arguments it would seem that the commentary he is discussing and *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are different works. There are several reasons that lead to this conclusion: firstly, he quotes a passage from the commentary he is discussing that is concerned with the two truths and the three natures, but this passage does not appear in any of the three versions of *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* that I have consulted,¹¹¹ nor is there any passage that remotely resembles it. Secondly, D̄zong-ka-ba states that the commentary he is discussing quotes Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* (which would refute the contention that Asaṅga could have written the commentary, since he lived before Dharmakīrti), but this citation is also not found in the commentary entitled *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*. Thirdly, D̄zong-ka-ba refers to the commentary he is discussing as a "great commentary" ('*grel chen*),¹¹² but *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* comprises only eleven folios in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*, and so it is highly unlikely that it would be referred to as a "great commentary".

¹¹⁰Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 34: "It is plain that Tson-kha-pa refers to the *bhāṣya* on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* attributed to Asaṅga."

¹¹¹These are the Peking edition, the *Sde dge* edition, and the excerpts included in Lamotte's version of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*.

¹¹²*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 43.4.

The key to discovering the identity of the commentary to which D̄zong-ka-ba is referring lies in Bu-d̄ön's *Chos bsgyur dkar chag*,¹¹³ which indicates that the *Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna* ('*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa*; attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (*byang chub rdzu 'phrul*) in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan 'gyur*) is thought by one scholar to have been composed by Asaṅga, but Bu-d̄ön thinks that this attribution is incorrect. One of the reasons that Bu-d̄ön gives for this assertion is that the commentary cites Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*tshad ma rnam nges*), and this is also one of D̄zong-ka-ba's reasons for denying the attribution of authorship to Asaṅga. Also, Bu-d̄ön refers to this text as a "great commentary" ('*grel pa chen po*), which is a further indication that the text to which both he and D̄zong-ka-ba are referring is the commentary attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül in the *Sde dge Bstan 'gyur*, rather than the one attributed to Asaṅga.¹¹⁴ *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* is too short

¹¹³Putun bukkyōshi, ed. Soshu Nishioka, *Tōkyō Daigaku Bungakubu Bunka Koryū Kenkyū shisetsu Kenkyū Kiyō* 4 (1980), pp. 61-92; 5 (1981), pp. 43-94; 6 (1983), pp. 47-201; see especially p. 55.7-15 (cited in Steinkellner, "Who Was Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul?", p. 280 note 34).

¹¹⁴In his *Zin bris* commentary on the *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 29b.4), Śer-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay refers to Bu-d̄ön's discussion of the commentary attributed to Asaṅga (although he incorrectly identifies the text in which the discussion is found as the *Chos 'byung* instead of the *Chos bsgyur dkar chag*; there is no mention of this problem in the *Chos 'byung*'s discussion of Asaṅga's works in Obermiller's translation, p. 140), and mentions that the text that D̄zong-ka-ba is referring to is the one that Bu-d̄ön thinks was actually composed by *Cog ru Klu'i rgyal mtshan*, i.e., the *Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna* ('*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa*). This also seems to be the text to which A-ku-Lo-drö-gya-tso (p. 195.4) refers to when he identifies the commentary under discussion as a commentary in two volumes. This could not be *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*,

to be considered a “great commentary”, and its discussion of the sūtra is rather sketchy in comparison to the commentaries of Wonch’uk and Jang-chup-dzu-trül and skips over many important points in the sūtra. The only texts in the *Bstan ’gyur* that would qualify as “great commentaries” on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are the works of Wonch’uk (almost three volumes in the *Sde dge* edition) and Jang-chup-dzu-trül (most of two volumes in *Sde dge*), which are by far the largest and most comprehensive extant commentaries on the sūtra. Since Wonch’uk cites many post-Asaṅga Indian authors (such as Asvabhāva and Sthiramati), as well as Chinese authors such as Hsüan-tsang, no Tibetan scholar would have attributed his commentary to Asaṅga, which leads to the conclusion that the “great commentary” attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül in the *Sde dge* edition (no author is mentioned in the Peking edition) must be the one to which Ḍzong-ka-ba is referring.

Although it seems clear that Ḍzong-ka-ba’s arguments refer specifically to the commentary attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan ’gyur* rather than to *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, two of Ḍzong-ka-ba’s points still need to be considered in relation to the latter text: (1) that Asaṅga had already “extensively commented” on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* in the *Compendium of Ascertainments* and that (2) composing a second commentary would have been redundant. With regard to the first point, although the *Compendium of Ascertainments* quotes most of the sūtra and comments on each chapter, these comments are very terse (generally one to three lines), and the total commentary on the text would only fill about three pages, thus making it the shortest commentary on the

which is only eleven folios in the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan ’gyur*, while the *Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna* is the only two-volume commentary on the *Saṃdhinirmocana* in the *Bstan ’gyur*. The references to Śer-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay and A-ku Ḍo-drö-gya-tso were reported by Jeffrey Hopkins.

Sūtra Explaining the Thought. The fact that the *Compendium* quotes the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* extensively does not entail that it has *commented* on it extensively, and so this by itself is not sufficient reason to reject the attribution of this work to Asaṅga. Also, the comments found in the *Compendium* are only short summaries of the main ideas of each chapter and, because of their brevity, necessarily ignore many important points in each chapter, and so it can hardly be argued that this section of the *Compendium* extensively comments on the sūtra and “settles well the difficult points”.

It should be noted, however, that D̄zong-ka-ba's assertion most likely is not that the comparatively short section of the *Compendium* in which the sūtra is extensively quoted settles well the difficult points of the sūtra, but rather that the author does this throughout the whole text of the *Compendium*. If we examine the *Compendium*, however, there is a good deal of evidence against this contention. In the Peking edition, the *Compendium* comprises a total of 576 pages, and aside from the section in which the *Sam̄dhinirmocana* is quoted (vol. 111, pp. 83b.5-107d.7) there are a total of 111 quotes of Buddha's statements or of sūtras. Of these, I could only identify two as corresponding to lines in the *Sam̄dhinirmocana*. These two occur on p. 71b.8 and p. 71c.7 of the *Compendium*, in a section that quotes a number of questions directed at Buddha (apparently from various sūtras) asking of what he was thinking when he made certain statements. The two quotes from the sūtra are: (1) “of what was the Supramundane Victor thinking when he said, ‘All phenomena are without entityness’” (*bcom ldan 'das kyis ji las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhes gsungs*); and (2) “of what was the Supramundane Victor thinking when he said, ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow’” (*bcom ldan 'das kyis ji las dgongs nas chos thams cad ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa dang gzod ma nas zhi ba dang rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan*

las 'das pa zhes gsungs). These two questions are part of one question asked by Paramārthasamudgata near the beginning of chapter seven of the *Samdhinirmocana* (translation p. 63; *Dōk* p. 46.5).¹¹⁵ The *Compendium* does not discuss these in detail, but only gives short explanations of the import of the questions. Regarding the first, the text states: “[Buddha] said this with respect to this and that [phenomenon] for the benefit of trainees, thinking of the three types of non-entitynesses: non-entitynesses in terms of character, non-entitynesses in terms of production, and ultimate non-entitynesses”.¹¹⁶ After quoting the second part of the question, the *Compendium* comments: “[Buddha] said this thinking just of non-entitynesses in terms of character”.¹¹⁷ The text then goes on to cite a number of similar questions, apparently from other sūtras, but does not again discuss the *Samdhinirmocana* until the beginning of the section in which it is quoted extensively (p. 83b.5).

Aside from these two instances, I have found no other passages in the *Compendium* in which statements from Buddha or a sūtra are quoted that correspond to passages in the *Samdhinirmocana* (aside from the section in which most of the sūtra is quoted), nor have I seen any other places where the *Samdhinirmocana* is mentioned by name, although other works are mentioned by name.

Returning to our previous point, it would be strange that the *Compendium* does not even mention the *Samdhinirmocana* or any passage from it for the first 331 pages if it

¹¹⁵See note 330 to the translation for the full Tibetan passages of the various recensions of the sūtra.

¹¹⁶The text reads: *'dul ba'i dbang gis de dang der ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum las dgongs nas gsungs te / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid do.*

¹¹⁷The text reads: *mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kho na las dgongs te gsungs so.*

is extensively commenting on the *Samdhinirmocana* and settling well its difficult points (as Āzong-ka-ba contends). Moreover, there are over one hundred quotes from sūtras in this section of the *Compendium*, and if the *Samdhinirmocana* is an important topic of discussion there would seem to be no good reason to neglect to mention it or quote from it.

In fairness to Āzong-ka-ba, it should be mentioned that the arguments I have presented are mainly circumstantial and that his main contention is that the *Compendium* comments on the *Samdhinirmocana* and settles well its difficult points, not that it quotes the sūtra. To evaluate the merits of Āzong-ka-ba's contention fully, it would be necessary to study the *Compendium* comprehensively, comparing its thought with that of the *Samdhinirmocana* to determine whether or not his ideas can be supported by looking at the text as a whole. Given the size of the *Compendium*, this would be a massive undertaking, and such a task lies outside the scope of the present study, which is primarily concerned with the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* and its commentaries.

Since the *Compendium* only specifically refers to the *Samdhinirmocana* in the places cited above and mainly quotes other texts, it would be a monumental task to study the whole of the *Compendium* to determine whether or not it is implicitly referring to the sūtra in other places. However, a comparison of the section of the *Compendium* that quotes and explicitly discusses the sūtra with *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* could provide a useful starting point for a discussion of the question of whether or not the two texts could have been written by the same author.

According to the position of Āzong-ka-ba cited above, there would be no need for Asaṅga to compose a commentary on the sūtra in addition to the *Compendium*, and so according to this principle the attribution of authorship of *The Explanation of the*

Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought to Asaṅga should be rejected. As we have seen above, an examination of the sources cited by the *Compendium* provides little evidence to support D̄zong-ka-ba's claim, and so a comparison of the section of the *Compendium* that explicitly discusses the sūtra with corresponding portions of *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* could provide clues as to whether or not the texts are in conflict in terms of how they comment on the sūtra. If there were important doctrinal differences between the *Compendium* and *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* this would probably be sufficient reason to decide that they were not written by the same author, but when one compares the two texts one finds a number of similarities. For instance, in both works the author begins with a statement that the first chapters of the sūtra discuss five characteristics of the ultimate, that it is: (1) an inexpressible character; (2) a non-dual character; (3) a character that completely transcends the sphere of argumentation; (4) a character that completely transcends difference or non-difference; and (5) a character that is everywhere of one taste.¹¹⁸ At the beginning of their discussions of the second

¹¹⁸The Tibetan of the texts reads as follows: *Compendium of Ascertainments* (Peking vol. 110, p. 83b): *don dam pa ni mtshan nyid lnga dang ldan pa yin te / brjod du med pa'i mtshan nyid dang / gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rtog ge'i spyod yul las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid dang / tha dad pa dang / tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid dang / thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid do.*

The *Commentary* (Sde dge #3981, p. 5.2) reads: *de la bcom ldan 'das kyis don dam pa'i mtshan nyid lnga bstan ste / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid lnga ni / brjod du med pa'i mtshan nyid dang / gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rtog ge'i spyod yul las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid dang / gzhan dang gzhan ma yin pa las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid dang / thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid do.*

chapter of the sūtra, both also indicate that it discusses the ultimate in terms of its relation to argumentation (*rtog ge, tarka*), and their discussions begin with the statement that the sūtra indicates that the ultimate is everywhere of one taste.¹¹⁹

The *Compendium* prefaces its citation of the fifth chapter with the statement that it is concerned with “the character of mind” (*sems kyi mtshan nyid, citta-lakṣaṇa*), and the *Commentary* begins its discussion by stating that the chapter is concerned with “the secrets of mind” (*sems kyi gsang ba, citta-guhya*).¹²⁰

At the beginning of chapter six, both texts indicate that this chapter focuses on “the character of phenomena” (*chos kyi mtshan nyid, dharma-lakṣaṇa*).¹²¹ The *Compendium* begins chapter seven by stating that this chapter is concerned with “the character(s) of non-entityness(es) of phenomena” (*chos rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i mtshan nyid, dharmānām niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇa*), and the *Commentary* states that the main topic is “the teaching of the three non-entitynesses that are antidotes to four kinds of mistaken conceptions with respect to objects.”¹²²

Except for the use of *gzhan dang gzhan ma yin pa* in the *Commentary* and *tha dad pa dang tha dad pa ma yin pa* in the *Compendium*, the wording is nearly identical.

¹¹⁹Compare *Compendium* p. 84b.2: *de la rtog ge'i spyod yul las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid ni*; and *Commentary* p. 9.6: *gnyis pa ni rtog ge la brten nas don dam par spyod pa*.

¹²⁰*Compendium* p. 87b.4 reads: *de la sems kyi mtshan nyid ni*; *Commentary* p. 12.4 reads: *lnga pa la ni sems kyi gsang ba la shin tu rmongs pa rnam pa gsum ste*.

¹²¹*Compendium* p. 88b.2 reads: *de la chos rnam kyi mtshan nyid ni*. *Commentary* p. 13.3 reads: *drug pa la ni dgos pa drug dang ldan pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid bstan te*.

¹²²*Compendium* p. 89b.2: *de la chos rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i mtshan nyid ni*; *Commentary* p. 14.2: *bdun pa la ni don la log par rtog pa rnam pa bzhi'i gnyen po ngo bo nyid med pa nyid gsum bstan pa 'di ma brjod na*.

The *Compendium* begins chapter eight with the statement that it is concerned with “the path of calm abiding and special insight that are subsumed by yoga,” and the *Commentary* begins its discussion of the chapter by stating that it is concerned with “the path of yoga in terms of six aspects.”¹²³

Chapter nine of the *Compendium* begins with the statement that the chapter “teaches in accordance with the divisions of the vehicle(s), beginning with the presentation of the vehicle(s),” and the *Commentary* states that in this chapter “questions and answers — beginning with what should be known with respect to thoroughly completing the perfections — are expressed, because the perfections are included within the Great Vehicle.”¹²⁴ Finally, the citation of the tenth chapter of the *Compendium* begins with the statement that this chapter is “a thorough division that establishes the activities of Tathāgatas, beginning with just the presentation of the vehicle(s),” and the *Commentary* states that the chapter indicates the “antidotes to the thorough obscurations with respect to the bodies of Tathāgatas.”¹²⁵

With the exception of the last chapter, the statements of both texts are remarkably similar, and they often use the same words to indicate the focus of the chapters. While this may not prove that the same person wrote both works, it does indicate that there are

¹²³*Compendium* p. 93d.2: *chos gdags rnam par dgod pa las brtsams nas / rnal 'byor gyis yongs su bsdud pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi lam gyi rab tu dbye ba ni*; *Commentary* p. 15.4: *brgyad pa la ni rnam pa drug gis rnal 'byor gyi lam bstan te*.

¹²⁴*Compendium* p. 99d.2: *theg pa rnam par bzhag pa las brtsams nas theg pa'i rnam par dbye ba ji lta ba bzhin bstan pa ni*; *Commentary* p. 18.3: *dgu pa la ni pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa la mkhas par bya la brtsams nas 'dri ba dang lan brjod de / pha rol tu phyin pa rnams theg pa chen pos bsdus pa'i phyir ro*.

¹²⁵*Compendium* p. 104c.5: *theg pa rnam par gzhas pa kho na las brtsams nas de bzhin gshegs pa'i bya ba bsgrub pa'i rab tu dbye ba ni*; *Commentary* p. 21.1: *bcu pa la ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku la zhin tu rmongs pa rnams kyi gnyen por ni*.

no important differences in the views presented in the two texts. To take this a step farther, the fact that both texts preface their discussions of the chapters with similar statements fits with the idea that both were written by the same author, since Asaṅga could have expanded on his brief comments from the *Compendium* when he wrote the *Commentary*, or perhaps he condensed his ideas from the *Commentary* when he wrote the *Compendium*. In any case, Ḍzong-ka-ba's contention that Asaṅga would not have written a separate commentary in addition to the *Compendium* does not seem to be supported by a comparison of the portion of the text that quotes the sūtra and *The Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*.

Similarities between these texts are also found in their formats. They are similar to each other (and different from the other commentaries) in that they are mainly "meaning commentaries." This means that they summarize the meaning of passages and sections, while the other commentaries on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are mainly "word commentaries" which quote terms, phrases, and passages and then comment on them. The comments of the *Compendium* are limited to short prefatory statements before the citation of each chapter that indicate the central meaning of the chapter, and the *Commentary* begins its discussion of each chapter with a similar statement concerning the focus of the chapter and then generally provides overviews of smaller sections. Many of these overviews take the form of divisions of the thought of the section, and these divisions are then sometimes explained individually, but more often simply stated and left unexplained.

d. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (byang chub rdzu 'phrul): *Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna, 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa)

The commentary attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül is the second-largest extant commentary on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, and it provides extensive explanations of the entire sūtra, especially the tenth chapter.¹²⁶ It is found in the “Miscellaneous” (*sna tshogs*) section of the *Sde dge* edition of the *Bstan 'gyur* (vols. *co, cho, jo*),¹²⁷ which is mainly composed of texts composed by Tibetan authors of the eighth and ninth centuries. The name of the author is given as “*Byang chub rdzu 'phrul*” in *Sde dge*, but no author is mentioned in Peking. As Steinkellner has pointed out, *Byang chub rdzu 'phrul* is an epithet of the King *Khri Srong lde brtsan*, and a number of works are attributed to him in the Tibetan canon.¹²⁸

Steinkellner¹²⁹ refers to works by MacDonald and Stein¹³⁰ that indicate that the two parts of the name *byang chub* and *rdzu 'phrul* refer to specific attributes of the king: (1)

¹²⁶The particular focus of this work on the tenth chapter has been noted by Steinkellner (“Who Was *Byang chub rdzu 'phrul*”, op. cit., p. 279), who speculates that the stress laid on this particular chapter of the sūtra may have been due to the author’s interest in the sections devoted to reasoning, which Steinkellner speculates may have proved useful to the scholar-monks who were propagating Buddhism in Tibet.

¹²⁷In the Peking edition this section is called “Wondrous Treatises” (*ngo tshar bstan bcos*), and this commentary is found in vols. *co* and *cho*.

¹²⁸Steinkellner (“Who Was *Byang chub rdzu 'phrul*”), pp. 278-82. For instance, Bu-ñdon lists the author of the *Bka' yang dag pa'i tshad ma* (a commentary on the tenth chapter of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*) as *Khri srong lde brtsan*, and he later refers to the author as “*Lha btsan po Byang chub rdzu 'phrul*” [Steinkellner cites Lokesh Chandra, ed., *Bstan bsgyur gyi dkar chag, yid bzhin nor bu dbang gi rgyal po'i phreng ba*, in *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (New Delhi, 1971, vol. 26, pp. 401-643), number 633.3 and 7].

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 278-9.

¹³⁰Steinkellner cites: (1) Ariane MacDonald, “Une lecture des Pelliot Tibétain 1286, 1287, 1038, 1047, et 1290. Essai sur la formation et l’emploi des mythes politiques

the idea that he is a Bodhisattva (*byang chub sems dpa'*) and (2) his magical powers (*rdzu 'phrul*), and he refers to the use of the epithet *'phrul gyi lha byang chub chen po* in an inscription devoted to *Khri srong lde brtsan* that is cited by Richardson.¹³¹ This title, as Steinkellner notes, is not exactly the same as *byang chub rdzu 'phrul*, but does contain the two main elements of this epithet, namely the King's enlightenment (*byang chub*) and his magical power (*'phrul*). He concludes that "it is clear that *Byan chub rdzu 'phrul* was a well known name for the king *Khri Sroṅ lde brtsan* at the time of Bu ston."¹³²

Bu-dōn speculates that the author of this treatise was actually the translator (*lo tsa ba*) Lū-gyel-tsen (*klu'i rgyal mtshan*),¹³³ and in this *Catalogue of the Bstan 'gyur* (*bstan 'gyur dkar chag*) he indicates that he thinks that the *Byang chub rdzu 'phrul* commentary corresponds to another commentary attributed to *Khri srong lde brtsan* in

dans la religion royale de Sroṅ-bcan-sgam-po", in *Études Tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*, Paris, 1971, pp. 190-391; (2) R.A. Stein, "Un ensemble sémantique Tibétain: créer et procréer, être et devenir, vivre, nourrir et guérir", in *BSOAS* #36, 1973, pp. 412-423; (3) Stein, "Saint et devin: un titre Tibétain et Chinois des rois Tibétains", in *Journal Asiatique* #269, 1981, pp. 231-275; and (4) Stein, "Tibetica Antiqua I", in *BEFEO* #72, 1983, pp. 149-236.

¹³¹Steinkellner, op. cit., p. 279; the work by Hugh Richardson is *A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions* (London, 1985), p. 40, 11.33ff.

¹³²Steinkellner, op. cit., p. 279. He also mentions that none of the other catalogues mention the king as the author of this work, and that Bu-dōn mentions that some have thought that it was written by Asaṅga, but Bu-dōn thinks that this attribution is incorrect. His reasoning for rejecting the hypothesis of Asaṅga's authorship is based on the mention of a Tibetan work, the *Bka' yang dag pa'i tshad ma*, and it also cites Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, which was written long after Asaṅga.

¹³³Steinkellner (p. 280) translates the passage from Bu-dōn, which is found in Nishioka's version of Bu-dōn's *Chos bsgyur dkar chag* vol. II, p. 55.7-15.

the *Lhan dkar* catalogue.¹³⁴ Steinkellner also cites a passage in the commentary¹³⁵ that mentions the *Bka' yang dag pa'i tshad ma* (a commentary on the tenth chapter of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*) and states that it was composed by *Khri srong lde brtsan*, and the context indicates that *Khri srong lde brtsan* is a different author from the author of the commentary.

Steinkellner also notes that it is unlikely that the commentary could have actually been written by *Khri srong lde brtsan* because it is a work that indicates a high level of scholarly erudition on the part of its author, and it is unlikely that a king could have acquired the extent of technical knowledge evidenced in this work. For instance, the author of this commentary often goes into great detail in providing extensive divisions of terms, some of which extend to several levels of sub-divisions that in some cases span large sections of text. Steinkellner speculates that, as Bu-dōn contends,¹³⁶ the

¹³⁴See Steinkellner pp. 280-81. The passage in the *Catalogue of the Bstan 'gyur* is from Lokesh Chandra's edition (see note 113) p. 633.6. Steinkellner speculates that the reason for Bu-dōn's equation of the two texts is that both are said to consist of forty sections (*bam po*).

¹³⁵This passage is found in the Peking edition (#5845) p. 159.1.1. It is also cited by Bu-dōn (*Chos bsgyur dkar chag* vol. II, p. 55) as evidence that this commentary could not have been written by *Khri srong lde brtsan*.

¹³⁶Bu-dōn's contention that the author is actually Lū-gyel-tsen is also cited by Śer-śhul Ge-śhay in his *Zin bris* commentary on D̄zong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 29b.4), and he concurs with Bu-dōn's thought that the author is the great translator (*lo tsa ba*) *Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan* (although Śer-śhul Ge-śhay incorrectly cites the work in which Bu-dōn makes this assertion as the *Chos 'byung* rather than the *Chos bsgyur dkar chag*). If Bu-dōn's speculation is correct, this would mean that the probable time of composition of this text was during the reign of King Ral-ba-chen (*ral pa can*, r. 815-838), since according to Tsepon Shakabpa (*Tibet: A Political History*

author was actually the translator Ā-gyel-tsen, and he adds that there would be no problem with an accomplished translator's composing a scholarly commentary that demonstrates a wide range of knowledge of Buddhist thought and literature.

The author's general approach is to preface his remarks on a particular chapter by dividing it into sections and indicating the main thrust of each section. He then provides commentaries on individual verses, but (unlike Wonch'uk) he does not cite every verse or comment on the entire text; rather, he seems to have chosen the passages that interested him and commented on those. In addition, he often goes into great detail concerning particular topics (such as the four analyses discussed in chapter ten of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*) while other topics mentioned in the sūtra are either not mentioned or only discussed briefly. Also, unlike Wonch'uk, he seldom cites other works or authors, and instead seems to be giving his own interpretations without reference to the opinions of others.

Each of these commentaries has proven to be useful in studying the thought of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. The approach and style of each differs from the others, but taken as a group they complement each other, and each one offers insights into the thought of this difficult text. Asaṅga's commentary provides summaries of major sections of the sūtra, definitions of key terms, and divisions that help to understand the relations between different parts of the text. Wonch'uk's commentary is a comprehensive discussion of practically every phrase and term of the *Samdhinirmocana* and is useful both for its detailed discussions of passages and terms and for the way that it places the sūtra in philosophical perspective by relating its

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 49) this was the time of Ā-gyel-tsen's greatest productivity.

thought to a wide range of Buddhist sources, particularly works by Yogācāra writers. Jang-chup-dzu-trül's commentary is a masterpiece of traditional scholarship and provides incisive and cogent explanations for almost every passage of the sūtra. Unlike Wonch'uk's work, quotations from other sources are rare, and most of the opinions appear to reflect the author's own ideas. Jñānagarbha's commentary is limited to a discussion of the eighth chapter, but this chapter is in my opinion the most difficult in the sūtra, and Jñānagarbha's detailed comments were immensely helpful in translating the chapter and examining its thought. Each one of these commentaries provides insights into the meaning of difficult and obscure passages, and they are invaluable resources for those who wish to explore the thought of the sūtra.

II. Overview of the Text

1. The Title of the Sūtra

The full title of the sūtra in Sanskrit is “*Ārya-saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*”, which has been translated into Tibetan as “*Phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i mdo*”. The term “*ārya*” (Tibetan: *’phags pa*) means “honorable, respectable, noble...excellent”,¹ and is often prefixed to the titles of texts in the Tibetan recensions of the Buddhist canon.²

The term *saṃdhi* derives from the Sanskrit root $\sqrt{dhā}$ with the prefix (*upasarga*) *saṃ* and was equated by Tibetan and Indian translators with the term *dgongs pa*, which Sarat Chandra Das states means “to think, reflect, meditate, consider”, “the act of thinking, reflection, cogitation”, or “to purpose, intend”.³ The *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (a recently published three-volume Tibetan-Tibetan-Chinese dictionary) states that *dgongs pa* is a term that is “an honorific for thinking or intention” (*bsam blo gtong ba’am sems pa’i zhe sa*).⁴ Monier-Williams translates *saṃdhi* as “junction, connection, combination, union with...association, intercourse with...comprehension, totality, the whole essence or scope of...agreement, compact...alliance, league. reconciliation, peace

¹M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Delhi, 1979), p. 152.

²For examples, see Hakuju Ui et. al., *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons* (Sendai, Japan, 1934), p. 58.

³Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 275.

⁴*Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (Chengdu, n.d.), p. 459.

between...making a treaty or peace, negotiating alliances”, and he states that *saṃ √dhā* means both (1) “to place or hold or put or draw or join or fasten or fix or sew together, unite...to combine, connect with...to bring together, reconcile” and (2) “intimate union, compact, agreement...a promise, vow...intention, design”.⁵ Edgerton states that it means “union, concord, conciliation”, “intention”, “esoteric meaning”, and that *saṃ √dhā* means “the ‘real’ meaning of a Buddhist text or doctrine”.⁶

The term *nirmocana* is a combination of the Sanskrit verbal root *√muc* or *√muñc* and the prefix (*upasarga*) *nir*, and was translated into Tibetan as *nges par 'grel pa*, a combination of the intensifying adverb *nges par*, “certainly, surely, really”⁷ and the verb *'grel pa*, which means “to explain, comment upon”, “to put in, arrange”.⁸ According to Monier-Williams, *nir √muc* means “to loosen, free from...liberate...to be freed or free one’s self from, get rid of”,⁹ and Edgerton states that the compound *saṃdhi-nirmocana* means “setting forth, unfolding the real truth, fundamental explanation”.¹⁰

As the above citations indicate, the terms *saṃdhi* and *nirmocana* have a wide range of possible meanings, and one finds corresponding differences among the scholars who have translated and commented on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. The term *saṃdhi* is interpreted in a number of ways: (1) the Tibetan translators rendered it as *dgongs pa*, which means “thought”, “intention”; (2) the Chinese translators rendered it as both “hidden”, “profound”, “secret” and “knot”, “bond”, “connection”. Hsüan-tsang

⁵M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. 1144.

⁶Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. 556.

⁷*Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 354.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 300.

⁹*Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 556.

¹⁰*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, vol. 2, p. 557.

translates the title of the sūtra as “*The Sūtra of the Profound Secret Connection*” (chieh shen mi ching, 解深密經), while Bodhiruci translates it as “*Sūtra Undoing the Knots of the Profound*” (shen mi chieh t’o ching, 深密解脫經), and Paramārtha translates it as “*Sūtra of the Knots of the Profound*” (chieh chieh ching, 解節經). Lamotte follows Hsüan-tsang’s rendering, and translates the title as “*L’Explication des Mystères*”, and he cites a variety of terms in which *saṃdhi* indicates something hidden, mysterious, or abstruse.¹¹ He also states that the literal meaning of the title is “sūtra untying knots” (*sūtra détachant les nœuds*).¹²

Wonch’uk states that according to Vasubandhu Indians recognize three meanings of the term *saṃdhi*: (1) a connection between two things (*dn̄gos po gnyis mtshams sbyar ba*); (2) the connections of the joints of bones (*rus pa’i tshigs ’grel pa*); or (3) profound paths (*lam zab mo*).¹³ He then states that translators translated it according to

¹¹Lamotte, *Sam̄dhinirmocana-sūtra*, pp. 12-13.

¹²Ibid., p. 12.

¹³Wonch’uk, *Extensive Commentary on the Profound Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (*ārya-gambhira-saṃdhinirmocana-sutra-ṭīkā*, ’phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa’i mdo’i rgya cher ’grel pa) (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985), *Sde dge* vol. ti (118), p. 72.6. The passage reads: *slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis bstan bcos sgrol ma zhes bya ba mdzad pa las kyang / don dam pa drug du yod par ’gyur zhe na / rgya gar skad du / san dhi nir mo tsa na zhes bya ba la / san dhi zhes bya ba ni don dam pa gsum dang ldan te / dang po ni rgya gar yul pa dag dn̄gos po gnyis mtshams sbyar ba la yang san dhi zhes ’bod do // gnyis pa ni rus pa’i tshigs ’grel pa la yang san dhi zhes zer ro // gsum pa ni lam zab mo la yang san dhi zhes zer bas / de nas lo tswa ba rnams so so nas don re re la brien nas bsgyur ba yin te / mdo sde ’di’i mtshan ni yang dag par na dgongs pa zab mo zhes bya ba yin no.*

In what appears to be a discussion of Paramārtha’s translation of the title (which is translated in the Tibetan version of Wonch’uk’s commentary as *Tshig nges par ’grel pa’i mdo*), Wonch’uk adds: “In another way, with regard to this sūtra, [the term

the individual meanings of the words of the title, and so they understood the term *saṃdhi* to mean “the correct profound thought” (*yang dag par na dgongs pa zab mo*). In an earlier section he indicated that in the case of the title of the *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra* “*saṃdhi*” refers to “statements in a secret manner” (*gsang ba'i tshul du gsungs*),¹⁴ which accords with the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang, Bodhiruci, and Paramārtha, all of whom used translation equivalents that mean “profound” or “secret”.

Among the commentaries on the *sūtra*, the most extensive explanation of the title is found in the introductory portion of the commentary attributed to Jang-chup-dzu-trül, which indicates that *saṃdhi* has connotations of profundity and hiddenness and that the text helps one to cut the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience:

This [title] *Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* (*'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*) is designated according to the level of meaning. This [*sūtra*], definitely delineates the meaning of the profound thought and indirect thought of the Tathāgata and cuts all the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience; here, '*Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana*' is designated as the name of the *sūtra*.... With respect to that, '*ārya*' (*'phags pa*) means 'one who is very distanced from all sinful non-virtuous qualities.' '*Samḍhi*' (*dgongs pa*) [refers to] the profound thought and indirect thought of the Tathāgata. Also, in one aspect the meaning of the words [refers] to the knots

saṃdhi] is nominally designated from an example; therefore it is [translated as] 'word' or 'connection'. So the connection between the meaningful words and things is like the interconnection of joints of bones” (*gzhan du na mdo sde 'di ni dpe las mtshan du brags pas tshigs zhes bya ba dang / mtshams sbyor ba zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar don gyi tshigs dang / dngos po 'grel pa ji ltar rus pa'i tshigs phan tshun 'grel ba lta bur gyur pa'i phyir ro*).

¹⁴Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 4.6.

of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience. 'Nirmocana' (*nges par 'grel pa*) [refers to] definite delineation. It refers to 'definite delineation of the profound thought and indirect thought of the Tathāgata'. Also, in one aspect the meaning of the words means to cut completely: this refers to 'completely cutting all of the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience'. With respect to that, if the meaning of the words is brought together in a general way: it definitely unties the profound thought of the Tathagata and it cuts all of the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience; hence, it both explains [Buddha's] thought and completely cuts knots.¹⁵

¹⁵Explanation of the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought (*'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa*, *arya-saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna*), Tohoku #4358 (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, 1985), vol. *cho* (205), p. 8.2: *'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo 'di yang don gyi gnas skabs las btags pa yin te / 'dis de bzhin gshegs pa'i dgongs pa dang ldem por dgongs pa zab mo'i don nges par gtan la 'bebs shing nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mdud pa ma lus pa gcod pas 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa zhes mdo sde'i ming du btags pa yin te...de la 'phags pa zhes bya ba ni sdig pa mi dge ba'i chos thams cad las ring du gyur pa zhes bya ba'i don to // dgongs pa zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i dgongs pa dang ldem por dgongs pa zab mo dag go // yang tshig gi don rnam pa gcig tu na nyon mongs pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mdud pa la yang bya'o / nges par 'grel pa zhes bya ba ni nges par gtan la 'bebs pa ste / de bzhin gshegs pa'i dgongs pa dang ldem por dgongs pa zab mo'i don nges par gtan la 'bebs pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // yang tshig gi don rnam gcig tu na ma lus par gcod pa'i don te // nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mdud pa ma lus par gcod pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // de la tshig gi don spyir bsdu na de bzhin gshegs pa'i dgongs pa zab mo nges par bkrol bas nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mdud pa ma lus par gcod pas na / de ni dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa yang yin la / mdud pa ma lus par gcod pa yang yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro.*

I have chosen to translate the term *saṃdhi* as “thought” in accordance with the Tibetan translations of the sūtra primarily because this accords with the structure of the text itself, which consists of a series of questions by disciples of Buddha who ask him to explain the thought behind his earlier teachings. In this sūtra he explains his thought, the basic intention that lay behind the literal reading of the words he uttered. For example, in chapter seven the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata says to Buddha:

I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking (*ci las dgongs te*) when he said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], ‘All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’ I ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying, ‘All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’

Buddha replies:

Paramārthasamudgata...your thought (*sems pa*) of asking the Tathāgata about the meaning of this is good. Therefore, Paramārthasamudgata, listen to my explanation (*bshad pa*) of my thought (*ngas gang la dgongs te*) with respect to that in consideration of which I said, ‘All phenomena are without entityness, all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’¹⁶

In this passage, the question and answer indicate that when Buddha taught that ‘all phenomena are without entityness’ and so forth he was thinking (*dgongs te*) of something else and that he will now explain (*bshad pa*) his thought. Similar statements can be found in other parts of the sūtra. For instance:

¹⁶Translation p. 63; Dōk p. 46.2.

(1) in chapter eight (pp. 103; *Dōk* p. 94.4) Buddha is asked to explain (*gsungs*) what he was thinking of (*dgongs te*) when he said, “A dirty pot, for example, an unclean mirror, for example, and an agitated pond, for example, are not suitable for viewing the signs of one’s own face, and the opposites of those are suitable”; (2) in chapter nine (p. 141; *Dōk* p. 138.4) Buddha is asked about the thought (*dgongs pa*) behind his statement, “Both the Hearer Vehicle and the Great Vehicle are one vehicle”; and (3) in chapter ten (p. 159; *Dōk* p. 157.4) Buddha is asked what he was thinking of (*ci las dgongs*) when he said, “Due to the power of the blessings of Tathāgatas [and Bodhisattvas] the marvellous bodies of humans in the Desire Realm...[appear]”.

As these passages indicate, in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* Buddha is presented with questions concerning certain teachings that he has given in the past that are either conceptually difficult or contradictory with teachings that were presented at other times, and he is asked to explain what he was thinking of when he gave them. For this reason, I have chosen to translate *saṃdhi* as “thought” in preference to its other possible meanings.

As with the term *saṃdhi*, there are differing opinions among the translators and commentators concerning how *nirmocana* should be interpreted. Bodhiruci’s translation of the title as “*Sūtra Undoing the Knots of the Profound*”, Lamotte’s contention that the title literally means “*Sūtra Untying Knots*”, and Jeffrey Hopkins’ translation of the title as “*Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*”¹⁷ reflect the literal meaning of the term, which is derived from the root \sqrt{muc} or $\sqrt{mūñc}$, which means “to liberate”, “to free”, “to release”. These connotations are reflected in the passage from Jang-chup-dzu-trül’s commentary cited above, in which he states that this sūtra helps one to cut the bonds of

¹⁷See, for example, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 426-7.

the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience. They are also reflected in Jñānagarbha's discussion of the title, which contains a similar statement:

Samḍhinirmocana means 'cutting the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience' through definitely freeing (*nges par dkrol bas*) the profound thought [of Buddha]. It is a 'sūtra' because it is simply a complete statement of what is definite.¹⁸

Bodhiruci's translation and the commentaries of Jang-chup-dzu-trül and Jñānagarbha reflect the literal meaning of *nirmocana*, which means "to liberate", "to free", "to unbind", "to untie", "to unravel" and they also reflect the fact that in the *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra* Buddha unravels the conceptual knots created by his earlier contradictory or abstruse statements and, as Jñānagarbha and Jang-chup-dzu-trül state, this helps his audience to free themselves from the knots of afflictions.

The Tibetan and Indian translators, however, translated *nirmocana* as *nges par 'grel pa*, which means "to explain, comment upon" or "to put in, arrange" according to Sarat Chandra Das.¹⁹ Equating *nirmocana* with *nges par 'grel pa* is a case of a "meaning translation", and it apparently reflects the fact that throughout the sūtra Buddha is asked to explain the thought behind his earlier teachings, as is indicated by the fact that he uses verbs that mean "to explain", "to teach", or "to expound" to describe what he is doing. For example:

¹⁸Jñānagarbha, *Commentary on Just the Chapter of the Superior Maitreya from the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought* (*ārya-maitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhāṣya*, 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe'i bshad pa), Tohoku #4033, Ōtani University Press, *sems tsam* vol. 2 (bi), p. 318b.5: dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa zhes bya ba ni dgongs pa zab mo nges par bkrol bas / nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mdud pa gcod pa zhes bya ba'i don to // mdo zhes bya ba ni nges pa ma lus par smos pa nyid kyis so.

¹⁹A Tibetan-English Dictionary, p. 300.

(1) When asked in chapter seven why he taught the idea of one vehicle (*theg pa gcig, ekayāna*) Buddha states that the path of purification is the same in all three vehicles (i.e., the Hearer vehicle, the Solitary Realizer vehicle, and the Bodhisattva vehicle), and he concludes (p. 70; *Dōk* p. 54.6), “Thinking of that, I explain that there is one vehicle” (*‘di la dgongs nas ngas theg pa gcig tu bshad kyi*); (2) later in the same chapter (p. 71; *Dōk* p. 56.1) he says that his doctrine was “explained with a thought [behind it]” (*bsam pa rnam par dag pas bshad pa*); (3) at the conclusion of the chapter (p. 84; *Dōk* p. 72.1), Paramārthasamudgata asks, “Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in this form [of explanation] of doctrine that explains [your] thought?” (*bcom ldan ‘das dgongs pa nges par ‘grel pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs ‘di la nges par bstan pa ‘di’i ming ci lags*); this formula also occurs at the conclusions of chapters eight, nine, and ten; (4) in chapter ten, Mañjushrī asks Buddha to summarize his teachings: “Supramundane Victor, please teach the quintessential meanings (*gzung kyi don bstan du gsol*) by which Bodhisattvas enter into the indirect thought²⁰ of the profound doctrines spoken by the Tathāgata” (*de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs pa’i chos zab mo rnams kyi ldem por dgongs pa la yang dag par ‘jug par ‘gyur zhing*), to which Buddha replies: “Listen, Mañjushrī, and I will explain to you all of the quintessential meanings (*gzungs kyi don ma lus par khyod la bshad do*), in order that Bodhisattvas may enter into that which I have said in indirect speech” (*byang*

²⁰For discussions of this and related terms, see *Somme* notes p. 23, *Compendium* II.2, and David S. Ruegg, “An Indian Source for the Tibetan Hermeneutical Term *Dgoñs Gzi* ‘Intentional Ground’”, in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 16, 1988, pp. 1-4 and “Purport, Implicature, and Presupposition”, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 13, 1985, pp. 309-325.

chub sems dpa' rnam ngas ldem po ngag du gsungs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir).

As these examples indicate, throughout the sūtra Buddha and his interlocutors describe what he is doing as “explaining” or “teaching” and his interlocutors ask him to explain “what he was thinking of”.²¹ As with my choice of the word “thought” to translate

²¹It should be noted also that the sūtra contains many more statements in which Buddha states that he is “explaining” (*bshad pa*) his thought or “teaching” (*bstan pa*), for instance:

(1) Buddha’s statement in chapter two (p. 34; *Dok* p. 15.7), “I am completely enlightened with respect to the ultimate, which has a character completely transcending all argumentation, and having completely realized it I also have explained and clarified it [for others], and I have opened it up, revealed it, and taught it” (*ngas ni don dam pa rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te / mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bshad cing gsal bar byas / rnam par phye / gdags pa byas / rab tu bstan to*); (2) in chapter five, after being asked about the meaning of the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness, Buddha answers (p. 51; *Dok* p. 34.7), “Vishālamati, I will explain (*bshad*) to you the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness”; (3) at the beginning of chapter six (p. 56; *Dok* p. 40.2), Buddha says, “Guṇākara, I will explain (*bshad*) to you the character of phenomena”; (4) in chapter eight (p. 102; *Dok* p. 92.7), Buddha is asked, “What are exalted wisdoms that know doctrines and that know meanings of Bodhisattvas who cultivate calm abiding and special insight?”, to which he replies “Maitreya, I teach (*bstan mod kyi*) enumerations of exalted wisdom and insight extensively, but I will explain it briefly” (*mdor bstan to*); (5) later in the chapter (p. 106; *Dok* p. 97.6), Buddha is asked to teach about emptiness, and Buddha agrees to the request by answering, “Maitreya...I will fully explain to you the character of emptiness” (*byams pa...khyod la stong pa'i mtshan nyid rdzogs par bshad kyis*); (6) in chapter nine (p. 132; *Dok* p. 128.4), Buddha states, “[I] will explain to you (*khyod la bshad*) — collectively and specifically — the purities of the perfections”; (7) on p. 140

saṃdhi, my decision to translate *nirmocana* as “explaining” in accordance with the Tibetan translation of *nges par 'grel pa* is based on the structure of the text itself, in which Buddha “explains” his thought to his audience.

The choice of this “meaning translation”, which reflects the structure of the text, is also guided by Wonch'uk's gloss of *nges par 'grel pa* with *rnam par bshad pa*,²² “to

(Dok p. 137.2), Buddha states, “I thoroughly explain (*rab bshad*) that the state of having abandoned all assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in the marrow...is the Buddha ground”.

Of course, it is not surprising that Buddha states that he is “explaining” or “teaching”, and one could undoubtedly find any number of other examples in other sūtras that contain similar statements. They do, however, serve to corroborate the idea that this is a text in which Buddha explains his thought, as well as a text in which he unravels the conceptual knots that his earlier teachings had created for some of his followers.

²²Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 73.2 and 212.1. The first passage reads:

‘*Nirmocana*’ is *rnam par 'grel pa*; this means ‘explain’. Therefore, in the master Paramārtha's *Tshigs nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i brjed byang byas ba* [his translation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sutra*] *nges par 'grel pa* [means] explain. *Tshigs* [means] hard and knot. With respect to that, hard [means] firm. Knot [means] bond. So just as there are hard and firm things and knots and bonds within the joints of wood and of humans the profound thoughts of the teachings within this sūtra are also very difficult to realize and very difficult to untie; therefore, it cannot be realized and understood by ordinary beings and beginning Bodhisattvas, whereby it is ‘hard and knotty’. Because this sūtra unties, it is called ‘*Tshigs nges par 'grel pa*’. Furthermore — because having included all the very subtle and difficult to understand meanings from among all the treatises of the Great Vehicle that are contained in this sūtra they are explained clearly — this sūtra is called ‘*Tshigs nges par 'grel pa*’. (*nir mo tsa na zhes bya ba ni rnam par 'grel ba la bya ste / rnam par bshad pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / de'i phyir slob dpon yang dag bden pas tshigs nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i brjed byang byas ba las / nges par 'grel pa ni rnam par bshad pa'o // tshigs ni sra ba dang mdud pa ste / de la sra ba*

explain, to declare, prove, enunciate”²³ and Jang-chup-dzu-trül’s statement that the title implies both that it cuts the knots of the obstructions and explains [Buddha’s] thought: “because it definitely frees the profound thought of the Tathāgata and because it cuts all of the knots of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, it both explains [Buddha’s] thought and cuts all knots”.²⁴ This meaning is also reflected in Wonch’uk’s statement, “Because in this sūtra the meaning of the very profound and hidden thought of all of the three vehicles which is difficult to untie is revealed and clearly indicated, it is called ‘[Sūtra] *Explaining the Profound Thought*’.”²⁵ That the term *nirmocana* in the title can mean “explain” or “teach” is also seen in: (1) Jang-chup-dzu-trül’s statement (cited in example 5 above), [the phrase,] “...this form [of explanation] of doctrine that explains [your] thought” (*dgongs pa nges par ’grel pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs ’di*) “refers to the general presentation of the body of this sūtra that teaches the definitive meaning” (*nges pa’i don bstan pa’i mdo sde ’di’i lus rnam*

ni brtan pa’o // mdud pa ni ’ching ba ste / ji ltar shing dang mi’i rus pa’i tshigs dag las sra zhing brten pa’i dngos po dang / mdud pa’i ’ching ba dag yod pa bzhin du / mdo sde ’di las bstan pa’i dgongs pa zab mo yang shin tu rtogs par dka’ zhing shin tu dgrol bar dka’ bas so so’i skye bo dang spyod pa dang po’i byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyis rtogs shing shes par bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir don ’di sra ba dang mdud pa zhes bya ste / mdo sde ’dis ’grol bar mdzad pa’i phyir tshigs nges par ’grel pa zhes bya’o // gzhan yang theg pa chen po’i bstan bcos thams cad las shin tu phra zhing rtogs par dka’ ba’i don ’byung ba de dag mdo sde ’dir bsdus nas / gsal bar rnam par bshad pa’i phyir / mdo sde ’dis tshigs nges par ’grel pa zhes bya’o zhes bshad de).

²³Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 1252.

²⁴See above, note 17.

²⁵Wonch’uk, vol. ti (118), p. 4.7: *theg pa gsum po thams cad kyis shin tu zab cing mkhyud pa rnam par dgrol par dka’ ba’i don mdo sde ’di las rnam par phye ste gsal bar ston par mdzad pas na / dgongs pa zab mo nges par ’grel pa zhes bya’o*.

par gzhaḡ pa);²⁶ (2) Edgerton's statement that the compound *saṃdhi-nirmocana* means "setting forth, unfolding the real truth, fundamental explanation";²⁷ and (3) Lamotte's use of the French term "*explication*" to translate *nirmocana*.

In choosing "explaining" over other possible equivalents I have followed the Tibetan translation, which appears to have been based on a consideration of the format of the sūtra. The choice of *rnam par 'grel pa*, "to explain, to comment upon" instead of *rnam par bkrol pa*, "to liberate, unravel, free" indicates that the Tibetan translators decided to use a term that reflected the *modus operandi* of the text itself, which consists of questions about Buddha's thought and his explanations. While it is true that many of these explanations could also be seen as attempts to "unravel" conceptual knots or "free" his listeners from the bonds of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, the fact that when Buddha is questioned about the thought behind his earlier teachings he responds by offering to "explain" himself indicates that the Tibetan translation reflects an important aspect of the architecture of the text. In the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* we find a number of explanations that attempt to show ways to reconcile apparent contradictions in Buddha's earlier teachings and to define his thought, and the translation "*Sūtra Explaining the Thought*" was chosen in order to indicate something of the format of the text and what it attempts to do, given that no single translation into English (or Tibetan) can reflect the dual meaning perceived by the commentators.

2. The Character of the Ultimate

a. The Ultimate is Ineffable and of a Non-Dual Character

²⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül, vol. *cho* (205), p. 268.6. A similar passage is found on p. 462.4.

²⁷*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, vol. 2, p. 557.

The *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* consists of ten chapters of unequal length, each of which deals with a specific subject or set of subjects, and each of which has a specific person who serves as the main interlocuter. With the exception of Subhūti, for whom the fourth chapter is named, the interlocuters are high-level Bodhisattvas. The introduction states that the Bodhisattvas present on the occasion of the teaching of the sūtra have all “progressed to the irreversible grounds” (*phyir mi ldog pa’i sa bgrod pa*). According to Wonch’uk, the “irreversible grounds” are the eighth through tenth grounds, but Jang-chup-dzu-trül²⁸ only states that the term refers to the eighth ground. He adds that all of these Bodhisattvas have received prophecies that they will attain omniscience. All of the Bodhisattvas in the audience are said by the sūtra to have attained the level of the irreversible grounds, and from among these the introduction lists the names of the ten Bodhisattvas who speak in the sūtra. These are referred to by the sūtra as “great beings” (*sems dpa’ chen po, mahāsattva*). Jeffrey Hopkins reports that the Second Dalai Lama thinks that they have all attained the tenth Bodhisattva ground,²⁹ an idea that Hopkins reports is echoed by Gung-tang.³⁰ Wonch’uk, however, after reporting a similar opinion, declares that this is an incorrect idea that is found in the *’Phags pa’i*

²⁸See Wonch’uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 195.3 and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 60.7.

²⁹Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition) pp. 129-131. Hopkins states that this idea is found in *Rgyal ba dge ’dun gya mtsho*’s commentary on the difficult points of the *Legs bshad snying po* (entitled *Rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa’i gsung ’bum las drang nges rnam ’byed kyi dka’ ’grel dgongs pa’i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i sgron me*, blockprint from the library of H.H. The Dalai Lama, n.d., p. 6a.3).

³⁰Jeffrey Hopkins (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, pp. 129-131) reports that this passage is found in Gung-tang’s (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me*, 1762-1823) *Commentary on Āzong-ka-ba’s Legs bshad snying po*, entitled *Drang nges rnam ’byed kyi dka’ ’grel risom ’phro legs bshad snying po’i yang snying* (Sarnath: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965), pp. 73.13-74.6.

tshigs nges par 'grel pa'i mdo (Paramārtha's Chinese translation of the sūtra) and the texts of the Sarvāstivādins.³¹ He states that according to the author of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* these "great beings" are fully enlightened in this very lifetime.

Although there is a disagreement concerning whether or not the Bodhisattvas who are the interlocuters of the sūtra have already attained enlightenment or are in the penultimate lifetime before attaining full enlightenment, Wonch'uk, Jang-chup-dzu-trül, Asaṅga,³² the Second Dalai Lama, and Gung-tang all agree that they are at a very high level of attainment. They are at or near the completion of their training and have reached an advanced level of realization, which indicates that their questions will presumably deal with matters of concern to high-level Bodhisattvas.

Although the interlocuters of the first seven chapters — Gambhīrārthasaṃdhi-nirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, and Paramārthasamudgata — are to my knowledge only mentioned in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, the interlocuters of the last three chapters — Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara, and Mañjuśrī — are well-known figures in the Mahāyāna Buddhist pantheon. Maitreya is the being who will become the next Buddha of the present era and is presently residing in the Tuṣita heaven in preparation for his final rebirth as a Buddha.³³ Avalokiteśvara³⁴ is the embodiment of compassion in Mahāyāna mythology, and Mañjuśrī³⁵ is the embodiment of wisdom.

³¹Vol. ti (118), pp. 202.1.

³²See *Explanation of the Superior Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, pp. 6.7-8.2, which discusses their exalted spiritual attainments.

³³According to Wonch'uk (vol. thi [119], p. 172) he is called "Love" (*byams pa, maitreya*) "because his nature is endowed with love and compassion". Regarding this Bodhisattva, see: Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., *Maitreya*, Princeton, 1986; Lewis Lancaster, "Maitreya", in *Encyclopedia of Religions*, ed. Mircea Eliade, pp. 136-141; Shinjou Suguro, "On Maitreya", in *Bukkyō Gaku*, vol. 21, 1987, pp. 1-28; and Hisao Inagaki, "Haribhadra's Quotations from Jñānagarbha's *Anantamukha-*

nirhāra-dhāraṇīṭikā”, in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, pp. 139-40, which discusses Haribhadra’s etymology of Maitreya’s name in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*.

³⁴Avalokiteshvara (Tib. *spyan ras gzigs dbang phyugs*) is one of the most important personages in Mahāyāna Buddhism. As Har Dayal notes (*The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, Delhi, 1970, pp. 46-49), he is the embodiment of compassion (*snying rje, karuṇā*), which, along with wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*) is one of the two main principles of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Dayal adds (p. 47) that his name literally means “The Lord Who Looks Down”, implying that he views the sufferings of sentient beings with compassion. According to Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 488.5), he is named ‘Avalokiteshvara’ “because within this Bodhisattva there is effortless natural wisdom and compassion, he has autonomy in terms of the three actions, physical perfection and so forth”. He then goes on to give other etymologies (on pp. 488-9) from several sūtras, including one from the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* that states: “Due to the power of his auspicious exalted wisdom, Avalokiteshvara thoroughly protects [sentient beings] from the worldly fears.”

He figures prominently in many Mahāyāna sūtras, e.g., several Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* (in which he is said to be one of the Bodhisattvas in the Pure Land of Amitābha), and the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (which has an entire chapter [number 24; number 25 in Kumārajīva’s Chinese version] in which he is the main figure). In the latter sūtra, he is said to be the savior of beings in trouble. It is said that by merely remembering his name with devotion one can be saved in times of trouble.

For more on this Bodhisattva, see: (1) *Introduction à l’étude d’Avalokiteṣvara* by Marie-Thérèse de Mallmann (Paris, 1948), which deals with his representations in Buddhist art; (2) “À propos Avalokiteśvara” by Giuseppe Tucci, in *MCB* 9 (1948-51), pp. 173-220, which disagrees with key theses of de Mallmann’s work; (3) *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* by Har Dayal (Delhi, 1970), pp. 46-49; and (4) “Kuan-yin: The Cult of Half Asia”, by C.N. Tay, in *History of Religions* 16 (Nov. 1976), pp. 147-77.

³⁵As Har Dayal notes, (*The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, Delhi, 1970, pp. 46-49), Mañjushrī (*’jam dpal*), whose name literally means “Soft

Glory”, is considered to be a master of wisdom in Mahāyāna mythology and is associated with inspired courage (*spobs pa, pratibhāna*). As Dayal notes (p. 46), he is also sometimes referred to as “Soft Voice” (*mañjughoṣa*), “Lord of Speech” (*vāgīśvara*) and “Crown Prince” (*kumāra-bhūta*). He is an important figure in the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and is often a main interlocutor in them, generally asking Buddha about the perfection of wisdom (*shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, prajñā-pāramitā*).

According to Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 193.6), he is named “Mañjushri” because “his mind [that realizes] the truth of suchness is permanently peaceful and isolated, benefits all enemies and friends, and does not harm them.” Wonch’uk cites a commentary on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* as stating that he is “endowed with the meaning of ‘glory’ (*dpal, śrīyas*) because he is revered by all worldlings and is said to be praised by offerings and praised by everyone”. On p. 194.1 Wonch’uk adds: “In reality this Bodhisattva is a Tathāgata who also thoroughly teaches the doctrine of Buddhism; therefore, he teaches in the form of a Bodhisattva.”

Jeffrey Hopkins reports (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, p. 13 n. 13) that according to Ser-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay (*ser shul dge bshes blo bzang phun tshogs*) — in his commentary on the “Mind-Only” (*sems tsam*) section of Ḍzong-ka-ba’s *Legs bshad snying po*, entitled *Drang nges rnam ’byed kyi zin bres zab don gsal ba’i sgron me* (Mysore: Sera Byes Monastery, n.d., L.C. #75-90632, pp. 3a.6-3b.1) — he is “smooth” due to being free from the roughness and coarseness of the afflictions (*nyon mongs pa, kleśa*). Hopkins (ibid., pp. 81-82) adds that Jam-yang-shay-ba (*’jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, in his *Dam pa’i chos mngon pa mdzod kyi don legs par bshad pa rin po che’i gru gzugs zhes bya ba’i gnas dang po* [Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972, *Collected Works of ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, vol. 7.1], p. 6.6] states that he is called “Smooth Glory” “because he is smooth, possesses the attribute of smoothness, and is endowed with the glory of the two collections [of merit and wisdom]” (*’jam zhing mnyen pa’i gsung can tshogs gnyis kyi dpal dang ldan pas ’jams dpal*).

For more on this Bodhisattva, see: Étienne Lamotte’s “Mañjuśrī” in *T’oung pao* 48, 1960, pp. 1-96; Raoul Birnbaum’s *Studies on the Mysteries of Mañjuśrī*, Boulder, 1983; *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (tr. Étienne Lamotte; English tr. Sara Boin, London,

Among the interlocuters of the sūtra the only non-Bodhisattva is Subhūti, for whom the fourth chapter is named. Since Subhūti is said in several texts to be the most advanced of Buddha's Hearer disciples in realization of emptiness, this is probably the reason for his inclusion among this distinguished assembly.³⁶

The exalted status of the interlocuters serves to establish that this is an advanced teaching, and this is also confirmed by the fact that the setting of the sūtra is a celestial palace that fills countless worldly realms and that reflects the perfections of the Buddha who inhabits it.³⁷ This idea is expanded upon by Asaṅga's *Commentary* (p. 5.5), which states:

1976), p. 113 note 1; David Snellgrove's *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Boston: Shambala, 1987), pp. 59-60 and 312-17; "The Litany of Names of Mañjuśrī" by Ronald M. Davidson in *Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honor of Professor R.A. Stein*, vol. 1, MCB 20, 1981, pp. 1-69.

³⁶See the excellent note provided by Étienne Lamotte in *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (London: Pāli Text Society, 1976) pp. 54-5, which gives a brief biography of Subhūti that is drawn from a number of sources and indicates a number of places where he is said to be the greatest of Buddha's disciples in realization of emptiness. See also note 178 to the translation and Wonch'uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 359.5-359.6, where he also mentions this idea.

³⁷This is found at the beginning of the sūtra, ranging from pp. 25-27 (Dok pp. 4-8). The sūtra opens with a statement concerning the wondrous qualities of the palace:

— Thus have I heard: at one time the Supramundane Victor was dwelling in an inestimable great palace, arrayed with seven various precious substances blazing brightly, extensively filling countless worldly realms, thoroughly giving rise to great rays of light, with a great many individual sections, laid out limitlessly, [4] an uninterrupted area, in a sphere of activity that completely transcends the three worlds, having arisen from the supreme root of virtues of that which is beyond the world, characterized by the completely pure mind of one who has mastery, an abode of the Tathāgata, along with a community of innumerable Bodhisattvas, with *devas*, *nāgas*, *yakṣas*, *gandharvas*, *asuras*,

It is (1) perfect in terms of color; (2) perfect in terms of shape; (3) perfect in terms of measurement; (4) perfect in terms of area; (5) perfect in terms of causes; (6) perfect in terms of nature; (7) perfect in terms of its master; (8) perfect in terms of servants; (9) perfect in terms of direction; (10) perfect in terms of resources; (11) perfect in terms of accomplishing activities; (12) perfect in terms of non-harmfulness; (13) perfect in terms of opponents; (14) perfect in terms of support; (15) perfect in terms of the particulars of the master's abode; (16) perfect in terms of vehicle; (17) perfect in terms of entrance; and (18) perfect in terms of basis.

In addition to the praises of the excellent qualities of the palace and exalted attainments of its inhabitants, the idea that this is a teaching for advanced practitioners is also indicated by statements at the end of four chapters in which Buddha concludes the discourse by stating that this is a teaching of definitive meaning (*nges pa'i don, nitārtha*) and should be apprehended as such, and he indicates the benefits that members of the assembly attain through hearing it. For instance, at the end of chapter seven, the sūtra states:

garuḍas, kiṃnaras, mahoragas, humans, and non-humans, all wandering about everywhere. The palace was firm by way of the joy and the great bliss of the taste of doctrine, thoroughly abiding because of thoroughly bringing about all the welfare of all sentient beings, [5] was free from all the harms of the defilements of the afflictions, completely free from all Demons (*bdud, māra*), surpassing all arrays, created by the blessing of the Tathāgata, definitely structured by great mindfulness, intelligence, and realization, the support of great calm abiding and special insight, operating by way of the great doors of liberation: emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, a great array of good qualities, kings of jewelled lotuses, [and ornamented by limitless collections of good qualities].

When this teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning, was set forth, 600,000 beings generated the unsurpassed, completely perfect mind of enlightenment; 300,000 Hearers [attained] the eye of doctrine that, with respect to phenomena, is undefiled and free from stains; 150,000 Hearers thoroughly released their minds from contaminations in terms of non-attachment; 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained the forbearance of the doctrine of non-production.³⁸

Thus, the text is presented as a definitive teaching both in terms of its structure and by means of statements that it is of definitive meaning. The setting is particularly significant, since it establishes from the beginning that the teaching of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* takes place in an exalted spot, a celestial palace, and it praises the high attainments of the residents, which includes the Buddha, an assembly of Hearers, and advanced Bodhisattvas. The implication is that those present on the occasion of the teaching of the sūtra are advanced practitioners, and so the discourse to follow will be for those of exalted spiritual status. The fact that the interlocutors include very advanced Bodhisattvas and the most accomplished of Buddha's Hearer disciples in the realization of emptiness also indicates that this is a teaching for advanced practitioners, and not for beginners.

This theme continues throughout the text, and there are numerous statements that indicate that the teachings of this sūtra are for the advanced and not for "children" (*byis pa, bāla*).³⁹ In addition, in the first four chapters the main interlocutors discuss the

³⁸Translation p. 85; *ĀDok* p. 72.1. Similar statements occur at the end of chapter eight (p. 117; *ĀDok* p. 110.5), chapter nine (p. 142; *ĀDok* p. 139.6), and chapter ten (p. 161; *ĀDok* p. 159.5).

³⁹See, for example, chapter one, beginning on p. 29 (*ĀDok* p. 10.2), which contrasts the awareness of Superiors to that of children:

differences between the understandings of Superiors (*'phags pa, ārya*) and “children”, and they indicate that the teachings of this text are in accordance with the understanding of Superiors. For example, the concluding stanzas of the first chapter state:

Even though the Conqueror taught the profound as not being the
domain of children, as ineffable and non-dual,

These children, obscured by ignorance, delight in elaborations of
speech and abide in duality.

Those who do not understand, or understand wrongly, are reborn
as sheep or oxen.

Having abandoned the speech of the wise, they are reborn here in

Similarly, when those sentient beings — who have childish natures, who are ordinary beings, who have not attained the supramundane wisdom of Superiors, who do not manifestly cognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena — see and hear these compounded and uncompounded things, they think: ‘These compounded and uncompounded things which appear [really] exist.’

Having thought this, they emphatically apprehend and manifestly conceive these in accordance with how they are seen and heard. They also subsequently impute conventional designations: ‘This is true; the other is false.’ Later these must be closely examined by them.

Regarding that, when those sentient beings — who do not have childish natures, who see the truth, who have attained the supramundane wisdom of Superiors, who manifestly cognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena — see and hear these compounded and uncompounded things, they think: ‘These compounded and uncompounded things which appear are non-existent. Those with regard to which the discrimination of compounded and uncompounded and the discrimination of attributes of compounded and uncompounded operate are compositional signs that arise from mental construction, like a magician’s illusions. These obscure the mind.’

cyclic existence for a very long time.⁴⁰

The first four chapters concentrate on the nature of the ultimate (*don dam pa*, *paramārtha*), and each focuses on a particular aspect of it. The first chapter begins with a statement that the ultimate “is ineffable and of a non-dual character” (*brjod du med pa / gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid*).⁴¹ This idea is developed through a comparison of the character of the compounded (*’dus byas*, *saṃskṛta*) and the uncompounded (*’dus ma byas*, *asaṃskṛta*).⁴² According to the Bodhisattva

⁴⁰Translation p. 32; *Dōk* p. 13.5. A similar thought can be found in the concluding verses to chapter five, which states:

If the appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
Having all the seeds, flowing like a river
Were conceived as being a self, this would not be suitable.
Therefore, I do not teach this to children.

⁴¹Translation p. 27; *Dōk* p. 8.3.

⁴²These two terms, compounded (*’du byas*, *saṃskṛta*) and uncompounded (*’du ma byas*, *asaṃskṛta*), are a common division that includes all phenomena. “Compounded” refers to phenomena that arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. The term literally means “put together” or “made”, and its opposite term, uncompounded, refers to whatever is not produced in dependence upon causes and conditions. According to Asaṅga’s *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (I.11), everything that is subject to arising (*utpāda*), extinction (*vyaya*), and abiding and change (*sthityanyathātva*) is the compounded.

Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 217.5) states that the “compounded” is so called because it is produced from the accumulation of many conditions. Quoting the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*bye brag tu bshad pa chen po*), he states: “Whatever phenomena subsist on the activity of aggregation by causes and conditions and are related with such are compounded.” Those that do not are uncompounded.

On page 218.1 he quotes Asaṅga to the effect that the uncompounded is non-conceptual, and hence Wonch’uk draws the conclusion that the compounded is associated with conceptuality. He adds that the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* states: “Whatever also appears in terms of production, cessation, abiding, and change is

Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, these two terms include all phenomena, but he states that the terms “compounded” and “uncompounded” are merely conventional designations used by Buddhas and Superiors in order to express their understanding of reality. He adds that these are only conventional expressions and that in reality the compounded is not compounded and the uncompounded is not uncompounded.

O son of good lineage, the so-called ‘all phenomena’ are of just two kinds, compounded and uncompounded. Concerning these, the compounded is not compounded, nor is the uncompounded uncompounded. The uncompounded is not uncompounded, nor is it compounded....The so-called ‘compounded’ is a term designated by the Teacher [i.e., Buddha]. This term, imputed by the Teacher, is a conventional expression arisen from mental construction. That which is a conventional expression arisen from mental construction is a thoroughly non-established conventional expression of various mental constructions. Therefore, it is not uncompounded....Because of their Superior’s exalted wisdom and Superior’s vision, Superiors perfectly realize the inexpressible, and because they are completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to the inexpressible reality, they nominally designate the ‘compounded’.⁴³

This passage indicates that the common division of phenomena into the two categories of “compounded” and “uncompounded” is merely a conventional one and is a nominal designation based on mental conventions. Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana adds that although Superiors completely understand the inexpressible reality, they use such conventionalities in order to communicate with ordinary beings who “have childish

‘compounded’. Whatever lacks production, cessation, abiding, and change is ‘uncompounded’.” See also *Visuddhimagga* XIV.456 and *Compendium* pp. 29 and 102.

⁴³Translation p. 28; *Dōk* p. 8.6.

natures, obscured natures, and natures of disordered wisdom”⁴⁴ because such beings require conceptual designations.

The perception of ordinary beings is compared to that of the audience of a magic show in which a magician chants a special *mantra* that causes a pile of sticks and pebbles to appear as a herd of elephants, an army, jewels, etc. The audience of such a show is said to be completely convinced of the reality of the illusory appearance, while other beings with superior faculties are able to perceive the illusion but know it to be false.⁴⁵

For example, a skilled magician or his skillful student, located at a crossing of four great roads, having gathered grasses, leaves, twigs, pebbles, and stones, displays various aspects of magical activities, as follows: a herd of elephants, cavalry, chariots, and infantry; collections of gems, pearls, *vaidūrya*,⁴⁶ conch-shells, crystal and coral; collections of wealth, grain, treasures and granaries.

When those sentient beings — who have childish natures, obscured natures, and natures of disordered wisdom, who do not realize that these are grasses, leaves, twigs, pebbles, and stones — see and hear those, they think this: ‘This herd of elephants which is an appearance exists; the herd of horses which is an appearance, and cavalry, chariots, infantry, wealth, pearls, gems, conch-shells, crystal, coral, grain, treasures, and granaries [all] exist.’

Having thought this, they emphatically apprehend and manifestly conceive in accordance with how they see and hear. They also subsequently impute

⁴⁴Translation p. 29; *Dok* p. 11.1: *sems can gang dag byis pa'i rang bzhin can / rmongs pa'i rang bzhin can / shes rab 'chal pa'i rang bzhin can.*

⁴⁵This analogy is found in chapter one, beginning on p. 29 (*Dok* p. 10.6).

⁴⁶*Vaidūrya*, according to Chandra Das (*A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 877), can refer to three different types of lapis-lazuli: (1) a yellow lapis-lazuli called a *mañjuri*; (2) a green lapis-lazuli called a *sugata*; and (3) a white lapis-lazuli called a *sūnya*.

conventional designations: 'This is true; the other is false.' Later, these must be closely examined by them.

When other sentient beings — who do not have childish or obscured natures, and who have natures endowed with wisdom, who realize that these are grasses, twigs, pebbles, and stones — see and hear these, they think this: 'These which appear in this way are not herds of elephants, and these which appear in this way are not herds of horses, cavalry, chariots, infantry, wealth, pearls, gems, conch-shells, crystals, coral, grain, treasures, granaries, and storehouses, and that with respect to which there arises a discrimination of a herd of elephants and a discrimination of the attributes of a herd of elephants and those with respect to which there arises discrimination of the attributes of collections of wealth, grain, treasures, and storehouses are creations of magic.'

Having thought: 'These deceive the eye,' they do not emphatically apprehend or manifestly conceive in accordance with how they see and hear, and thereupon they do not subsequently impute conventional designations: 'This is true, the other is false.' It is like this: They subsequently impute conventional designations in accordance with objects. Later it is not necessary that these [beings] closely examine those [conventional designations].⁴⁷

The people in the latter group are likened to Superiors, who see the mistaken appearances that other beings perceive when they look at phenomena, but know them to be false and so do not assent to the illusion. Because they are able to perceive the true nature of phenomena along with their false appearances, they create designations of "compounded" and "uncompounded" in order to indicate the differences between their perceptions and those of ordinary beings, to indicate that what these ordinary beings

⁴⁷Translation p. 29; *Dōk* p. 10.5.

perceive as reality is actually false. Even while making such distinctions, however, the Superiors know that ultimately these designations of “compounded” and “uncompounded” only operate on the level of conventionalities, and do not express the true nature of reality.

When those sentient beings — who do not have childish natures, who see the truth, who have attained the supramundane wisdom of Superiors, who manifestly cognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena — see and hear these compounded and uncompounded things, they think: ‘These compounded and uncompounded things which appear are non-existent. Those with regard to which the discrimination of compounded and uncompounded and the discrimination of attributes of compounded and uncompounded operate are compositional signs that arise from mental construction, like a magician’s illusions. These obscure the mind’....In that way, Superiors completely realize things as inexpressible by way of a Superior’s exalted wisdom and a Superior’s vision, and because they completely realize the ineffable reality they nominally designate [the terms] ‘compounded’ and ‘uncompounded’.⁴⁸

Wonch’uk⁴⁹ compares the magician to the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*, *ālaya-vijñāna*), which has created things that are unreal since beginningless time. The sticks and stones that serve as the basis for the illusions are compared to the seeds (*sa bon*, *bija*) that reside in the basis-consciousness, and the jewels and so forth that the audience perceives are the results of those seeds. The perceptions of ordinary beings are controlled by their predispositions, and so they are unable to perceive reality as it is, just like the audience at the magic show which is affected by the power of the

⁴⁸Translation p. 31; *Dok* p. 13.2.

⁴⁹Wonch’uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 238.3.

magician's *mantra* and is unable to see beyond the illusion. Until the point of Buddhahood, one's perceptions are influenced by the seeds deposited in the basis-consciousness and one's objects of experience are determined by them. A Buddha, by contrast, stands outside of the illusion but is able to perceive how ordinary beings apprehend reality. A Buddha's own perception, however, is free from the influence of predispositions, which enables him/her simultaneously to perceive the true nature of things and how they appear to others.⁵⁰

b. The Ultimate Transcends All Argumentation

The second chapter continues the discussion of the ultimate, stating that it is "a character that completely transcends all argumentation" (*rtog ge, tarka*),⁵¹ which seems to mean that those who argue about the ultimate and devise philosophical systems that attempt to categorize it are necessarily mistaken. In this chapter, "argumentation" seems to refer to intellectual gamesmanship and hair-splitting scholastic quibbling, which enmeshes people in disputation and prevents them from perceiving the ultimate.

Dharmodgata, the main interlocuter of this chapter, begins by describing a debate that he witnessed between proponents of various non-Buddhist systems, each of whom thought that his/her system accurately described the ultimate. These people are

⁵⁰See note 61 to the translation.

⁵¹This begins on p. 33 (*Dōk* p. 15.1). For a discussion of "argumentation", see note 85 to the translation.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 84.4) states that the condensed meaning of this whole chapter is the teaching that the ultimate is a character that completely transcends all argumentation. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 278.2) states that this character has five aspects: (1) it is known internally, individually, by oneself; (2) it is a signless sphere of activity; (3) it is inexpressible; (4) it is complete elimination of all conventionalities; and (5) it is a character that pacifies all disputation.

described as being involved in petty wrangling and as being overly attached to their mistaken systems.⁵² Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 89.5) states that they are unable to understand the ultimate due to five faults: “(1) the fault of thorough searching (*kun du tshol ba'i nyes pa*); (2) the fault of manifest pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi nyes pa*); (3) the fault of exaggerated adherence (*mngon par zhen pa'i nyes pa*); (4) the fault of imputation (*'dogs pa'i nyes pa*); and (5) the fault of disputation (*rtisod pa'i nyes pa*)”. Wonch'uk adds that their faulty views arise from mistakenly adhering to the view of the transitory collection (*'jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*), which leads them to other wrong views and causes them mistakenly to argue with others on the basis of these wrong views.⁵³

Their understandings are contrasted with the perceptions of Buddhas, who truly understand the ultimate. Buddhas know the ultimate to be beyond the realm of what can be described by words, something that cannot be argued about without missing its true nature, and because of this they are able to lead others to an understanding of it.⁵⁴ Dharmodgata states that the debate took place in a distant world in which teachers of non-Buddhist systems had gathered to discuss the ultimate:

They were considering, weighing, closely thinking about, and thoroughly seeking the ultimate character of phenomena, but not having realized it, those

⁵²Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), p. 89.5 This same list of faults is also found in *Bhāṣya* p. 9.6.

⁵³Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 276.3) comments: “Because those different [groups] were differently minded in terms of various kinds of views that arise from the root of the view of the transitory collection (*'jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*), each was discordant with the other.” Because of their discordance they did not have the teachings of the four noble truths in any way.

⁵⁴See for instance pp. 33-34 (*Dōk* pp. 15-16), where Buddha states that he is completely enlightened with respect to the ultimate, and so he is able to reveal and teach it to others.

whose minds had become different, who had two-pointed minds,⁵⁵ who had minds that were not in accord, who were debating and quarreling, disputed with each other, agitated each other, harmed each other, were malevolent toward each other, and rejected each other.

When I had seen them thus in a diverse state, Supramundane Victor, I thought: ‘Alas!’⁵⁶ Tathāgatas arise in the world, and, due to their arising, the individual realization and actualization of an ultimate like this — which has a character completely transcending all argumentation — is indeed marvellous and astonishing.’⁵⁷

Buddha agrees with this assessment of his understanding, and then proceeds to give a number of descriptions, each of which indicates a different facet of the understanding of the ultimate, and each of which is designed to lead his audience to understand something of its nature.⁵⁸ Each of these appears to be a different way of looking at the ultimate through contrasting it with what is not ultimate. He states that:

(1) “the ultimate is known by Superiors individually by themselves,⁵⁹ whereas the objects known mutually by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation”;

⁵⁵The phrase “two-pointed mind” (*blo gros...gnyis can, vimati*) refers to a mind that moves in two directions because of doubt (*the tshom, vicikitsa*). See *Bhāṣya* p. 10.7.

⁵⁶The Tibetan term is *kye ma* (Skt.: *aho, hā*), which is used to express sorrow or despair.

⁵⁷Translation p. 33; *Dok* p. 15.2.

⁵⁸See note 89 to the translation.

⁵⁹Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 278.4) states that this means that: “Due to observing the object of suchness by way of a Superior’s non-conceptual exalted wisdom, they manifestly realize their own internal nature” (*’phags pa rnam kyī rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes kyis de bzhin nyid kyī yul la dmigs pas / nang gi rang gi ngo bo nyid mngon par rtogs pa’o*).

(2) “the ultimate [belongs to] the signless realm, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of signs”;

(3) “the ultimate is ineffable, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of expression”;

(4) “the ultimate is completely devoid of all conventions, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of conventions”;⁶⁰

(5) “the ultimate is completely devoid of all dispute, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of dispute.”⁶¹

After each of these descriptions of the ultimate, Buddha concludes that “whatever has a character completely transcending all argumentation is the ultimate.” This theme repeats throughout the chapter, and it raises interesting questions concerning the sūtra’s opinion

⁶⁰Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 290.6), in commenting on this passage, quotes the *Tshig nges par ’grel pa’i mdo*:

Moreover, Dharmodgata, I explain that suchness is a complete elimination of four types of things, all: (1) seeing (*mthong ba*); (2) hearing (*thos pa*); (3) differentiating distinctions (*bye brag phyed pa*); and (4) consciousnesses (*rnam par shes pa thams cad*). But conceptuality and analysis arise within observing these four things.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 91.6) states:

[This passage] indicates that due to the faults of positing — in dependence upon conventions such as seeing and so forth that living beings and so forth exist — one does not understand the ultimate. [The phrase,] ‘in dependence upon conventions such as seeing and so forth’ indicates that in dependence upon conventions of seeing, hearing, differentiating distinctions, and consciousness one posits selves, sentient beings, souls, and persons and so forth as existent due to apprehending [them] as enjoyers and agents. Also, due to positing [them] as selves one does not understand the ultimate; therefore, this is the fault of positing [such].

⁶¹These phrases are found on pp. 34-35 (*Dok* pp. 16.2-17.4).

of the value of Buddhist philosophy. Although the sūtra itself contains arguments for or against philosophical positions and refutes what it characterizes as wrong views, it exhibits a strong mistrust of discursive reasoning and argumentation. We are told repeatedly that the ultimate completely transcends all argumentation and that it is only realized by those whose understandings have also transcended the sphere of argumentation. If this is the case, it would seem that many prominent figures of Indian Buddhism who are revered for their great wisdom would fall short of the sūtra's standards. Asaṅga, for instance, wrote systematic philosophical texts that contained philosophical reasonings and arguments, and he wrote on the principles and rules of debate.⁶² Vasubandhu was renowned as a debater and his biographies contain stories of his prowess in argumentation.⁶³ He wrote a treatise on logic (the *Vādavidhi*), and although there are a number of passages in his works where he denigrates arguers he utilizes the tools and methods of debate and philosophical reasoning.⁶⁴ Since the sūtra

⁶²See, for instance, Alex Wayman, "The Rules of Debate According to Asaṅga", in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 78, Jan.-March, 1958, pp. 29-40 (which discusses a section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* that is concerned with the norms and conduct of scholastic debate), and Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic From Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, #XLIX, Baroda, 1929, which discusses logical treatises attributed to Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and other writers.

⁶³This aspect of Vasubandhu's work is discussed by Stefan Anacker in *Vasubandhu: Three Aspects* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969), pp. 41-47, where he examines Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*, a text on logic (which Anacker translates on pp. 87-98). Bu-dōn (*History of Buddhism*, tr. E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1931, pp. 136-147) and Tāranātha (*History of Buddhism in India*, tr. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Simla, 1970), pp. 149-150 and 162-175 report stories of his debating prowess, and a good biography is provided by Anacker (pp. 9-33), which includes some stories of his debating skills.

⁶⁴Some examples of his attitudes toward arguers (*tarkika*, *rtog ge pa*) can be found in: (1) the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Étienne Lamotte, "Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu

(*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*)”, in *MCB* IV, 1935-36, p. 197) he states: “You arguers do not understand in accordance with the meaning of scripture” (*rtog ge pa khyod rnams kyis lung gi don ji lta ba bzhin ma rtogs pas*); (2) the concluding remarks of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (V.31; in Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 462), where he states that the treatise is called “Differentiation of the Middle and Extremes” (*madhānta-vibhāga*) “because it is not of the sphere of activity of argumentation and because it cannot be distinguished by disputants” (*tarkasyāgocaravāt paravādibhirabhedyatvācca*); (3) in the conclusion of the *Viṃśatikā* (V.22; in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, p. 421), however, he seems to be saying that he himself is an arguer: “But it is not possible for people like me to consider [cognition-only] it in all of its aspects because it is not of the sphere of activity of argumentation” (*sarvaprakāra tu sā madṛśaiścintayitum na śakyate / tarkāviṣayatvāt*).

In his commentary on this last passage, Vinitadeva (*Prakarāṇa-viṃśatikā-tikā*, *rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*; Peking #5566, vol. 113, p. 324.5.5, *Oṭani Sde dge, sems tsam* vol. 14, p. 195a.5) states that this means that it is an object of activity of Buddhas, which may be a way of explaining why Vasubandhu, a renowned Buddhist master, admits that he is unable to know the ultimate. If it can only be perceived by Buddhas, this could be a reason why Vasubandhu (despite being an advanced practitioner) is not able to realize it. Vinitadeva states:

It is only an object of activity of the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors...People like me, who do not perceive suchness, who are not free from the nets of conceptuality, are unable to imagine all the aspects of that cognition-only. If you think, ‘Why is this,’ [the root text] says, ‘Because it is not an object of argumentation.’ Thus, the ultimate is not an object of conceptual thought. ‘Imagination’ [refers to] argumentation. Therefore, it [i.e., the ultimate] cannot be imagined. Since cognition-only is the ultimate, how could it become an object of argumentation? If one were to think, ‘Since those who do not perceive thusness are not able to imagine all the aspects, for whom are these object of activity in all aspects,’ [the root text] says, ‘They are objects of activity of Buddhas’ (*de ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis spyod yul kho na'o...de kho na ma mthong ba rtog pa'i dra ba ma bral ba bdag 'dra bas rnam par rig pa tsam de'i rnam pa thams cad bsam par mi*

seems to be saying that people who engage in argumentation cannot realize the ultimate, does this mean that even these luminaries of Buddhist philosophy were unable to know it?

At first glance it may seem to be saying this, but upon closer examination of the text the situation is less clear. The sūtra does not say that *all* people who engage in argumentation are unable to realize the ultimate, and the fact that it singles out *certain* groups could indicate that some people who engage in argumentation could do so. In addition, the text states that Buddhas and Superiors present their understandings to ordinary beings in terms of conventional expressions in order to be able to communicate with them in ways that they can understand. For instance, in chapter one it is said that “Superiors nominally impute ‘compounded phenomena’ and ‘uncompounded phenomena’ because they have completely and thoroughly realized the fact that things are inexpressible, and are completely and thoroughly enlightened with respect to the inexpressible reality,”⁶⁵ which seems to indicate that because they have realized the ultimate they are able to use conventional expressions that teach their listeners something about it. Moreover, it appears that the sūtra is saying that it is precisely because of the fact that they understand the ultimate that they can designate terms that accurately express something of the nature of reality.

The discussion of the ultimate in chapter two also leaves open the possibility that some people who engage in argumentation may still be able to understand the ultimate.

*nus so // ci'i phyir snyam pa la rtog ge'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba
smos so // 'di ltar don dam pa ni rtog pa'i yul ma yin no // bsam pa ni rtog
ge'o // de bas na de bsam par mi nus so // rnam par rig pa tsam ni don dam
pa yin na ji ltar rtog ge yul du'gyur / gal te de kho na ma mthong ba dag gis
rnam pa thams cad bsam par mi nus na de rnam pa thams cad du su'i spyod
yul snyam pa la / sangs rgyas spyod yul lo zhes bya ba smos so).*

⁶⁵Translation p. 28; Dōk p. 9.4.

For instance, in the sūtra Buddha uses arguments to establish positions and to convince his audience, and he also states that Superiors are able to use conventional expressions to teach others about their understandings. Also, when he contrasts the understandings of Superiors and ordinary beings, the main distinction seems to be that the former are able to use conventional expressions to describe something of their non-conceptual understanding of the ultimate, whereas the latter are so caught up in conventionalities that they are unable to understand the ultimate, which completely transcends conventional expressions. Thus, when Buddha states that the ultimate is “known by Superiors individually by themselves, whereas the objects known mutually by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation”⁶⁶ and that the ultimate is ineffable, while argumentation “belongs to the realm of expression”, these statements could be interpreted to mean that anyone who uses conventional expressions does not understand the ultimate, but Buddha himself is obviously using conventional expressions in this text to teach his understanding of the ultimate and to lead his audience toward full realization of it, and so it is difficult to imagine that the sūtra is trying to indicate that anyone who uses conventional expressions does not understand the ultimate. Rather, a more plausible conclusion is that it is saying that those whose understanding is limited only to conventions are unable to understand the ultimate,

⁶⁶Translation p. 34; *Dōk* p. 16.2. A similar idea can be found in Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Peking vol. 112, p. 241.1.8; Otani *Sde dge, sems tsam* vol 12, p. 53b.7):

Why is the ultimate so called? Because it is the sphere of activity of the supreme exalted wisdom of Superiors (*ci’i phyir don dam pa zhes bya zhe na / ’phags pa’i ye shes dam pa’i spyod yul yin pa’i phyir ro*).

See also Asvabhāva’s *Mahāyānasamgrhohanibandhana* (p. 282a.8; reported in *Somme* pp. 120-1): “The ultimate [is so called] because because it is an object of attainment by supreme exalted wisdom” (*don dam pa ni ye shes mchog gis thob par bya ba’i phyir ro*).

while those who understand the ultimate and become Superiors are able to use conventional expressions to speak of their understandings and can use arguments to establish their positions, but they are still aware of the limitations of conventional language and know that words are inadequate to convey the full existential reality of understanding of the ultimate.

This appears to be the import of a series of analogies that are provided near the end of the chapter. Buddha states that people who have only known hot and bitter tastes throughout their lives would be unable to imagine how something sweet would taste⁶⁷ and that people who have only known discursiveness would be unable to imagine the non-discursive understanding of Superiors. The clue here lies in the fact that while ordinary beings who are involved only in argumentation and discursive thought are said to be unable to imagine or relate to those who have transcended these, the opposite does not seem to be the case. Superiors seem to be able to understand the discursive thoughts of ordinary beings and are able to use conventional expressions to teach them something of the ultimate in terms that they can understand. The difference between the

⁶⁷This passage is found on p. 35 (Dōk p. 17.4). Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 307.2) explains this analogy as follows:

Just as those persons who always only partake of bitter tastes are unable to understand, infer, or imagine the taste of honey, so also householders abide in cyclic existence for a long time and always partake of the taste of worldly agitation and coarse sufferings. Therefore, they are unable to understand, infer, or imagine the very auspicious taste of pure behavior, the bliss of thorough emergence [from the household life]. Therefore, the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* explains, 'When, out of correct faith, one thoroughly emerges from the home to the homeless [life], because of being released from the various forms of obstructors that are the afflictions of friends and relatives, the misfortunes that reside in a household, and great sufferings, this is the bliss of definite emergence.'

Superiors who use conventional expressions and arguments and ordinary beings is that the former group has directly experienced a reality that transcends conventionalities while the latter is unable to even imagine such a reality. Superiors' teachings are based on their exalted understanding, whereas ordinary beings argue and create philosophical systems on the basis of a limited and partial understanding. According to Asaṅga, their inability to imagine the nature of the ultimate is a result of the power of previous argumentation, engaging in inference, and their fixed beliefs. He states that these beings "are unable to investigate, infer, or imagine" the non-discursive understanding of Superiors "due to the power of argumentation, the power of inference, and the power of belief".⁶⁸ Because they accustom themselves to fruitless disputation about the ultimate, they become involved in debate, acrimony, and anger, and thus they are unable to enter into actual understanding of the ultimate, which can only be understood through renouncing argumentation and cultivating the non-conceptual understanding gained by Superiors through meditation. The sūtra states:

Because of involvement with discursiveness and manifestly delighting in discursiveness for a long time, [beings are] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine the internal, non-discursive happiness of Superiors.⁶⁹

Jang-chup-dzu-trül has a similar statement:

The passage — 'Furthermore, Dharmodagata...realm of dispute' — indicates that due to the faults of dispute in which there is attachment and anger with respect to one's own and others' positions which are posited in a mutually discordant way one does not understand the ultimate. [The phrase,] 'mutually discordant positings' [indicates that] one disputes due to positing discordant tenet systems and textual systems through the power of exaggerated adherence

⁶⁸*Bhāṣya* p. 11.3.

⁶⁹Translation p. 35 (*Dōk* p. 17.7).

to doctrines and attachment to one's own position and anger toward the positions of others on this basis. One who is attached to positions and disputes due to exaggerated adherence to doctrines does not understand the ultimate; therefore, just these are the faults of argumentation....Argumentation arises with respect to discordances of non-realization or wrong realization, but because this [i.e., realization of the ultimate] is the opposite of that [i.e., argumentation,] all disputation is completely eliminated.⁷⁰

This commentary does not state that argumentation *per se* is bad, but rather that argumentation based on anger and exaggerated adherence to a particular philosophical position is to be avoided since it interferes with realization of the ultimate. This leaves open the possibility that someone who has realized the ultimate could engage in debate with others provided that his/her actions were not based on anger or acrimony, although it also seems to be a warning against the possible pitfalls of such activity.

Buddha sums up the discussion of this chapter with the following verse:

The signless realm that is individually [known by Superiors]

Is ineffable and is completely devoid of conventions.

The ultimate reality is free from dispute.

It has a character completely transcending argumentation.⁷¹

c. The Ultimate Transcends Sameness and Difference

Chapter three develops the idea that the ultimate transcends argumentation, and it indicates that even some Bodhisattvas are guilty of not being able to see the ultimate forest for the trees of conventionalities. It opens with a statement by the Bodhisattva

⁷⁰Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), p. 92.2.

⁷¹Translation p. 36; *Dok* p. 18.4.

Suvishuddhamati that the ultimate is “profound and subtle, having a character completely transcending sameness and difference”.⁷² He relates a story of a group of beginning Bodhisattvas whom he saw arguing about whether the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are different or non-different. He states that some Bodhisattvas held that they were different, and some held that they were non-different, and others were simply confused, having no idea which group was correct and which was mistaken. Buddha indicates that both groups are mistaken, since the character of the ultimate and the character of the compounded are neither different nor non-different:

Because even all these children of good lineage in this way do not realize the subtle ultimate having a character completely transcending compounded things, as well as difference and non-difference, they are childish, foolish, unclear, unskilled, and are not properly oriented.⁷³

⁷²Translation p. 36; *Dōk* p. 18.6 reads: *don dam pa phra zhing zab ste gcig dang tha dad pa las yang dag pa'i mtshan nyid*.

⁷³Translation p. 37; *Dōk* p. 19.1. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 325.4) comments that they are “childish” (*byis pa, bāla*) because of having “ignorant natures” (*ma rig pa'i bdag nyid*). They are “obscured” (*rmongs pa*) because they are “distinguished by their ignorance” (*ma rig pa las rnam par 'byed pa*). They are “unclear” (*mi gsal ba*) because they “still have not attained the faculty of knowing all of the unknown” (*da dung mi shes pa kun shes pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*). They are “unskilled” (*mi mkhas pa*) because they “still have not attained the faculty of omniscience” (*da dung kun shes pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*), and are “not properly oriented” (*tshul bzhin ma lags*) because they “still have not attained faculties endowed with omniscience” (*da dung kun shes pa dang ldan pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*). Wonch'uk concludes (line 7): “Therefore, they have not directly realized the mode of ultimate suchness that is a character which is neither one nor different” (*des na gcig dang tha dad pa ma yin pa'i mtshan nyid don dam par de bzhin nyid kyi tshul mngon du ma gyur pa yin no*).

Asaṅga elaborates on this by saying that they understand what is unimportant but do not realize what is important because they reason by way of faulty reasonings that lack correct consequences.

With respect to the third [chapter]: these Bodhisattvas who abide in the ground of engagement through belief⁷⁴ mentally consider the ultimate improperly, having become thoroughly obscured by the two thorough obscurations: (1) thorough obscuration with respect to imputations; and (2) thorough obscuration with respect to reasonings. Thorough obscuration with respect to imputations is due to being estranged from sutras of definitive meaning.

⁷⁴Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary) identifies the “ground of engagement through belief” as the first two paths, the path of accumulation (*tshogs lam, sambhāra-mārga*) and the path of preparation (*sbyor lam, prayoga-mārga*), in which one’s practice is motivated by desire to emulate the exalted states of beings in the higher grounds. According to Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay, this is called “engagement through belief” because at this stage one is an ordinary being (*so so’i skye bo, prthag-jana*) and so one does not realize emptiness directly (*mngon sum du*), but by way of belief (from an unpublished transcript of his lectures, p. 85). According to *Mahāyānasamgraha* III.3, entering this level involves taking interest in the fact that all phenomena are cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*). See *Somme* pp. 155-6 and notes p. 29*; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* III.2; and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. N. Dutt, Patna, 1966), pp. 218.8-222.23, and Sāgaramegha’s *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyāna* (Otani *Sde dge, sems tsam* vol. 11), pp. 328a.3-333a.4.

Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 321.6), quoting Vasubandhu’s *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya*, states that Bodhisattvas on this level engage in religious practice through belief because “since they do not directly realize suchness, in dependence upon belief they practice their practices by way of effort” (*de bzhin nyid.mngon sum du ma byas pas / mos pa la brten nas brtson ’grus kyis spyod pa rnams spyod do*).

Thorough obscuration with respect to reasonings is due to not directly understanding the branches of reasons (*gtan tshigs, hetu*) and so forth.⁷⁵

Buddha then outlines a series of correct reasonings that show that either position (that the nature of the ultimate and the nature of the compounded are different or that they are non-different) results in contradiction.⁷⁶ In the first reasoning, Buddha indicates that if

⁷⁵*Bhāṣya* p. 11.3. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 98.5) has a similar comment: he states that even though they are at the level of engagement through belief they are unable to understand the ultimate due to two types of obscurations: “(1) thorough obscuration with respect to imputations (*gdags pa la shin tu rmongs pa*); and (2) thorough obscuration with respect to reasoning (*rigs pa la shin tu rmongs pa*).”

⁷⁶These reasonings are also discussed by Jam-yang-shay-ba and Nga-wang-bel-den in their presentations of the two truths. See Guy Newland, *The Two Truths in the Mādhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1990), pp. 82-89. Newland reports that Nga-wang-bel-den divides the reasonings from sūtra into two groups of four. The first four demonstrate the problematic consequences of holding that the two truths are different entities (Newland, p. 83):

If the two truths were different entities, then (1) the mind realizing the .i.emptiness; of true existence would not overcome the conception of true existence; (2) the .i.emptiness; of true existence of a form would not be the mode of abiding of that form; (3) the non-affirming negative that is the mere excluder (*rnam par bcad tsam*) of the true existence of a form would not be the real nature of that form; and (4) .i.Buddha; Superiors would see forms as truly existent and would see the .i.emptiness; of true existence separately.

The second group of four refute the idea that the two truths are the same entity (Newland, p. 86):

If the two truths were one isolate, then (1) common beings would directly realize the mode of subsistence, (2) afflictions such as desire would be produced even while one is observing reality, (3) divisions by way of diverse aspect would not exist even among forms, and (4) one would not have to strive to search for the mode of subsistence of form.

the ultimate and the compounded were non-different, then even ordinary beings would perceive the ultimate, since they perceive the compounded, and so they would not be ordinary beings (since they would understand the ultimate, which is only done by Superiors). Buddha adds that they would also attain nirvāṇa and the highest enlightenment, and so there would be no need to engage in meditation or religious practice, since all ordinary beings would have already attained the primary goals of such practice.

Suvishuddhamati, if the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were not different, then even all ordinary beings would see the truth, and while [still] ordinary beings they would attain the highest achievement and would attain blissful nirvāṇa. Moreover, they would have manifestly and completely realized unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.⁷⁷

In the second reasoning Buddha shows that the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are also not different. If they were different, then the realization of a Superior who has understood the ultimate would not eliminate false ideas concerning the compounded, because realization of the ultimate would have as its referent something different from the compounded. The ultimate would be different from compounded phenomena, and so the ultimate nature of an object could have nothing to do with the object itself. What this would mean is that if one were to understand the ultimate character of a particular object, one would still not understand the final nature of the object, since these would be different factualities. If this were possible, there would be no way to reach enlightenment, since realization of the ultimate would not eliminate mistaken apprehension of false conventionalities because the two would be of different entities.

These reasonings are also discussed by Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), pp. 213-217.

⁷⁷Translation p. 38; *Dōk* p. 20.5.

If the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were different, then even seers of truth would not become separated from [false] characterizations of the compounded. Since they would not have separated from the signs of the compounded, even seers of truth would not be completely released from the bondage of [false] characterizations...seers of truth would not have attained the highest achievement, would not have attained blissful nirvāṇa, and also would not have manifestly and completely realized unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.⁷⁸

Buddha indicates that these conclusions are unacceptable. Ordinary beings are not seers of truth, and seers of truth are free from the bonds of mistaken conceptualizations. Thus, both those who think that the compounded and the ultimate are different and those who think they are the same are mistaken, since either position leads to an unacceptable consequence. The upshot of this argument seems to be that any statement one makes concerning the ultimate will be unable to characterize it accurately. Although logically it would seem that the ultimate and the compounded must be either the same or different (since these two states of affairs are mutually exclusive), the sūtra warns us not to imagine that either of these extremes expresses the relation between the ultimate and the compounded. Instead, the sūtra seems to be advising readers to beware of choosing one position at the expense of the other. Also, it seems that the true relation of the two is not something that can be properly expressed in words, since the sūtra never attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between its statements that the ultimate and the compounded are not different and that they are not non-different. The conclusion of this section seems to be that any attempt to verbally express the relation of the two or to form a conception of it will err on the side of one extreme or the other because “the ultimate, which has a character completely transcending difference and

⁷⁸Translation p. 38; *Dōk* p. 20.7.

non-difference, is subtle...profound...and difficult to understand".⁷⁹ It must be sought through meditation that moves beyond such limiting and distorting categories and perceives the ultimate as it is, free from conceptions about its nature.

The sūtra draws out other undesirable consequences that would result from holding either that the ultimate and the compounded are different or that they are non-different. Buddha states that if they were not different, then the ultimate would not be different from the afflicted character of the compounded.

If the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were not different, then it is the case that just as the character of the compounded is included in the thoroughly afflicted character, so also the character of the ultimate would be included in the thoroughly afflicted character.⁸⁰

On the other hand, if they were different, then the ultimate could not be the general character (*spyi'i mtshan nyid, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of compounded phenomena. This seems to imply that the ultimate is a quality or property that is found in compounded phenomena, which is borne out by Buddha's statement, "the ultimate character does not differ in all characters of compounded things".⁸¹ He adds that the ultimate is the "mere absence of self" (*bdag med pa tsam, nairātmyamātra*) and the "mere absence of inherent nature" (*rang bzhin med pa tsam, niḥsvabhāvamātra*) of compounded phenomena,⁸² and he concludes:

If the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were different, then just the mere absence of self and just the mere absence of inherent nature of compounded phenomena would not be the ultimate character [of those phenomena], and the thoroughly afflicted character and the

⁷⁹Translation p. 43; *Dōk* p. 26.3.

⁸⁰Translation p. 39; *Dōk* p. 22.5.

⁸¹Translation p. 41; *Dōk* p. 23.7.

⁸²Translation p. 41; *Dōk* p. 24.1.

completely purified character would also become simultaneously different characters....It is also the case that the characters of compounded phenomena differ and do not not differ, and so yogis also search for an ultimate beyond all compounded things as they are seen, as they are heard, as they are differentiated, and as they are thoroughly known, and the ultimate is thoroughly distinguished by being the selflessness of compounded things. The thoroughly afflicted character and the completely purified character also are not simultaneously different characters. Therefore, the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not suitable as being either 'non-different' or 'different.'⁸³

⁸³Translation p. 41; *Dōk* p. 24.1. The reasonings of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* are also discussed by Jam-yang-shay-ba and Nga-wang-bel-den in their presentations of the two truths. See Guy Newland, *The Two Truths in the Mādhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1990), pp. 82-89. Newland reports that Nga-wang-bel-den divides the reasonings from sūtra into two groups of four. The first four demonstrate the problematic consequences of holding that the two truths are different entities (Newland, p. 83):

If the two truths were different entities, then (1) the mind realizing the .i.emptiness; of true existence would not overcome the conception of true existence; (2) the .i.emptiness; of true existence of a form would not be the mode of abiding of that form; (3) the non-affirming negative that is the mere excluder (*rnam par bcad tsam*) of the true existence of a form would not be the real nature of that form; and (4) .i.Buddha; Superiors would see forms as truly existent and would see the .i.emptiness; of true existence separately.

The second group of four refute the idea that the two truths are the same entity (Newland, p. 86):

If the two truths were one isolate, then (1) common beings would directly realize the mode of subsistence, (2) afflictions such as desire would be produced even while one is observing reality, (3) divisions by way of diverse

This passage indicates that the ultimate is a characteristic of compounded phenomena, a property or trait that pervades all of them. This property is said to be their selflessness and absence of inherent nature, which in Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is the final nature of phenomena. The idea that the ultimate is a quality or characteristic of compounded phenomena is developed through a series of analogies that Buddha uses to indicate the relation between the ultimate and the compounded. In each of these the ultimate is compared to a quality or characteristic of something, a property that is essential to it but which can be discussed separately from the thing it characterizes, although the two cannot be separated in fact.

In the first analogy, the relation between the ultimate and the compounded is compared to that the relation between a conch and its white color. As Wonch'uk states,⁸⁴ in this analogy the conch is an example illustrating the character of compounded phenomena (*'du byed rnam kyī mtshan nyid kyī dper*), and whiteness is compared to the ultimate truth (*don dam pa'i dben pa*) "because it pervades all the nature of the form [of the conch]" (*gzugs kyī ngo bo nyid kun la khyab pa'i phyir*). He adds⁸⁵ that "the ultimate and conventionalities exist in mutual dependence" (*don dam pa dang kun rdzob ni phan tshun ltos pa las yod pa*). This implies that there is a necessary connection between the two and that neither could exist without the other, just as neither the conch nor its whiteness could exist independently of the other. The white color of the conch is not different from the conch, since it is a quality that pervades it. On the other hand, it is also not exactly the same as it, since they can be

aspect would not exist even among forms, and (4) one would not have to strive to search for the mode of subsistence of form.

These reasonings are also discussed by Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), pp. 213-217.

⁸⁴Wonch'uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 347.3.

⁸⁵On p. 352.1.

differentiated by thought and can be discussed separately. Since they are intimately related, however, one could not be eliminated without eliminating the other. (If one were to color the conch black, for instance, one would not eliminate the whiteness, but would only obscure it.) One cannot eliminate the whiteness, since it pervades the whole conch, but that does not mean that the whiteness is the conch, since there are other aspects of the conch that are not its color, such as its shape, taste, etc., and these cannot be equated with the white color of the conch.

This analogy is extended to several other relationships, and the point of these examples is to show that the ultimate and the compounded are intimately related, but are not completely the same, and that realization of the actual relation of these two and understanding of the nature of the ultimate is the means to attain liberation and to eliminate the bonds of assumptions of bad states.⁸⁶ Buddha concludes:

Similarly, Suvishuddhamati, it is not easy to designate the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate as being either different characters or non-different characters.⁸⁷

Joe B. Wilson reports that according to Gung-tang, the main idea of this chapter is that the two truths are different isolates (*ldog pa tha dad*), within being one entity (*ngo bo gcig*).⁸⁸ This means that they can be separated by thought, like a conch and its white color, but they are one entity. The example of the conch and its color is also cited by

⁸⁶These are described in note 141 to the translation. The passage in the sūtra ranges from pp. 38-40 (Dōk pp. 21-22).

⁸⁷Translation p. 43; Dōk p. 26.2.

⁸⁸Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only* (University Microfilms, 1985), p. 55. Wilson states that this idea is found in Gung-tang's commentary on Dōng-ka-bā's *Legs bshad snying po* (entitled *Bstan bcos legs bshad snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba*, Lhasa: *Gung thang gsung 'bum*, n.d., vol. *kha*), pp. 8-9. All references to this text by Gung-tang in the present dissertation are to Wilson's text.

Jam-yang-shay-ba⁸⁹ in a discussion of the relation between the two truths, the conventional truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, samvṛti-satya*) and the ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārtha-satya*). According to the Ge-luk-ba tradition, the relationship is one of sameness of entity and difference of isolates. Jam-yang-shay-ba cites passages from this section of the *Samdhinirmocana*, and he states that the two truths must be seen as being related within being of one nature, like a conch and its white color.

An “isolate” (*ldog pa*) is something that can be isolated or differentiated by thought and discussed separately from the thing it characterizes, like the case of the whiteness of a conch and the conch that it characterizes.⁹⁰ They cannot be separated in fact, since they are mutually dependent. The whiteness of the conch, for example, could not exist apart from the conch, nor could the conch exist without its color.

Although the idea that the relation between compounded phenomena and the ultimate is one of sameness of entity and difference of isolates is an ingenious solution to the conceptual conflict of the sūtra’s statements that they are neither different nor non-different, I suspect that this solution might be too neat and that it undermines something of the intent of the text. It does show a way to reconcile the apparent contradiction involved in stating that the two are neither different nor non-different, and it does not contradict the words of the sūtra, but if the author had wanted to present such a neat solution there would be no reason not to. Instead, the text stresses that the ultimate is difficult to discuss, difficult to realize, and that it cannot be grasped by conceptual thought or accurately described by words. The sūtra seems to avoid any attempt at resolution of the conceptual difficulties created by its conflicting statements except by offering analogies, and instead it urges us to look beyond words and

⁸⁹Jam dbyangs bshad pa, in his *Dbu ma chen mo* (Buxador: Gomang, 1967), pp. 525ff. This reference is from a draft translation of the text by Guy Newland, which he kindly lent to me.

⁹⁰See, for example, *Meditation on Emptiness* pp. 347-9 and 413-5.

conceptions in order to realize the ultimate. The Ge-luk-ba formulation of the relation between the ultimate and compounded phenomena fixes it in a conceptually apprehendable and verbally expressible way, but the *Samdhinirmocana* presents conceptual antinomies as problems that cannot be resolved conceptually. The intent of this procedure seems to be to forestall attempts to conceptualize the nature of the ultimate, to prevent people from thinking that they have understood the ultimate through philosophical ideas about it. The text even warns that some Bodhisattvas imagine that they know the ultimate through conceptual formulations about it and that they argue with others on the basis of limited understanding. Buddha says of such Bodhisattvas:

Because even all these children of good lineage in this way do not realize the subtle ultimate having a character completely transcending compounded things, as well as difference and non-difference, they are childish, foolish, unclear, unskilled, and are not properly oriented.⁹¹

The ultimate, however, can only be known through non-conceptual insight, and I suspect that part of the intent of the sutra is to warn its readers against facile explanations concerning the ultimate by presenting apparently contradictory statements that cannot be resolved conceptually and that might lead people beyond attempts to discuss it and toward direct realization of it.

d. The Ultimate is Everywhere of One Taste

The fourth chapter continues the discussion of the ultimate by explaining how it “has a character that is everywhere of one taste” (*thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid*).⁹² It is compared to space, which pervades everything and is undifferentiated in all

⁹¹Translation p. 38; *Dōk* p. 20.2.

⁹²Translation p. 48; *Dōk* p. 30.2.

compounded things. As with the statement in the previous chapter that “the ultimate character does not differ in all characters of compounded things,” this appears to indicate that the ultimate is a quality of compounded phenomena, a trait that characterizes all of them, although it is subtle and difficult to perceive.

Buddha then indicates that the ultimate has an important function in the context of religious practice, because it is “an object of observation for purification” (*rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa, viśuddhālamḃana*).⁹³ He equates it with thusness (*de bzhin nyid, tathatā*) and the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairātmya*), and he adds that it is an object of observation that leads to advanced states of spiritual attainment.

Subhūti, monks who practice yoga, having completely realized thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena of one aggregate do not [have to] seek individually for thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena in those [phenomena] that are other than that.... Those [monks who practice yoga] understand and thoroughly realize the ultimate, whose character is everywhere of one taste, through just thoroughly relying on the exalted wisdom that is non-dual with the scope of thusness, and not in another way. Therefore, Subhūti, you should know by this form [of explanation] also that that which has a character that is everywhere of one taste is the ultimate.⁹⁴

Unfortunately, the sūtra does not elaborate on how the ultimate functions as an object of observation for purification, or even what an object of observation for purification is. The term appears again in chapter seven, where it is stated that only the ultimate is an object of observation for purification and that the ultimate is the thoroughly established

⁹³Translation p. 48; *Dōk* p. 30.7.

⁹⁴Translation p. 48; *Dōk* p. 31.2.

nature (*yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid, pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*),⁹⁵ but this passage also gives no further clues concerning how an object of observation for purification acts.

The commentaries, however, do provide some indications concerning what it means to say that the ultimate is an object of observation for purification. Jang-chup-dzu-trül, for example, states not only that the ultimate is to be equated with suchness and the selflessness of phenomena, but also that it is something that leads to enlightenment and serves to counteract manifest pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal, abhimāna*), which the sūtra indicates is an obstacle that interferes with correct understanding. Jang-chup-dzu-trül states:

⁹⁵Translation p. 65; Dok p. 48.4. A statement that the ultimate should be equated with the thoroughly established nature is also found in Vasubandhu's *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya* (chapter III.10; Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, p. 441; Otani *Sde dge, sems tsam* vol. 2, p. 12a.6): "You should know that the ultimate truth is just the thoroughly established nature" (*paramārthasatyamekasmātpariniṣpannādeva svabhāva-dveditavyam; don dam pa'i bden pa ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gcig pur rig par bya'o*).

This section of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya* is concerned with the functions of the ultimate, the thoroughly established nature, in meditative practice. It is an object of observation that, when taken to mind in meditation, can lead to exalted spiritual states and to enlightenment. In the same section Vasubandhu also states:

The ultimate is known through three things: object, attainment, and achievement (*arthaprāptiprapattyā hi paramārthastridhā mataḥ*).... It is an ultimate object because suchness serves as an object of an ultimate wisdom. It is an ultimate attainment because its [attainment] is nirvāṇa, which serves as the ultimate aim. It is the ultimate achievement because its [achievement] is the path, which serves as the ultimate object (*arthaparamārthastathatā paramasya jñānasyārtha iti kṛtvā / prāptiparamārthaṃ nirvāṇaṃ paramo 'rtha iti kṛtvā / pratipatiparamārtho mārgaḥ paramo 'syārtha iti kṛtvā*).

Due to correctly knowing suchness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, which has a character that is everywhere of one taste, one perceives it....Because Superiors [know] the other-powered nature by way of a Superior's knowledge and perception, that which completely enlightens, which is perceived as being inexpressible, is thoroughly established suchness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, and has a character that is everywhere of one taste; therefore, it is an antidote to manifest pride in terms of apprehended objects, the ultimate that has a character that is everywhere of one taste.⁹⁶

In his commentary on *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, Ābel-jor-hlün-drup explains that the term "object of observation for purification" refers to the ultimate, which does not have either production or disintegration.⁹⁷ Citing the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, he states:

That suchness which is the object of the exalted wisdom purifying the two obstructions [i.e., the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience,] is the thoroughly established nature and is the object of observation for purification.⁹⁸

⁹⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül, vol. *cho* (205), p. 112.5: *de bzhin nyid don dam pa chos bdag med pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yang dag pa'i shes pas mthong ba ste...gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid 'phags pa rnams kyis 'phags pa'i shes pa dang mthong bas brjod du med par mthong bar rdzogs par sangs rgyas pa nyid yongs su grub pa'i de bzhin nyid don dam pa chos bdag med pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yin pas / de ni gzung ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi gnyen po don dam pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yin te.*

⁹⁷*Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Delhi: Rong tha mchog sprul rnam pa gnyis, 1968), p. 47.2-5

⁹⁸Ābel-jor-hlün-drup, p. 48.1: *sgrib gnyis rnam par dag par byed pa'i ye shes kyi yul du gyur pa'i de bzhin nyid de nyid yongs grub dang rnam dag gi dmigs par.* See also the

In an oral commentary on this section of Āl-jor-hlün-drup's text, Geshe Belden Drakba stated:

The only thing that is a true ultimate is that which is taken as the object of a path that will purify obstructions. Since other-powered natures do not have that quality of being an object of observation of a path of purification, they lack the entity of the ultimate....The true object of observation must be something that — through observing it again and again — will purify the afflictions. That is not true with other-powered natures. Because emptiness has this effect of purifying obstructions, it is the main object of meditation.

Wonch'uk's commentary contains a similar idea. He states, "Through the power of observing this object one also attains mental purification," and he adds that according to the *Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* an object of observation for purification has three aspects: (1) it is permanently changeless (*rtag tu rnam par 'gyur ba med*); (2) it is a nature of virtue and happiness (*dge dang bde ba'i ngo bo nyid*); and (3) it is manifestly accomplishes everything (*thams cad mngon par 'grub par 'gyur*).⁹⁹ He adds that a commentary on this text states:

Because the ultimate truth is free from sameness and difference, you should know that it is an object of observation for purification. Why is this? Because through the power of observing this object one obtains mental purification.¹⁰⁰

discussions of this term in *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi), pp. 11.22-12.6, 46.9-15, and 113.18-22.

⁹⁹Wonch'uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 406.2.

¹⁰⁰Wonch'uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 406.2: *don dam pa'i bden pa ni gcig pa dang tha dad pa nyid dang bral ba'i phyir rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa yin par rig par bya'o // de ci'i phyir zhe na / yul la dmigs pa'i dbang gis sems rnam par dag pa 'thob par 'gyur pa'i phyir*.

According to these sources, the ultimate is an “object of observation for purification” in the sense that when one meditates on it it serves to purify the mind by removing obstructions. According to the sūtra, it is a quality that pervades all phenomena and is “everywhere of one taste”, which seems to mean that it is something that is of an undifferentiable nature in all phenomena. It is compared to space, which is the same everywhere and lacks distinctions and is all-pervasive. It is also something that is unchanging, that is neither created nor destroyed, a quality that permanently characterizes all compounded phenomena.

In permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time,¹⁰¹ whether Tathāgatas appear or do not appear, the element of the reality of phenomena only thoroughly abides, and [it is] not otherwise.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ D̄zong-ka-bā (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 17.10; per Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, pp. 38-39) reports that Wonch'uk states that these terms (*rtaḡ pa rtaḡ pa'i dus*, *nityakāla* and *ther zug ther zug gi dus*, *śāśvatakāla*) imply respectively a backwards looking orientation and a forward looking orientation. D̄zong-ka-bā (p. 17.18) also states that Wonch'uk glosses “permanent, permanent time” as “former, former time” (*snga ma snga ma'i dus*) and that “everlasting, everlasting time” is glossed as “later, later time” (*phyi ma phyi ma'i dus*), but these glosses are not found in any of the four places (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 416, 512, 525, and 567) where Wonch'uk mentions the terms *rtaḡ pa rtaḡ pa'i dus* and *ther zug ther zug gi dus*, with the exception of p. 525.6, where Wonch'uk says that someone else's (*kha cig*) opinion equates *ther zug ther zug* with *phyi ma phyi ma*, but he does not claim this position as his own.

On p. 416.5 Wonch'uk states: “The suchness that is of one taste is (1) without oneness in the past from the beginning; therefore [the sūtra says,] ‘permanent, permanent time’. It is (2) without oneness in the future; therefore [the sūtra says,] ‘everlasting, everlasting time’” (*ro gcig pa'i de bzhin nyid gzod ma nas sngar yang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas / rtaḡ pa rtaḡ pa'i dus zhes bya'o / phyis kyang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas / ther zug ther zug gi dus zhes bya ste*). On p. 567.6, in a discussion of the

When we add these statements to those of the previous chapters, we can see that although the sūtra began by warning us that the ultimate is ineffable and cannot be expressed in words it has made a number of statements about it, each of which is supposed to tell us something of its nature and functions. It is a quality of phenomena that is imperceptible to ordinary beings but which is known directly by Superiors through their exalted wisdom and vision. It is also all-pervasive and omnipresent, since it is said to characterize all compounded phenomena. It is permanent and changeless. It has no distinctions or differentiations, an idea that is also expressed in positive terms by the statement that it is “everywhere of one taste”. It is non-dual and completely transcends any attempts to characterize, describe, or discuss it, and it is not something about which we can legitimately argue. It eludes any attempt to categorize it through verbal or conventional designations, and those who attempt to discuss or debate its nature tend to miss the reality of the ultimate.

Its main importance for religious practice, however, seems not to be its elusiveness and resistance to categorization, but its function as an “object of observation for purification”. If it were merely a quality that could only be perceived by Superiors but not by ordinary beings it would probably be of interest primarily as a sort of anomaly, something that is seen by one group but not by another. The ultimate, however, is an object of observation that when meditated on leads to the state of a Superior and the realizations associated with that state. Thus, through cultivating understanding of the ultimate one can transform oneself from an ordinary being into a Superior, can eliminate afflictions, and can progress toward complete enlightenment. This is what the sūtra

uncompounded (*'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*) he states: “Because it abides as the reality of phenomena in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, it is uncompounded” (*rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos rnam kyī chos nyid du rnam par gnas pa'i phyir 'dus ma byas.pa'o*).

¹⁰²Translation p. 50; Dōk p. 33.2.

seems to be urging its readers to do. If we discuss the ultimate, categorize it, argue about it, and construct philosophical systems around it, we will direct our attention away from meditating on it. If, on the other hand, we take it as an object of observation in meditation, this can lead to advanced states of realization and can initiate a process of meditative training that culminates in the attainment of Buddhahood.

The presentation of the ultimate in the sūtra contrasts sharply with some discussions of it by Western scholars, especially those who see the ultimate as a state of awareness, a perfected level of understanding in which false imputational natures no longer operate. An example of this idea can be found in John Keenan's article, "Buddhist Yogācāra Philosophy as Ancilla Theologiae", where he states that the thoroughly established nature (which the *Samdhinirmocana* equates with the ultimate) is:

awakening both to the true suchness of all things in the silence of ultimate meaning and also to the dependent co-arising of all human constructs and notions in terms of the other-dependent pattern.¹⁰³

According to Keenan's presentation, the thoroughly established nature is not a quality that pervades all phenomena and that is their true nature (as it is said to be in the *Samdhinirmocana*), but instead is a state of awareness that is attained when one eliminates imputations. This is certainly not the way that it is presented in the sūtra, and I know of no Yogācāra treatise that presents the thoroughly established nature as a state of awareness rather than as a quality that is found in all phenomena.

A idea that is similar to Keenan's is expressed in an article by Gadjin Nagao, "The Buddhist World-View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and Its Similes", in which he states:

¹⁰³ *Japanese Religions*, 15.5, 1988, p. 37.

pariniṣpanna or “consummated” means perfect, real, and existent; and connotes ‘reality’, ‘truth’, ‘real existence’, or ‘the absolute’. It does not mean that this reality exists in an ontological sense or that it is to be perceived epistemologically. It is a reality completely perfected or “consummated” by a practitioner through arduous practice.¹⁰⁴

Like Keenan, Nagao thinks that the ultimate is not a quality of phenomena that is their ultimate nature (as the *Samdhinirmocana* contends), but rather is something brought about by a religious practitioner. In addition, his contention that it does not exist in an ontological sense appears to contradict the sūtra’s statements that it is a quality that pervades all phenomena at all times and that is their true nature. According to Nagao, it is not a quality of things that is present at all times, but rather a state of awareness that is reached by advanced practitioners. In his view, they “transform” the ordinary world and “consume” it through their meditative practice, and so:

The sages and enlightened ones also live in this one, unchanging world. But, because they are enlightened and are free of all false imagination and attachment, for them, the world is no longer imagined and contaminated; it is pure and “consummated”. The world in which they live their lives differs in no way from our world. For them, too, summer is hot and winter is cold; willows are green and flowers are red. Due to their deep insight and detachment, however, only the pure and real world is manifested to them; the imagined world does not appear. It is in this sense that the one, unchanging world is referred to as possessing a “consummated” nature. It is “consummated” in the sense that it has assumed a nature of perfection owing

¹⁰⁴*The Eastern Buddhist*, 16, 1983, p. 2.

to the long, assiduous training of the enlightened sages. In other words, the consummated world is established anew by them.¹⁰⁵

Although he cites the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* near the beginning of his article as one of the “main sources” for the theory of the three natures,¹⁰⁶ Nagao’s view of the relation of the thoroughly established nature to compounded phenomena appears to be the exact opposite of that presented in the sūtra. While the sūtra states that it is the eternal, unchanging reality that pervades all phenomena and that “whether Tathāgatas appear or do not appear, the element of the reality of phenomena only thoroughly abides”, Nagao thinks that it is something that is brought about through the efforts of meditators. In his view, it appears that if there were no enlightened sages there would be no thoroughly established nature, since for him it is something that must be “consummated” through the effort of religious practitioners. The *Samdhinirmocana*, as we have seen, rejects this view: according to the sūtra, it is an “object of observation for purification”, something that exists permanently at all times, the ultimate reality that pervades all phenomena, and so it is something that meditators can take as their meditative object in order to eliminate obstructions. If it were something that is brought about through individual effort, as Nagao contends, it could not serve this function, since it would be the end result of meditative practice, rather than an object that facilitates it.

I can see no way of reconciling the two positions. For Nagao and Keenan, the ultimate (the thoroughly established nature) is something brought about through meditative training, a state of mind that allows enlightened sages to perceive the world in a “consummated” aspect, while for the sūtra it is an ineffable, permanent quality of phenomena that is in no way dependent on individual effort for its actualization. It is simply the true nature of phenomena, and because of this it can serve as an object of

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 1 note 1.

observation for purification that one can use to bring about advanced levels of realization. Moreover, since the thoroughly established nature, the ultimate, is also equated with the selflessness of phenomena, it is difficult to imagine how sūtra's presentation of the ultimate could be reconciled with the positions of Keenan and Nagao, since in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy the selflessness of phenomena is a quality that characterizes all phenomena at all times and is not something that is brought about through meditative training. Rather, meditative training enables sages to perceive the true nature of phenomena directly, to understand that they lack self and that this is their final nature.

It would also be difficult to reconcile the sūtra's discussion of the ultimate and those of Keenan and Nagao in light of the analogies presented in the third chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana* illustrating the relation between the ultimate and compounded phenomena. In these analogies, the ultimate is compared to the whiteness of a conch, the yellowness of gold, the melodiousness of a musical instrument, etc. In all of these analogies, the ultimate is compared to a quality that is present in a thing and is not something that is brought about through individual effort. No effort is required to make a conch white, or gold yellow: these qualities are present in conches and gold, just as, according to the sūtra, the ultimate is always present in all compounded phenomena. There is no need for sages to "consummate" or "perfect" it through their meditative practice, since, according to the sūtra, it is just what it is in "permanent, permanent time" and in "everlasting, everlasting time". In other words, the ultimate character of phenomena is a quality that is present in them at all times, something that is not brought about or transformed through personal effort.

III. Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Sūtra Explaining the Thought

a. The Term "Hermeneutics"

The etymology of the term "hermeneutics" is connected with Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods and the intermediary between the gods and humanity. His task was to translate the wishes and commands of the gods into the language of humans, a task that required him to be conversant both with the language and idioms of humans and to know how to translate, convey, and explicate the messages sent from the gods to human beings. He had to understand for himself the intentions behind the gods' pronouncements and commands and how these could best be conveyed to humans, who neither spoke the gods' language nor shared their worldview. It is significant that in Greek mythology Hermes is considered to be the inventor of language and writing (the principal tools by means of which we apprehend meaning and communicate it to others), because the discipline of hermeneutics is concerned with uncovering and explicating the meaning of utterances. As Paul Ricoeur states,

The hermeneutical problem was first raised within the limits of *exegesis*, that is, within the framework of a discipline which proposes to understand a text — to understand it beginning with its intention, on the basis of what it attempts to say.¹

¹Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics", in *The Conflict of Interpretations*, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 3.

The modern usage of the term hermeneutics derives from the Greek verb *hermēneuō*, which means “to interpret or explain” and the Greek noun *hermēneia*, which means “interpretation” or “explanation”.² In both the classical Greek usage and in its modern meanings, hermeneutics is concerned with interpretation of the meaning of utterances (whether verbal, non-verbal, or written), and from very early times a distinction has been made between actual commentary and exegesis and the rules, methods, and theories governing them, which fall within the domain of hermeneutics. In Western thought, the term hermeneutics has strong connections with biblical interpretation, the discipline of articulating rules and methodologies for determining the meanings of scriptural statements and transmitting those meanings to readers of scripture.

According to Richard Palmer, the earliest example of this usage of the term occurs in the title of a book by J.C. Dannhauer that presented principles for interpretation of Christian scriptures, entitled *Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrarum litterarum*, published in 1654.³ Palmer notes that until fairly recently the term hermeneutics has been primarily connected with biblical exegesis, but since the time of Schleiermacher (1768-1834) its range has been extended to the point where it is now viewed by many philosophers as being

fundamental to all the humanities — all those disciplines occupied with the interpretation of the *works* of man. It is more than merely interdisciplinary, for its principles comprise a theoretical foundation for the humanities.⁴

Palmer distinguishes six divisions within the field of hermeneutics: (1) principles of biblical exegesis; (2) general philological methodology; (3) the science of linguistic

²See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. (1940), I, p. 690.

³Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 34.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 10.

understanding; (4) the methodological foundations of the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*); (5) phenomenology of existence and existential understanding; and (6) systems of interpretation whose purpose is to determine the meanings behind myths and symbols.⁵ He admits that there may be more divisions than this and that there is considerable overlapping and mutual influence between the various groups, but he thinks that each category represents a distinguishable trend in hermeneutics.

The first group, in Palmer's view, is primarily concerned with the rules and methods proper to interpretation of scripture, with developing viable and consistent standards to enable students of scripture to get at the meaning of sacred texts. The second group consists of biblical scholars who are concerned with philological questions related to Bible study. They propose to treat the Bible as literature and to use the same tools of study and exegesis that are used on other texts. As Spinoza expressed this approach, "The norm of biblical exegesis can only be the light of reason common to all".⁶ According to Spinoza and other proponents of Rationalism, the Bible contains universal rational and moral truths, and the task of exegesis is to find the truths intended by the writers of scriptures and translate them in ways acceptable to enlightened reason.

The third group, represented primarily by Schleiermacher and his disciples, "reconceived hermeneutics as a 'science' or 'art' of understanding".⁷ For them, hermeneutics is concerned with determining and articulating the conditions that make understanding itself possible. The fourth group is represented by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), who championed the idea that hermeneutics properly understood can serve as the

⁵Ibid., p. 33.

⁶*Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670), chapter 7; cited in Palmer, p. 38.

⁷Palmer, p. 40.

methodological foundation for all the human sciences and who wanted to find the principles underlying human understanding. Through this program, he hoped to determine the basic structures of understanding common to all the human sciences. The fifth group, represented by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900), sees understanding and interpretation as fundamental modes of human existence and proposes a phenomenological investigation of the ontological dimensions of understanding. In Heidegger's terminology, his purpose was to uncover how *Dasein* comes to understand itself, to find the processes of understanding and interpretation through which man can come to know the structure of his own being. The sixth division of hermeneutics is represented by Paul Ricoeur, who defines hermeneutics as a discipline primarily concerned with textual exegesis. He states, "We mean by hermeneutics the theory of rules that govern an exegesis, that is to say, an interpretation of a particular text or collection of signs susceptible of being considered as a text".⁴

In each of these cases, hermeneutics is conceived as being the rules and methodologies used in interpretation, rather than the act of interpretation itself. This is an important distinction, and it will be used in the present essay, which will be mainly concerned with the principles of interpretation outlined in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and their ramifications for Buddhist philosophy. Another important concern of this chapter will be to examine the similarities and differences between Western approaches to hermeneutics and the theories presented in the sūtra and its commentaries. The aim of this study will be to look into the principles of interpretation as outlined in the sūtra in an attempt to determine how these compare with some Western formulations as well as their ramifications for the study and exegesis of Buddhist literature and for human understanding.

⁴Paul Ricoeur, *De l'interprétation*, p. 18, translated by Palmer, p. 43.

The first goal of this study will be to justify appropriating the term “hermeneutics” to describe an important focus of the sūtra. I will then outline the hermeneutical issues the text faces, how it proposes to resolve them, and how its resolutions were further explicated by some of the scholars who commented on the sūtra. Throughout this section, I will also attempt to show the connections between the thought of the first seven chapters of the sūtra and to indicate how the discussion of theories of interpretation in the seventh chapter is built upon the analysis of the nature of the ultimate in the first four chapters. Some other important concerns of this chapter will be to show the complex interrelationship between reason and authority in the sūtra and its commentaries and to analyze how implicit norms of tradition and notions of authority influence the thought of the text.

b. The Case of the Sūtra Explaining the Thought

The purpose of the foregoing discussion of hermeneutics was to set the stage for discussing the hermeneutical theory of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. One problem immediately presents itself: since the term hermeneutics has its roots in Greek mythology and was later appropriated by Western philosophy to include such non-Buddhist tasks as exegesis of the Bible and the methodological foundation of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, what possible connection could this have with Buddhist philosophy? Or, to express the question another way, what term or terms in Buddhist philosophy correspond closely enough with the term hermeneutics to justify appropriating it for Buddhist studies?

As mentioned above, in this study a distinction will be drawn between texts that present rules for interpretation and others that simply interpret without explicating the theories in terms of which interpretations are formulated. All texts probably contain either explicit or implicit interpretations, but for our present purposes the focus will be

on Buddhist texts that attempt to establish rules and methodologies in terms of which scriptures may be explicated. As Robert Thurman has pointed out, questions concerning interpretation are of crucial importance in Buddhism, since the Buddhist canon contains a huge number of texts that are considered by the tradition to have been spoken by Buddha, although these often contain contradictory and apparently incompatible doctrines.⁹ When Buddhism spread to other countries, the size and scope of the Buddhist canon made it necessary for Buddhist scholars to devise systems in terms of which the differences could be reconciled that would allow them to distinguish consistently which texts and teachings would be normative for their particular traditions and which would be held to be of “interpretable meaning” (*drang ba’i don, neyārtha*).

In Tibet, one of the most influential texts that explicate rules for interpretation is Ḍzong-ka-ba’s *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*), which is one of the main sources for the present study. The first part of this text, entitled “Mind-Only” (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*) outlines the rules for interpretation in the Mind-Only (or Yogācāra) school and is based on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and on some of the main treatises of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and their commentators. In the first part of this text, Ḍzong-ka-ba cites passages from the sūtra and from Yogācāra treatises and evaluates various interpretation theories in Buddhist literature in order to formulate ground rules for interpretation according to the Yogācāra tradition. This text spawned a number of commentaries in Tibet that attempted to draw out the implications of Ḍzong-ka-ba’s thought, and the process continues today in Tibetan monastic universities. A part of the curriculum studied in these monastic universities is called “The Interpretable and the Definitive” (*drang nges*), which is partly concerned with explicating the rules that govern interpretation of scriptures, and students in these universities are still

⁹See Robert Thurman, “Buddhist Hermeneutics”, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, XI.VI.1, 1978, pp. 19-21.

debating the ramifications of D̄zong-ka-ba's text. Since D̄zong-ka-ba's work and part of the study based on it are concerned with explicating rules that govern interpretation of Buddhist scriptures, a plausible comparison can be made between this subject and Western biblical hermeneutics, since both are concerned with rules for interpreting the scriptures of their respective traditions.

In Indian literature, however, it is more difficult to find terms that correspond to Western usages of the term hermeneutics. One of the few examples of an Indian term that has some of the connotations of this word is the term "explaining the thought" (*saṃdhi-nirmocana*) as it is used in the *Sam̄dhinirmocana-sūtra*, in which Buddha not only explains what he was thinking of when he made some of his earlier statements, but also expounds general rules for determining the meaning of other scriptural statements and how to understand the thought behind them.

As we saw in chapter two, the *Sam̄dhinirmocana-sūtra* is a text in which Buddha is asked to explain what he was thinking of when he made certain statements, and in the sūtra Buddha is confronted with a number of problematic teachings he had given previously. Throughout most of the text, he discusses various points of doctrine and responds to questions on specific points, but the most important section for the discussion of hermeneutics in the sūtra occurs in the seventh chapter, in which he provides general rules for interpreting some of his earlier statements. Since, as we have seen, hermeneutics is mainly concerned with articulating rules for interpretation, it seems to me that this term accurately describes an important focus of this chapter, which, among other things, sets forth principles for interpreting the thought behind certain of Buddha's statements.

The occasion for Buddha's outlining of these rules is a series of questions presented to him by the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, who asks:

The Supramundane Victor spoke, in many ways, of the own-character (*rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa*) of the [five] aggregates...the [six] sense spheres,

dependent arising, and the [four] sustenances...the own-character of the [four] truths...the constituents...the [four] mindful establishments...the [four] thorough abandonings, the [four] bases of magical emanations, the [five] powers, the [five] forces, and the [seven] branches of enlightenment....

The Supramundane Victor also said that all phenomena are without entityness, and that all phenomena are not produced, not ceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.

Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking when he said, 'All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.' I ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying, 'All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.'¹⁰

The format of this question indicates that there is a discrepancy between Buddha's teachings on the aggregates and so forth and his subsequent statements that indicated that "all phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow". The sūtra unfortunately does not spell out exactly what this discrepancy is, nor does it explicitly state that there is a contradiction between the two sets of teachings, but the format of Paramārthasamudgata's question, "I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking when he said..." indicates that the two sets of teachings are in conflict and that there is a need for Buddha to explain the thought behind them. Thus, after quoting this passage in his commentary, Wonch'uk states that Paramārthasamudgata's question implies that

¹⁰Translation p. 63 (Dok p. 45.1).

because earlier Buddha spoke of the thirteen original types of phenomena — the aggregates, the sense spheres, the constituents, etc. — as existent by way of their own entityness and later spoke of all phenomena as unproduced by way of their own entityness, unceasing, etc., the two teachings: (1) speaking of [the thirteen types of phenomena] as naturally existent; and (2) later speaking of [all phenomena] as without entityness are mutually contradictory. Therefore, the meaning of [Paramārthasamudgata's question] is, '[I] do not understand of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking in speaking of non-entityness and so forth.'¹¹

A similar idea is expressed in *The Essence of the Good Explanations* when D̄zong-ka-bā quotes Paramārthasamudgata's question and states his intent in asking it in a paraphrase that makes clear that the sūtra implies that there is a contradiction between the two sets of teachings being discussed:

This asks the following question: If the statements in some sūtras that all phenomena are without entityness etc., and the statements in some sūtras that the aggregates and so forth have an own-character, etc., were left as they are verbally, they would be contradictory. However, since [the Supramundane Victor] must be without contradiction, of what were you [Buddha] thinking when you spoke of non-entityness, etc.?¹²

Both the phrasing of the question in the sūtra and D̄zong-ka-bā's paraphrase of it indicate that there was a perceived conflict between the two sets of teachings and that Paramārthasamudgata is asking Buddha to outline a way to reconcile them. The perception of conflict between different sets of doctrines within a religious tradition is

¹¹Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 552.4.

¹²*The Essence of the Good Explanations*, Sarnath ed., p. 5.9 (tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, pp. 18-19).

often the occasion for doctrinal and terminological innovation that attempts to explain away the apparent contradictions and reconcile one set of teachings with the other. As Robert Carroll writes, "dissonance give rise to hermeneutics."¹³ Moreover, cognitive psychology has shown that when such contradictions occur with regard to things to which an individual is deeply committed (such as religion), the experience of dissonance can be especially traumatic and will motivate people to find ways to reconcile or alleviate the contradiction. As Robert Wicklund and Jack Brehm express this, "When a person holds two cognitions that are in a dissonant relationship, the amount of dissonance he experiences is a direct function of how important those cognitions are to him."¹⁴ In some cases where the perception of dissonance is strong enough, this may cause people to re-evaluate and even reject cognitions that are seen as conflicting with other strongly held convictions and in other cases may lead to a rejection of the authority upon which the original cognition was based.

In this passage, however, there is no apparent perceived need to reject the authority of Buddha's words just because some of his teachings are in conflict. Rather, *Paramārthasamudgata* is asking Buddha to provide explanations that will show a way to reconcile the doctrinal conflicts brought about by the teachings concerning non-entityness, etc., which appear to contradict his teachings on the aggregates, etc. This process of conflicts between old doctrines and paradigms and new paradigms and resolutions operates in all living religions, in which changing historical circumstances and new paradigms (such as the teachings on non-entityness) lead to cognitive conflicts. Unless these conflicts prove fatal to the religion, new paradigms and resolutions will be formulated to reduce the dissonance, but these often contain prob-

¹³Robert P. Carroll, *When Prophecy Failed* (New York: Seabury, 1979), p. 124.

¹⁴Robert A. Wicklund and Jack W. Brehm, *Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976), p. 2.

lems of their own, which in turn lead to further developments in religious paradigms and doctrines. Throughout this process of adaptation and innovation, the members of a religion will also strive to remain faithful to their tradition, and the dialectic of adaptation and continuity governs the process of development of religious organizations. As George Lindbeck describes this process, "Anomalies accumulate, old categories fail, and with luck or skill...new concepts are found that better serve to account for the data. If they are not found, the consequences can be intellectually and religiously traumatic."¹⁵ All religious traditions undergo change, but at the same time struggle to retain their identity, and disagreements about which adjustments are appropriate are part of the hermeneutical process. According to Gadamer,

The hermeneutical problem only emerges clearly when there is no powerful tradition present to absorb one's own attitude into itself and when one is aware of confronting an alien tradition to which he has never belonged or one he no longer unquestioningly accepts.¹⁶

Although Gadamer's statement of the problem is perhaps too strong for this situation (since there is no evidence that the tradition itself is being called into question, but only that conflicting doctrines are being reconciled), it does hint at the problem that the sūtra is addressing, that of a perceived cognitive dissonance between two sets of teachings that was apparently strong enough to prompt the question raised by *Paramārthasamudgata* and to require new hermeneutical strategies and innovations in vocabulary to alleviate the problem. The tone of the questioning indicates, however, that the text was written at a time when traditional authority was still decisive, and there

¹⁵George Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), p. 8.

¹⁶Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 46.

is no perceived need to reject the authority of Buddha because some of his teachings are in conflict.

Innovations in vocabulary are often attempts to reconcile apparent conflicts through proposing new terminology that either provides greater precision in making doctrinal distinctions or that enables sets of conflicting doctrines to be reconciled by means of the new terminology. The solution proposed by the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* does both by introducing the vocabulary of the three “non-entitynesses” (*ngo bo nyid med pa, niḥsvabhāva*) of phenomena and the three “characters” (*mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa*) of phenomena and stating that when Buddha gave his earlier teachings he was thinking of these.

Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of three types of non-entityness of [phenomena] — the non-existence of an entityness in terms of character, the non-existence of an entityness in terms of production, and an ultimate non-entityness — I taught, ‘All phenomena are without entityness.’¹⁷

He expands on this statement by equating each of these non-entitynesses with one of the three characters of phenomena.

Paramārthasamudgata, if you ask, ‘What is the non-entityness in terms of character of phenomena’, [I reply,] ‘It is the imputational character.’ Why? It is thus: that [imputational character] is a character posited by nominal terminology and does not subsist by way of its own character. Therefore, it is said to be ‘without entityness in terms of character.’

Paramārthasamudgata, if you ask, ‘What is the non-entityness in terms of production of phenomena,’ [I reply,] ‘It is that which is the other-powered nature of phenomena.’ Why? It is thus: Those [other-powered phenomena]

¹⁷Translation p. 65 (Dok p. 47.3).

arise through the force of other conditions and not by themselves; therefore, they are said to be ‘without entityness in terms of production.’

“Paramārthasamudgata, if you ask, ‘What is the ultimate non-entityness of phenomena,’ [I reply,] ‘Those dependently arisen phenomena that are without entityness due to being without entityness in terms of production are [also without entityness due to being] without the entityness of the ultimate.’ Why? Paramārthasamudgata, I thoroughly teach that that which is the object of observation of purification in phenomena is the ‘ultimate’, and since the other-powered character is not the object of observation of purification, it is said to be ‘without the entityness of the ultimate.’

[Moreover,] Paramārthasamudgata, that which is the thoroughly established character of phenomena is also called the ‘ultimate non-entityness.’ Why? Paramārthasamudgata, that which in phenomena is the selflessness of phenomena is called their ‘non-entityness’. It is the ultimate, and since the ultimate is thoroughly distinguished by [being] the non-entityness of all phenomena, it is called the ‘ultimate non-entityness’.¹⁸

The use of the term “character” to describe each of these non-entitynesses is reminiscent of the use of the same term to describe the ultimate in relation to compounded phenomena in the discussion of the ultimate in the first four chapters of the sūtra. As we saw in the previous chapter, the *Samādhinirmocana* describes the ultimate as a characteristic or quality of phenomena, and so it is not surprising that in the seventh chapter the ultimate (which is equated with the thoroughly established character and the selflessness of phenomena) is again described in this way. In the above quoted passage, Buddha also describes two other characters of phenomena, the imputational character (*kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid, parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*) and the other-powered

¹⁸Translation p. 65 (Dok p. 47.4).

character (*gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid, paratantra-lakṣaṇa*), and he indicates that, like the ultimate, these are aspects in terms of which phenomena can be viewed and which are characteristics of compounded things.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the ultimate is described in the sūtra as being a quality of phenomena that can be conceptually distinguished from the things that it characterizes and that can be discussed separately (like a conch and its white color) although they cannot be separated ontologically. This does not seem to be true of the case of the relation between imputational characters described in the sūtra and compounded phenomena, however, since the sūtra's discussion of imputational characters describes them as being completely unreal, like a sky-flower, and as being merely posited by terms and thought.¹⁹ The overall impression that the sūtra gives is that the

¹⁹I qualify my discussion of imputational natures with the phrase “as described in the sūtra” on the basis of an important point made by D̄zong-ka-ba, which is that the sūtra hints that not all imputations are non-existent. D̄zong-ka-ba divides imputations into two types, existent and non-existent, and Hopkins points out that if there were no existent imputations this would contradict the sūtra's statement on D̄ok p. 59.2 that some beings develop a view of nihilism that causes them mistakenly to think that all phenomena do not exist, and this leads them to deprecate each of the three characters of phenomena, including the imputational character. If some imputations did not exist it would be impossible to deprecate imputations, since a person who viewed them as non-existent would be correct. According to D̄zong-ka-ba (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 13.11), when the sūtra compares imputations to sky-flowers (which are completely non-existent), this “is an example of their merely being imputed by thought and is not an example of their not occurring among objects of knowledge” (*rtog pas btags pa tsam gyi dpe yin gyi shes bya la mi srid pa'i dpe min no*) and should not be taken to mean that they are completely non-existent like sky-flowers. Hopkins points out that space, for example (which is defined in the sūtra as “a mere absence of the entityness of forms” that “pervades everywhere”), is an imputation that exists, and the sūtra's references to it treat it as such. Moreover, it must belong to the class of imputations,

imputational characters it describes are conceptual overlays falsely attributed to things, like the hairs and so forth seen by people with faulty vision or the yellow hue that colors the perceptions of people with jaundice. In the verses at the end of chapter six, imputational characters are described as being “phenomena that have a non-existent character”, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül asserts that they are “utterly non-existent in terms of both truths”.²⁰ Although they are perceived, the state of affairs that they indicate is merely a deception caused by misconceptions, and so, while the ultimate is described as being an essential and inseparable quality of a thing (like the color of a conch), there would seem to be no reason that the imputational characters described in the sūtra could not be eliminated without changing the ontological status of the things to which they are attributed (as, for instance, if the condition that causes a person with jaundice to see things as yellow is removed, that person will no longer perceive them as having a yellow hue, but the elimination of the false conception of yellowness will not eliminate

since it is described as being uncompounded (and so it cannot be an other-powered nature, since these are compounded in the sense of being produced by other causes and conditions), but it is not a thoroughly established nature (since, as we saw in the previous section, a thoroughly established nature must be an object of observation of purification, and space is not). Since it is described as pervading everywhere, it must exist, since it is incomprehensible that something that is all-pervasive is also non-existent.

To return to our previous point, however, the descriptions of imputations in the sūtra characterize them as non-existent, but the sūtra’s statement that a view that treats all imputations as completely non-existent is mistaken indicates that it agrees with D̄zong-ka-ba’s point that there are some that do exist, although it does not elaborate on this, nor does it indicate any examples of existent imputations. For this reason, I have chosen to limit the extension of the discussion of imputations to those specifically mentioned in the sūtra in order to leave open the possibility that some imputations are not completely non-existent.

²⁰Translation p. 61 (D̄ok p. 44.5); Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. 205 (*cho*), p. 213.5.

the objects that one had previously perceived as being yellow). Buddha describes the relation between the three characters as follows:

The imputational character is to be viewed as being like the faults of clouded vision that exist in the eye of a person who has clouded vision. It is like this: For example, the other-powered character is to be viewed as being like the signs of clouded vision of that very [being], which appear as: the signs of a hair-net, or flies, or sesame seeds; or an appearance of either a sign of blue, a sign of yellow, a sign of red, or a sign of white....When the eyes of just that very being become thoroughly purified and faults of clouded vision that have formed in the eyes do not exist, the thoroughly established character is to be viewed as being like the object of operation which is the natural object of operation of that person's eyes.²¹

This passage indicates that the imputational character as described in the sūtra is something falsely or mistakenly attributed to other-powered phenomena, but that when one views the thoroughly established character imputations no longer appear. The sūtra explains that this is because the thoroughly established character is an “object of observation for purification”, which (as we saw in the previous chapter) means that it is an object that when meditated on serves to eliminate obstructions. In the context of the discussion of the three characters, this means that when one takes the thoroughly established character as one's object of observation, this can serve to eliminate the false views of imputations. Buddha continues:

That which is the thorough non-establishment — of the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as that imputational character, that which is just the absence of entityness of only that [imputational]

²¹Translation p. 58 (Dok p. 41.1).

nature, that which is the absence of a self of phenomena, which is suchness, the object of observation of purification, is the thoroughly established character.²²

In other words, the thoroughly established character, the ultimate truth, is an absence of a quality that is attributed to other-powered characters. This quality, the imputational character, is a conceptual overlay that people mistakenly attribute to other-powered phenomena, although in reality they do not possess this quality. Moreover, the attribution of the imputational character is not merely erroneous; it is also psychically and spiritually harmful and is an obstruction that prevents progress on the Buddhist path.

Buddha then elaborates on his earlier discussion of imputational characters as being “non-entitynesses in terms of character” by stating that when he spoke of all phenomena as being unproduced, unceasing, and quiescent from the start it was in consideration of the fact that imputational characters do not exist by way of their own character, and so they cannot be said to be produced. Since they are not produced, they cannot cease, and so they are also “quiescent from the start”.

That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced.

That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is quiescent from the start. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally passed beyond sorrow. That which is naturally passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.

Therefore, thinking of non-entitynesses in terms of character I taught, ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’²³

²²Translation p. 79 (Dok p. 64.3).

²³Translation p. 67 (Dok p. 49.2).

He adds that the ultimate is also unproduced and so forth because it does not arise in dependence upon causes and conditions, is not compounded, and is just the absence of a self of phenomena. The selflessness of phenomena is always the true nature of phenomena, never changes into something else, is devoid of all obstructions, and so it also is quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow.

Thinking of the ultimate non-entityness that is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena, I taught, 'All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.' Why? It is thus: the reality, the uncompoundedness, the freedom from all obstructions in phenomena, which is the ultimate non-entityness and which is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena, thoroughly abides in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time. That which abides in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time, due to [being] just that reality, is uncompounded. Because it is uncompounded, it is not produced. It is unceasing. Because it is devoid of all obstructions, it is quiescent from the start. That is naturally passed beyond sorrow. Therefore, also thinking of the ultimate non-entityness that is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena, I taught, 'All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, are quiescent from the start, and are naturally passed beyond sorrow.'²⁴

These passages indicate the outlines of how Buddha explains the thought behind his statements that all phenomena are unproduced and so forth. He states that when he made these pronouncements he was thinking of specific aspects of phenomena, and his remarks were made with reference to these, although he did not explicitly make this point. Thus, although he made sweeping statements that "all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow", he

²⁴Translation p. 67 (*Dōk* p. 49.6).

was thinking of specific ways in which phenomena are unproduced and so forth. The vocabulary innovations of the three characters and three non-entitynesses indicate the thought behind his earlier statements and provide models in terms of which the contradictions implicit in them can be reconciled.

Thus, Buddha indicates that when he declared that all phenomena are unproduced he was thinking that the imputational characters described in the sūtra are unproduced in the sense that they are without entityness in terms of character and are like a sky-flower (which is completely non-existent), and so they cannot be said to be produced. Other-powered phenomena are unproduced in the sense that they are not produced by their own power, but require other causes and conditions for their production. The thoroughly established character is unproduced in the sense that it is uncompounded and is just the selflessness of phenomena, which does not come into being due to causes and conditions. Looked at in these ways, these three characters are said to be “unproduced”, and if they are unproduced they must also be unceasing (since they are not produced in the first place), and so they can also be said to be “quiescent from the start” and “naturally passed beyond sorrow”. Jang-chup-dzu-trül comments:

The imputational character is a character that is posited in the manner of names and terminology but is not posited by way of its own character; therefore, since it is utterly non-existent in terms of both truths it is a non-entityness due to being a non-entityness in terms of character. The other-powered character is produced by the power of other conditions but is not [produced] by way of its nature; therefore — since it exists merely [like] a magician’s illusions in terms of conventional truths — it is a non-entityness due to being a non-entityness in terms of production, and — since it does not have ultimate non-entityness because it is not an object of observation of purification — it is not an ultimate non-entityness because it is not an ultimate truth; thus, it is a non-entityness. Also, the thoroughly established

character is the ultimate, and the ultimate is distinguished by being the non-entityness of all phenomena and — because it is both the ultimate truth and a non-entityness — it is a non-entityness due to being the ultimate non-entityness.²⁵

Paramārthasamudgata expands on Buddha's answer by stating that Buddha had a thought behind his earlier teachings, that when he spoke of the non-entityness in terms of character of phenomena he was referring to imputational characters, which are merely imputed by names and terminology and have no real mode of subsistence. When he said that phenomena lack entityness in terms of production he was speaking of other-powered characters, which serve as the bases of imputations. These lack entityness in terms of production in the sense that they depend upon other causes and conditions for their production and are not produced autonomously.

The vocabulary innovations of the three non-entitynesses and the three characters allow the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* to reconcile the apparent conflict of Buddha's earlier statements and to provide an exegetical model by means of which one can posit the thought behind them. As *Paramārthasamudgata* explains it,

I offer the meaning of what the Supramundane Victor said as follows: Those which are posited by nominal terminology — to the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as the character of entities [such as] 'form aggregate' or attributes [such as 'the production of form'] and that which is posited through nominal terminology as the character of entities or the character of attributes [such as] 'the production of the form aggregate,' 'the cessation [of the form aggregate],' 'the abandonment and thorough knowledge [of the form aggregate]' are imputational characters. In

²⁵Jang-chup-dzu-trül, vol. 205 (*cho*), p. 213.5.

dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of character, of phenomena.

Those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena, are other-powered characters. In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of production, of phenomena, and, in addition, [designated] the non-entityness in terms of the ultimate....

That which is the thorough non-establishment — of the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as that imputational character, that which is just the absence of entityness of only that [imputational] nature, that which is the absence of a self of phenomena, which is suchness, the object of observation of purification, is the thoroughly established character. In dependence upon that, the Supramundane Victor, in addition, designated the ultimate non-entityness of phenomena.

Just as this is applied to the form aggregate, so this should be applied similarly to the remaining aggregates. Just as this is applied to the aggregates, so this should be applied similarly to each of the sense spheres that are the twelve sense spheres. This should be applied similarly to each of the limbs of existence that are the twelve limbs of existence. This should be applied similarly to each of the sustenances that are the four sustenances. This should be applied similarly to each of the constituents that are the six constituents [i.e., the manifold constituents] and the eighteen constituents [i.e., the various constituents].²⁶

²⁶Translation p. 78 (*Dok* p. 63.6).

As a strategy for interpreting Buddha's teachings, this has a wide range of application, since the aggregates, sense-spheres, and so forth include all phenomena. As a framework for interpreting cognitive experience, it also has wide-ranging applications. In laying out the terminology of the three non-entitynesses and the three characters, the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* has provided a way to reconcile apparently contradictory statements, and it also provides what could be called an "epistemological hermeneutic" that could apply to a broad spectrum of cognitive phenomena. I use the term "epistemological hermeneutic" to describe this model because it outlines a framework for interpreting the presuppositions, veracity (truth value, reliability, validity), and nature of knowledge and a way of categorizing cognitive experience. For example, the sūtra's categorization of imputational characters as false conceptions superimposed on other-powered phenomena is a description of a particular way of perceiving and relating to our surroundings, one that is determined by false conceptions of reality that influence how and what we experience. The sūtra itself implicitly makes this connection, which indicates that its teachings have ramifications beyond the limited goal of reconciling the two sets of teachings mentioned above.

Thus, the sūtra's statements that imputational characters are attributed to other-powered phenomena in terms of names and conceptions is a description of how most people view reality, and when one's understanding is structured in terms of mistaken conceptual imputations one could be said to be apprehending reality on the level of the mistaken imputational characters described in the sūtra. Such apprehension is erroneous, misunderstands the true nature of the objects of one's experience, and involves attributing to objects qualities that they lack. Wonch'uk makes this point when he writes:

Why is it called 'imputational'? Because conceptual mental consciousness, having immeasurable aspects, just gives rise to error, it is termed 'imputational'. Because while [phenomena] do not truly have their own

character it merely conceptually apprehends [them] thus, it is [called] 'imputational'.²⁷

As a description of a particular way of experiencing, this indicates that when one's perceptions operate on the level of imputational characters, one engages in superimposing qualities onto phenomena that they do not possess. When, however, one understands compounded phenomena as being produced in dependence upon causes and conditions, one apprehends them in terms of the other-powered character, which refers to a phenomenon's being produced by causes and conditions. As Buddha describes this character in chapter six of the sūtra,

The other-powered character of phenomena...is just the dependent arising of phenomena. It is thus: Because this exists, that arises; because this is produced, that is produced.²⁸

A person who understands compounded phenomena in terms of the other-powered character perceives them as being produced by other causes and conditions and does not imagine that they are produced by way of their own nature. This represents a significant advance in understanding and indicates that one has eliminated some of the false conceptions in terms of which one previously perceived things.

The next decisive advance in understanding comes when one perceives the non-existence of imputational characters that were previously superimposed onto other-powered phenomena. At this point, one perceives objects in a manner that is free from certain types of mistaken imputations. One overcomes the afflictions that resulted from previous misunderstanding of the true nature of phenomena through taking to mind the thoroughly established character, which is said to be the ultimate non-entityness and an object of observation for purification of obstructions.

²⁷Wonch'uk vol. *ti* (118), p. 496.4.

²⁸Translation p. 58 (Dok p. 40.5).

In its presentation of the level of understanding attained by those who perceive phenomena in terms of the thoroughly established character, the sutra describes the broad outlines of the sort of realization that can free sentient beings from the illusions that mire them in ignorance and consequent. When we perceive the non-existence of the imputational characters that were superimposed onto other-powered phenomena, then we can perceive objects in terms of the ultimate truth, because the fact that phenomena are utterly devoid of imputational characters is the ultimate truth. One who perceives the absence of imputational characters that are imputed to other-powered phenomena knows the ultimate.

The applicability of the three natures schema to cognitive experience indicates the range of the hermeneutical theory of the *Sutra Explaining the Thought*. The intent of the discussions of strategies of interpretation presented in the text is not simply to provide guidelines for interpreting certain texts and teachings, but to suggest new ways of viewing the world which, if properly understood, can radically transform one's consciousness and overturn deeply rooted misconceptions about the nature of reality. This attitude accords with Ricoeur's idea that the world is the ultimate referent of a text,²⁹ since the aim of Buddhist teachings is to bring about the elimination of one's illusions and misconceptions about the world and to replace them with understanding that accords with reality. Ricoeur's remarks about the relation between texts and the world of our experience are relevant here:

The term world then has the meaning that we all understand when we say of a new born child that he has come into the world. For me, the world is the ensemble of references opened up by every kind of text, descriptive or poetic, that I have read, understood, and loved. And to understand a text is to

²⁹Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory* (Fort Worth: Texal Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 36-7.

interpolate among the predicates of our situation all the significations that make a *Welt* out of our *Umwelt*. It is this enlarging of our horizon of existence that permits us to speak of the references opened up by the text or of the world opened up by the referential claims of most texts.³⁰

The hermeneutical principles outlined in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are not merely guidelines for textual exegesis; rather, the goal of Buddhist doctrine is to present guidelines for re-interpreting all of one's experience, to reorient one's perceptions and understandings in such a way that one is no longer confused and deluded by false appearances and mistaken conceptions. In this sense, the referents of Buddhist teachings are the world and one's perceptions of it.

Of course, the same claim could be made for many (or perhaps most) religious texts, but I think that the distinctive feature of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* is its presentation of a comprehensive worldview in terms of which Buddhist practitioners are to interpret all aspects of their experience and reorient their attitudes and perceptions. Other Buddhist texts, such as the corpus of texts that outline the rules of monastic discipline, also provide guidelines for changing one's lifestyle and reorienting one's thinking, but the *Samdhinirmocana* proposes a model for fundamental and comprehensive restructuring of the worldviews and cognitions of the trainees of the sūtra that if fully actualized will profoundly influence every aspect of cognitive experience. This attitude is reflected in the sūtra in Buddha's explanations of the cognitive and existential ramifications of his teachings on the three non-entitynesses and the three natures:

The Tathāgata teaches them doctrines stemming from non-entitynesses in terms of character and ultimate non-entitynesses in order that [those beings] become averse toward all compounded phenomena, become separated from desire,

³⁰Ibid., p. 37.

become completely released, thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are the afflictive emotions, thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are actions, and so that they thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes. Because, hearing these doctrines, they do not conceive other-powered characters to be the imputational character, they believe and understand non-entitinesses in terms of production [that is to say, other-powered phenomena] to be without the entity of character and without the entity of the ultimate, whereupon they realize, just as it is, [the other-powered nature]....On this basis, they thoroughly develop aversion toward all compounded phenomena, become completely free from desire, become completely released, and become thoroughly released from the afflictive afflictions, the afflictions that are actions, and the afflictions that are lifetimes. With respect to that, *Paramārthasamudgata*, through just this path and through just this procedure, even sentient beings who have the lineage of the Hearer Vehicle attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvāṇa. Through just this path and through just this procedure, sentient beings who have the lineage of the Solitary Realizer vehicle and those who have the lineage of the Tathāgata vehicle attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvāṇa.³¹

As this passage indicates, Buddha's intention in presenting the terminological innovations of the three non-entitinesses and the three natures is not only to provide an exegetical schema through which contradictions in his earlier statements can be reconciled, but also to facilitate a reorientation of the perceptions of sentient beings whose understanding of reality is mistaken. The ultimate aim expressed in this passage is a soteriological one, involving first overcoming misconceptions, desires, and afflictions through eliminating the wrong views that give rise to them and then leading

³¹Translation p. 70 (*Dok* p. 53.3).

those who follow this training to a transformation of the way they view reality that culminates in the attainment of nirvāṇa.

c. The Three Wheels of Doctrine

The discussion of the thought behind Buddha's conflicting teachings is further developed by Paramārthasamudgata in a section near the end of the seventh chapter where he characterizes the doctrinal differences in Buddha's teachings in terms of "wheels of doctrine" (*chos kyi 'khor lo, dharma-cakra*). In what appears to be a summary of the discussion of the doctrinal conflicts caused by Buddha's teachings asserting the non-entityness and so forth of phenomena and the resolutions proposed by the vocabulary innovations of the three characters and the three non-entitynesses, he indicates that Buddha has given specific teachings to certain groups of trainees, and he implies that each group was presented with teachings that conform to their level of understanding. The first wheel of doctrine that he describes consists of teachings spoken at the Deer Park in Sarnath, which were given to Hearers (*nyan thos, śrāvaka*) and which were primarily articulated in terms of the four noble truths.

Initially, in the area of Vārānasi in the Deer Park [called] 'Sage's Alighting', the Supramundane Victor thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine for those who were thoroughly engaged in the Hearer Vehicle, fantastic and marvellous, which none — god or human — had turned in a similar fashion in the world, through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths.³²

Paramārthasamudgata states that this wheel of doctrine "is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute."³³ The description of these teachings indicates that they include Buddha's teachings concerning the aggregates and so forth and that they were presented for a

³²Translation p. 83 (Dok p. 69.4).

³³Translation p. 83 (Dok p. 69.6).

particular group for a particular purpose. An underlying assumption behind this description is that Buddha taught them such doctrines for their own benefit, although they did not represent his final thought and thus were of interpretable meaning.

The second wheel of doctrine consists of teachings given to Mahāyānists in which Buddha taught that phenomena lack entityness, are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow. These teachings are not correct on the literal level, however, and need to be explained in terms of the three types of non-entityness of phenomena.

During the second period, based on the absence of entityness of phenomena and based on the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and natural passing beyond sorrow [of phenomena], the Supramundane Victor turned a second wheel of doctrine, for those thoroughly engaged in the Great Vehicle, very fantastic and marvellous, in an elaborative way. Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute.³⁴

This passage indicates that the second wheel consists of Buddha's statements that all phenomena lack entityness, production, etc., which were the source of the doctrinal conflicts discussed above. These teachings appeared to contradict his earlier teachings regarding the aggregates, etc., teachings that are spoken with reference to "aspects of the four noble truths". As Ālo-sang-gōn-chok explains the doctrinal conflict,

The middle turning of the wheel indicated [in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*] — the Mahāyāna sūtras on the profound, the perfection of wisdom — is not literal because, thinking of the non-entityness of the first of the three natures — imputations, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established

³⁴Translation p. 83 (Dok p. 69.7).

natures — and thinking of the non-entityness in terms of production of the second [i.e., other-powered natures], and thinking of the ultimacy and non-entityness of the third [i.e., thoroughly established natures, Buddha] said that all phenomena lack entityness. Therefore [the middle wheel] is not suitable to be literal because in that case [Buddha] would have spoken deprecatingly of all three natures.³⁵

Since the teachings presented in the second wheel were not acceptable on the literal level, Buddha turns a third “wheel of doctrine” in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* in which he introduces new vocabulary and doctrines (for example, the three characters and the three wheels) that provide the keys to understanding the thought behind his earlier teachings for those of his followers who had been confused by his second wheel teachings and who saw them as being in conflict with the teachings of the first wheel.

During the third period, based on the absence of entityness of phenomena and based on the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and natural passing beyond sorrow [of phenomena], the Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those who are thoroughly engaged in all vehicles, extremely fantastic and marvellous, through the distinctiveness of thorough differentiation. This wheel of doctrine is unsurpassable, does not provide an opportunity [for refutation], is of definitive meaning, and does not serve as a basis for dispute.³⁶

According to these passages, both the second and third wheels are “based on the absence of entityness of phenomena and based on the absence of production” and so forth, which indicates that the focus of both is the same set of teachings, but the second

³⁵Lo-sang-gñon-chok (in his word commentary on Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Precious Garland of Tenets*, p. 123.2.

³⁶Translation p. 84 (Dok p. 70.3).

wheel is described as being of interpretable meaning, while the third wheel is of definitive meaning. The third wheel is described by Paramārthasamudgata as the wheel in which Buddha teaches “through the distinctiveness of thorough differentiation” because in this wheel Buddha explains what he was thinking of when he gave the teachings of the middle wheel and he differentiates the three non-entitynesses and indicates that the first two wheels are of interpretable meaning while the third is of definitive meaning. Āl-jor-hlūn-drup comments that third wheel teachings are “unsurpassable” (*bla na ma mchis pa, anuttara*) because there are no sūtras of definitive meaning that are superior to them. They “do not provide an opportunity [for refutation]” (*skabs ma mchis pa, anavakāṣa*) because there is no opportunity for opponents validly to dispute them in terms of the literal readings of the teachings. They are of “definitive meaning” (*nges pa'i don, nitārtha*) because they “need not be interpreted as something else and are definitive as that meaning” (*'di'i don gzhan du drang mi dgos shing don der nges pa'o*).³⁷ Džong-ka-ba comments that the statement that the third wheel does not involve controversy

should be taken as [meaning] that since the [sūtra] indicates the existence or non-existence of entityness, there is no place for controversy when scholars analyze whether the meaning of the sūtra is or is not delineated in that way.³⁸

Wonch'uk³⁹ states that the first wheel includes doctrines in which Buddha “thoroughly teaches the causes and effects of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa in the Deer Park for those inclined toward the Hearer vehicle; this is ‘the wheel of doctrine of the four truths’.” The second wheel includes “teachings of the superior Perfection of Wisdom [sūtras] to

³⁷*Lags bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Buxaduar: Sera Monastery, 1968), p. 31.5.

³⁸*The Essence of the Good Explanations*, Sarnath ed., p. 27.4 (translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, p. 48).

³⁹Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 4.2.

sixteen congregations at the Vulture Peak and so forth to those who are inclined toward the Bodhisattva vehicle; this is the wheel of doctrine of absence of character" (*mtshan nyid med pa'i chos kyi 'khor lo*). The teachings of the third wheel, however, are those teachings that are for "those inclined toward all vehicles".

Because in this sūtra the meaning of the very profound and hidden thought of all of the three vehicles which is difficult to untie is revealed and clearly indicated, it is called '[Sūtra] Explaining the Profound Thought'.⁴⁰

These third wheel teachings, according to Wonch'uk, are taught both in pure lands such as Padmagarbha (*padma'i snying po*) and in impure places. The main example of such teachings is the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, and Wonch'uk states that such teachings are called "the Mahāyāna wheel of doctrine of definitive meaning" (*nges pa'i don theg pa chen po'i chos kyi 'khor lo*). He adds that the teachings of this vehicle "are the thought of the teachings of Tathāgatas."⁴¹ In his discussion of the sūtra's statements concerning the three wheels in the seventh chapter, he states:

Those teachings of the four truths are teachings spoken in the first [period]. Those teachings of absence of character are teachings of the second period. Those complete and perfect teachings of reasonings of existence or non-existence — stemming from the three types of entityness, the three types of non-entityness, and so forth — are teachings of the third period....The first wheel teaches that [phenomena] are existent while holding back [the doctrine of] emptiness; the second wheel teaches that [phenomena] are empty while holding back [the doctrine of] existence, but the third wheel completely teaches

⁴⁰Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 4.7: *theg pa gsum po thams cad kyi shin tu zab cing mkhyud pa rnam par dgrol par dka' ba'i don mdo sde 'di las rnam par phye ste gsal bar ston par mdzad pas na / dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa zhes bya'o*.

⁴¹Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* (118), p. 4.5.

reasonings of emptiness and existence; therefore, it is said to be of 'definitive meaning'.⁴²

The third wheel is said in the sūtra to be beneficial for sentient beings who listen to these teachings and copy, memorize, and recite them and is said to produce spiritual benefits for all lineages of Buddhists, i.e., those of the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva vehicles. According to Ābel-jor-hlün-drup, this wheel is taught "for the sake of taking care of trainees of the three lineages" (*gdul bya rigs can gsum ka rjes su bzung ba'i ched du*),⁴³ an idea that is also expressed in the concluding statement of the seventh chapter of the sūtra, which contains an outline of the benefits received by those who were present when this chapter of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* was taught.

When this teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning, was set forth, 600,000 beings generated the unsurpassed, completely perfect mind of enlightenment; 300,000 Hearers [attained] the eye of doctrine that, with respect to phenomena, is undefiled and free from stains; 150,000 Hearers thoroughly released their minds from contaminations in terms of non-attachment; 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained the forbearance of the doctrine of non-production.⁴⁴

This passage indicates that part of the sūtra's claim to authoritativeness is based on the sensibleness and efficacy of its teachings. Through outlining the spiritual advances made by those in the audience who heard the teachings of the *Samdhinirmocana*, it indicates that people reading this sūtra should listen to and contemplate the teachings it presents because of the spiritual benefits to be derived from them.

⁴²Wonch'uk, vol. *thi* (119), p. 142.6.

⁴³Ābel-jor-hlün-drup, *Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Buxaduar: Sera Monastery, 1968), p. 30.3.

⁴⁴Translation p. 86 (Dok p. 72.3).

The implicit claims of authoritativeness in the sūtra also derive from a number of other sources. As mentioned previously, throughout the text there are both implicit and explicit claims made by the sūtra about its definitiveness. Beginning with the introduction, this is presented as a text for advanced practitioners, and the place where it is taught is described as being a vast celestial palace that reflects the supreme state of realization of the Buddha. In addition, the residents of the palace and the audience of the sūtra are described as being very advanced practitioners, and the interlocutors (except for Subhūti) are Bodhisattvas who have attained a high level of understanding.

The authority of the Buddha and his teaching abilities are also important elements of the sūtra's implicit arguments for its authoritativeness. When the first two wheels are described, the audience is told that these wheels were taught for particular congregations, and behind this statement is the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of "skill in means" (*thabs la mkhas pa*, *upāya-kauśalya*, an idea that is discussed in the ninth chapter of the sūtra), which holds that Buddha teaches each individual or group what will be most beneficial. In addition, the Mahāyāna tradition in general views Buddha as omniscient (an idea that is discussed in the tenth chapter of the sūtra), and so he is able to know precisely the nature of the predispositions of each individual and group and adapt his teachings accordingly. Thus, given the statements indicating that Buddha's teachings of interpretable meaning in the first two wheels were concordant with the spiritual needs and predispositions of their respective audiences, the assembly present at the teaching of the *Samādhinirmocana* apparently should conclude that, since Buddha teaches everyone what is most beneficial, they should know that the doctrines they are hearing are ideally suited to them.

In general, Buddhism asks for a level of assent directly proportioned to the evidence, and the implicit arguments of the text give Buddhists in the audience (and those who belong to traditions that hold it to be authoritative) a number of reasons to accept it as definitive. The text is taught by Buddha, and the appeal of the sūtra is

mainly based on his personal authority, but there are also implicit appeals based on the sensibleness of the sūtra's teachings. Although throughout the text Buddha simply declares the definitiveness of his teachings without arguing against rival viewpoints (including rival viewpoints that he himself had presented on other occasions), there is also an undercurrent of thought in the text that indicates that those in the audience will be convinced not only by the authority of the Buddha who is presenting the teachings but by their apparent persuasiveness. When the teachings of the first two wheels are said to be "surpassable", of "interpretable meaning" and to serve as a "basis for dispute", whereas the third wheel is "unsurpassable", of "definitive meaning" and does not serve as a "basis for dispute", this indicates that the audience should find the third wheel teachings more compelling and convincing. The sense of the reasonableness of the teachings of the sūtra is also fostered by the presentation of analogies throughout the text, which demonstrate the superiority of the sūtra's discussion of the ultimate in the first four chapters and its presentation of interpretable and definitive teachings in the seventh chapter. The implicit claim of the sūtra's multi-faceted arguments for its own definitiveness — which is based on the personal authority of Buddha, the reasonableness of its doctrines, the persuasiveness of its analogies, as well as the sūtra's own claims of definitiveness — requires the assumptions that this is a teaching given by the supreme authority for Buddhists and that these teachings can effectively reconcile the conceptual difficulties that arose from his earlier teachings and will advance their spiritual progress. Thus, the congregation that is listening to these new teachings (and later traditions that accept them as authoritative) have good reasons in a traditional context for confidence in the teachings of the third wheel.

The qualification "in a traditional context" is an important one, since in Buddhism community, tradition, and authority are important. Each interpretive community (such as the Yogācāra school, which takes the *Samādhinirmocana* as authoritative) chooses which texts, persons, interpretations, and strategies are authoritative, and belonging to a

particular interpretive community involves at least in part accepting this framework as normative. Operating within a traditional context determines the sort of evidence one relies on. If, for instance, one is a biblical fundamentalist, one will take the doctrine of virgin birth as being definitive, even though virginity and pregnancy are incompatible states of affairs. If the primary authority is Buddha, then whatever he says will appear to a devout traditional Buddhist as possessing a high degree of authority. Given such an attitude, Buddhists will seek for interpretational schemas that accord with this assumption, and whatever momentary doubts they may entertain will be seen as being merely due to their own imperfections in understanding.

This attitude is expressed in a passage in the seventh chapter in which the reactions of various types of beings to the sūtra's teachings are described. Some are criticized for thinking that the doctrines of the *Samdhinirmocana* are demonic in origin because they conflict with the teachings they are familiar with, while others are praised for accepting them with simple faith because they know that the sūtra's teachings are given by Buddha, and his teachings must be beneficial and authoritative, even if people of limited understanding cannot fathom how this can be so.

When those sentient beings...who are honest and have an honest nature, who are unable to remove conceptuality, who do not abide in thoroughly holding their own view to be supreme hear this doctrine, although they do not understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it, they develop belief and experience faith with respect to this doctrine. They believe: 'These sūtras are taught by the Tathāgata, and are profound, brilliantly profound, possessing [the doctrine of] emptiness, difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, unanalyzable, not an object of activity of argumentation, known by the wise who finely analyze and by the discerning.'

Apprehending that they do not understand the meaning of those sūtras and what they teach, they say: 'The enlightenment of the Supramundane Victor is profound; the reality of phenomena is also profound; therefore, the Tathāgata alone knows; we do not understand. The doctrine that is taught by the Tathāgatas works on sentient beings by way of their various beliefs. Our understanding and perception are merely [like] cowprints [compared to that of the Tathāgatas], whereas the Tathāgata's knowledge and perception are infinite.'⁴⁵

In other words, they understand that since these teachings (that appear to conflict with what they have previously heard) are taught by Buddha, they are authoritative, even if they are unable to comprehend them. They know that if they are unable to see the harmony of thought in Buddha's contradictory statements, this is because their understanding is limited. Because of their attitude of reverence for the teachings and the Teacher, Buddha states that "on this basis, they advance by way of the collection of merit and advance by way of the collection of wisdom, and they also thoroughly ripen their continuums, which were not [previously] ripened."⁴⁶

This passage presents an appeal to tradition and to the authority of Buddha and is apparently meant to convince people who might doubt the veracity of the teachings presented in the sūtra. Those Buddhists who are convinced that the teachings of the *Samdhinirmocana* are indeed spoken by Buddha will have strong reasons for accepting them as authoritative. A traditional Buddhist (or a traditionalist of any religion) will tend to accept even very questionable doctrines as being highly probable if they are supported by the evidence of the authority of the founder of the tradition. Based on such authority, Buddhists can accept Buddha's teachings as being highly probable even

⁴⁵Translation p. 73 (Dok p. 57.5).

⁴⁶Translation p. 73 (Dok p. 58.1).

if they see no way that they can be true and even if they appear to contradict other teachings. Thus, a traditional Buddhist can accept as true such apparently contradictory propositions as: (1) Buddha is omniscient; (2) Buddha's teachings express the truth; and (3) Buddha's teachings often contradict each other.

As the sūtra indicates, recognition of doctrinal conflict does not necessarily lead to rejecting of tradition. As John Skorupski states,

The traditional thinker is, precisely, traditional: this is not directly a matter of being unwilling to reject one's own theories, but of unwillingness to reject traditionally handed-down ones — of piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed.⁴⁷

Thus, given a basic presupposition of the authoritativeness of Buddha's teachings, a traditional Buddhist who hears the teachings of the sūtra would be very reasonable in accepting its doctrines as definitive. Especially if he/she belongs to an interpretive community that accepts the sūtra as normative, this is the most reasonable conclusion that a traditional thinker could draw. The traditional Buddhist (and traditionalists of all types) accepts cognitive principles that in effect limit the range of possible criticism of apparently contradictory doctrines. In order legitimately to accept or reject particular teachings attributed to a Buddha, one would presumably need to have actualized for oneself the state of a Buddha. Until this point, the most reasonable response is that of those beings who accept what Buddha says because he says it. They can reasonably accept his statements on his authority, even though they might not be able to articulate how apparent conflicts that arise from his teachings might be reconciled. For the audience of the *Samdhinirmocana*, the question of whether or not the doctrines presented by Buddha in this sūtra really represent his final thought would seem to be irrelevant

⁴⁷John Skorupski, *Symbol and Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 204.

given the context: since Buddhists believe that Buddha adapts himself to each audience and only tells them what will be most beneficial to them, the members of the audience should reasonably conclude that what they are hearing is the ideal teaching for them.

This should not, however, be taken as indicating that I think that Buddhist traditionalists are irrational or anti-rational. On the contrary, I would contend that, given the cultural and religious assumptions under which they operate, they are being very reasonable in accepting Buddha's teachings on his authority. In a similar fashion, when a research chemist describes the intricacies of chemical reactions I accept his/her authority on such matters simply because I have good reasons to believe that a highly trained chemist has an understanding of chemistry surpassing my own, and not because I can personally explain how he/she is right. I assume that a chemist's opinions will be based on experimental evidence, but I have no means of either proving or falsifying the chemist's assertions. In a similar manner, Buddha's assertions are convincing and authoritative for Buddhists because of the total cognitive and hermeneutical matrix within which they operate. It should be noted, however, that accepting Buddha as an authority does not preclude innovation, but rather sets the standards in terms of which innovation takes place, and within the limits and norms of their traditions Buddhist scholars will attempt to "posit the thought" of Buddha in ways that both remain faithful to the tradition and accord with reason and empirical evidence. As Richard Bernstein, quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, states,

It is a false dichotomy to oppose tradition and reason, or even tradition and revolution, for 'it is traditions which are the bearers of reason, and traditions at certain periods actually require and need revolutions for their continuance.'⁴⁸

⁴⁸Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 77. The passage

In other words, traditions are not to be viewed as ossified and rigid systems that are resistant to change and innovations, but rather as continually changing organisms that require innovations in doctrine and practice to retain their vitality. Doctrines are modified, interpreted, or discarded to the extent that they contradict compelling evidence or prove unfruitful for new or different questions that come to interest members of the tradition, and this process of innovation and reinterpretation is a sign that the tradition remains vital and relevant for its adherents. Throughout this process of change and adaptation, however, they seek to retain a sense of continuity with the foundational principles of the tradition, despite the fact that these principles may be interpreted and applied in very different ways by various interpretive communities and at different times.

d. What are Third Wheel Teachings?

The three wheels schema shows the interrelationship between continuity and change in the thought of the sūtra. It indicates that although Buddha taught doctrines that were contradictory on the literal level there was an underlying thought behind them in terms of which they can be reconciled. Thus, although the sūtra is reinterpreting Buddha's teachings in terms of new vocabulary and doctrines, it is also concerned to show how these are in accord with the tradition. It indicates that there is an underlying interrelationship between the wheels, in that second wheel teachings refer to and contradict first wheel teachings, and third wheel teachings specify what Buddha was thinking of when he taught the second wheel.

from MacIntyre is in his "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science", in *Monist*, 60 (1977), p. 461.

In the third wheel, according to Wonch'uk, Buddha thoroughly explains the thought behind his earlier teachings of entityness and non-entityness, and "because of thoroughly indicating entityness and non-entityness, this is a turning of the wheel of correct doctrine through such thorough differentiation."⁴⁹ Ābel-jor-hlün-drup expresses a similar thought when he says:

The Teacher — at the third time, in Vaiśālī, for the sake of taking care of those having all three lineages, the special trainees of [this wheel], stemming from the subject matter of non-entityness and so forth — differentiated well the particulars of true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three, imputations, other-powered phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena in the third [wheel of doctrine], the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation.⁵⁰

In a discussion of this passage of Ābel-jor-hlün-drup's text, Geshe Palden Dragpa (oral commentary) stated:

Although Paramārthasamudgata asks Buddha explicitly about the thought behind his teaching of the middle wheel, this carries over to the thought behind his teaching of the first wheel. Therefore, Paramārthasamudgata is implicitly asking about Buddha's thought in his teaching of the first wheel.

In other words, in the third wheel Buddha's purpose is to clarify the thought behind his earlier statements and to present an exegetical framework that will allow his followers to categorize certain of his teachings. The model that he presents is a contextually based interpretational scheme. According to this model, the teachings he gave to Hearers that were mainly concerned with the four noble truths were valid and beneficial for that

⁴⁹Wonch'uk, vol. *thi* (119), p. 137.1.

⁵⁰Ābel-jor-hlün-drup, *Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Buxaduar: Sera Monastery, 1968), p. 30.3.

audience, but were not of definitive meaning and did not represent his final thought. The teachings that he gave to Mahāyānists in which he made blanket statements that “all phenomena lack entityness” etc. were also of interpretable meaning, and the explanations of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* indicate how to reconcile them with his final thought on the literal level. The teachings of the third wheel have the same subject matter as those of the second wheel (non-entityness, non-production, etc.), but they are definitive, because they do not require interpretation in order to reconcile them with Buddha’s thought. The sūtra’s statement that these teachings are unsurpassable, do not provide an opportunity for refutation, are of definitive meaning, and that they do not serve as a basis for dispute indicates that according to the system of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* those doctrines that are correct as they stand are definitive, while those that require interpretation are interpretable. This is the conclusion reached by D̄zong-ka-b̄a, who indicates that he thinks that the internal logic of the sūtra suggests that teachings that are literally acceptable are definitive, while those that are not are interpretable. Stated as a general principle, this entails that

the differentiation of interpretable and definitive scriptures that are set forth stemming from the ultimate derives from whether there is or is not damage by reasoning to the literal reading.⁵¹

This principle was further developed and refined by D̄zong-ka-b̄a’s followers. As Ḡön-chok-jik-may-wang-b̄o expresses it:

⁵¹*The Essence of the Good Explanations*, p. 86.18 (tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, p. 162).

[Proponents of this system] designate a scripture whose explicit teachings cannot be accepted literally as a sūtra requiring interpretation. They designate any scripture whose explicit teaching can be accepted literally as definitive.⁵²

Following D̄zong-ka-ba's analysis in *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, the Ge-luk-bas assert that the division of the three wheels of doctrine is made according to subject matter and that the determining factor is how selflessness is presented in each of the wheels. As Jeffrey Hopkins expresses this principle,

The first turning is comprised of doctrines that set forth the selflessness of persons but do not refute that phenomena are established by way of their own character as bases of names and conceptions. The second is comprised of those that on the literal level set forth the non-true existence of all phenomena, without distinguishing that some do and others do not truly exist. The third is comprised of those that clearly discriminate the true existence of emptinesses and impermanent phenomena and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena.⁵³

In the first six chapters, the sūtra presents a particular worldview based on its presentation of selflessness that is correlated with a particular way of orienting oneself cognitively. This provides the basis for the innovations of vocabulary and doctrine in the seventh chapter. The presentation of the worldview in the seventh chapter is informed by and based on the discussions of the previous six chapters. The doctrines of the three characters and three non-entitynesses, for example, are informed by the discussion of the ultimate in the first four chapters and the discussion of the three characters in the sixth chapter; and the discussion of how sentient beings are to

⁵²Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1976), p. 121.

⁵³*Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 426.

transform their cognitions of reality presupposes the presentation of consciousness in the fifth chapter, in which the basis-consciousness is described as “flowing like a river” that is constantly changing due to the presence of new predispositions that result from particular cognitive behaviors. The sūtra’s delineation of how consciousness is to be transformed in light of the worldview presented in the seventh chapter presupposes the idea of a constantly changing continuum of consciousness that is altered in accordance with the cognitive seeds deposited in it.⁵⁴

⁵⁴As I mentioned in the opening section, Lamotte thinks that the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* as it exists today is a composite work that is made up of various different texts from different times. He bases his theory on the stylistic differences between the chapters, such as the fact that the first four chapters are considerably shorter than the last four and the fact that each chapter discusses a distinct theme and/or set of doctrines. I think, however, that the sūtra nevertheless has an internal coherence in its thought, and it seems to me that if the text repeated key doctrinal points throughout the text this would be evidence of poor writing and editing rather than an argument for the idea that it is a unitary work. Moreover, the minor stylistic differences that the text exhibits are, in my opinion, much less striking than the underlying coherence of thought, and I think that if one views the sūtra as a whole and as a philosophical work that attempts to present a coherent worldview based on the presentation of the ultimate, a picture of strong underlying unity emerges. The text first describes the setting of the discourse, then lays out the foundations of the later discussion through its delineation of the nature of the ultimate and similes illustrating its nature, then it describes the nature of consciousness, which is significant for its later discussion in that it provides a basis for understanding how the mind may be reoriented in terms of the new worldview presented in the sūtra. The sixth chapter lays the groundwork for the discussions of the seventh chapter by describing the three characters. Building upon this, the seventh chapter lays out a worldview based on the discussion of the ultimate, the three characters, the three non-entitynesses, and the three wheels. The eighth and ninth chapters draw out the implications of this discussion in terms of how it is to be applied in the context of meditative practice, and finally the tenth chapter outlines the nature of

The worldview also presupposes and incorporates the presentation of the ultimate that was discussed in the previous chapter. When, for instance, *Paramārthasamudgata* states that the thoroughly established character is the ultimate, an object of observation of purification, and the selflessness of phenomena, he is fully in accord with the descriptions of the ultimate in the first four chapters. Moreover, these descriptions constitute the basis upon which the worldview is outlined in the seventh chapter, and this in turn is the foundation of the discussion of interpretable and definitive scriptures. This is indicated by the concluding colophon of the seventh chapter, which characterizes the preceding discussion as “this teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning”. Although the sūtra does not explicitly make this connection, I think that it implies that third wheel teachings are the doctrines and vocabulary innovations of the *Samdhinirmocana* that differentiate Buddha’s interpretable and definitive teachings and that accord with the worldview of the sūtra’s presentation of selflessness. This worldview is presented to a particular audience that perceives Buddha’s teachings concerning non-entityness and so forth as contradicting his first wheel teachings. The *Samdhinirmocana* outlines a worldview that allows the members of the audience to reconcile the cognitive conflicts of the first two wheels, and the worldview provides guidelines for textual analysis that both show how what is taught in the first two wheels is not literally acceptable and how to posit the thought behind those teachings. The worldview incorporates and builds upon the discussions of the ultimate, the analysis of consciousness, and the delineation of the three characters in the first six chapters, and the presentation

Buddhahood, which appears to be the result of successfully following the path outlined in the *Samdhinirmocana*. This internal coherence does not, however, disprove the possibility that the sūtra might have been composed in stages. I wish merely to point out that Lamotte’s evidence does not establish his case, and that his argument for its gradual formation is not proven on the basis of the inconsistencies that he saw in the internal structure of the text.

of selflessness in the seventh chapter — which shows both the problems with the first two wheels and how to posit Buddha's thought — serves as the basis for the hermeneutical method of the sūtra. According to this method of differentiating the wheels, they are distinguished by the presentations of selflessness implied by each, and not by other criteria, such as the time or place at which they were presented.

Robert Thurman, however, contends that the division of Buddha's teachings into the three wheels is a chronological one, and that the three wheels refer to periods in Buddha's life. According to Thurman, "...this scheme of the *Samdhinirmocana*...is both historical (as relating to Buddha's biography) and philosophical, as relating to the content of the teaching."⁵⁵ This is a plausible conclusion, since some of the language used in the sūtra and the commentaries might suggest this (for example, the fact that the discussion of the first wheel is introduced with the words, "initially, in the area of Varāṇasī..." and the second wheel is introduced with the words, "during the second period..."), but I think that the internal logic of the sūtra indicates that Thurman's statement is problematic, since no Mahāyāna text that I have seen suggests that Buddha taught Hīnayāna doctrines for a certain period and then switched to teaching exclusively Mahāyāna doctrines. Rather, he adapted his teachings to each individual and group he encountered, giving each what would be most beneficial. In Mahāyāna literature, Buddha is portrayed as a skillful teacher who encountered different types of students during his life and was able to present each student or group of students the teachings that would be most helpful. As Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* explains this,

Just as grammarians
Begin with reading the alphabet
So the Buddha teaches doctrines

⁵⁵Robert Thurman, "Buddhist Hermeneutics", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, XI.VI.1, 1978, p. 28.

That students can bear.

To some, he teaches doctrines

For reversal of sins.

To some, for the sake of achieving of merit;

To some, doctrines based on duality;

To some, [he teaches doctrines] based on non-duality.

To some, the profound, frightening to the fearful,

Having an essence of emptiness and compassion,

The means of achieving enlightenment.⁵⁶

In the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, the same principle applies, and Buddha indicates that for those who will benefit from first wheel teachings he teaches the four truths and related doctrines, while for those who would most benefit from second wheel teachings he teaches that all phenomena lack entityness, etc. For those who require the explanations of the third wheel, he differentiates his interpretable and definitive teachings with reference to the previous two wheels. To say that the three wheels refer to periods of Buddha's life does not appear to accord with the thought of the sūtra, since there is no indication in the *Samādhinirmocana-sūtra* that Buddha only encountered first wheel trainees during the first part of his teaching career, second wheel trainees during the second part, and third wheel trainees during the third part. Dzong-ka-ba rejects the idea that the division of the three wheels is based on chronology when he contends that

⁵⁶*Ratnāvalī*, chapter four, verses 94-97 (ed. Michael Hahn, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī*, Bonn, 1982, pp. 129-131).

the three stages of wheels [of doctrine] mentioned in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* are posited, not by way of the assemblies of [Buddha's] circle or by way of periods in the teacher's life and so forth, but by way of the subjects of expression.⁵⁷

Kay-drup elaborates on this by adding,

Furthermore, those are in terms of the mode of settling the meaning of selflessness — an explanation that mostly does not refute true existence, an explanation that all phenomena are without true existence, and a good differentiation of true existence with respect to the three natures. [The differentiation of] three wheels is done in terms of the fact that they respectively teach such.⁵⁸

According to D̄zong-ka-ba and Kay-drup, it is incorrect to say that the division of the three wheels is based either on periods of Buddha's life or on which persons were present in the audience of particular teachings. Rather, the basis for the division is how the meaning of selflessness is settled in each of the wheels. According to D̄zong-ka-ba, in the first wheel Buddha implicitly spoke of the selflessness of persons, but the teachings of this wheel gave his audience the impression that the aggregates and so forth were ultimately truly established. In the second wheel, he refuted this idea and declared that all phenomena without qualification lack such true establishment. In the third wheel, he individually differentiated which phenomena are established by way of their own character and which are not. According to D̄zong-ka-ba,

⁵⁷*The Essence of the Good Explanations* (Sarnath edition, p. 87.11); tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, p. 163.

⁵⁸From Kay-drup's *Thousand Dosages* (*stong thun chen mo*), in *The Collected Works of the Lord Mkhas-grub rje dge legs dpal bzai po*, vol. 1, p. 179; translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, ch. 4, p. 2.

Initially, at Vārāṇasī he spoke of the selflessness of persons; [thus] there is one cycle in which the true establishment of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth, except for a few, is not refuted and true existence is mentioned frequently. Then, there is one cycle in which, without [clearly] making distinctions, true establishment is refuted [on the literal level] with respect to all of the phenomena of the aggregates and so forth. Then there arose one cycle in which, with respect to those, he individually differentiated the mode of the first nature [the imputational nature] as not established by way of its own character and the other two as established by way of their own character. Therefore, [the wheels of doctrine that are the bases for differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive in the Questions of Paramārthasamudgata Chapter and in the texts commenting on its thought] are taken in terms of these [modes of teaching subject matter]; other sūtras that teach in a way other than those modes of teaching are not in any sensible way bases of this [school's] analysis of the interpretable and the definitive.⁵⁹

Ḍzong-ka-ba's use of the term "cycles" (*skor*) has important ramifications for our argument. It implies that the three wheels are interrelated sets of doctrines that were taught at different times. Moreover, the sūtra's statements that the wheels of doctrine were taught during successive "periods" probably only indicates that he *began* teaching the second wheel after the first, and later *began* teaching the third after the second had been articulated. This, I think, is the most reasonable conclusion, since, as stated above, there is no indication in traditional biographies of Buddha or in the *Samdhinirmocana* that he only encountered first wheel trainees during the first part of his life, second wheel trainees during the second part, and third wheel trainees during the third part. In

⁵⁹*The Essence of the Good Explanations*, p. 87.15; tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, chapter 4, p. 164.

addition, the statement that he taught the three wheels during successive periods is probably based on the fact that each of the third wheels refers to and requires the previous wheel(s) in order to be intelligible.

Thus, the discussion of the three wheels of doctrine in the seventh chapter of the sūtra is based on the presentation of the the previous two wheels, the description of the ultimate in the first four chapters, and on the statements concerning the three natures in the sixth chapter.. The teachings of the third wheel should be viewed as the result of a dialectical process. The teachings of the first wheel present an implicit thesis, which is opposed by the anti-thesis of the second wheel. The third wheel is a new thesis that attempts to reconcile the apparent conflicts between the first two wheels, but it could not have intelligibly been formulated without them.

The meaning of third wheel doctrines is highly contextual. Taken alone, they are unspecifiable, and they depend upon the perspectives of the first two wheels for self-definition. In this sense, the doctrines of the three wheels are internally related and mutually constitutive, rather than disjunctively opposed. Moreover, the meanings of third wheel doctrines are constituted by the contextual matrix in which they occur. An attempt to separate them from their context would result in unintelligibility, and the dialectical relationships between the three wheels determine the meaning and extension of the third wheel. It comes into being as a result of a dialectical process in which second wheel teachings oppose the implicit assumptions insinuated by the first wheel, resulting in cognitive conflicts that the third wheel attempts to overcome through its new synthesis, a worldview that incorporates the sūtra's presentation of the ultimate, the doctrines of the three characters, the three non-entitynesses, and the three wheels. These new doctrines, in conjunction with its presentation of the ultimate, are intended to reconcile the cognitive conflicts between the first two wheels and to outline a schema through which their harmony with Buddha's thought can be seen, but the meanings of third wheel teachings are constituted through a dialectical interrelationship in which the

doctrines of the three wheels mutually constitute each other. The meaning of the third wheel teachings is a function of the correlation of the elements of the dialectical and contextual field of which they are integral members.

Furthermore, the identities of the wheels are mutually established: first and second wheel teachings acquire new identities through the articulation of the third wheel. Before the formulation of the three wheels schema in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought*, they are simply teachings of Buddha among others, but when the sūtra singles out certain sets of teachings and identifies them as belonging to a specific “wheel of doctrine” they appear in a new light. Similarly, the second wheel and third wheel only achieve their identities through their dialectical relationship to the other wheels. The conclusion of this argument is that the three wheels are taught in successive “cycles” in the sense that the second is formulated in opposition to the implicit assumptions fostered by the first and the third is taught in order to reconcile the conceptual difficulties that the second wheel caused for some Buddhists.

Underlying the sūtra’s discussion of how to differentiate interpretable and definitive teachings is a set of implied foundationalist principles, for example, the assumption that behind the contradictions there is a “thought” that can and should be recognized and articulated. Buddha presents each of his teachings for a particular purpose, and the task of Buddhist exegetes is to uncover it and to represent it accurately. Thus, when the sūtra claims that Buddha had a “thought” behind his earlier contradictory teachings, that he presented them for a particular “purpose”, and when he agrees to explain “of what he was thinking” when he taught the first two wheels, the implication is that the meaning of Buddha’s teachings is determined by and founded upon his thought. The sūtra provides guidelines that will allow his followers to understand what this thought is, and its assumptions that Buddha’s thought determines what his teachings mean and that explicating this thought is essential to correct understanding accords with E.D. Hirsch’s statement that “all valid interpretation...is

founded on the re-cognition of what an author meant.”⁶⁰ Of course, both Hirsch and Buddhist exegetes are aware that differences of opinion occur among qualified interpreters, but this does not mean that the re-cognition of the author’s meaning is impossible, but only that it is sometimes very difficult.⁶¹ The sūtra attempts to overcome the difficulties presented by conflicting teachings by outlining interpretive models that will allow exegetes who base themselves on the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* to locate the underlying purpose behind the teachings.

Āzong-ka-ba, in the introduction to *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, develops this point. He states that Buddha presents many different teachings and reasonings that enable trainees to understand suchness, but, since these are sometimes in conflict, people must learn to differentiate which scriptures are interpretable and which are definitive. Unless one successfully differentiates the interpretable and the definitive, one will be unable to attain liberation. However, one cannot simply rely on Buddha’s statements concerning which teachings are interpretable and which are definitive, because Buddha has given different groups of trainees conflicting guidelines for differentiation. The conclusion Āzong-ka-ba draws is that

one must seek [Buddha’s] thought, following the [two] great openers of the chariot-ways [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga], who were prophesied as differentiating the interpretable and the definitive in [Buddha’s] scriptures and who commented on the thought of the interpretable and the definitive and, moreover, settled it well through reasoning....⁶²

⁶⁰E.D. Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 126.

⁶¹This idea is discussed by Hirsch in *Validity in Interpretation*, pp. 75-76.

⁶²*The Essence of the Good Explanations*, p. 3.5; tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, pp. 11-12.

The bases for interpretation, according to *Dzong-ka-ba*, are both tradition and reasoning. If one belongs to an interpretive community that accepts the *Samdhinirmocana* and the system of Asaṅga, then one should have confidence both in the authoritativeness of the *Samdhinirmocana* and in the reasonings set forth by Asaṅga that draw out its meaning. According to *Dzong-ka-ba*, this confidence is justified on the basis of tradition, which holds that Buddha prophesied Asaṅga's birth and declared that he would validly interpret and present his thought. The final authority for *Dzong-ka-ba*, however, is reasoning, and he states that

in the end, the differentiation [between the interpretable and the definitive] must be made just by stainless reasoning, because if a speaker asserts a tenet contradicting reason, [that person] is not suitable to be a valid being and because the suchness of things also has reasoned proofs which are establishments by way of [logical] correctness.⁶³

This statement, in my opinion, accords with the overall thrust of the discussion of interpretable and definitive scriptures in the *Samdhinirmocana*. Although, as stated earlier, throughout the sūtra Buddha simply declares how the audience should understand and interpret his teachings, there is also an implicit appeal to reason, and the text indicates that the audience should find the vocabulary innovations, new doctrines, and analogies of the sūtra persuasive. Moreover, since these principles are apparently meant to be applied to future exegetical situations, they imply a set of principles that can function as models and paradigms in terms of which one can formulate reasonings that will allow one to make distinctions between interpretable and definitive scriptures. In the final analysis, then, the appeal of the sūtra is multi-faceted: the text implies that its teachings should be accepted on the basis of the authority of the Buddha, the authority of tradition, and the persuasiveness of its presentation.

⁶³Ibid., p. 3.10; tr. Hopkins, p. 12.

This probably does not mean, however, that every Buddhist is expected to differentiate interpretable and definitive scriptures individually. In Buddhism, this differentiation is done primarily in reliance upon scriptures accepted as authoritative by one's tradition and on great exegetes whose interpretations are accepted by the tradition as normative, such as Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, and the interpretive community to which one belongs will determine one's hermeneutical orientation to a large extent. Tradition determines the scriptures and exegetes an individual will follow, and until one directly cognizes emptiness for oneself it is generally assumed that one will defer to such authorities. The point of differentiating the interpretable and definitive in texts like the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* seems to be that such differentiation provides a guide for people to follow until they are able to understand the ultimate themselves and then to formulate informed interpretations. This is not, however, a rejection of critical thought, but rather is based upon a recognition that others have greater expertise in these matters and should be deferred to. As mentioned earlier, this is similar to the attitude most people without specialized knowledge in chemistry exhibit toward those who are accomplished in that field. Just as I will defer to the opinions expressed by a highly trained chemist with regard to his/her field of expertise, Buddhists who have not directly cognized emptiness would be expected by the tradition to defer to authorities such as Buddha and the great Buddhist exegetes. It should also be noted that although the texts and scholars that one uses as bases for interpretation are those that happen to be normative for the tradition to which one belongs, still most exegetes formulate reasonings based on their normative sources that attempt to demonstrate that their particular tradition's vision is superior to others and is the most persuasive for interpretation. In conclusion, then, the presentation of hermeneutical models in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* and their elaboration by later exegetes exhibit a number of interrelated perspectives that appeal to authority, tradition, reasoning, and persuasion,

and in order to understand the hermeneutical system of the sūtra these must all be taken into account.

Part Two:

Translation of the *Sūtra* *Explaining the Thought* and Notes

Preface to the Translation

The main edition used in the present translation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is the Dōk (*stog*) Palace edition.¹ According to the preface (*dkar chag*) to the Dōk Palace *Translations of [Buddha's] Teachings (bka' 'gyur)*, p. 2b,² the chief minister (*bka' 'phrul blon*) Šō-nam-hlün-drup (*bsod nams lhun grub*) obtained a copy of the *Bka' 'gyur* from Bhutan (*dbus phyogs lho bo 'brug*) and had a copy made in order to promote the long life (*sku'i ring*) of King Nyi-ma-nā-m-gyel (*nyi ma rnam rgyal*) of

¹The *Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur*, Leh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978; printed at Jayyed Press, Ballimaran, Delhi-6, India, vol. 63 (*na*), pp. 1-160. This has been studied by Tadeusz Skorupski, *A Catalogue of the Stog Palace Kanjur* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1985); reviewed by Bruce Cameron Hall, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (JIABS)* vol. 9, #2, p. 159 and by Helmut Eimer in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)* 50, 1987, pp. 172-3.).

²The *Bka' 'gyur* is one of the two main divisions of the Tibetan Buddhist canon, the other being *Bstan 'gyur*. The term *Bka' 'gyur* literally means 'translation of speech', and this section of the canon contains the purported teachings of the Buddha translated into Tibetan. It includes *sūtras* (*mdo*), *tantras* (*rgyud*), and *vinaya* (*'dul ba*). The *Bstan 'gyur* mainly contains philosophical treatises and commentaries composed by Buddhist writers. Helmut Eimer ("A Note on the History of the Tibetan Kanjur", *Central Asiatic Journal*, 32, #1-2, 1988, p. 64) speculates that the earliest version of the *Bka' 'gyur* was compiled in the Nar-tang (*snar thang*) Monastery, and he provides a speculative history of how the earliest *Bka' 'gyur* was compiled and redacted. The history of the development of the canon is also described in the *Blue Annals* (tr. George Roerich, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949, pp. 337-39).

Ladakh (r. 1691-1729).³ The exact date of the production of this work is not mentioned, but must have occurred during the lifetime of King Nyi-ma-ñam-gyel.⁴ According to *Buddhist Text Information* no. 49, 1986, p. 7, the original text may have come from *Se'u la* in Bhutan,⁵ and may have been a copy of the Gyan-ñzay (*rgyal rtse*)

³The reign of this king is described in the *La dwags rgyan rabs*, ed. A.H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet* (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1972), p. 44.

⁴Helmut Eimer ("The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham/Litang Kanjur", *Indica et Tibetica* 13, Bonn, 1988, pp. 44-5) speculates that this version of the *Bka' 'gyur* may have been produced in the fifteenth century.

⁵According to Skorupski (op. cit., p. xii), this edition may have been brought to Ladakh by the Lama *Se'u la Byams mgon ngag dbang rgyal mtshan* (1647-1732), who was the king's spiritual advisor (*dbu bla*). Helmut Eimer ("Some Results of Recent Kanjur Research", *Archiv für Zentralasiatische Geschichtsforschung*, 1983, p. 6), speculates that the Bhutanese original from which the Dōk Palace edition derives may have come from the *Them spangs ma* edition, but in a short discussion of Skorupski's claims (pp. 8-10 of *Buddhist Text Information* #49, 1986), Eimer states that the Dōk Palace *Bka' 'gyur* may be substantially different from the *Them spangs ma* edition and may actually be a second generation copy of an original brought from *Se'u la* in Bhutan to Ladakh.

Skorupski (p. xviii) presents evidence for Eimer's position when he notes that the arrangement of the Dōk Palace edition differs substantially from that of the *Them spangs ma*. In the case of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, however, during my study of Dōk and K I found that they were almost always in agreement, and the few differences I found were mainly obvious scribal errors or slight differences in spelling (for instance, the term *mithun* in Dōk is consistently spelled 'thun in K). See also: (1) Bruce Cameron Hall, *JlABS* 9.2, pp. 157-8, where he states that Dōk differs substantially from all other known *Bka' 'gyurs*; (2) Geza Bethlenfalvy, *A Hand-list of the Ulan Bator Manuscript of the Kanjur rGyal-rtse Them-spangs-ma* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982), which describes a version of the *Them spangs ma* edition that the author studied in Mongolia; (3) Kojun Saito, "A Study of the Hand-written Copy of the Tibetan Kanjur from rGyal-rtse", in *Taishō Daigaku Kenkyū-kiyō* (Tokyo: Taishō University Press, 1977, pp. 406-345), which provides a list of the texts found in the handwritten copy brought from Gyan-ñzay (*rgyal rtse*) by Ekai Kawaguchi and kept in

Them spangs ma Bka' 'gyur. No translator is cited in the text, but the colophon at the end states that it was revised according to the new translation system (*skad gsar bcad*).⁶

Based on a study of the *Them spangs ma* text obtained by Ekai Kawaguchi in Gyan-ḍzay (referred to henceforth as K) and now housed in the Tōyō Bunko Library in Tokyo, Tadeusz Skorupski speculates that the present Ḍok Palace version may be a copy of the Gyan-ḍzay *Them spangs ma* edition of the *Bka' 'gyur*.⁷ According to an

the Tōyō Bunko Library in Tokyo; and (4) Jaya Paṇḍita's description of an older version of the *Them spangs ma*, in *Collected Works of Jaya Paṇḍita Blo-bzan-'phrin-las*, vol. 4, by Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1981.

The Ḍok Palace edition (as well as the *Them spangs ma* editions found in Tokyo and Ulan Bator) may ultimately derive from the edition found by Ekai Kawaguchi in the *Dpal 'khor chos sde* in Gyan-ḍzay in Central Tibet, which derives from the original *Bka' 'gyur* printed in the first and second decades of the 14th century in the Ḡa-dam-ba (*bka' gdams pa*) monastery Nar-tang (*snar thang*). Ḍok and K may represent the oldest known edition of the *Bka' 'gyur* (see Bruce Cameron Hall, *JABS* vol. 9, #2, p. 159; and Helmut Eimer "A Note on the History of the Tibetan Kanjur", pp. 68-9). There is at present no way to ascertain whether or not the Gyan-ḍzay edition has survived the Chinese invasion of Tibet. See also: (1) Helmut Eimer, "Zur Beurteilung der Textqualität der Kanjur-Handschrift aus dem Palast in Tog/Ladakh", in *Indological and Buddhist Studies in Honor of Prof. J.W. deJong*, Canberra, 1982, pp. 121-136, in which he compares the text quality of the Ḍok text to other *Bka' 'gyurs*; (2) Eimer, "Some Results of Recent Kanjur Research", in *Archiv für Zentralasiatische Geschichtsforschung*, 1983, p. 6; and (3) J.W. deJong, "Notes À Propos des Colophons du Kanjur", *Zentralasiatische Studien* 6, 1972, pp. 505-559.

⁶Page 160.1 concludes the *Samḍhinirmocana* with the phrase: "*skad gsar chad kyis kyang bcos te gtan la phab pa*." This is also found at the conclusion of the sūtra on p. 70b.1 in Kawaguchi's version of the *Them spangs ma Bka' 'gyur* (K). It is not found in P p. 26c, N P 81a, L p. 87b, or C p. 71a, but is found at the conclusion of D, p. 110.

⁷Skorupski, op. cit., p. xii. Kawaguchi described his pioneering trip to Tibet in a book in two volumes published in 1904 (Tokyo: Hakubunkan; reprint Tokyo: Sankibo, 1941). This has been translated into English under the title *Three Years in Tibet*

introduction to the *Rwa rgya dkar chag*,⁸ the *Them spangs ma Bka' 'gyur* is said to have derived from the *Nar-tang* (*snar thang*) edition, and was produced under the direction of *Śi-du Rap-dēn-gün-sang-pak-ba* (*si tu rab brtan kun bzang 'phags pa*, 1389-1442), edited by *Lo-chen Tuk-jay-bel* (*lo chen thugs rje dpa*), and completed in 1431. The introduction to the Ulan Bator edition of the *Them spangs ma*, however, states that it was corrected by *Bu-dōn* (*bu ston rin chen grub*, 1290-1364).⁹

As Bruce Cameron Hall notes, the translation found in the *Dok Palace Bka' 'gyur* differs substantially from that found in the Peking (P), *Sde dge* (D), Lhasa (L), *Nar-tang* (N), and Cho-nay (C) editions.¹⁰ The group of P, D, L, N, and C represent one

(Madras, London, 1909). See also *Second Journey to Tibet* (Tokyo: Kinno-hoshi-sha, 1966), which describes Kawaguchi's second visit to Tibet, and Gadjin Nagao, "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan", *Acta Asiatica* 29, 1975, pp. 107-8; and Taishun Mibu, "On the Kawaguchi Collection", *Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies* #2, 1955, which describes the texts, artifacts, etc. brought back to Japan by Kawaguchi.

⁸A *mdo rwa rgya'i Bka' 'gyur gyi dkar chag*, by the fourth *Paṇ chen Bstan pa'i nyi ma*, from a blockprint in the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, India, 1983.

⁹According to Skorupski (p. xviii), the only two known surviving copies of the *Them spangs ma* edition are one in the Tōyō Bunko Library in Tokyo (brought to Japan by Ekai Kawaguchi) and another in the State Library of Ulan Bator. See also Bethlenfalvy, op. cit., pp. 5-10.

¹⁰Hall, op. cit. p. 158. My translation has utilized all of these texts, as well as the version of the *Samdhinirmocana* found in Asaṅga's *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, which quotes almost all of the sūtra, except for the introduction and the colophons at the end of chapters.

This includes most of the available *Bka' 'gyurs*. Kenneth K.S. Ch'en ("The Tibetan Tripiṭaka", in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, IX, 1946-7, pp. 53-62) also lists a *Bka' 'gyur* from Kumbum kept in Leningrad, an edition from Yongle (now lost), and a manuscript in Berlin. Helmut Eimer ("Some Results of Recent Kanjur Research",

in *Archiv für Zentralasiatische Geschichtsforschung*, 1983, p. 3 N. 2) also lists editions from Urga, Taipei, and Tokyo.

The *Them spangs ma* edition used in this study (K) is a photocopy of the manuscript brought to Japan by Ekai Kawaguchi. Kawaguchi obtained a copy of a version of the *Bka' 'gyur* that he found in Gyan-ḍzay, and this manuscript is now housed in the Tōyō Bunko Library in Tokyo. Helmut Eimer ("A Note on the History of the Tibetan Kanjur", p. 68) contends that the original text copied for Kawaguchi was written between 1856 and 1875. The print quality of Kawaguchi's manuscript is excellent, and it has proved invaluable as a basis for correcting errors in *Ḍok*. It does, however, contain many more obvious errors than does *Ḍok*, but fortunately these generally do not occur in the same place as do *Ḍok*'s errors. I am deeply grateful to Professor Yoshihide Yoshizu of Komazawa University for procuring a copy of this rare manuscript for me.

The *Sde dge* (D) edition used in this study was published by the Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, vol. *mdo sde ca*. A bibliography for this edition can be found in Eimer, "Some Results", p. 4. See also Yoshiro Imaeda, "Note sur le Kanjur de Derge", in *Tantric and Taoist Studies, in Honour of R.A. Stein* (Bruxelles, 1981, MCB XX), pp. 229-236. Eimer ("The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham", p. 45) indicates that the original *Sde dge* blockprint was made in 1608-1621.

The Peking (P) text is the one published by the Suzuki Research Foundation (vol. 29, #774, Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1958). In "The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham" (p. 45), Eimer provides a chronology of various versions of the Peking version, beginning with a blockprint made in 1410.

The Lhasa edition (L) used in this study is a microfiche distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. *mdo nga*. See Eimer, "Some Results", p. 4 and "The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham", pp. 44-5.

The *Ñar-tang* edition (N) used in this study is a microfiche distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. 51. See Eimer "Some Results", pp. 5-6 and "The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham", pp. 44-5, where he indicates that the original blockprint of this version was made in 1730-1732.

The *Co ne* (C) text used in this study is a microfilm copy obtained from the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., Kanjur vol. 5. The *Co ne* edition is discussed by Taishun Mibu, "A Comparative List of the *Bka'-'gyur* Division in the Co-ne, Peking,

translation of the text, while the *Ādok* Palace text (*Ādok*) and K have a very different reading that differs in word choice and word order, and contains passages that are not found in P, D, N, L, and C. These texts, in turn, contain words and passages that are not found in *Ādok* and K. During the course of translating the *Ādok* Palace text and comparing it to P, D, N, L, and C, I found numerous differences between the two versions.

These differences fall into five main categories: (1) differences in terminology; (2) differences in word order; (3) differences in spelling; (4) differences in meaning; and (5) words and phrases that are found in one version but not in the other. It should be noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive, since parallel sections may contain more than one of these types of differences.

1. Differences in Terminology

This category includes instances in which one version uses a term that is matched by a different but similar term in the other version. Some examples are:

(a) *Ādok* and K consistently use *mithong ba'i chos* where Lamotte, P, and D use *tshe 'di la*. See for instance *Ādok* p. 7.2 and Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.6, and D p. 4.5.

Sde-dge and Snar-than Editions", in *Taishō Daigaku Kenkyū-kiyō*, #44, 1959, pp. 1-69. For a detailed description of the relations between the various recensions of the *Bka' 'gyur*, see Eimer, "Some Results", pp. 7-18. Also, see Eimer, "The Position of the 'Jan Sa tham", p. 45, where he indicates that the original *Co ne* blockprint was made in 1721-1731.

According to Royei Tokuoka (*IBK* 1988, pp. 940-926), the oldest version of the Tripiṭaka is the *Sde dge*, the Lhasa edition (which only has the *Bka' 'gyur*) is the newest, and the Peking was only published in China. He adds that Lhasa is similar to Peking in the sections that he compared.

(b) *ĀDok* and K often use *sna tshogs* where Lamotte, P, and D use *tha dad pa*. See for instance: (1) *ĀDok* p. 7.3 and Lamotte p. 34, P p. 3b.7, and D p. 4.6; (2) *ĀDok* p. 138.6, K p. 61b.8 and Lamotte p. 147, P p. 23c.3, D p. 96.2.

(c) In a number of parallel passages, parallel terms differ in the two versions, such as: (1) *ĀDok* p. 15.4 and K p. 7b.3, which read: *gcig la gcig kha shags [K: gshags] kyis brtsad par bgyis / yid byung bar bgyis / gnod par bgyis / mtho btsam par [K: pa] bgyis / skur pa btab par bgyis te*. Lamotte p. 39, P p. 4c.6, and D p. 10.2 read: *gcig la gcig stobs kyis gnon pa bgyis / zher 'debs pa bgyis / gab gab bgyis / mnan [P: gnan] par bgyis / tshar gcad pa bgyis te*; (2) *ĀDok* p. 55.2, K p. 25b.6, which read: *shin tu phyir phyogs par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.1, D p. 38.6 read: *shin tu mi phyogs par 'gyur ro* (this is also found on *ĀDok* p. 55.3, K p. 25b.7 and Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.1, D p. 38.6); (3) *ĀDok* p. 55.5, K p. 25b.8 read: *de bas na*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.3, D p. 38.7 read: *de'i phyir*; (4) *ĀDok* p. 115.2, K p. 51b.8 read: *don chen po 'jig rten las 'das pa 'dris pa ma yin pa'i sems rnyed pas / rgya cher dga' zhing mthog tu dga' ba'i phyir / sa dang po ni rab tu dga' ba zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.6, D p. 79.6 read: *sa dang po ni don che ba 'dris pa ma yin pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems thob pas dga' ba dang mchog tu dga' ba rgya che ba'i phyir rab tu dga' ba zhes bya'o*.

(d) *ĀDok* and K consistently use *shes par bya'o* where Lamotte, P, and D use *rig par bya'o*. See for instance: *ĀDok* p. 16.7, K p. 8b.2 and Lamotte p. 40, P p. 4d.7, and D p. 11.2; *ĀDok* p. 17.2, K p. 8a.4 and Lamotte p. 40, P p. 4e.1, and D p. 11.3; see also *ĀDok* p. 18.1 and K p. 8b.5, which read: *rnam par rig pa'i tha snyad*, where Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.6, and D p. 11.7 read: *rnam par shes pa'i tha snyad*.

(e) In several places *ĀDok* and K use *blun pa* where Lamotte, P, and D use *rmongs pa*. See, for instance, *ĀDok* p. 20.1 and 20.3, K p. 9b.5 and 9b.6 and Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.3-4, D p. 13.4, L p. 10b.6-7, N p. 11b.4-5, C p. 8b.3-4, and V p. 85a.2-3 and Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.6, and D p. 13.5.

(f) In several places $\bar{D}ok$ and K use *de'i phyir* where Lamotte, P, and D use *des na*, and sometimes Lamotte, P, and D use *de'i phyir* where $\bar{D}ok$ and K use *des na*. See: $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.7, K p. 10a.2 and Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.2, D p. 14.1; $\bar{D}ok$ p. 21.5, K p. 10a.7 and Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.6, D p. 14.5; $\bar{D}ok$ p. 22.6, K p. 10b.7 and Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.4, D p. 15.3.

(g) $\bar{D}ok$ p. 22.6 and K p. 10b.7 use *du lhung ba*; Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.4, D p. 15.3 use *du gtogs par*.¹¹

¹¹For other examples of this type, see translation notes numbers 19, 29, 34, 38, 44, 63, 67, 68, 70, 74, 94, 95, 96, 98, 116, 119, 121, 124, 126, 127, 132, 133, 138, 147, 150, 152, 155, 161, 168, 171, 174, 175, 180, and 182.

2. Differences in Word Order

This category includes instances of parallel passages with roughly the same meaning that exhibit differences in word order. Some of these are very divergent and would necessitate different English translations. Some examples are:

(a) *Ā*Dok p. 12.1-2 and K p. 6a.3 read: *gang 'di ltar snang ba 'di ni glang po che'i tshogs ma yin no*. Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.3, D p. 7.7, and V p. 83e.2 read: *glang po che'i tshogs [snang ba: omitted in V] gang yin pa 'di ni med do*.

(b) *Ā*Dok p. 42.7 and K p. 20a.5 read: *ming dang 'brel pa'i mtshan ma la brten te*. Lamotte p. 63, P p. 8e.3, D p. 29.6 read: *mtshan ma dang 'brel ba'i [P, D: pa'i] ming la [P: las] brten nas*.

(c) Stog p. 115.7 and K p. 52a.5 read: *mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa dang / mtshan ma la yang nyon mongs pa 'byung bas mi sgul ba'i phyir / sa brgyad pa ni mi g.yo ba zhes bya'o*. Lamotte p. 126, P p. 20a.3, D p. 80.3 read: *sa brgyad pa ni mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa nyid dang / mtshan ma'i nyon mongs pa kun tu byung [P: 'byung] bas mi spyod [P, D: skyod] pa nyid kyi phyir mi g.yo ba zhes bya'o*.

(d) *Ā*Dok p. 17.7 and K p. 8b.4 read: *nang gi 'phags pa'i mi smra bar gyur pa'i bde ba*. Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.5, and D p. 11.6 read: *nang gi mi smra ba 'phags pa'i bde ba*.

(e) *Ā*Dok p. 19.4 and K p. 9a.8 read: *kha cig ni the tshom dang yid gnyis su gyur nas*. Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.8, and D p. 13.1 read: *the tshom du gyur pa'i blo gros can / yid gnyis su gyur pa kha cig ni*.

(f) *Ā*Dok p. 26.7 and K p. 12b.6 read: *zhi gnas lhag mthong goms bya ste / mtshan ma dag gi bcings pa dang / gnas ngan len gyi bcings pa las / skye bo rnam par grol bar 'gyur*. Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.6, and D p. 18.1 read: *skye ba po yi [P, D: yis] lhag mthong dang / zhi gnas goms par byas nas ni / gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba dang / mtshan ma'i 'ching las rnam grol 'gyur*.¹²

3. Differences in Spelling

This category includes instances of parallel passages in which a term is spelled differently in the two versions. Some examples are:

(a) *Ā*Dok p. 21.1 and K p. 10a.3 read: *bcings pa*. Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.22, D p. 14.2 read: *'ching ba*. This divergent spelling is also found in *Ā*Dok p. 22.1, K p. 10b.2 and Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.8, D p. 14.6; and in *Ā*Dok p. 26.7, K p. 12b.6 and Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.6, D p. 18.1.

(b) *Ā*Dok p. 25.2 and K p. 12a.1 read: *pi wang*. Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.3, D p. 16.7 read: *pi bang*.

(c) *Ā*Dok p. 28.5 and K p. 13b.3 read: *spang*. Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6d.1, D p. 19.3 read: *spangs*.

(d) *Ā*Dok p. 28.5 and K p. 13b.3 read: *bsgom par*. Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.1, D p. 19.3 read: *sgom pa*.

(e) Stog p. 115.4 and K p. 52a.2 read: *sreg*. Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.8, D p. 80.1 read: *bsreg*.

¹²For other examples, see translation notes numbers 55, 64, 78, 99, 110, 114, 120, 125, 134, 145, 149, 177, 179, and 185.

(f) Stog p. 121.5 and K p. 54b.4 read: *spyod*. Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.4, and D p. 84.2 read: *spyad*.

(g) Stog p. 122.3 and K p. 54b.8 read: '*phongs pa*. Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.8, D p. 84.5 read: *phongs pa*.¹³

4. Differences in Meaning

This category includes instances of recognizably parallel passages in which the meaning differs in the two versions. Examples of this category are rare in comparison to the other categories, since the two versions are in general agreement with respect to the meaning of parallel passages, and many of the differences in meaning may be due to scribal omissions and/or errors. Some examples are:

(a) Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.5, and D p. 8.2 differ from *Ā*Dok p. 12.4 and K p. 6a.7 in stating that childish beings viewing a magician's illusions think that they exist: *sgyu ma byas pa 'di ni yod*. According to *Ā*Dok and K, these beings recognize them as magical illusions: '*di ni sgyu ma byas pa yin no*.

(b) *Ā*Dok p. 12.4 and K p. 6a.7 indicate that childish beings think that the magical creations "deceive the eye": '*di ni mig slu bar byed pa snyam du sems shing*. Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.5, and D p. 8.2 indicate that they think that the eye-deceiving magical creations exist: *mig slu bar byed pa 'di ni yod do snyam du sems cing*.

(c) *Ā*Dok p. 19.5 and K p. 9b.1 ask: "which is speaking truthfully, which is speaking falsely?" (*bden par smra ba ni gang / brdzun par smra ba ni gang*), while

¹³For other examples, see translation notes numbers 48, 157, and 204.

Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.1, and D p. 13.2 ask: “which is without [falsehood], which is lying?” (*gang ni med par mchi ba lags / gang ni shob be mchis lags*).

(d) *Ā*Dok p. 21.2 and K p. 10a.4 use an instrumental particle (*bas*), but Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.3, and D p. 14.2 use a conditional particle (*na*). *Ā*Dok and K read: *mtshan ma'i bcings pa las rnam par ma grol bas*; Lamotte, P, and D read: *mtshan ma'i 'ching ba las rnam par grol na*.

(e) Lamotte p. 63, P p. 8e.4, D p. 29.6, L p. 23a.6, and N p. 24a.6 have a negative particle (*med*) that is omitted in *Ā*Dok p. 42.7 and K p. 20a.5: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen pa med pa la brten nas ni yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid rab tu shes so*.¹⁴

5. Missing Words and/or Phrases

This category includes instances of a word or phrase that is found in one version but is absent in the other. Some examples are:

(a) The phrase *yon tan gyi tshogs mtha' yas pas brgyan pa'i bkod pa* is found in Lamotte p. 31, D p. 3.3, P p. 3a.5, L p. 3.1, N p. 2b.6, and C p. 2b.4 but does not appear in *Ā*Dok p. 5.4.

(b) The term *sa* is found in Lamotte p. 32, P p. 3b.2, and D p. 4.2 but is omitted in *Ā*Dok p. 6.4.

(c) The adverb *nges par* is omitted in *Ā*Dok p. 6.7 but is found in Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.5, and D p. 4.4.

¹⁴For other examples, see translation notes numbers 41, 107, 115, 142, 143, 172, 181, 183, and 184.

(d) The adjective *chen po* is found in Lamotte p. 34, P p. 3c.2, and D p. 5.1 but omitted in *ĀDok* p. 7.6.

(e) *ĀDok* p. 13.5 and K p. 6b.7 have the phrase '*jug par 'gyur ba*', which is omitted in Lamotte p. 38, P p. 4b.4, and D p. 9.1.

(f) The term *lhung ba* is found in *ĀDok* p. 17.3 and K p. 8a.8 but omitted in Lamotte p. 40, P p. 4e.1, and D p. 11.3-4.¹⁵

A comparison of *ĀDok* and K reveals that these two versions of the *Samdhinirmocana* are very similar, and most of the differences between them are minor. In general, K contains more obvious scribal errors than does *ĀDok*.¹⁶ It is, however, very legible and has proved to be invaluable as a basis for amending errors in *ĀDok*. In addition, in the case of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* it is clear that these two texts are different versions of a single translation. The similarities and differences between these two texts are indicated in the notes to the translation. The word choice and word order of these two

¹⁵For other examples, see translation notes numbers 38, 63, 67, 68, 95, 96, 98, 116, 119, 121, 124, 126, 127, 132, 138, 147, 150, 152, 155, 161, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 180, and 182.

¹⁶Some examples are: (1) *ĀDok* p. 18.6 and K p. 9a.3 read: *gcig dang tha dad pa las yang dag pa'i [K: par] mtshan nyid*; (2) *ĀDok* p. 25.2 and K p. 12a.2 read: *a ka [K: ga] ru*; (3) *ĀDok* p. 27.5, K p. 13a.4: *bdag dus gcig na gdon pa na nags khrod chen po zhig tu [K: na] mchis na*; (4) *ĀDok* p. 40.1, K p. 18b.3: *gang khyod de bzhin gshegs [K: gshe] pa*; (5) *ĀDok* p. 57.5, K p. 26b.7: *de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyis mkhyen gyis [K: kyi]*; (6) *ĀDok* p. 59.7, K p. 7: *gzhan rnam kyang de dag la [K: las] chos su [bya: omitted in K] ba dang*; (7) *ĀDok* p. 99.4, K p. 45a.7: *de la yang gcig gis mi [K: ni] sbyor bar mi byed do*; (8) *ĀDok* p. 102.4, K p. 46b.2: *shin tu bsam pa [K: shin tu bas]*; (9) *ĀDok* p. 142.2, K p. 63a.6: *'di ltar dngos po bzhi 'am / dgu 'am / nyi shu [rtsa: omitted in K] dgu 'di dbang du byas pa'o [K: ba'o]*; (10) *ĀDok* p. 148.2, K p. 65b.4: *skye ba la [K: las] sogs pa'i sdug bsngal*.

texts is the same, but K contains one more line per page than does *Ā*ok, and so has fewer pages overall.

My study of the eight versions of the sūtra that I have consulted indicates that there are two main recensions of the sūtra, and these partially correspond to Helmut Eimer's division of the extant *Bka'* 'gyurs into what he terms a "Western" group and an "Eastern" group. These are so named because the members of the first group originate from *Ā*dzang (*gtsang*) Province in Western Tibet and surrounding areas, while the other group derives from Eastern locations in Tibet and China.¹⁷ The Western Group includes the *Ā*ok Palace text, the *Them spangs ma* edition (of which K is one of the two surviving representatives),¹⁸ and N and L, while the Eastern Group includes P, D, and C. Eimer states that these two groups of the *Bka'* 'gyur exhibit many variant readings, which is certainly true of the *Samdhinirmocana*. In the case of the *Samdhinirmocana*, however, N and L mostly accord with P, D, and C, with only minor differences,¹⁹ while *Ā*ok and K differ greatly from all other texts.²⁰ Eimer places N and

¹⁷Helmut Eimer "A Note on the History of the Tibetan Kanjur", *Central Asiatic Journal*, 32, #1-2, 1988, p. 64. See also Eimer's "The Position of the 'Jañ Sa tham", pp. 46-7.

¹⁸The other is the version found in the State Library of Ulan Bator by Bethlenfalvy (see note 5), which was not available to me while preparing this study.

¹⁹One of the differences between the translation of P, D, N, and L is that P and D generally use *yang* instead of 'ang, while N and L generally prefer 'ang.

²⁰See Bruce Cameron Hall, *JABS* vol. 9, #2, pp. 157-8. Some examples are:

(a) *Ā*ok p. 42.7 and K p. 20a.5 read: *yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o*. Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8e.2, D p. 29.5 read: *yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid blta bar bya'o*.

(b) *Ā*ok p. 115.7 and K p. 52a.5 read: *mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa dang / mtshan ma la yang nyon mongs pa 'byung bas mi sgul ba'i phyir / sa brgyad pa ni mi g.yo ba zhes bya'o*. Lamotte p. 126, P p. 20a.3, D p. 80.3 read: *sa brgyad pa*

L in a different line of transmission than *Ā*Dok and K, but this does not explain the fact that their readings of the *Samdhinirmocana* generally agree with the “Eastern” texts P, D, and C, and differ greatly from *Ā*Dok and K, which are “Western” texts. In a discussion of the relations between the “Eastern” and “Western” groups, Eimer writes:

The Eastern Group — so called because only witnesses from Eastern Tibet and China are accessible at present — follows a different order...it shows a remarkable number of variant readings as against the Western Group. The differences between the two groups are largely due to the re-edition of the early Narthang manuscript by Tshal pa Kun dga’ rdo rje about the middle of the XIVth century.²¹

Eimer’s contention that the *Bka’ ’gyur* was redacted in the sixteenth century would account for the many differences in word choice and translation equivalents that exist in *Ā*Dok and K in contrast with P, D, N, L, and C but does not account for the fact that N and L, which belong to the same group as *Ā*Dok and K, agree with P, D, and C, which belong to a different group. In addition, the re-edition of the *Bka’ ’gyur* does not fully explain the great differences in word order that are present in *Ā*Dok and K when

ni mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa nyid dang / mtshan ma’i nyon mongs pa kun tu byung [P: ’byung] bas mi spyod [P, D: skyod] pa nyid kyi phyir mi g.yo ba zhes bya’o.

(c) *Ā*Dok p. 135.2 and K p. 60a.8 read: *ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa de ltar / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas ’dzin du lags na / ngo bo nyid mchis pa’i rnams kyang ci’i slad du mi ’dzin.* Lamotte p. 144, P p. 22e.5, D p. 93.5 read: *gal te shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid ’dzin na [P: no] / ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid kyang ci’i slad du mi ’dzin lags.*

²¹Eimer, “The Position of the ’Jañ Sa Tham”, p. 46. In “A Note on the History of the Tibetan Kanjur” (p. 67), Eimer places the dates of *Tshal pa Kun dga’ rdo rje* (also known as *Si tu Dge ba’i blo gros*) at 1309-1364.

compared with the other texts. An editor revising a text according to a newly developed set of translation equivalents would not normally also move phrases around or change the word order of passages, but in the case of the *Samdhinirmocana* almost every page of *Ā*Dok and K contains passages that vary in their arrangement when compared to P, D, etc.

The notes to the translation indicate the main differences between *Ā*Dok and the other texts and provide hundreds of examples of differences in word order and word choice between the texts consulted in this project. During the course of making comparisons between the various versions, I came to suspect that the *Ā*Dok and K texts represent a translation of the *Samdhinirmocana* that is different from any other version that I have seen (including P, D, N, L, C, and V). This is because of the great differences in word order and word choice exhibited in *Ā*Dok and K. If *Ā*Dok and K were merely a revision of an earlier text for which a redactor amended translation equivalents in accordance with a new system of translation, it would be difficult to explain the many passages in which *Ā*Dok and K rearrange the order of phrases²² or the occasions where

²²Some examples are:

(a) *Ā*Dok p. 116.3 and K p. 52a.8 read: *shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra ba rab tu spangs pa mi chags mi thogs par shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i phyir / sa bcu gcig pa ni sangs rgyas kyi sa zhes bya'o*. Lamotte p. 127, P p. 20a.5, D p. 80.5 read: *sa bcu gcig pa ni nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra mo spangs pas chags pa med cing thogs pa med par shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa nyid kyi phyir sangs rgyas kyi sa zhes bya'o*.

(b) *Ā*Dok p. 140.5 and K p. 62b.3 read: *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnam kyi gnas gyur pa de la yang chos kyi sku zhes bgyi 'am / 'jam dpal mi bya'o*. Lamotte p. 149, P p. 23d.6, D p. 97.4 read: *ci lags / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnam kyi gnas [P: su] gyur pa gang lags pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] chos kyi sku lags [P: legs] par brjod par bgyi 'am / 'jam dpal brjod par mi bya'o*.

*Ā*Dok and K reverse the meaning of passages.²³ The texts of P, D, N, L, C, and V all appear to be different recensions of the same translation, exhibiting only minor variations, but *Ā*Dok and K exhibit significant differences.

These observations are, of course, only pertinent to the case of the *Samdhi-nirmocana* and do not necessarily invalidate Eimer's contention that the different recensions of the *Bka'* 'gyur derive from a common source, but my research on this text indicates that in the case of the *Samdhinirmocana* there is a close connection between the recensions of N, L, P, D, and C, while *Ā*Dok and K represent a different textual tradition. It should also be noted, however, that a particular edition of the *Bka'* 'gyur may contain different strata of translations and recensions. In a letter to me (dated Sept. 18, 1989), Dr. Eimer noted that each *Bka'* 'gyur has its own history of revision and transmission, and he stated that "it could well be that one translation was thoroughly revised or that it was superseded by another one which seemed more adequate to the revisors." This situation of course presents difficulties for scholars attempting to understand the relations between the various versions of the *Bka'* 'gyur, since if

(c) *Ā*Dok p. 143.3 and K p. 63b.5 read: *phyi rol gyi sems can rnam la log pa'i nan tan yongs su shes pa'i gnas pa*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.5, D p. 99.2 read: *phyi rol gyi sems can rnam la log par sgrub pa'i gnas yongs su shes pa*.

²³See, for example, translation notes 755 and 478. In a letter to me Dr. Eimer indicated that *Ā*Dok has been "modernized or standardized to some extent" and reiterated his idea that it derives from the same line as the *Them spangs ma* editions in Tokyo and Ulan Bator. His articles and his letter indicate, however, that he thinks that all known versions of the *Bka'* 'gyur ultimately derive from a common source, the original *Bka'* 'gyur collected at Gyan-*dzay*. In "Some Results" p. 14 Eimer contends that in the *Ā*Dok text "some readings have been contaminated", and adds that this contamination may have come from the *Sde dge* text. This would account for at least some of the greatly variant readings found in *Ā*Dok when compared to P, D, etc., but not for the differences in word order.

redactors occasionally substituted one version of a particular text for another in one version of the *Bka'* 'gyur it adds to the problems already present in studies examining differences in the different recensions. My own research is only relevant to the case of the *Samāhinirmocana*, but I think that it should be clear from the examples given above and the hundreds of differences cited in the notes to the translation that whatever relation other texts in the recension of *Ādok* and *K* have to other *Bka'* 'gyurs, in the case of the *Samāhinirmocana* they represent one translation that differs noticeably and consistently from the other translation represented by *P*, *D*, *N*, *L*, and *C*.

Since the present study is mainly concerned with the sūtra itself and its commentaries rather than with the canonical collections in which it is found, an exploration of the differences between various *Bka'* 'gyur recensions beyond what has already been indicated exceeds the limits of this work. However, differences in reading between the various recensions are indicated in notes, and these may be of interest to scholars who study the relations between various *Bka'* 'gyurs. In most cases, the *Ādok* and *K* readings have been given first, followed by *P* and *D*, along with Lamotte's version. Where there are important textual differences, *N*, *L*, *C*, and often Asaṅga's citation of the sūtra in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (V)²⁴ are included. Because *N*, *L*, and *C* generally agree with *P* and *D*, it was felt that it would be cumbersome and repetitive to cite every passage that differs from *Ādok* and *K*. In addition, since the translation of *Ādok* and *K* is generally internally consistent, as is the translation found in *P*, *D*, *L*, *N*, and *C*, when a chapter contains parallel passages, generally only the first occurrence of a variant reading in *Ādok*, *K*, and *P*, etc. is cited. It is hoped that these notes will be of

²⁴This text is useful in comparing variant readings, and cites almost all of the sūtra, except for the introduction and the colophons at the end of chapters. The citation of each chapter is prefaced by a short introduction to the main theme(s) of the chapter.

use to scholars who are interested in differences between the various recensions of the sūtra and may be relevant to other researches into the differences between the various versions of the *Bka' 'gyur*.

The translation, except in rare cases, follows *Ādok*, and the instances where another reading has been chosen over *Ādok*'s are indicated in notes. Where text corrections have been made, the main reason is that *Ādok* has an obvious misspelling or a reading that is unclear in *Ādok* but clear in the other texts. In addition, the instances where the other texts have misspellings or problematic readings are discussed in the notes. In general, the reading of the other texts is chosen over that of *Ādok* only in the cases where *Ādok*'s reading is either very unclear or contradicts the overall thought of the sūtra.²⁵ In addition, the commentaries on the *Samdhinirmocana* have sometimes been utilized to choose between conflicting readings. The notes to the translation indicate the problematic readings, along with the differences between the various recensions of the sūtra, and often add material from the various commentaries. The explanatory portions of the notes are intended to provide a kind of running commentary on the *Samdhinirmocana* and are mainly derived from the canonical commentaries, as well as Tibetan commentaries of the Ge-luk-ba (*dge lugs pa*) school and oral commentaries from contemporary Tibetan scholars.

None of the versions of the *Samdhinirmocana* that I have consulted mention a translator. All of the texts I have used in this work are translated according to the rules of the new translation style, which was established in A.D. 814.²⁶ The technical terms

²⁵A good example can be found in note 478 to the translation.

²⁶See Zuihō Yamaguchi, "A Chronological Research for the History of Buddhism in the Ancient Tibetan Kingdom" in *Naritasan Bukkyō-kenkyūsho Kiyō*, no. 3, 1978, pp. 1-52 and "A Study of the sGra sbyor bam po gnyid pa" in *Naritasan Bukkyō-kenkyūsho Kiyō*, no. 4, 1979, pp. 1-24; reported by Noriaki Hakamaya, "The Old and New

given in the translation and notes that come from the sūtra are given first in Tibetan and generally followed by a Sanskrit equivalent. This order is due to the fact that the primary texts used in the translation are all in Tibetan, and any Sanskrit equivalents are only speculative. Most of the Sanskrit terms are based upon Lamotte's proposed equivalents, and the occasions where I disagree with Lamotte are indicated in notes. All Sanskrit terms are given in standard transliteration, except for the names of Suvishuddhamati (*suviśuddhamati*, *blo gros shin tu rnam dag*), Viśālakīrti (*viśālakīrti*, *grags pa can*), Viśālamati (*viśālamati*, *blo gros yangs pa*), Avalokiteśvara (*avalokiteśvara*, *phyan ras gzigs dbang phyug*), and Mañjuśrī (*mañjuśrī*, *'jam dpaḥ*), where I have used *sh* instead of *ś* to indicate for non-specialists how they should be pronounced. Tibetan names are given in accordance with the essay phoneticization system developed by Jeffrey Hopkins at the University of Virginia,²⁷ and the first occurrence of each name is followed with its spelling in the transliteration system developed by Turrell Wylie.²⁸

The page numbers given in brackets refer to the Dōk Palace text, and corresponding passages from the other versions I consulted are indicated in the notes.

Translations of the *Samādhinirmocana-sūtra*", in *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu Ronshū*, 1983, p. 1-17.

²⁷See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 19-22, where he describes how this transcription system renders Tibetan words into corresponding "essay phonetics".

²⁸See Turrell Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription", in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 22, 1959, pp. 261-67.

The Sūtra Explaining the Thought

Introduction

Thus have I heard: at one time¹ the Supramundane Victor² was dwelling in an inestimable great palace, arrayed with seven various precious substances blazing brightly,³ extensively filling countless worldly realms, thoroughly giving rise to great rays of light,⁴ with a great many individual sections, laid out limitlessly,⁵ [4] an uninterrupted area, in a sphere of activity that completely transcends the three worlds,⁶ having arisen from the supreme root of virtues of that which is beyond the world,⁷ characterized by the completely pure mind of one who has mastery,⁸ an abode of the Tathāgata,⁹ along with a community of innumerable Bodhisattvas,¹⁰ with *devas*, *nāgas*, *yakṣas*, *gandharvas*, *asuras*, *garuḍas*, *kiṃnaras*, *mahoragas*, humans, and non-humans,¹¹ all wandering about everywhere. The palace was firm by way of the joy and the great bliss of the taste of doctrine, thoroughly abiding because of thoroughly bringing about all the welfare of all sentient beings,¹² [5] was free from all the harms of the defilements of the afflictions,¹³ completely free from all Demons (*bdud*, *māra*),¹⁴ surpassing all arrays, created by the blessing of the Tathāgata,¹⁵ definitely structured by great mindfulness, intelligence, and realization,¹⁶ the support of great calm abiding and special insight,¹⁷ operating by way of the great doors of liberation: emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness,¹⁸ a great array of good qualities, kings of jewelled lotuses, [and ornamented by limitless collections of good qualities].¹⁹

The Supramundane Victor — endowed with a mind of good understanding,²⁰ not possessing the two behaviors,²¹ fully involved in the doctrine of signlessness, abiding by way of the abiding of a Buddha,²² having attained sameness with all Buddhas, having full realization due to not possessing obstructions,²³ endowed with irreversible qualities, not captivated by way of objects of activity, [6] positing [doctrines] inconceivably,²⁴ thoroughly penetrating the sameness of the three times, endowed with bodies that pervade all worldly realms,²⁵ having attained exalted wisdom that has no doubts with respect to all phenomena, endowed with knowledge that possesses all behaviors, without perplexity with respect to knowledge of doctrine, endowed with a body that is unimagined,²⁶ having thoroughly given rise to the wisdom of all Bodhisattvas,²⁷ having perfected the excellent non-dual abode of a Buddha,²⁸ having reached the limit of the liberating and unshared exalted wisdom of a Tathāgata, having thoroughly attained the equality of [the state of] a Buddha without ends or middle, endless due to the element of qualities,²⁹ extending to the limit of the realm of space³⁰ — was staying together with a limitless assembly of Hearers (*nyan thos, śrāvaka*),³¹ all very knowledgeable, children of the Buddha with liberated minds, very liberated wisdom,³² completely pure ethics,³³ who were happily associating with those who yearn for doctrine, very learned, bearing in mind what they had learned, accumulating learning, contemplating good contemplations, speaking good words, doing good deeds, with agile wisdom, rapid wisdom, and sharp wisdom, with wisdom of definite emergence [from cyclic existence],³⁴ with wisdom of definite discrimination, [7] with great wisdom, extensive wisdom, profound wisdom, unequalled wisdom, endowed with the precious jewel of wisdom,³⁵ endowed with the three knowledges,³⁶ who had obtained supreme pleasant abiding in this life³⁷ and great thorough purification of good qualities,³⁸ who had fully developed the peacefulness of their own behaviors,³⁹

endowed with great patience and determination, fully abiding in the Tathāgata's teachings.

Also, he was staying together with all the innumerable Bodhisattvas, assembled from various⁴⁰ Buddha lands, thoroughly abiding in a great state, who had definitely emerged [from cyclic existence] by way of Mahāyāna doctrine,⁴¹ had even-mindedness toward all beings, were freed from all imputations, ideations, and mental constructions, who had conquered all Demons and opponents, had become distant from all mental activities of Hearers and Solitary Realizers,⁴² were firm because of the joy and bliss of the taste of the great doctrine,⁴³ who had completely transcended the five great fears,⁴⁴ having solely progressed to the irreversible grounds,⁴⁵ and who had actualized those grounds of thoroughly pacifying all harms to all sentient beings.⁴⁶ Among these were the Bodhisattvas, the great beings: Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, [8] Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Āryāvalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī,⁴⁷ all living together.

Chapter One

Bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana

Then, Bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka⁴⁸ questioned Bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana⁴⁹ about the ultimate, which is ineffable and of non-dual character: "O Conqueror Child,⁵⁰ when it is said, 'All phenomena are non-dual, all phenomena are non-dual', how is it that they are non-dual?"

"O son of good lineage,⁵¹ the so-called 'all phenomena' are of just two kinds, compounded ('*dus byas, saṃskṛta*) and uncompounded ('*dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*).

Concerning these, the compounded is not compounded, nor is the uncompounded uncompounded. The uncompounded is not uncompounded, nor is it compounded.”⁵²

“O Conqueror Child, why is the compounded neither compounded nor uncompounded? Why is the uncompounded neither uncompounded nor compounded?”

“O son of good lineage, the so-called ‘compounded’ is a term designated by the Teacher [i.e., Buddha].⁵³ This term, imputed by the Teacher, [9] is a conventional expression arisen from mental construction. That which is a conventional expression arisen from mental construction is a thoroughly non-established conventional expression of various mental constructions. Therefore, it is not uncompounded.

“O son of good lineage, the so-called ‘uncompounded’ also is included within conventions. Even if something were expressed that is not included within the compounded and uncompounded, it would be just like this.⁵⁴ Since an expression is also not something that is without thingness, what is a thing?⁵⁵ Because of their Superior’s exalted wisdom and Superior’s vision, Superiors⁵⁶ perfectly realize the inexpressible,⁵⁷ and because they are completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to the inexpressible reality, they nominally designate the ‘compounded.’

“O son of good lineage, the so-called ‘uncompounded’ is a term imputed by the Teacher, arisen from mental construction. Whatever is a term imputed by the Teacher and arisen from mental construction is a thoroughly non-established conventional expression of various mental constructions. Therefore, it is not uncompounded.

“O son of good lineage, the so-called ‘compounded’ also is included within conventions. [10] Even if something were expressed that is not included within the compounded and uncompounded, it would be just like this. Since an expression is also not something that is without thingness, what is a thing?⁵⁸ Superiors perfectly realize the inexpressible⁵⁹ by way of a Superior’s exalted wisdom and a Superior’s vision, and

because they are completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to the inexpressible reality, they nominally designate the ‘uncompounded’.”

“Conqueror child, how is it that Superiors nominally impute ‘compounded phenomena’ and ‘uncompounded phenomena’ because they have completely and thoroughly realized the fact that things are inexpressible, and are completely and thoroughly enlightened with respect to the inexpressible reality?”

“O son of good lineage, it is like this: For example, a skilled magician or his skillful student, located at a crossing of four great roads, having gathered grasses, leaves, twigs, pebbles, and stones, displays⁶⁰ various aspects of magical activities, as follows: a herd of elephants, cavalry, chariots, and infantry; collections of gems, pearls, [11] *vaidūrya*,⁶¹ conch-shells, crystal and coral; collections of wealth, grain, treasures and granaries.

“When those sentient beings — who have childish natures, obscured natures, and natures of disordered wisdom, who do not realize that these are grasses, leaves, twigs, pebbles, and stones — see and hear those, they think this: ‘This herd of elephants which is an appearance exists; the herd of horses which is an appearance, and cavalry, chariots, infantry, wealth, pearls, gems, conch-shells, crystal, coral, grain, treasures, and granaries [all] exist.’

“Having thought this, they emphatically apprehend and manifestly conceive⁶² in accordance with how they see and hear. They also subsequently impute conventional designations: ‘This is true; the other is false.’ Later, these must be closely⁶³ examined by them.

“When other sentient beings — who do not have childish or obscured natures, and who have natures endowed with wisdom, who realize that these are grasses, twigs, pebbles, and stones — see and hear these, they think this: ‘These which appear in this

way⁶⁴ are not herds of elephants, [12] and these which appear in this way are not herds of horses, cavalry, chariots, infantry, wealth, pearls, gems, conch-shells, crystals, coral, grain, treasuries, granaries, and storehouses, and that with respect to which there arises a discrimination of a herd of elephants and a discrimination of the attributes of a herd of elephants and those with respect to which there arises discrimination of the attributes of collections of wealth, grain, treasuries, and storehouses are creations of magic.’⁶⁵

“Having thought: ‘These deceive the eye,’⁶⁶ they do not emphatically apprehend or manifestly conceive in accordance with how they see and hear, and thereupon they do not subsequently impute conventional designations: ‘This is true, the other is false.’ It is like this: They subsequently impute conventional designations in accordance with objects.⁶⁷ Later it is not necessary that these [beings] closely⁶⁸ examine those [conventional designations].

“Similarly, when those sentient beings — who have childish natures, who are ordinary beings,⁶⁹ who have not attained the supramundane wisdom of Superiors, who do not manifestly cognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena — see and hear these compounded and uncompounded things, they think: ‘These compounded and uncompounded things which appear [13] [really] exist.’

“Having thought this, they emphatically apprehend and manifestly conceive these in accordance with how they are seen and heard. They also subsequently impute conventional designations: ‘This is true; the other is false.’ Later these must be closely examined by them.

“Regarding that, when those sentient beings — who do not have childish natures, who see the truth, who have attained the supramundane wisdom of Superiors, who manifestly cognize the inexpressible reality of all phenomena — see and hear these compounded and uncompounded things, they think: ‘These compounded and

uncompounded things which appear are non-existent. Those with regard to which the discrimination of compounded and uncompounded and the discrimination of attributes of compounded and uncompounded operate⁷⁰ are compositional signs that arise from mental construction, like a magician's illusions.⁷¹ These obscure the mind.'

"Having thought thus, with respect to these [compounded and uncompounded things], they do not emphatically apprehended or manifestly conceive in accordance with how they see and hear, and thereupon they do not subsequently impute conventional designations: 'This is true, the other is false.' It is like this: due to thoroughly understanding objects just as they are they impute conventional designations [based on their understanding],⁷² and later it is not necessary that these [beings] closely examine those [conventional designations].

"Son of good lineage, in that way, Superiors completely realize things as inexpressible by way of a Superior's exalted wisdom⁷³ and a Superior's vision, and because they completely realize the ineffable reality they nominally designate [the terms] 'compounded' and 'uncompounded'."

Then, at that time, Bodhisattva Gambhirārtha-saṃdhinirmocana spoke these verses:

Even though the Conqueror taught the profound as not being the domain of children,

as ineffable and non-dual,

These children, obscured by ignorance, delight in elaborations of speech and abide

in duality.⁷⁴

Those who do not understand, or understand wrongly, are reborn as sheep or oxen.

Having abandoned the speech of the wise, they are reborn here in cyclic
existence for
a very long time.⁷⁵

This [completes] the first [chapter: The Questions of] Gambīrārtha-saṃdhinirmocana.

Chapter Two

Bodhisattva Dharmodgata

Then, Bodhisattva Dharmodgata⁷⁶ spoke thus to the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, if one passes beyond as many world systems from this one as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, there is the world system called ‘Kīrtimat’ (Renowned), Buddha land of the Tathāgata Vishālakīrti (Greatly Renowned).⁷⁷ There, at a time that was much earlier than the early periods,⁷⁸ [15] I saw 7,700,000 teachers and so forth of the respective Forder systems,⁷⁹ who, involved in considering the ultimate character of phenomena, were in a certain area [in that world system].

“They were considering, weighing, closely thinking about, and thoroughly seeking the ultimate character of phenomena, but not having realized it, those whose minds had become different, who had two-pointed minds,⁸⁰ who had minds that were not in accord,⁸¹ who were debating and quarreling, disputed with each other, agitated each other, harmed each other, were malevolent toward each other, and rejected each other.⁸²

“When I had seen them thus in a diverse state, Supramundane Victor, I thought: ‘Alas!⁸³ Tathāgatas arise in the world, and, due to their arising, the individual realization and actualization⁸⁴ of an ultimate like this — which has a character completely transcending all argumentation⁸⁵ — is indeed marvellous and astonishing.’”

The Supramundane Victor spoke thus to Bodhisattva Dharmodgata: “It is so! Dharmodgata, it is so; I am completely enlightened with respect to the ultimate, [16]

which has a character completely transcending all argumentation, and having completely realized it I also have explained⁸⁶ and clarified it [for others], and I have opened it up, revealed it, and taught it.⁸⁷

“Why is this? I explain that the ultimate is known by Superiors individually by themselves,⁸⁸ whereas the objects known mutually by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation. Therefore, by this form [of explanation],⁸⁹ Dharmodgata, you should know that it is the case that whatever has a character completely transcending all argumentation is the ultimate.

“Moreover, Dharmodgata, I explain that the ultimate [belongs to] the signless realm, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of signs. Therefore, by this form [of explanation] also, Dharmodgata, you should know that it is the case that whatever has a character completely transcending⁹⁰ all argumentation is the ultimate.

“Furthermore, Dharmodgata, I explain that the ultimate is ineffable, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of expression. Therefore, by this form [of explanation] also, Dharmodgata, you should know that⁹¹ it is the case that whatever has a character completely transcending all argumentation is the ultimate.

“Moreover, Dharmodgata, I explain that the ultimate is completely devoid of all conventions, [17] whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of conventions.⁹² Therefore, by this form [of explanation] also, Dharmodgata, you should know that⁹³ it is the case that whatever has a character completely transcending all argumentation is the ultimate.

“Furthermore, Dharmodgata, I explain that the ultimate is completely devoid of all dispute, whereas argumentation [belongs to] the realm of dispute.⁹⁴ Therefore, by this form [of explanation] also, Dharmodgata, you should know that it is the case that whatever has a character completely transcending all argumentation is the ultimate.

“Dharmodgata, it is like this: For example, because of being acquainted with [only] hot and bitter tastes throughout their whole lives, beings [would be] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine the taste of honey or the taste of sugar.⁹⁵

“Because of involvement with passionate desire and⁹⁶ being exceedingly tormented by desire for a long time, [beings are] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine the happiness of inner solitude,⁹⁷ which is free from all signs of forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects.

“Because of involvement with discursiveness⁹⁸ and manifestly delighting in discursiveness for a long time, [beings are] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine the internal, non-discursive happiness of Superiors.⁹⁹

“Because of involvement with the conventions of seeing, hearing, [18] differentiating, and knowing¹⁰⁰ for a long time and¹⁰¹ manifestly delighting in them, [beings are] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine nirvāṇa, which eliminates the transitory collection (*'jig tshogs, satkāya*)¹⁰² and which completely eliminates all conventions.

“Dharmodgata, it is like this: For example, because of making effort at dispute for a long time due to strongly holding to what is ‘mine’¹⁰³ and manifestly delighting in dispute, [beings are] unable to investigate, infer, or imagine the lack of [thinking] ‘mine’¹⁰⁴ in Uttarakuru (*byang sgra mi snyan*),¹⁰⁵ the absence of all miserliness or the absence of dispute.¹⁰⁶

“Similarly, Dharmodgata, all arguers cannot investigate, infer, or imagine the ultimate that has the character of completely transcending all argumentation.”

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

The signless realm that is individually [known by Superiors]¹⁰⁷

Is ineffable and is completely devoid of conventions.

The ultimate reality is free from dispute.

It has a character completely transcending argumentation.¹⁰⁸

This [completes] the second chapter: [The Questions of] Dharmodgata.

Chapter Three

Bodhisattva Suvishuddhamati

Then, Bodhisattva Suvishuddhamati¹⁰⁹ spoke thus to the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, regarding what the Supramundane Victor said — ‘The ultimate, profound and subtle, having a character completely transcending sameness and difference,¹¹⁰ is difficult to realize’: what the Supramundane Victor said well in this way is wondrous.¹¹¹

“Supramundane Victor, once in a certain place¹¹² I saw a great many¹¹³ Bodhisattvas who were established in the ground of engagement through belief (*mos pas spyod pa'i sa, adhimukticaryā-bhūmi*),¹¹⁴ [19] who had mutually come [from various places] and gathered [there].¹¹⁵ In this way, they came together to initiate [consideration of]¹¹⁶ the difference or non-difference of the compounded and the ultimate.¹¹⁷

“At that time¹¹⁸ a certain Bodhisattva said, ‘The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different.’ Another said, ‘The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not suitable as being non-different;¹¹⁹ the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are different.’

“One [Bodhisattva] with doubts and divided mind¹²⁰ said: ‘From among (1) those Bodhisattvas who say,¹²¹ “The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different,” and (2) those Bodhisattvas who say, “The character of the

compounded and the character of the ultimate are different” — which is speaking truthfully, which is speaking falsely?¹²² Which is properly oriented, which is improperly oriented?¹²³

“Having heard that, Supramundane Victor, I thought this: ‘Since it is the case that even¹²⁴ all these children of good lineage have not sought out the subtle ultimate¹²⁵ having a character completely transcending difference and non-difference from compounded things, all [20] are [just] childish, [obscured,] unclear, [unskilled,] and not properly oriented.’”¹²⁶

The Supramundane Victor said to Bodhisattva Suvishuddhamati: “It is so! Suvishuddhamati, it is so; because even¹²⁷ all these children of good lineage in this way do not realize the subtle ultimate having a character completely transcending compounded things, as well as difference and non-difference, they are childish, foolish,¹²⁸ unclear, unskilled, and are not properly oriented.¹²⁹

“Why is this? Suvishuddhamati, those who are oriented in that way¹³⁰ toward compounded things do not cognize¹³¹ the ultimate, nor do they manifestly realize the ultimate. Why is this? Suvishuddhamati, if the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were not different, then¹³² even all ordinary beings¹³³ would see the truth, and while [still] ordinary beings they would attain the highest achievement, and would attain blissful nirvāṇa.¹³⁴ Moreover, they would have manifestly and completely realized unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.¹³⁵

“Also, if¹³⁶ the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were different, then¹³⁷ even seers of truth¹³⁸ [21] would not become separated from [false] characterizations of the compounded. Since they would not have separated from the signs of the compounded, even seers of truth would not be completely released from

the bondage¹³⁹ of [false] characterizations. Because of¹⁴⁰ not being completely released from the bondage of [false] characterizations, they would not be completely released from the bondage of assumptions of bad states [of mind and body].¹⁴¹ If they were not released from these two bonds, then seers of truth would not have attained the highest achievement, would not have attained blissful nirvāṇa, and also would not have manifestly and completely realized unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.¹⁴²

“Suvishuddhamati, it is the case that ordinary beings are not seers of truth and that, as ordinary beings, they also have not attained the highest achievement, nor have they attained blissful nirvāṇa. Also, they have not manifestly and completely realized unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.¹⁴³ Therefore¹⁴⁴ it is not suitable to say, ‘The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different.’ Regarding that [difference or non-difference of the compounded and the ultimate], you should know by this form [of explanation] that it is the case that¹⁴⁵ those who say, ‘The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different’ are improperly oriented and are not oriented properly.

“Suvishuddhamati, it is not the case that seers of truth [22] have not not separated from the [false] characterizations of the compounded — they are just separated.¹⁴⁶ Also, seers of truth are not unreleased from the bondage of [false] characterizations — they are completely released.¹⁴⁷ Seers of truth are also¹⁴⁸ not unreleased from the bondage of assumptions of bad states [of body and mind] — they are completely released. When [a person] is completely released from these two¹⁴⁹ [assumptions of bad states, that person] attains the highest achievement and attains blissful nirvāṇa, and also manifestly and completely realizes unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. Therefore,

it is not suitable to say, 'The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are different.'

"Regarding that [difference or non-difference of the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate], you should know by this form [of explanation] that it is the case that those who say, 'The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are different' are improperly oriented and are not oriented properly.

"Moreover, Suvishuddhamati, if¹⁵⁰ the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were not different, then¹⁵¹ it is the case that just as the character of the compounded¹⁵² is included in¹⁵³ the thoroughly afflicted character, so also the character of the ultimate would be included in the thoroughly afflicted character.

"Suvishuddhamati, if the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were different, then the ultimate character [23] in all characters [i.e., entities] of compounded things would not be suitable to be [their] general character (*spyi'i mtshan nyid, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).¹⁵⁴ Suvishuddhamati, it is the case that the character of the ultimate is not included in the thoroughly afflicted character, and the ultimate character is the general character of the characters [i.e., entities] of [all]¹⁵⁵ compounded things; therefore, it is not suitable to say, 'The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different,' [and] it is not suitable to say, '[The character of the compounded] is different from the character of the ultimate.'

"Regarding that [difference or non-difference of the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate], you should know by this form [of explanation] also that it is the case that [both] those who say, 'The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different' and [those who say], '[The character of the

compounded] is different from the character of the ultimate' are improperly oriented, and are not oriented properly.

"Moreover, Suvishuddhamati, if the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were not different, then just as the ultimate character does not differ¹⁵⁶ in all characters [i.e., entities] of compounded things, so also all the characters [i.e., entities] of compounded things would not differ, and yogis also would not search for¹⁵⁷ an ultimate beyond all compounded things as they are seen, as they are heard, as they are differentiated, and as they are thoroughly known.¹⁵⁸ [24]

"If¹⁵⁹ the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate were different, then just the mere absence of self and just the mere absence of inherent nature¹⁶⁰ of compounded phenomena would not be the ultimate character [of those phenomena], and¹⁶¹ the thoroughly afflicted character and the completely purified character would also become simultaneously different characters [and so there would be no possibility of progressing from the state of affliction to the state of purification].

"Suvishuddhamati, it is also the case that the characters of compounded phenomena differ and do not not differ, and so yogis also search for an ultimate beyond all compounded things as they are seen, as they are heard, as they are differentiated, and as they are thoroughly known, and the ultimate is thoroughly distinguished by the selflessness of compounded things. The thoroughly afflicted character and the completely purified character also are not simultaneously different characters. Therefore, the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not suitable as being either 'non-different' or 'different.'

"With respect to that [difference or non-difference of the compounded and the ultimate], you should know by this form [of explanation] also that it is the case that those

who say, 'The character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different,' and [those who say,] 'They are different' are improperly oriented, and are not oriented properly.

"Suvishuddhamati, it is thus: For example, [25] it is not easy to designate the whiteness of a conch as being a character that is different from the conch or as being a character that is not different from it.¹⁶² As it is with the whiteness of a conch, so it is with the yellowness of gold, and it is also not easy to designate the melodiousness of the sound of the *viṇā*¹⁶³ as being either a character that is not different from the *viṇā* or as being a character that is different [from it].

"Also, it is not easy to designate the fragrant smell of the black *agaru* tree¹⁶⁴ as being a character that is not different from the black *agaru* tree or as being a character that is different [from it]. It is not easy to designate the heat of pepper¹⁶⁵ as being a character that is not different from the pepper or as being a character that is different [from it.] As it is with the heat of pepper, so it is with the astringency of *myrobalan arjuna*.¹⁶⁶

"It is thus: For example, it is not easy to designate the softness of cotton¹⁶⁷ as being either a character that is not different from cotton or a character that is different [from it]. It is thus: For example, it is difficult to designate clarified butter¹⁶⁸ as being either a character that is not different from butter or a character that is different [from it]. It is thus: For example, with respect to the impermanence in all compounded phenomena; or the suffering in all contaminated things (*zag pa dang bcas pa*, *sāsrava*);¹⁶⁹ or the selflessness of persons¹⁷⁰ in all phenomena, it is difficult to designate these as being characters that are not different from those or as characters that are different from those. [26]

“Suvishuddhamati, it is thus: For example, it is not easy to designate the unpeaceful character of desire as being either a character that is not different from desire or a character that is different [from it].¹⁷¹ You should know that just as it is with desire, so it is with anger (*zhe sdang*, *dveṣa*) and obscuration (*gti mug*, *moha*).

“Similarly, Suvishuddhamati, it is not easy to designate¹⁷² the character of the compounded and the character of the ultimate as being either different characters or non-different characters. Suvishuddhamati, in that way¹⁷³ I have completely and perfectly realized the ultimate, which has a character completely transcending difference and non-difference, and is subtle, supremely subtle, profound, supremely profound, difficult to understand, supremely difficult to understand. Having completely and perfectly realized [the ultimate], I also have proclaimed and thoroughly taught [it], within expansively designating [it].”¹⁷⁴

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

The character of the compounded realm and of the ultimate
Is a character that is devoid of sameness and difference.
Those who impute sameness and difference¹⁷⁵
Are improperly oriented.

Having cultivated calm abiding and special insight,¹⁷⁶
Beings will become completely released
From the bonds of [false] characterizations
And the bonds of assuming bad states [of body and mind].¹⁷⁷ [27]

This [completes] the third [chapter: The Questions of] Suvishuddhamati.

Chapter Four

Subhūti

Then the Supramundane Victor spoke thus to the venerable Subhūti:¹⁷⁸ “Subhūti, in the realms of sentient beings, how many sentient beings who communicate their understandings under the influence of boastful pride do you think exist?¹⁷⁹ In the realms of sentient beings, how many sentient beings who communicate understandings that are without the influence of boastful pride do you¹⁸⁰ think exist?”

Subhūti answered: “Supramundane Victor, I think that¹⁸¹ in the realms of sentient beings those sentient beings who expound understandings and who are without boastful pride are very few. I think that¹⁸² in the realms of sentient beings those sentient beings who expound their understandings under the influence of boastful pride are immeasurable, countless, and inexpressible [in number].

“Supramundane Victor, at one time there was a hermitage in a great forest, and with me¹⁸³ there were many monks together in that hermitage in a great forest.¹⁸⁴ These monks, having come together, mutually assembled in the morning.¹⁸⁵ They expounded their understandings by teaching what they had manifestly realized through observing phenomena in various ways.¹⁸⁶ From among them one¹⁸⁷ [28] expounded his understanding based on observation of the [five] aggregates (*phung po, skandha*),¹⁸⁸ observation of the signs of the aggregates, observation of the production of the aggregates, observation of the disintegration of the aggregates, observation of the

cessation of the aggregates, and observation of the actualization of the cessation of the aggregates.¹⁸⁹

“Just as this one observed the aggregates, in the same way another, based on observation of the [six] sense spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*),¹⁹⁰ expounded his understanding; one, based on observation of dependent arising (*rtan cing 'brel bar 'byung, pratitya-samutpāda*),¹⁹¹ expounded his understanding; another, based on observation of the [four] sustenances (*zas, āhāra*),¹⁹² the signs of the sustenances, the arising of the sustenances, the disintegration¹⁹³ of the sustenances, the cessation of the sustenances, and based on observation of the actualization of the cessation of the sustenances, expounded his understanding. One, based on observation of the [four] truths (*bden pa, satya*),¹⁹⁴ observation of the signs of the truths, observation of complete cognition of the truth [of suffering], observation of the abandonment¹⁹⁵ of the truth [of origin], observation of actualization of the truth [of cessation], and observation of meditative cultivation¹⁹⁶ of the truth [of the path],¹⁹⁷ expounded his understanding. Another, based on observation of constituents (*kham, dhātu*),¹⁹⁸ observation of the signs of constituents, observation of the various constituents (*kham tha dad pa*),¹⁹⁹ observation of the manifold constituents (*kham du ma*),²⁰⁰ apprehension of the cessation of constituents, observation of the actualization of the cessation of constituents, expounded his understanding.

“One, based on observation of the [four] mindful establishments (*dran pa nye bar gzhas pa, smṛtyupasthāna*),²⁰¹ observation of the signs of the mindful establishments,²⁰² [29] observation of the antidotes to the discordances (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi gnyen po, vipakṣasya pratipakṣa*)²⁰³ of the mindful establishments, observation of meditative cultivation of the mindful establishments,²⁰⁴ observation of

the production of the mindful establishments that have not yet been produced,²⁰⁵ observation of the abiding,²⁰⁶ non-forgetfulness,²⁰⁷ further arising (*phyir zhing 'byung ba, bhūyobhāva*),²⁰⁸ and increasing and extending (*'phel zhing rgyas pa, vṛddhivirūḍhi*),²⁰⁹ of the mindful establishments that have been produced, expounded his understanding.

“Just as that one [observed] the mindful establishments, in the same way others [observed the four] thorough abandonings (*yang dag par spong pa, samyakprahāṇa*),²¹⁰ the [four] bases of magical emanations (*rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa, rddhipāda*),²¹¹ the [five] powers (*dbang po, indriya*),²¹² the [five] forces (*stobs, bala*),²¹³ and the [seven] branches of enlightenment (*byang chub kyi yan lag, bodhyāṅga*).²¹⁴ One observed the eight branches of the path of Superiors (*'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa, aṛyāṣṭāṅgamārga*),²¹⁵ observed the signs of the eight branches of the path of Superiors, observed the antidotes to the unfavorable class of the eight branches of the path of Superiors, observed the meditative cultivation of the eight branches of the path of Superiors, observed the production of the eight branches of the path of Superiors that have not yet been produced and the abiding, non-deterioration, continued arising, and increase of the eight branches of the path of Superiors that have been produced. Having seen²¹⁶ them expound their understandings based on such observations, I thought thus: ‘These venerable persons expound their understandings by teaching their realizations through observing various phenomena.²¹⁷ In that way, even all these prideful venerable persons, not seeking the ultimate that is everywhere of one taste,²¹⁸ [just] view [these topics] in this way within being overcome by boastful pride’.²¹⁹ [30]

“Therefore,²²⁰ Supramundane Victor, that which the Supramundane Victor said in this very teaching: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound, difficult to realize,²²¹ and has a character that is everywhere of one taste’ — which was spoken well in this way by the Supramundane Victor — is wondrous. If even those sentient beings who have entered into just this teaching of the Supramundane Victor²²² and are monks have difficulty in realizing in that way the ultimate that has a character which is everywhere of one taste, what need is there to say anything about Forders, who are outside this [teaching]?”

The Supramundane Victor said: “It is so! Subhūti, it is so; I have completely and perfectly realized the ultimate, which is subtle, supremely subtle, profound, supremely profound, difficult to understand, supremely difficult to understand, and which has a character that is everywhere of one taste. Having completely and perfectly realized [the ultimate], I also have proclaimed and thoroughly taught it, within expansively designating it.²²³

“Why is this? Subhūti, I thoroughly teach that the ‘ultimate’ is that which is the object of observation for purification of the aggregates.²²⁴ Subhūti, I thoroughly teach that the ‘ultimate’ is the object of observation for purification for the sense spheres, [31] dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, constituents, mindful establishments, thorough abandonings, bases of magical emanations, powers, forces, branches of enlightenment, and, Subhūti, the eight branches of the path of Superiors.²²⁵ That object of observation of purification is of one taste with all of the aggregates and is of a character that is not different [from the aggregates and so forth].

“Just as it is with the aggregates, so [the ultimate] is of one taste also with everything from the sense spheres up to²²⁶ the eight branches of the path of Superiors, and is of a character that is not different [from them]. Therefore, Subhūti, you should

know by this form [of explanation] also²²⁷ that that which has a character that is everywhere of one taste is the ultimate.

“Moreover, Subhūti, monks who practice yoga, having completely realized²²⁸ thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena of one aggregate do not [have to] seek individually for thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena in those [phenomena] that are other than that — the aggregates, sources, dependent arising, sustentances, truths, constituents, mindful establishments, thorough abandonings, bases of magical emanations, powers, forces, [32] limbs of enlightenment, and the eight limbs of the path of Superiors.²²⁹ Those [monks who practice yoga] understand and thoroughly realize the ultimate, whose character is everywhere of one taste, through just thoroughly relying on the exalted wisdom that is non-dual with the scope of thusness, and not in another way.²³⁰ Therefore,²³¹ Subhūti, you should know²³² by this form [of explanation] also that that which has a character that is everywhere of one taste is the ultimate.

“Moreover, Subhūti, just as these aggregates, sense spheres, dependent arising, sustentances, truths, constituents, mindful establishments, thorough abandonings, bases of magical emanations, powers, forces, and limbs of enlightenment are of mutually different characters, and just as the eight limbs of the path of Superiors are of mutually different characters, in the same way if thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena [of each] of those phenomena were also of different characters,²³³ then thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena would have causes and would arise related to causes.²³⁴ If it arose related to causes, it would be compounded.²³⁵ [33] If it were compounded, it would also not be the ultimate because of not being ultimate. It would be [necessary to] search for another ultimate.²³⁶

“Subhūti, it is like this:²³⁷ thusness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena does not arise related to causes, and is not compounded; it is not not the ultimate, and it is not [necessary to]²³⁸ search for another ultimate beyond that²³⁹ ultimate. In permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time,²⁴⁰ whether Tathāgatas appear or do not appear, the element of the reality of phenomena only thoroughly abides, and [it is] not otherwise.²⁴¹

“Therefore, Subhūti, you should know by this form of explanation also that that which has a character that is everywhere of one taste is the ultimate. Subhūti, it is like this: For example, space is signless, non-conceptual, and non-increasing with respect to the manifold various aspects of instances of forms;²⁴² it has the character of being of one taste everywhere.²⁴³ Similarly, with respect to the phenomena that have different characters, the ultimate is to be viewed as having a nature that is everywhere of one taste.”²⁴⁴

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

The Buddhas teach that the ultimate
Is not different and its sign is everywhere of one taste.
Those who conceptualize difference with respect to that ultimate [34]
Abide in pride and are obscured.²⁴⁵

This [completes] the fourth [chapter: The Questions of] Subhūti.

Chapter Five

Vishālamati

Then Bodhisattva Vishālamati²⁴⁶ asked the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, when you say, ‘Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness; Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness’,²⁴⁷ Supramundane Victor, for what reason are these Bodhisattvas wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness? For what reason does the Tathāgata designate²⁴⁸ these Bodhisattvas as wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness?”

The Supramundane Victor said to Bodhisattva Vishālamati: “Vishālamati, you are involved in [asking] this [question] in order to benefit many beings, [to bring] happiness to many beings, out of sympathy toward the world, and for the sake of the welfare, benefit, and happiness of many beings, including gods and humans.²⁴⁹ Your asking the Tathāgata about this meaning is good, good!²⁵⁰ Therefore, Vishālamati, I will explain to you the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness; listen!

“Vishālamati, [35] in this cyclic existence of the six kinds of transmigrators,²⁵¹ the bodies of whatsoever sentient beings are thoroughly established and are produced²⁵² within the various types of sentient beings — whether this be the state of birth from eggs, the state of birth from wombs, the state of birth from moisture, or the state of spontaneous birth.²⁵³ It is thus: In dependence upon two types of impellers (*nye bar*

len pa, upādāna) — the impellers of the functioning physical sense powers and the impellers of predispositions of elaborations of conventionally designating signs, names, and conceptions²⁵⁴ — initially, the mind which has all of the seeds ripens and forms, increasing, developing, and expanding there.²⁵⁵ With respect to that, in the Form Realm, impellers are of two kinds. In the Formless Realm, impellers are not twofold.²⁵⁶ Vishālamati, because that consciousness apprehends and appropriates this body in that way, it is called the ‘appropriating consciousness’ (*len pa’i rnam par shes pa, ādāna-vijñāna*).²⁵⁷ It is thus: because of having the same establishment and abiding²⁵⁸ in the bodies of those [beings], it is connected and thoroughly connected [and hence] is called the ‘basis-consciousness’ (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*).²⁵⁹ It is thus: Because it completely and thoroughly accumulates predispositions²⁶⁰ established by [the perception of] forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects, it is called ‘mind’ (*sems, citta*).²⁶¹

“Vishālamati, depending upon and abiding in that appropriating consciousness, [36] the sixfold collection of consciousnesses — eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, bodily consciousness, and mental consciousness — arises.²⁶² With respect to that, in dependence upon an eye and a form, as well as a consciousness, an eye consciousness arises. A conceptual mental consciousness that functions together with that eye consciousness, that is [present] at the same time as it, and that has the same object of activity arises.²⁶³

“Vishālamati, with respect to that, in dependence upon an ear [and a sound], a nose [and a smell], and a tongue [and a taste], as well as consciousness, and in dependence upon a body as well as consciousness, [an ear consciousness, a nose consciousness, a tongue consciousness, and] a body consciousness arise.²⁶⁴ Conceptual mental

consciousnesses that function together with the [ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, and] body consciousness, that are [present] at the same time [with them], and that have the same object of activity [as them] arise.

“If one eye consciousness arises once, then one conceptual mental consciousness also arises once, having the same object of activity as the eye consciousness.²⁶⁵ If two, three, four, or all five collections of consciousness also arise together, then [only] one conceptual mental consciousness also arises once, having the same object of activity as the five collections.²⁶⁶

“Vishālamati, [37] it is like this: For example, with respect to the flowing of a great river, if the causes of the arising of one wave are present, then [just]²⁶⁷ one wave will arise. If the causes of the arising of two waves are present, [then two waves will arise], and if the causes of the arising of many²⁶⁸ waves are present, then many waves will arise, but²⁶⁹ the continuity of the river itself²⁷⁰ will not be broken; it will not be thoroughly consumed.²⁷¹

“With respect to a thoroughly clear round mirror, if the causes of the arising of one reflection are present, then one reflection will arise. If the causes of the arising of two reflections are present, [then two reflections will arise], and if the causes of the arising of many reflections are present, then many reflections will arise, but the round mirror will not become of the nature of a reflection, and [its own nature] will not be cut off.²⁷²

“Vishālamati, just like the water and the mirror,²⁷³ abiding in and depending upon²⁷⁴ the appropriating consciousness, if the causes of the arising of one eye consciousness are present, then one eye consciousness will arise.²⁷⁵ Also, if the causes of the arising of up to five collections of consciousness are present, then even a fivefold collection of consciousness will also [simultaneously] arise.²⁷⁶

“Vishālamati, it is like this: Although in dependence upon knowing the system of Doctrine, and abiding in knowledge of the system of Doctrine, [38] Bodhisattvas indeed become wise with respect to the secrets²⁷⁷ of mind, sentience, and consciousness, due to merely this the Tathāgata does not designate that these Bodhisattvas are in all respects dwelling in²⁷⁸ wisdom with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness.²⁷⁹

“Vishālamati, after the level of²⁸⁰ those Bodhisattvas who do not see their own internal and individual impellers, and do not see the appropriating consciousness, these [Bodhisattvas beyond this level] are in accord with reality.²⁸¹ [They do not see] the [seed-]basis,²⁸² basis-consciousness, accumulation²⁸³ [of seeds], mind, eye, form, eye consciousness, ear, sound, ear consciousness, nose, smell, nose consciousness, tongue, taste, tongue consciousness, body, tangible objects, or body consciousness, and, Vishālamati, after the level of those Bodhisattvas who do not see their own individual sentience, and do not see phenomena or mental consciousness, [Bodhisattvas beyond this level] also are in accord with reality. These Bodhisattvas are said to be ‘wise with respect to the ultimate’. The Tathāgata designates Bodhisattvas who are wise with respect to the ultimate as ‘wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness’.²⁸⁴ [39]

“Vishālamati, for just this reason Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to mind, sentience, and consciousness. For just this reason, the Tathāgata also designates them as ‘wise with respect to mind, sentience, and consciousness’.”

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

If the appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,

Having all the seeds, flowing like a river²⁸⁵

Were conceived as being a self, this would not be suitable.

Therefore, I do not teach this to children.²⁸⁶

This [completes] the fifth [chapter: The Questions of] Viśhālamati.

Chapter Six

Guṇākara

Then Bodhisattva Guṇākara²⁸⁷ asked the Supramundane Victor, “Supramundane Victor, when you say, ‘Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to the character of phenomena; Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to the character of phenomena’, for what reason are Bodhisattvas wise with respect to the character of phenomena? For what reason do you designate²⁸⁸ these Bodhisattvas as wise with respect to the character of phenomena?”

The Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, you are involved in [asking] this [question] in order to benefit many beings, [40] [to bring] happiness to many beings, out of sympathy toward the world, and for the sake of the welfare, benefit, and happiness of many beings, including gods and humans. Your reason for asking the Tathāgata about this²⁸⁹ is good, good! Therefore, Guṇākara, I will explain to you the character of phenomena;²⁹⁰ listen!

“Guṇākara, there are three characters of phenomena. If you ask, ‘What are these three’, [they are] the imputational character (*kun biags pa’i mtshan nyid, parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*), the other-powered character (*gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid, paratantra-lakṣaṇa*), and the thoroughly established character (*yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid, pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*). Guṇākara, if you ask, ‘What is the imputational character of

phenomena', [I reply,] 'It is that which is posited by nominal terminology as the entities and attributes of phenomena due to imputing whatsoever conventions'.²⁹¹

"Guṇākara, if you ask, 'What is the other-powered character of phenomena', [I reply,] 'It is just the dependent arising of phenomena'. It is thus: Because this exists, that arises; because this is produced, that is produced. It is thus: This ranges from: 'Due to the condition of ignorance, compositional factors [are produced]' up to: 'In this way, just the great aggregates of suffering arise'.²⁹²

"Guṇākara, if you ask, 'What is the thoroughly established character of phenomena', [I reply,] 'It is that which is the suchness of phenomena, that which Bodhisattvas realize through the cause of effort²⁹³ and through the cause of proper mental application.²⁹⁴ Also, through thoroughly accomplishing familiarization with that,²⁹⁵ [41] one thoroughly accomplishes [all of the stages] up to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment'.

"Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, the imputational character is to be viewed as being like the faults of clouded vision that exist in the eye of a person who has clouded vision.²⁹⁶ It is like this: For example, the other-powered character is to be viewed as being like the signs of clouded vision of that very [being], which appear as: the signs of a hair-net, or flies, or sesame seeds; or an appearance of either a sign of blue, a sign of yellow, a sign of red, or a sign of white. Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, when the eyes of just that very being become thoroughly purified and faults of clouded vision that have formed in the eyes do not exist,²⁹⁷ the thoroughly established character is to be viewed as being like the object of operation which is the natural object of operation of that person's eyes.²⁹⁸

“Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, when²⁹⁹ a very clear crystal is in contact with the color blue, it appears at that time to be a precious jewel such as a sapphire or an *indranīla*.³⁰⁰ Moreover, because it is wrongly apprehended as a precious jewel, such as a sapphire or an *indranīla*, sentient beings are thoroughly deluded. When it is in contact with the color red, it appears at that time to be a precious jewel such as a ruby.³⁰¹ Furthermore,³⁰² because it is wrongly apprehended as a precious jewel such as a ruby, sentient beings are thoroughly deluded. When it is in contact with the color green, it appears at that time to be a precious jewel such as an emerald.³⁰³ [42] Moreover, because it is wrongly apprehended as a precious jewel such as an emerald, sentient beings are thoroughly deluded. When it is in contact with the color gold, it appears at that time as gold.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, because it is also wrongly apprehended as gold, sentient beings are thoroughly deluded.

“Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, the other-powered character should be viewed as being [under the influence of] the predispositions for conventions which are the imputational nature, like a very clear crystal that is in contact with a color.³⁰⁵ It is like this: For example, the other-powered character that is apprehended as the imputational character should be viewed as being like the mistaken apprehension of the very clear crystal as a sapphire, an *indranīla*, a ruby, an emerald, or gold. Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, the very clear crystal should be viewed as the other-powered character. Guṇākara, it is like this: For example, just as the very clear crystal is thoroughly not established as [having] the character of³⁰⁶ a sapphire, an *indranīla*, a ruby, an emerald, or gold, and is without those natures in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, so other-powered [phenomena] are thoroughly not established in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time as

[having] the imputational character, and are without that nature;³⁰⁷ just that non-establishment or naturelessness is to be viewed as the thoroughly established character.³⁰⁸

“Guṇākara, with respect to that, in dependence upon signs that are connected with names,³⁰⁹ [43] the imputational character is known. In dependence upon the manifest conception of the other-powered character as being the imputational character, the other-powered character is known. In dependence upon the non-existence of the manifest conception of that other-powered character as being the imputational character, the thoroughly established character is known.³¹⁰

“Guṇākara, with respect to that, when Bodhisattvas know the imputational character as it really is with respect to the other-powered character of phenomena, then they know the phenomena that have a non-existent character as they really are. Guṇākara, with respect to that, when Bodhisattvas know the other-powered character as it really is, then they know the phenomena that have a character of thorough affliction as they really are. Guṇākara, with respect to that, when Bodhisattvas know the thoroughly established character as it really is, then they thoroughly know the phenomena that have a character of complete purification as they really are. Guṇākara, with respect to that, when Bodhisattvas know the phenomena that have a non-existent character in the other-powered character, then they completely abandon the phenomena that have a thoroughly afflicted character. When they completely abandon the phenomena that have a thoroughly afflicted character, then they attain the phenomena that have a completely purified character.

“Guṇākara, from that point at which³¹¹ Bodhisattvas know, in this way, the inherent nature of imputational phenomena as it really is; [44] and when they know the

other-powered character of phenomena, the thoroughly established character of phenomena, the characterlessness of phenomena, the thoroughly afflicted character of phenomena, and the thoroughly purified character of phenomena; and when they know the phenomena that have a non-existent character, then they completely abandon the phenomena that have a character of thorough affliction. When they completely abandon the phenomena that have a character of thorough affliction, then they realize [i.e., attain] the phenomena that have a character of thorough purification.³¹² At just that point, Bodhisattvas are 'wise with respect to the character of phenomena'. Moreover, at just that point, the Tathāgata designates these Bodhisattvas as 'wise with respect to the character of phenomena'.'³¹³

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

When [Bodhisattvas] know the phenomena that have a non-existent character
Then they have abandoned the phenomena that have a thoroughly afflicted
character.

When they completely abandon the phenomena that have a thoroughly
afflicted
character

Then they attain the phenomena that have a completely pure character.

Lazy beings who are overcome by non-conscientiousness³¹⁴

Do not consider the faults of compounded phenomena.

Because of degenerating from stable and non-fluctuating phenomena

They are objects of compassion.³¹⁵

This [completes] the sixth [chapter: The Questions of] Guṇākara.

Chapter Seven

Paramārthasamudgata

Then Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata³¹⁶ asked the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, when I was here alone, my mind generated the following qualm.³¹⁷ The Supramundane Victor [45] spoke,³¹⁸ in many ways, of the own-character (*rang gi mīshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa*)³¹⁹ of the [five] aggregates. He also spoke of [their] character of production, character of disintegration, abandonment, and thorough knowledge. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates,³²⁰ so he also spoke with respect to the [six] sense spheres, dependent arising, and the [four] sustenances.³²¹

“The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character³²² of the [four] truths, as well as speaking of the thorough knowledge [of true sufferings], abandonment [of true origins], actualization [of true cessations], and meditative cultivation [of true paths]. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the constituents, as well as speaking of the various constituents and the manifold constituents, [their] abandonment, and thorough knowledge. The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the [four] mindful establishments, as well as speaking of [their] discordances, antidotes, meditative cultivation,³²³ the production of the [mindful establishments] that have not been produced, the abiding of the [mindful establishments] that have been produced, [their] non-deterioration,³²⁴ further arising, and increasing and extending.³²⁵

“Just as he did with respect to the mindful establishments, so the Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways,³²⁶ of the [four] thorough abandonings, the [four] bases of magical emanations, the [five] powers, the [five] forces, and the [seven]

branches of enlightenment. [46] The Supramundane Victor also spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the eight branches of the path of Superiors, and also spoke of [their] unfavorable class, antidotes, production of the [branches of the path of Superiors] that have not been produced, the abiding of the [branches of the path of Superiors] that have been produced, [their] non-deterioration, further arising, and increasing and extending.³²⁷

“Supramundane Victor, the Supramundane Victor also said that all phenomena are without entityness, and that all phenomena are not produced, not ceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.³²⁸

“Therefore, I am wondering of what the Supramundane Victor was thinking³²⁹ when he said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], ‘All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’ I ask the Supramundane Victor about the meaning of his saying, ‘All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’”³³⁰

Having been asked that, the Supramundane Victor said to Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “Paramārthasamudgata, the thought in your mind, [47] properly generated [virtue],³³¹ is good, good! Paramārthasamudgata, you are involved in [asking] this [question] in order to benefit many beings, [to bring] happiness to many beings, out of sympathy toward the world, and for the sake of the welfare, benefit, and happiness of many beings, including gods and humans. Your thought of asking the Tathāgata about the meaning of this is good. Therefore, Paramārthasamudgata, listen to my explanation of my thought with respect to that in consideration of which I said,³³² ‘All phenomena are without entityness, all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’”³³³

“Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of three types of non-entityness of [phenomena] — the non-existence of an entityness in terms of character, the non-

existence of an entityness in terms of production, and an ultimate non-entityness — I taught,³³⁴ ‘All phenomena are without entityness.’

“Paramārthasamudgata,³³⁵ if you ask, ‘What is the non-entityness in terms of character of phenomena’, [that is, what is without entityness in terms of being established by way of its own character, I reply,] ‘It is the imputational character.’³³⁶ Why? It is thus: that [imputational character] is a character posited by nominal terminology³³⁷ and does not subsist by way of its own character. Therefore, it is said to be ‘without entityness in terms of character.’

“Paramārthasamudgata, if you ask, ‘What is the non-entityness in terms of production of phenomena,’ [I reply,] ‘It is that which is the other-powered nature of phenomena.’ Why? It is thus: [48] Those [other-powered phenomena] arise through the force of other conditions³³⁸ and not by themselves; therefore, they are said to be ‘without entityness in terms of production.’

“Paramārthasamudgata, if you ask, ‘What is the ultimate non-entityness of phenomena,’ [I reply,] ‘Those dependently arisen phenomena that are without entityness due to being without entityness in terms of production are [also without entityness due to being] without the entityness of the ultimate.’³³⁹ Why? Paramārthasamudgata, I thoroughly teach that that which is the object of observation of purification in phenomena is the ‘ultimate’,³⁴⁰ and since the other-powered character is not the object of observation of purification, it is said to be ‘without the entityness of the ultimate.’

“[Moreover,]³⁴¹ Paramārthasamudgata, that which is the thoroughly established character of phenomena is also called the ‘ultimate non-entityness.’ Why? Paramārthasamudgata, that which in phenomena is the selflessness of phenomena is called their ‘non-entityness’. It is the ultimate, and³⁴² since the ultimate is thoroughly distinguished by [being] the non-entityness of all phenomena, it is called the ‘ultimate non-entityness’.³⁴³

“Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to that, it is thus: non-entitynesses in terms of character [i.e., those which are without entityness in the sense of not being established by way of their own character — imputations —] are to be viewed as like a sky-flower, [for example].³⁴⁴ Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to that, it is thus: Also, non-entitynesses of [self-] production [i.e., those which are without self-production — other-powered phenomena —] are to be viewed as like magical creations, [for example].³⁴⁵

“Something beyond those [other two types of non-entityness] is to be viewed as the ultimate non-entityness.³⁴⁶ Paramārthasamudgata, [49] with respect to that, it is thus: Just as, [for example,] space is distinguished by merely [being] non-existence of the entityness of form [that is, as being a mere absence of forms] and as pervading everywhere, so the ultimate non-entityness is to be viewed as being distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena and as pervading everything.³⁴⁷ Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of those three types of non-entityness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without entityness.’³⁴⁸

“Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to that, thinking of non-entitynesses in terms of character [that is, thinking of imputations which are not established by way of their own character], I taught, ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’ Why? Paramārthasamudgata, it is thus: That which does not exist by way of its own character is not produced. That which is not produced does not cease. That which is not produced and does not cease is quiescent from the start. That which is quiescent from the start is naturally passed beyond sorrow. That which is naturally passed beyond sorrow does not have the least thing to pass beyond sorrow.³⁴⁹ Therefore, thinking of non-entitynesses in terms of character, I taught, ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’³⁵⁰

“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of the ultimate non-entitiness that is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena, [50] I taught,³⁵¹ ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.’ Why? It is thus: the reality, the uncompoundedness, the freedom from all afflictions in phenomena, which is the ultimate non-entitiness and which is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena, thoroughly abides in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time.³⁵² That which abides in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time, due to [being] just that reality, is uncompounded. Because it is uncompounded, it is not produced. It is unceasing. Because it is devoid of all afflictions, it is quiescent from the start. That is naturally passed beyond sorrow.³⁵³ Therefore, also thinking of the ultimate non-entitiness that is distinguished by [being] the selflessness of phenomena,³⁵⁴ I taught, ‘All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, are quiescent from the start, and are naturally passed beyond sorrow.’³⁵⁵

“Paramārthasamudgata, I do not designate the three kinds of non-entitiness because, in the world of sentient beings, sentient beings view the entity of the imputational [character] as being different by way of entity³⁵⁶ [from the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character — since sentient beings do not view phenomena in this way]; nor do I do so because they view the entity of the other-powered [character] and the entity of the thoroughly established [character] as being different by way of entity. [51] Superimposing the imputational nature onto other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures, sentient beings subsequently designate the convention that other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures are of the character of the imputational nature.

“In just the way that they subsequently designate³⁵⁷ such conventions, in that same way [their] minds are thoroughly infused with such designations of conventions,³⁵⁸ and due to this relation with the designation of conventions, or due to

[their] predispositions (*bag la nyal, anuśaya*)³⁵⁹ toward [making] designations, they manifestly conceive other-powered natures and thoroughly established natures to be of the character of the imputational nature.³⁶⁰ In just the way that they manifestly conceive this, in that same way,³⁶¹ due to the causes and conditions of manifestly conceiving other-powered natures³⁶² as being of the imputational nature, in the future other-powered natures are thoroughly generated.³⁶³

“On that basis, they become thoroughly afflicted by the thorough afflictions that are the afflictive emotions. Also, they are thoroughly afflicted by the thorough afflictions that are actions and the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes.³⁶⁴ For a long time, they transmigrate as hell-beings or animals or hungry ghosts or gods or demi-gods or humans, and travel about within these transmigrations, not passing beyond cyclic existence.³⁶⁵

“Paramārthasamudgata, regarding that,³⁶⁶ [52] I teach doctrine stemming from non-entitynesses in terms of production³⁶⁷ to those beings who have not previously³⁶⁸ generated roots of virtue, who have not purified the obstructions, who have not ripened their continuums, who have not acquired belief,³⁶⁹ and who have not achieved the collections of merit and wisdom. These [beings], having heard these [doctrines],³⁷⁰ discriminate compounded phenomena that are³⁷¹ dependent arisings as impermanent, and know them as just unstable, unworthy of confidence, and naturally changeable,³⁷² whereupon they develop aversion and antipathy toward all compounded phenomena.

“Having developed aversion and antipathy, they turn away from wrong-doing. They do not commit any wrong-doing, and they also practice virtue.³⁷³ Also, due to practicing virtue,³⁷⁴ they generate roots of virtue that were not [previously] generated. They also purify obstructions that were not [previously] purified, and in addition they ripen their continuums which were not [previously] ripened. On that basis, they have great faith, and they achieve the collections of merit and wisdom.

“Indeed, they have achieved³⁷⁵ [the levels of the path] ranging from generation of roots of virtue up to the [completion of] the collections of merit and wisdom, but because they do not understand, as they really are, the two aspects of non-entityness in terms of character³⁷⁶ and the ultimate non-entityness with respect to non-entitynesses in terms of production [that is to say, other-powered natures], they do not develop aversion toward all compounded phenomena,³⁷⁷ [53] they do not become thoroughly separated from desire,³⁷⁸ and they do not become completely released [from cyclic existence].³⁷⁹ They do not become completely released from the thorough afflictions that are the afflictive emotions; they do not become completely released from the thorough afflictions that are actions; and they do not become completely released from the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes.³⁸⁰

“Also, the Tathāgata teaches them doctrines stemming from non-entitynesses in terms of character³⁸¹ and ultimate non-entitynesses in order that [those beings] become averse toward all compounded phenomena, become separated from desire, become completely released,³⁸² thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are the afflictive emotions, thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are actions, and so that they thoroughly pass beyond the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes. Because, hearing these doctrines, they do not conceive³⁸³ other-powered characters to be the imputational character, they believe and understand non-entitynesses in terms of production [that is to say, other-powered natures] to be without the entity of character and without the entity of the ultimate, whereupon they realize, just as it is, [the other-powered nature].³⁸⁴ Thereby, it is thus: through knowledge that is not infused with conventions and through knowledge that is not related with conventions and is without the predispositions toward [designating] conventions,³⁸⁵ the power of consciousness is generated in this lifetime, and also, with respect to future [lifetimes], because the causes are thoroughly severed, [54] other-powered characters cease.³⁸⁶

“Moreover, on this basis,³⁸⁷ they thoroughly develop aversion toward all compounded phenomena, become completely free from desire, become completely released, and³⁸⁸ become thoroughly released from the afflictive afflictions, the afflictions that are actions, and the afflictions that are lifetimes. With respect to that, Paramārthasamudgata, through just this path and through just this procedure, even sentient beings who have the lineage of the Hearer Vehicle attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvāṇa.³⁸⁹ Through just this path and through just this procedure, sentient beings who have the lineage of the Solitary Realizer vehicle and those who have the lineage of the Tathāgata vehicle attain the unsurpassed accomplishment and blissful nirvāṇa. The path of thorough purification of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas is only this one, and [their] purification is also one, and there is no second.³⁹⁰

“Thinking of this, I explain that there is only one vehicle (*theg pa gcig, ekayāna*),³⁹¹ but it is not that, in the realms of sentient beings, there do not exist various types of sentient beings who naturally have dull faculties, middling faculties, and sharp faculties.³⁹²

“Paramārthasamudgata, even though all the Buddhas exert themselves [in his/her behalf], a person who has the lineage of a Hearer who proceeds solely to peacefulness³⁹³ [55] is unable to attain the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment upon being set in the essence of enlightenments.³⁹⁴ Why is this? It is thus: due to very limited compassion and great fear of suffering, [such beings] are naturally of an inferior lineage.³⁹⁵ Just as their compassion is very limited, so they have turned away from the welfare of sentient beings.³⁹⁶ Just as they are very afraid of suffering, so they have turned away from the thorough compoundedness of all compounded phenomena.³⁹⁷

“I do not describe those who have turned away from others’ welfare and have turned away from the thorough compoundedness of compounded phenomena as unsur-

passably, perfectly enlightened.³⁹⁸ Therefore, they are called '[those who] seek peace for themselves alone.'³⁹⁹

"Moreover, I describe those Hearers who change with respect to the enlightenment [that they are seeking] as being a type of Bodhisattva.⁴⁰⁰ They are as follows: having overcome the afflictive obstructions, they then are incited⁴⁰¹ by the Tathāgatas, and their minds become released from the obstructions to omniscience.⁴⁰² Regarding that: initially, due to having the aspect of application for their own sake,⁴⁰³ they are released from the afflictive obstructions, whereby the Tathāgatas designate them as being of the Hearer lineage. [56]

"In this way, Paramārthasamudgata, various types of faith⁴⁰⁴ of sentient beings are seen with regard to my disciplinary doctrine, which was explained well, which was taught well, my doctrine which was explained with a very pure thought, which was well propounded.⁴⁰⁵ Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to this, thinking of just these three types of non-entityness, the Tathāgata, by way of the aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning,⁴⁰⁶ taught the doctrine in this way, 'All phenomena are without entityness; all phenomena are not produced, not ceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow.' Regarding that, [when] sentient beings — who have generated great roots of virtue,⁴⁰⁷ have purified the obstructions, have ripened their continuums, who have great faith and have accumulated great collections of merit and wisdom⁴⁰⁸ — hear this doctrine, they understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it, and they develop belief in that doctrine.⁴⁰⁹ They also realize, by means of their exalted wisdom, the meaning just as it is. Also, through cultivating their realization, they very quickly attain the very final state.⁴¹⁰ Furthermore, they thoroughly experience faith in me, and say, 'Ah! The Supramundane Victor has become completely enlightened; he has become completely enlightened with respect to all phenomena.'⁴¹¹

“With respect to that, [57] those sentient beings — who have not generated great roots of virtue, have not purified obstructions, have not ripened their continuums, who have little belief and who have not accumulated great collections of merit and wisdom,⁴¹² who are honest and have an honest nature, who are unable to remove conceptuality, who do not abide in thoroughly holding their own view to be supreme — hear this doctrine, although they do not understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it, they develop belief and experience faith with respect to this doctrine.⁴¹³ They believe: ‘These sūtras are taught by the Tathāgata, and are profound, brilliantly profound, possessing [the doctrine of] emptiness, difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, unanalyzable, not an object of activity of argumentation, known by the wise who finely analyze and by the discerning.’⁴¹⁴

“Apprehending that they do not understand the meaning of those sūtras and what they teach,⁴¹⁵ they say: ‘The enlightenment of the Supramundane Victor is profound; the reality of phenomena is also profound; therefore, the Tathāgata alone knows; we do not understand.’⁴¹⁶ The doctrine that is taught by the Tathāgatas works on sentient beings by way of their various beliefs.⁴¹⁷ Our understanding and perception are merely [like] cowprints [compared to that of the Tathāgatas], whereas the Tathāgata’s [58] knowledge and perception are infinite.’⁴¹⁸ Copying the sūtras, they write them out in letters. Having written them down, they also memorize them, read them, thoroughly disperse them, revere them, recite them, and repeat them [to others].⁴¹⁹ However, because they do not understand,⁴²⁰ as it is, that which I explained with a thought behind it, they are not able to practice meditation,⁴²¹ but, on this basis, they advance by way of the collection of merit and advance by way of the collection of wisdom, and they also thoroughly ripen their continuums, which were not [previously] ripened.⁴²²

“Whatever sentient beings — other than these sentient beings — who have not achieved [the levels of the path] ranging from [generating] great roots of virtue up to the

[completion of] the collections of merit and wisdom,⁴²³ who are not honest and do not have an honest nature, who are able to remove conceptuality, who abide in thoroughly holding their own view to be supreme,⁴²⁴ having heard this doctrine, do not understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it.

“Even though they have belief in that doctrine they — with respect to the meaning of all these doctrines — adhere to the terms as only literal: ‘All these phenomena are only without entityness. All these phenomena are only unproduced, only unceasing, only quiescent from the start, only naturally passed beyond sorrow.’⁴²⁵ On that basis, they acquire the view that all phenomena do not exist [59] and the view that character does not exist.⁴²⁶ Also, having acquired the view of nihilism and the view of the non-existence of character, deprecating all [phenomena] in terms of all of the characters, they also deprecate the imputational character of phenomena.⁴²⁷ They also deprecate the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character of phenomena.⁴²⁸

“Why, Paramārthasamudgata? It is thus: If the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character exist,⁴²⁹ then the imputational character is also thoroughly known [i.e., is possible]. However, those who perceive the other-powered character and the thoroughly established character as non-existent also deprecate the imputational character.⁴³⁰ Therefore, those [persons] are said to deprecate even all three aspects of characters.⁴³¹

“Because they [correctly] conceive my doctrine to indeed be doctrine and because they also [incorrectly] conceive what is not the meaning to be the meaning, they hold doctrine to indeed be doctrine and they hold what is not the meaning to be the meaning.⁴³² Due to their belief in the doctrine, they advance through virtuous qualities, but, due to adhering to what is not the meaning, they degenerate from wisdom.⁴³³ Because they degenerate from wisdom, they degenerate from very vast and very immeasurable virtuous qualities.

“You should know that others — who, having heard from them [60] that doctrine is indeed doctrine, and that what is not the meaning is the meaning — develop belief in terms of the view.⁴³⁴ Because they [correctly] conceive the doctrine to indeed be doctrine, and because they [incorrectly] conceive what is not the meaning to be the meaning, they adhere to doctrine as being doctrine and adhere to what is not the meaning as being the meaning. You should know that, on this basis, they also similarly degenerate⁴³⁵ from virtuous qualities.

“Those who do not develop belief in terms of the view, hearing from them that phenomena are without entityness, hearing that phenomena lack production, lack cessation, are just quiescent from the start, and are just naturally passed beyond sorrow, develop fear and become afraid. Becoming very afraid, they say: ‘This is not the teaching of the Buddha; this is a statement by a Demon,’⁴³⁶ and, thinking thus, they deprecate and reject those sūtras, and speak offensively and unpleasantly.⁴³⁷ I describe those who, on that basis, have obtained great karmic obstructions, and thereby deceive many beings and who have a view of the non-existence of all characters and who teach what is not the meaning to be the meaning as obtaining great karmic obstructions.⁴³⁸

“Those sentient beings who have not produced roots of virtue, have not purified the obstructions, have not purified their continuums, [61] have not acquired belief, have not accumulated the collections of merit and wisdom, who are not honest, who do not have honest natures, who are [not] able to remove conceptuality, who abide in conceiving their own view to be supreme,⁴³⁹ having heard the doctrine, do not understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it, and do not have belief in these doctrines, [incorrectly] conceive doctrine to be non-doctrine and [incorrectly] conceive the meaning to be what is not the meaning.

“Because they conceive doctrine to be non-doctrine and because they conceive the meaning to be what is not the meaning, adhering to doctrine as being non-doctrine and adhering to the meaning as being non-meaning,⁴⁴⁰ they say: ‘This is not the

teaching of the Buddha; this is a statement by a Demon,' and, thinking in this way, they deprecate and abandon these sūtras, and they speak offensively and unpleasantly and also engage in interpolation.⁴⁴¹ In many forms, they are involved in destroying, eradicating, and undermining these sūtras.⁴⁴²

"They also conceive persons who have belief in this to be enemies. Even from previous [lifetimes], they are obstructed by karmic obstructions, and also, on this basis, they are obstructed by karmic obstructions in this way.⁴⁴³ [62] It is easy to designate the beginning of that karmic obstruction; it is not easy to designate for how many incalculable numbers of eons it will arise.⁴⁴⁴

Paramārthasamudgata, in this way, various types of belief of sentient beings are seen with regard to my good explanations, such disciplinary doctrine, which was explained well, which was taught well and which was taught with a very pure thought."⁴⁴⁵

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

What sage would propound, without a thought behind it,⁴⁴⁶ that
 'Phenomena are without entityness; phenomena are not produced;
 Phenomena do not cease; phenomena are quiescent from the start;
 All phenomena are naturally passed beyond sorrow'?

I explain non-entityness in terms of character, non-entityness in terms of
 production, and

Non-entityness in terms of the ultimate.

Whatever sage understands the thought behind my explanation with respect to
 these

Does not travel on a path of degeneration.⁴⁴⁷

The path of thorough purity is this one purification —
 There is no second [path of purity].
 Therefore, this is designated as being one vehicle.
 But it is not that there are not various types of sentient beings.⁴⁴⁸

In the realms of sentient beings, sentient beings who
 Attain nirvāṇa for themselves are innumerable.
 However, those who [attain] nirvāṇa [but] do not abandon [other] sentient
 beings,
 Who have firmness and compassion, are very rare.⁴⁴⁹

The uncontaminated realm of those who are released is subtle,
 Inconceivable, equal, and without differentiation,⁴⁵⁰
 Accomplishing the aims of all [sentient beings] and abandoning suffering and
 afflictions.
 It cannot be expressed dualistically, and is blissful and stable.⁴⁵¹

Then, at that time, Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata offered this to the Supramundane Victor, “Supramundane Victor, what the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, explained with a thought behind it — subtle, supremely subtle, profound, supremely profound, difficult to realize, supremely difficult to realize — is amazing and fantastic. Supramundane Victor, I offer the meaning of what the Supramundane Victor said as follows: Those which are posited by nominal terminology⁴⁵² — to the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as the character of entities [such as] ‘form aggregate’ or attributes [such as ‘the production of form’] and that which is posited through nominal terminology as the character of entities or the

character of attributes [such as] ‘the production of the form aggregate,’ ‘the cessation [of the form aggregate],’ ‘the abandonment and thorough knowledge [of the form aggregate]’ are imputational characters. [64] In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entitiness, in terms of character, of phenomena.⁴⁵³

“Those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena, are other-powered characters.⁴⁵⁴ In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entitiness, in terms of production, of phenomena, and, in addition, [designated] the non-entitiness in terms of the ultimate.

“Supramundane Victor, I offer the meaning of what the Supramundane Victor said as follows: That which is the thorough non-establishment — of the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as that imputational character, that which is just the absence of entitiness of only that [imputational] nature,⁴⁵⁵ that which is the absence of a self of phenomena, which is suchness, the object of observation of purification, is the thoroughly established character.⁴⁵⁶ In dependence upon that, the Supramundane Victor, in addition, designated the ultimate non-entitiness of phenomena.

“Just as this is applied to the form aggregate, so this should be applied similarly to the remaining aggregates.⁴⁵⁷ Just as this is applied to the aggregates, so this should be applied similarly to each of the sense spheres that are the twelve sense spheres. This should be applied similarly to each of the limbs of existence that are the twelve limbs of existence. This should be applied similarly to each of the sustenances that are the four sustenances. This should be applied similarly to each of the constituents that are the six constituents [i.e., the manifold constituents] and the eighteen constituents [i.e., the various constituents].⁴⁵⁸ [65]

“Supramundane Victor, I offer, in this way, the meaning pronounced by the Supramundane Victor: Those which are posited by nominal terminology — to the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as the character of entities [such as] ‘the truth of suffering’ or the character of attributes [such as] ‘knowledge of the truth of suffering’ are imputational characters. In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of character, of phenomena.

“Those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena, are other-powered characters. In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of production, of phenomena [i.e., other-powered natures] and, in addition, designated the ultimate non-entityness.⁴⁵⁹

“Supramundane Victor, I offer in this way the meaning pronounced by the Supramundane Victor: That which is the thorough non-establishment — of the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as that imputational character, that which is just the absence of entityness of only that [imputational] nature, that which is the absence of a self of phenomena, which is suchness, the object of observation of purification, is the thoroughly established nature. In dependence upon that, the Supramundane Victor, in addition, designated that the ultimate non-entityness. [66]

“Just as this is applied to the Superior truth of suffering, so this should be applied similarly to the remaining [truths].⁴⁶⁰ Just as this is applied to the truths, so this should be applied similarly to each of: the [four] mindful establishments, the [four] thorough abandonings, the [four] bases of magical emanations, the [five] powers, the

[five] forces, the [seven] branches of enlightenment, and the branches that are the [eight] branches of the path of Superiors.

“Supramundane Victor, I offer in this way the meaning pronounced by the Supramundane Victor: Those which are posited by nominal terminology — to the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as the characters of entities, [such as] ‘pure meditative stabilizations’, or as the characters of attributes, [such as] ‘discordances and antidotes of meditative stabilizations’, ‘cultivation of meditative stabilizations’, ‘production of [meditative stabilizations] that have not yet been produced’, ‘production and abiding, non-forgetfulness, further arising, and increasing and extending⁴⁶¹ [of meditative stabilizations]’ are imputational characters. In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of character, of phenomena.

“Those which are the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena, are other-powered characters. In dependence upon those, the Supramundane Victor designated the non-entityness, in terms of production, [of phenomena],⁴⁶² and, in addition, [67] designated the ultimate non-entityness.

“Supramundane Victor, I offer in this way the meaning pronounced by the Supramundane Victor: That which is the thorough non-establishment — of the objects of activity of conceptuality, that is to say, the foundations of imputational characters and those which have the signs of compounded phenomena — as that imputational character, that which is just the absence of entityness of only that [imputational] nature, that which is the absence of a self of phenomena, which is suchness, the object of observation of purification, is the thoroughly established character. In dependence upon that, the Supramundane Victor, in addition, designated the ultimate non-entityness.

“Supramundane Victor, it is like this: For example, dried ginger (*bca' sga, sunṭhi*) is placed in all medicinal powder preparations and all medicinal elixir preparations.⁴⁶³ Similarly, this teaching of definitive meaning, stemming from non-entitynesses of phenomena, and stemming from the non-production, non-cessation, quiescence from the start, and being naturally passed beyond sorrow of phenomena, is placed in all sūtras which are of interpretable meaning by the Supramundane Victor.

“Supramundane Victor, it is like this: For example, the basis for the drawing of a picture [e.g., the canvas]⁴⁶⁴ is of one flavor in all of the picture, whether [its features] are blue, yellow, red, or white. [68] It brings out whatever is drawn in the picture.⁴⁶⁵ Similarly, this teaching of definitive meaning by the Tathāgata, stemming from non-entitynesses of phenomena through to [phenomena being] naturally passed beyond sorrow, is of one taste in all sūtras of interpretable meaning. It brings out [whatever is taught in] those [sūtras] of interpretable meaning.⁴⁶⁶

“Supramundane Victor, it is like this: For example, adding butter to various types of cooked meat and various types of cooked grain is very satisfying.⁴⁶⁷ Similarly, when this teaching of definitive meaning by the Tathāgata, stemming from non-entitynesses of phenomena through to [phenomena being] naturally passed beyond sorrow, is added to all types of sūtras of interpretable meaning, it is very satisfying and supremely satisfying.⁴⁶⁸

“Supramundane Victor, it is like this: For example, space is everywhere of one taste and also does not obstruct any activities.⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, this definitive teaching by the Tathāgata, stemming from non-entitynesses of phenomena through to [phenomena being] naturally passed beyond sorrow, is of one taste in all sūtras of interpretable meaning. It also does not obstruct any effort⁴⁷⁰ with regard to the Hearer Vehicle, the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, or the Great Vehicle.” [69]

The Supramundane Victor said to Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “Good! Paramārthasamudgata, you have understood⁴⁷¹ the explanation of the Tathāgata that has

a thought behind it. Your good exemplification with respect to this meaning — with the examples of dried ginger, the basis for the drawing of a picture, adding of butter⁴⁷² [to cooked meat and boiled grain], and space — is good, good! Paramārthasamudgata, it is indeed so; it is not otherwise; you should retain it in this way.”⁴⁷³

Then, at that time, the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata also offered this to the Supramundane Victor: “Initially,⁴⁷⁴ in the area of Vārānasī in the Deer Park [called] ‘Sage’s Alighting,’⁴⁷⁵ the Supramundane Victor thoroughly turned a wheel of doctrine for those who were thoroughly engaged in the Hearer Vehicle,⁴⁷⁶ fantastic and marvellous, which none — god or human — had turned in a similar fashion in the world, through teaching the aspects of the four noble truths.⁴⁷⁷ Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine thoroughly turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute.”⁴⁷⁸

“During the second period,⁴⁷⁹ based on the absence of entityness of phenomena and based on the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and natural passing beyond sorrow [of phenomena], the Supramundane Victor turned a second wheel of doctrine, for those thoroughly engaged in the Great Vehicle, [70] very fantastic and marvellous, in an elaborative way.⁴⁸⁰ Furthermore, that wheel of doctrine turned by the Supramundane Victor is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute.”⁴⁸¹

“During the third period,⁴⁸² based on the absence of entityness of phenomena and based on the absence of production, the absence of cessation, quiescence from the start, and natural passing beyond sorrow [of phenomena], the Supramundane Victor turned a third wheel of doctrine for those who are thoroughly engaged in all vehicles,⁴⁸³ extremely fantastic and marvellous,⁴⁸⁴ through the distinctiveness of thorough differentiation.⁴⁸⁵ This wheel of Doctrine is unsurpassable, does not provide an

opportunity [for refutation], is of definitive meaning, and does not serve as a basis for dispute.⁴⁸⁶

“Supramundane Victor, having heard these teachings of definitive meaning [taught] by the Supramundane Victor, stemming from non-entitinesses of phenomena through to natural passing beyond sorrow [of phenomena], if whatever sons of good lineage or daughters of good lineage train in [those teachings of definitive meaning] by way of the aspects of developing belief [in these teachings], or writing them out in letters, exerting themselves at writing them out in letters, memorizing them, reading them, revering them, thoroughly dispersing them, receiving their oral transmission,⁴⁸⁷ reciting them, or reflecting on them, [71] how much merit will they generate?”⁴⁸⁸

The Supramundane Victor spoke thus to Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “A son of good lineage or daughter of good lineage will generate immeasurable, incalculable merit.⁴⁸⁹ Although it is not easy to provide examples with respect to that, I will explain it to you briefly.⁴⁹⁰ Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: For example, if one compares the particles of earth on the tip of a fingernail to [all of] the particles of earth in the ground, it does not approach even a hundredth part. It does not approach even a thousandth part, even a one hundred thousandth part, it does not approach even an enumeration, even a portion, even a similitude, even a comparison of it.⁴⁹¹ If one compares the water in a cow’s hoofprint and the water of the four great oceans,⁴⁹² it does not approach even a one hundredth part; [it does not approach even a thousandth part, even a one hundred thousandth part, it does not approach even an enumeration, even a portion, even a similitude;] it does not approach even a comparison.⁴⁹³ Similarly,⁴⁹⁴ with respect to my explanations of the merit [accumulated by those sons and daughters of good lineage] — ranging from those who train in sūtras of interpretable meaning by way of the aspects ranging from developing faith [in them] through to [training in those sūtras by way of the aspect of] meditating [on them] — if one compares the merit of those [Bodhisattvas] ranging from those who are thoroughly

established in faith in the explanations that are of definitive meaning through to those who are thoroughly established in training [in those sūtras] by way of the aspects of meditating [on these explanations that are of definitive meaning], it does not approach even a one hundredth part; it does not approach even a comparison.” [72]

Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in this form [of explanation] of doctrine that explains [your] thought?⁴⁹⁵ How should it be apprehended?”

The Supramundane Victor said: “Paramārthasamudgata, this is ‘the teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning.’ This is to be apprehended as ‘the teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning.’”

When this teaching of the ultimate, the definitive meaning, was set forth, 600,000 beings generated the unsurpassed, completely perfect mind of enlightenment; 300,000 Hearers [attained] the eye of doctrine that, with respect to phenomena, is undefiled and free from stains; 150,000 Hearers thoroughly released their minds from contaminations in terms of non-attachment; 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained the forbearance of the doctrine of non-production.⁴⁹⁶

[This completes] the seventh chapter: [The Questions of] Paramārthasamudgata.

Chapter Eight

Maitreya

Then the Bodhisattva Maitreya⁴⁹⁷ asked the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, abiding in what and in dependence upon what do Bodhisattvas cultivate calm abiding (*zhi gnas, śamatha*) and special insight (*lhag mthong, vipaśyanā*) in the Great Vehicle?”⁴⁹⁸

The Supramundane Victor said: “Maitreya, abiding in and depending upon an unwavering resolution to expound the designations of doctrines⁴⁹⁹ and to become unsurpassably, perfectly enlightened [Bodhisattvas cultivate calm abiding and special insight in the Great Vehicle].”⁵⁰⁰ [73]

“With respect to those teachings in which the Supramundane Victor said: ‘The four things that are objects of observation [of calm abiding and special insight]⁵⁰¹ are: (1) analytical images (*rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan, savikalpa-pratibimba*); (2) non-analytical images (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan, nirvikalpa-pratibimba*); (3) the limits of phenomena (*dnegos po'i mtha', vastvanta*); and (4) thorough accomplishment of the purpose (*dgos pa yongs su grub pa, kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*)’⁵⁰² — Supramundane Victor, how many [of those] are [just] objects of observation of calm abiding?”⁵⁰³

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “One is; to wit, non-analytical images.”⁵⁰⁴

“How many are [just] objects of observation of special insight?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “[Only] one is;⁵⁰⁵ to wit, analytical images.”

“How many are [just] objects of observation of those two?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Two are; to wit, the limits of phenomena and the thorough accomplishment of the purpose.”

“Supramundane Victor, how is it that Bodhisattvas, abiding on these four phenomena that are objects of observation of calm abiding and special insight, seek calm abiding and become skilled in special insight?”⁵⁰⁶

“Maitreya, designations of doctrine that I have stated⁵⁰⁷ to Bodhisattvas are: (1) sūtra collections (*mdo'i sde, sūtrānta*); (2) discourses in prose and verse (*dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa'i sde, geya*); (3) prophetic discourses (*lung bstan pa'i sde, vyākaraṇa*); (4) verses (*tshigs su bcad pa'i sde, gāthā*); (5) purposeful statements (*ched du brjod pa'i sde, udāna*); (6) specific teachings (*gleng gzhi'i sde, nidāna*); (7) narratives (*rtogs pa brjod pa'i sde, avadāna*); (8) discourses [that report] what occurred (*de lta bu byung ba'i sde, itivṛttaka*); (9) discourses on [Buddha's previous] births (*skyes pa rabs kyī sde, jātaka*); [74] (10) extensive discourses (*shin tu rgyas pa'i sde, vaipulya-sūtra*); (11) discourses on miraculous phenomena (*rmad du byung ba'i chos kyī sde, adbhuta-dharma-sūtra*), and (12) discourses that delineate (*gtan la bab par bstan pa'i sde, upadeśa*)⁵⁰⁸ — Bodhisattvas hear them well, apprehend them well, repeat them well, thoroughly analyze them with their minds, and also realize them well with insight.⁵⁰⁹

“Remaining alone in an isolated situation,⁵¹⁰ setting their minds thoroughly within, they take to mind just those doctrines in accordance with how they have contemplated them.⁵¹¹ They take to mind that mind through which they mentally contemplate those doctrines through the mental contemplation that continually arises internally.⁵¹² The arising of physical and mental pliancy through their engaging [in this practice] in this way and abiding in that many times is called ‘calm abiding’.⁵¹³ In this way, Bodhisattvas seek⁵¹⁴ calm abiding.

“Having attained physical pliancy and mental pliancy, they — abiding in just that — analyze and consider those phenomena internally as images that are objects of activity of meditative stabilization, having abandoned the aspects of mind [that were

previously taken to mind] in accordance with how [those aspects] have been thought on.⁵¹⁵ That differentiation, thorough differentiation, thorough investigation, thorough analysis, forbearance, interest, intelligence, view, and investigation of the objects that are known with respect to those images that are the objects of activity of such meditative stabilizations is called 'special insight'.⁵¹⁶ [75] In that way, Bodhisattvas are skilled in special insight."

"Supramundane Victor, prior to attaining physical and mental pliancy, when a Bodhisattva is doing internal mental contemplation that is the mind observing the mind, what is that mental contemplation called?"⁵¹⁷

"Maitreya, it is associated with an imitation that is a similitude of calm abiding; it is not calm abiding."⁵¹⁸

"Supramundane Victor, prior to attaining physical and mental pliancy, when a Bodhisattva is doing internal mental contemplation of images that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations in accordance with how those phenomena are contemplated, what is this mental contemplation called?"⁵¹⁹

"Maitreya, it is associated with an imitation that is a similitude of special insight; it is not special insight."⁵²⁰

"Supramundane Victor, are the path of calm abiding and the path of special insight different or the same?"⁵²¹

[The Supramundane Victor] said: "Maitreya, they are not different, and they are also not the same. Why are they not different? Because special insight observes the mind that is the object of observation [of calm abiding]. Why are they not the same? Because [special insight] observes an analytical image."⁵²²

"Supramundane Victor, is that image that is the object of activity of meditative stabilization which is a viewing consciousness [76] different from the mind or is it not different?"⁵²³

“Maitreya, it is said to be not different. Why is it not different? Because that image is simply cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*).⁵²⁴ Maitreya, I explain that consciousness is thoroughly distinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation is cognition-only.”⁵²⁵

“Supramundane Victor, if that image which is the object of activity of meditative stabilization is not different from the mind, how does the mind itself investigate the mind itself?”⁵²⁶

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Maitreya, with respect to that, although no phenomenon apprehends any phenomenon, that mind which is generated in that way appears as such.⁵²⁷ Maitreya, it is like this: For example, with form acting as a condition, form itself is seen in a perfectly clear round mirror, but one thinks, ‘I see an image.’ In that, the form and the appearance of the image appear as different factualities. Likewise, the mind which is generated in that way and the object of activity of meditative stabilization called an image also appear to be different factualities.”⁵²⁸

“Supramundane Victor, are the forms and so forth of sentient beings, which abide in the nature of images of the mind, not different from the mind?”⁵²⁹

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Maitreya, they are not different. With respect to those images, because childish beings with distorted awareness [77] do not know cognition-only just as it is in reality they consider [them] wrongly.”⁵³⁰

“Supramundane Victor, at what point do Bodhisattvas solely cultivate special insight?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “During the internal mental contemplation of just the signs of mind.”⁵³¹

“At what point do [Bodhisattvas] solely cultivate calm abiding?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “During the internal mental contemplation of uninterrupted mind.”⁵³²

“At what point do [Bodhisattvas], combining the two, calm abiding and special insight, unite them together?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “During the mental contemplation of mental one-pointedness.”⁵³³

“Supramundane Victor, what are the signs of mind?”

“Maitreya, they are analytical images that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations, the objects of observation of special insight. What is an uninterrupted mind? Maitreya, it is a mind that observes that image, the object of observation of calm abiding.⁵³⁴ What is mental one-pointedness? It is the thorough realization that ‘this image which is the object of activity of meditative stabilization is cognition-only,’ and having realized that, it is also mental contemplation in that way.”⁵³⁵

“Supramundane Victor, how many kinds of special insight are there?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Maitreya, there are three kinds: [78] (1) that arisen from signs (*mtshan ma las byung ba, nimitta-mayī*); (2) that arisen from thorough searching (*yongs su tshol ba las byung ba, paryeṣaṇā-mayī*); and (3) that arisen from individual investigation (*so sor rtog pa las byung ba, pratyavekṣaṇā-mayī*).⁵³⁶ What is that arisen from signs? It is that special insight which takes to mind just an analytical image that is the object of activity of a meditative stabilization. What is that arisen from thorough searching? It is that special insight which takes to mind [its object] for the sake of understanding well through wisdom just those phenomena that were not well understood with respect to this and that [image].⁵³⁷ What is that arisen from individual investigation? It is that special insight which takes to mind [its object] for the sake of thoroughly contacting great happiness through release with respect to phenomena that are realized well through wisdom in terms of this and that [image].”⁵³⁸

“How many kinds of calm abiding are there?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “You should know that through engagement with an uninterrupted mind, it is of three kinds.⁵³⁹ Maitreya, also, with respect to calm

abiding, there are the eight: the first concentration, the second, third, and fourth concentrations, and the sphere of limitless space (*nam mkha' mtha' yas skye mched, ākāśānantyāyatana*), sphere of limitless consciousness (*rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched, vijñānānantyāyatana*), sphere of nothingness (*ci yang med pa'i skye mched, ākiṃcanyāyatana*), sphere without [coarse] discriminations but which has [subtle] discriminations (*'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched pa, naiva-saṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*)."⁵⁴⁰

“Moreover, there are four kinds [of calm abiding]: (1) immeasurable love (*byams pa tshad med pa, maitri-apramāṇam*); (2) immeasurable compassion (*snying rje tshad med pa, karuṇā-apramāṇam*); (3) immeasurable joy (*dga' ba tshad med pa, muditā-apramāṇam*); and (4) immeasurable equanimity (*btang snyoms tshad med pa, upekṣā-apramāṇam*).”⁵⁴¹

“Supramundane Victor, when you say, ‘calm abiding and special insight that dwell on doctrines’⁵⁴² and ‘[calm abiding and special insight] that do not dwell on doctrines,’ what is that which dwells on doctrines? [79] What is that which does not dwell on doctrines?”

“Maitreya, they are as follows: due to engagement with the signs of doctrines that are apprehended and contemplated, calm abiding and special insight [engaging] meanings dwell on doctrines.⁵⁴³ You should know that, having obtained instructions and teachings from others, without relying upon doctrines that are apprehended and contemplated, calm abiding and special insight that have objects are like this: [Calm abiding and special insight focusing] on discolored corpses or putrefying corpses or on what is concordant with such, or on the impermanence of all compounded phenomena, or suffering, or the selflessness of all phenomena, or the peace of nirvāṇa, or on what is concordant with such, do not dwell on doctrines.⁵⁴⁴

“Maitreya, with respect to that, I designate a Bodhisattva — who follows the fact, in dependence upon calm abiding and special insight that dwell on doctrines — as

of sharp faculties.⁵⁴⁵ [I designate a Bodhisattva —] who follows faith in dependence upon [calm abiding and special insight] that do not dwell on doctrines — as of dull faculties.”⁵⁴⁶

“Supramundane Victor, when [you designate] ‘calm abiding and special insight which observe doctrines that are unmixed’ and when [you designate] ‘calm abiding and special insight which observe doctrines that are mixed,’ what is observation of doctrines that are unmixed? What is observation of doctrines that are mixed?”⁵⁴⁷

“Maitreya, [80] if a Bodhisattva cultivates calm abiding and special insight that observe each of the individual doctrines of sūtras and so forth in terms of doctrines as they have apprehended and considered them, this [Bodhisattva cultivates] calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines which are unmixed.⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, this mental contemplation — in which [a Bodhisattva], having collected together these doctrines of sūtras and so forth into one, grouped them into one, gathered them into one, made them into one aggregation, thinks: ‘All these doctrines flow into suchness, descend into suchness, have descended into suchness,⁵⁴⁹ flow into enlightenment, descend into enlightenment, have descended into enlightenment, flow into passing beyond sorrow [i.e., nirvāṇa], descend into passing beyond sorrow, have descended into passing beyond sorrow, flow into transformation of the basis, descend into transformation of the basis, have descended into transformation of the basis;⁵⁵⁰ all these doctrines have been expressed through the manifest expression of innumerable and measureless virtuous doctrines’⁵⁵¹ — is called ‘calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are mixed’.”⁵⁵²

“Supramundane Victor, when you designate ‘calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are a little mixed,’ ‘observation of doctrines that are very mixed,’ and ‘observation of doctrines that are immeasurably mixed,’ what is observation of doctrines that are a little mixed? [81] What is observation of doctrines

that are very mixed? What is observation of doctrines that are immeasurably mixed?"⁵⁵³

"Maitreya, mental contemplation — upon having individually collected together [the scriptures], beginning with sets of discourses, through to extensive discourses, discourses on miraculous phenomena, and discourses that delineate — is to be known as '[calm abiding and special insight] observing doctrines that are a little mixed.'⁵⁵⁴ Mental contemplation — upon having collected together as many of these sets of discourses and so forth as one has apprehended and contemplated — is to be known as '[calm abiding and special insight] observing doctrines that are very mixed.'⁵⁵⁵ Mental contemplation — upon having collected together [sets of discourses and so forth], thinking: 'The teachings of doctrines of the Tathāgata are countless; also, the words and letters are measureless; also, wisdom and inspiration are measureless in their increase'⁵⁵⁶ — is to be known as being calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are immeasurably mixed."

"Supramundane Victor, at what point do Bodhisattvas attain calm abiding and special insight which observe doctrines that are mixed?"

"Maitreya, you should know that they attain them through five causes: (1) when mentally contemplating, they destroy all of the bases of the assumption of bad states in each moment;⁵⁵⁷ (2) abandoning various discriminations, they attain joy in the joyousness of doctrine;⁵⁵⁸ [82] (3) they understand well that the appearances of doctrines are measureless in the ten directions and that their aspects are not limited;⁵⁵⁹ (4) the non-imaginary signs that are partially concordant with purification — these being endowed with thorough accomplishment of one's purpose — arise in them;⁵⁶⁰ and (5) for the sake of thoroughly completing and thoroughly accomplishing the truth body, they thoroughly grasp the causes of increasing goodness, the greatest auspiciousness."⁵⁶¹

“Supramundane Victor, on what level are calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are mixed realized, and on what level do [Bodhisattvas] seek to attain [them]?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Maitreya, you should know that having realized these on the first ground, the Very Joyous, they are attained on the third ground, the Luminous.⁵⁶² Nevertheless, Maitreya, even beginning Bodhisattvas should not neglect⁵⁶³ their training in mental contemplation of these.”

“Supramundane Victor, at what point do calm abiding and special insight become conceptual meditative stabilizations? At what point do they become non-conceptual and merely analytical? At what point do they become non-conceptual and non-analytical?”⁵⁶⁴

“Maitreya, analytical calm abiding and special insight — that experience clear and coarse signs of doctrines in accordance with how, upon being apprehended, they are investigated and analyzed⁵⁶⁵ — are meditative stabilizations that are conceptual and analytical. [83] Analytical calm abiding and special insight that experience the subtle — not analyzing in the sense of experiencing that which is clear and coarse among the signs of those doctrines, but which are just mindful of the appearances of those — are non-conceptual and merely analytical meditative stabilizations.⁵⁶⁶ Analytical calm abiding and special insight — through taking to mind experiencing doctrines spontaneously in all respects with regard to the signs of those — are non-conceptual and non-analytical meditative stabilizations.⁵⁶⁷

“Moreover, Maitreya, calm abiding and special insight of thorough searching are conceptual and analytical meditative stabilizations. [Calm abiding and special insight] that perform individual analysis are non-conceptual and merely analytical [meditative stabilizations. Calm abiding and special insight] that observe doctrines that are mixed are non-conceptual, non-analytical meditative stabilizations.”

“Supramundane Victor, what is the cause⁵⁶⁸ of calm abiding? What is the cause of thorough stabilization? What is the cause of equanimity?”⁵⁶⁹

“Maitreya, when the mind is excited, or when one has qualms that it will be excited, mental contemplation of sobering phenomena (*skyo bar gyur pa'i chos*) and of an uninterrupted mind [observing those] is called ‘the cause of calm abiding’.⁵⁷⁰ Maitreya, when the mind becomes lax, or when one suspects that the mind will become lax, the mental contemplation of pleasing phenomena or of the signs of the mind of these [phenomena] is called ‘the cause of thorough stabilization’. [84]

“Maitreya, when a path — that is singly dedicated to calm abiding, or is singly dedicated to special insight, or even one that is a union of those two — is not afflicted by the secondary afflictions that are those two [i.e., excitement and laxity], this mind of natural engagement, of spontaneous mental contemplation, is the cause of equanimity.”⁵⁷¹

“Supramundane Victor, when Bodhisattvas cultivating calm abiding and special insight thoroughly know doctrine and thoroughly know the meaning, in what way do they thoroughly know doctrine? In what way do they thoroughly know the meaning?”⁵⁷²

“Maitreya, they thoroughly know doctrine by way of five aspects: (1) the aspect of names; (2) the aspect of words; (3) the aspect of letters; (4) the aspect of individuality; and (5) the aspect of collection. What are names? They are what are designated as actual names to thoroughly afflicted and purified phenomena. What are words? They are what reside in and depend upon collections of just these names for the sake of imputing conventions in regard to thorough affliction and purification. What are letters? They are the letters that are the bases of these two.⁵⁷³ What is thorough knowledge in the aspect of individuality? It is thorough knowledge through mental contemplation that observes unmixed [doctrines]. What is thorough knowledge in the aspect of collection? [85] It is thorough knowledge through mental contemplation

that observes mixed [doctrines]. This is called 'thorough knowledge of phenomena upon having collected all of these into one'; in this way, doctrines are thoroughly known.⁵⁷⁴

"Bodhisattvas thoroughly know objects by way of ten aspects, by: (1) their varieties; (2) the way that they really exist; (3) objects that are apprehenders; (4) objects that are apprehended; (5) objects that are abodes; (6) objects that are resources; (7) mistaken objects; (8) non-mistaken objects; (9) thoroughly afflicted objects; and (10) thoroughly purified objects.⁵⁷⁵

"Maitreya, with respect to that, these which are the final divisions, in all respects, of thoroughly afflicted and thoroughly purified phenomena are the varieties. Moreover, these are: 'the fivefold enumeration of the aggregates, the sixfold enumeration of the internal sense spheres, and also the sixfold enumeration of the external sense spheres', and so forth.⁵⁷⁶

"Maitreya, with respect to that, the suchness of just those thoroughly afflicted and thoroughly purified phenomena is the way that they really exist. Moreover, it has seven aspects: (1) the suchness of arising is the beginninglessness and endlessness of compounded phenomena; (2) the suchness of character is the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena in all phenomena; [86] (3) the suchness of cognition is [the fact that] compounded phenomena are cognition-only;⁵⁷⁷ (4) the suchness of abiding is explained by me as true sufferings;⁵⁷⁸ (5) the suchness of distorted establishment is explained by me as true sources; (6) the suchness of purification is explained by me as true cessations; and (7) the suchness of correct establishment is explained by me as true paths.⁵⁷⁹

"Maitreya, with respect to that, due to the suchness of arising, the suchness of abiding, and the suchness of distorted establishment, all sentient beings are similar and equal. Maitreya, with respect to that,⁵⁸⁰ due to the suchness of character and the suchness of cognition, all phenomena are similar and equal

“Maitreya, with respect to that, due to the suchness of purification, all enlightenments — [including] the enlightenment of Hearers, the enlightenment of Solitary Realizers, and supreme, perfect enlightenment — are similar and equal.⁵⁸¹ Maitreya, due to the suchness of correct establishment wisdoms that are thoroughly conjoined with calm abiding and special insight — that observe as mixed all the doctrines that one hears — are similar and equal.⁵⁸²

“Maitreya, with respect to that, [87] objects that are apprehenders are the following phenomena: (1) the five physical sense spheres;⁵⁸³ (2) mind; (3) mentality; (4) consciousness; and (5) mental factors.⁵⁸⁴ Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are apprehended are the six external sense spheres. Moreover, Maitreya, objects that are apprehenders are also objects that are apprehended. Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are abodes are worldly realms, the realms of sentient beings in which [sentient beings] appear to abide.⁵⁸⁵

“Moreover, these [worldly realms] are: one village, or 100 villages, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or one area that reaches to the ocean, or 100 of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or one Jambudvīpa,⁵⁸⁶ or 100 of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or one [set of] four great continents, or 100 of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or a lesser chiliocosm,⁵⁸⁷ or one hundred of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or a middling dichiliocosm, or 100 of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these; or a great trichiliocosm, or 100 of these, or 1,000 of these, or 100,000 of these, or 10,000,000 of these, or 1,000,000,000 of these, or 10,000,000,000 of these, or 1,000,000,000,000 of these, or an incalculable number of these,⁵⁸⁸ or 100 incalculable numbers of these, or 1,000 incalculable numbers of these, or 100,000 incalculable numbers of these, or a [number equal to] however many subtle atoms of dust motes there are in 100,000 incalculable worldly realms that are the great trichiliocosms of the immeasurable, incalculable worldly realms of the ten directions.⁵⁸⁹ [88]

“Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are resources are explained by me as being property that is an apprehended object due to being an object of enjoyment of sentient beings.⁵⁹⁰ Maitreya, with respect to that, mistaken objects are mistaken discriminations, mistaken thoughts, and mistaken views of the impermanent as permanent with respect to just these objects that are apprehending subjects and so forth; or mistaken discriminations, mistaken thoughts, and mistaken views of suffering as bliss, of the impure as pure, or of the selfless as a self.⁵⁹¹

“Maitreya, with respect to that, you should know that non-mistaken objects are the opposite of those, and they are antidotes [to them].⁵⁹² Maitreya, with respect to that, thoroughly afflicted objects are of three kinds: (1) thorough afflictions that are the thorough afflictions of the three realms; (2) thorough afflictions that are actions; and (3) thorough afflictions that are lifetimes.⁵⁹³ Maitreya, with respect to that, thoroughly purified objects are the phenomena that are harmonies with enlightenment due to serving to separate one from just those three types of thorough afflictions. Maitreya, you should know that these ten aspects include all objects.⁵⁹⁴ [89]

“Moreover, Maitreya, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know objects by way of five kinds of phenomena.⁵⁹⁵ What are these five? They are: (1) things that are objects of knowledge; (2) objects that are objects of knowledge; (3) knowledges; (4) attainment of the fruits of knowledges; and (5) thoroughly knowing that.

“Maitreya, with respect to that, what are things that are objects of knowledge? They are to be viewed as being all objects of knowledge. They are as follows: the aggregates, the internal sense spheres, the external object sense spheres, and so forth.⁵⁹⁶ Maitreya, with respect to that, you should know objects that are known in accordance with what is known through various aspects. Moreover, these [aspects] are such things as: conventionalities and ultimate [truths], faults and good qualities, conditions, time, the characteristics of production, abiding, and disintegration, sickness and so forth, [true] sufferings, [true] sources, and so forth [i.e., the four noble truths], suchness,

reality-limit (*yang dag pa'i mtha'*, *bhūta-koṭi*),⁵⁹⁷ the element of qualities (*chos kyi dbyings*, *dharma-dhātu*),⁵⁹⁸ condensed [discourses], extensive [discourses], certain prophecies [of future Buddhahood],⁵⁹⁹ differentiation, scriptural questions, establishments, secrets, and [scriptural] teachings. You should know that those which are partially concordant with such are the objects that are objects of knowledge.⁶⁰⁰

“Maitreya, [90] with respect to that, knowledges are the harmonies with enlightenment that apprehend both of those. These are: the [four] mindful establishments, the [four] thorough abandonings, and so forth.⁶⁰¹

“Maitreya, with respect to that, obtaining the fruit of knowledge is: (1) disciplining desire, anger, and bewilderment; (2) completely abandoning desire, anger, and bewilderment; (3) the fruits of virtuous endeavor;⁶⁰² and (4) those common and uncommon, and mundane and supramundane qualities of Hearers and Tathāgatas that I have taught as to be actualized.⁶⁰³

“Maitreya, thorough knowledge of such is liberating knowledge of just those phenomena that are actualized, and extensively explaining and thoroughly teaching these to others.⁶⁰⁴ Maitreya, you should know that all objects are also included by way of these five aspects of objects.

“Moreover, Maitreya, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know objects by way of four aspects. What are the four aspects of objects? They are: (1) appropriated objects of mind; (2) objects of experience; (3) objects of cognition; and (4) objects of thorough affliction and objects of thorough purification. Maitreya, you should know that all objects are also included by way of these four aspects of objects.

“Moreover, Maitreya, [91] Bodhisattvas thoroughly know objects by way of three aspects. What are the three aspects of objects? They are: (1) objects that are letters, (2) objects that are meanings, and (3) objects that are realms. Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are letters should be viewed as collections of names and so forth. Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are meanings should be known in ten

aspects: (1) the character of suchness; (2) the character of knowledge; (3) the character of abandonment; (4) the character of actualization; (5) the character of meditation; (6) the character of differentiation of these characters of suchness and so forth; (7) the character of basis and dependent arising;⁶⁰⁵ (8) the character of phenomena that interrupt knowledge and so forth; (9) the character of concordant phenomena; and (10) the character of faults of non-knowledge and benefits [of knowledge] and so forth and knowledge and so forth. Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are realms are the five realms: (1) worldly realms; (2) the realms of sentient beings; (3) the realm of qualities; (4) the realm of discipline; and (5) the realm of methods of discipline.⁶⁰⁶ Maitreya, with respect to that, you should know that all objects are also included by way of these three aspects of objects.”

“Supramundane Victor, what are the differences between: thorough knowledge of objects by wisdom arisen from hearing, thorough knowledge of objects by wisdom arisen from thinking, [92] and, Supramundane Victor, thorough knowledge of objects by wisdom arisen from cultivating calm abiding and special insight?”⁶⁰⁷

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “Maitreya, through knowledge arisen from hearing Bodhisattvas abide in the letters, are literal, do not have the thought [behind the teachings], do not actualize them, are concordant with liberation, but do not thoroughly know liberative meanings.⁶⁰⁸ Maitreya, through knowledge arisen from thinking [Bodhisattvas] abide in the letters but are not literal, do not actualize the thought [behind the teachings] and are concordant with liberation, but they do not know liberative meanings.⁶⁰⁹ Maitreya, through knowledge arisen from meditation Bodhisattvas actualize — as objects of activity of meditative stabilization — reflections that are concordant with these things to be known: that which abides in the letters and that which does not abide in the letters; that which is literal and that which is the thought [behind the teachings]; and they are very concordant with liberation and they

thoroughly know liberative meanings. Maitreya, these are the differentiations of those.”⁶¹⁰

“Supramundane Victor, [93] what are exalted wisdoms that know doctrines and that know meanings of Bodhisattvas who cultivate calm abiding and special insight? What is insight?”

“Maitreya, I teach enumerations of exalted wisdom and insight extensively, but I will explain it briefly. Whatever is a wisdom of calm abiding and special insight observing doctrines that are mixed is an exalted wisdom. Whatever observes doctrines that are unmixed is insight.”⁶¹¹

“Supramundane Victor, how and through what mental contemplation cultivating calm abiding and special insight do Bodhisattvas remove what signs?”

“Maitreya, through mental contemplation of suchness [Bodhisattvas] remove the signs of doctrines and the signs of meanings. By not observing the nature of names with respect to names, and also not correctly perceiving the signs abiding in them, [Bodhisattvas] eliminate [signs]. Just as it is with respect to names, so also all words, letters, and meanings should be known. Maitreya, up through realms,⁶¹² through not observing an inherent nature of realms, and also thoroughly not perceiving the signs abiding in them, [Bodhisattvas] eliminate [signs].”

“Supramundane Victor, are the signs of thorough cognition of the meaning of suchness also eliminated?”

“Maitreya, when one does not observe as signless the thorough cognition of the meaning of suchness, with respect to that, what could be eliminated? Maitreya, [94] thorough cognition of the meaning of suchness exceeds all signs of doctrines and meanings; [I] do not explain that in that anything is exceeded by anything.”⁶¹³

“Supramundane Victor, regarding the statement by the Supramundane Victor — ‘A dirty pot, for example, an unclean mirror, for example, and an agitated pond, for example, are not suitable for viewing the signs of one’s own face, and the opposites of

those are suitable; similarly, minds that do not meditate are not able to know reality just as it is, whereas those that have meditated can do so' — thinking of what mental analysis and suchness did you say that?"⁶¹⁴

[The Supramundane Victor] said: "It was due to three kinds of mental analysis: (1) mental analysis arisen from hearing; (2) mental analysis arisen from thinking; and (3) mental analysis arisen from meditating; and, thinking of the suchness of cognition, [I] thoroughly taught these."

"Supramundane Victor, how many kinds of signs — which Bodhisattvas who thoroughly cognize doctrines and meanings in that way are engaged in removing — do you speak of? By what are they eliminated?"⁶¹⁵

"Maitreya, there are ten [kinds]; they are eliminated by emptiness. What are the ten? They are: (1) when one thoroughly knows the meanings of doctrines, the various signs of verbal expressions [95] are eliminated by the emptiness of all phenomena;⁶¹⁶ (2) when one thoroughly knows the meaning of the suchness of abiding, the signs that are a continuation of production, cessation, abiding, and transformation⁶¹⁷ are eliminated by the emptiness of character and the emptiness of what is beginningless and endless; (3) when one thoroughly knows objects that are apprehenders, the signs of the view of the transitory collection and the signs of the 'I'⁶¹⁸ are eliminated by the emptiness of the internal and the emptiness of the unapprehendable; (4) when one thoroughly knows objects that are apprehended, the signs of viewing enjoyment are eliminated by the emptiness of the external; (5) when one thoroughly knows objects that are resources — possessing the services of women and men and of possessions as objects of enjoyment — the signs of internal happiness and the signs of external apprehended objects⁶¹⁹ are eliminated by the emptiness of the external and internal and by the emptiness of nature; (6) when one thoroughly knows the objects that are abodes, the signs of the immeasurable are eliminated by the emptiness of the great; (7) in dependence upon [thoroughly knowing] formlessness, the internal signs of blissful libera-

tion⁶²⁰ are eliminated by the emptiness of compounded phenomena; [96] (8) when one thoroughly knows the objects of the suchness of character, the signs of selflessness of persons, the signs of selflessness of phenomena, the signs of cognition-only, and the signs of the ultimate⁶²¹ are eliminated by the emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, by the emptiness of non-things, by the emptiness of inherent existence of non-things, and by the emptiness of the ultimate; (9) when one thoroughly knows the objects of pure suchness, the signs of the uncompounded and the signs of the indestructible are eliminated by the emptiness of uncompounded phenomena and the emptiness of the indestructible;⁶²² and (10) when one takes to mind the suchness that is an antidote to these signs, the signs of emptiness are eliminated by the emptiness of emptiness.”⁶²³

“Supramundane Victor, when one eliminates the ten types of signs, what is eliminated? From what signs is one liberated?”⁶²⁴

“Maitreya, when one eliminates the signs of the image, the object of activity of meditative stabilization, one is thoroughly liberated from the signs that are bonds of thorough afflictions, and one also eliminates them.⁶²⁵ Maitreya, you should know that these emptinesses are antidotes to these main signs, but each of these is not a non-antidote to all these signs.⁶²⁶ [97] Maitreya, it is like this: For example, from ignorance up to old age and death,⁶²⁷ the thorough afflictions are not unproduced, but, mainly due to proximity or close proximity with conditions, compounded phenomena are explained as being produced. You should also view [these emptinesses] in just this way.”⁶²⁸

“Supramundane Victor, through examining what character of emptiness do Bodhisattvas come to not have manifest pride with respect to the meaning of emptiness, and what is the full character of uncorrupted emptiness?”⁶²⁹

At that time, the Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Maitreya: “Good! Maitreya, your asking the Tathagata about this meaning — so that Bodhisattvas would not become corrupted with respect to emptiness — is good, good!

Why is this? Maitreya, Bodhisattvas who are uncorrupted with respect to emptiness are completely uncorrupted with respect to all of the Great Vehicle.⁶³⁰ Maitreya, because of this, I will fully explain to you the character of emptiness; listen!

“Maitreya, the non-observation in all aspects — of the imputational character of the thoroughly afflicted in other-powered characters and of the thoroughly purified in the thoroughly established character — and the non-observation⁶³¹ of that in this which is thoroughly void in that [98] is ‘the full character of emptiness in the Great Vehicle’”

“Supramundane Victor, how many kinds of meditative stabilizations of the two, calm abiding and special insight, are included?”⁶³²

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “You should know that all of the many kinds of meditative stabilizations of Hearers, Bodhisattvas, and Tathāgatas that I have explained are included.”⁶³³

“Supramundane Victor, from what causes do calm abiding and special insight arise?”

“They arise from pure ethics as a cause. They arise from that cause which is a pure view arising from hearing and thinking.”

“Supramundane Victor, what are the results of these?”⁶³⁴

“Maitreya, pure mind is the result. Pure wisdom is the result.⁶³⁵ Moreover, Maitreya, you should know that all mundane and supramundane virtuous qualities, whether they be of Hearers, [of Bodhisattvas,] or of Tathāgatas, are results of calm abiding and special insight.”⁶³⁶

“Supramundane Victor, what are the functions of calm abiding and special insight?”

“Maitreya, they are liberation from the two bonds, the bonds of signs and the bonds of assumptions of bad states.”⁶³⁷ [99]

“Supramundane Victor, from among these five kinds of obstacles spoken of by the Supramundane Victor, which are obstacles to calm abiding? Which are obstacles to special insight? Which are obstacles to both?”⁶³⁸

“Maitreya, you should know that the views [which overvalue] bodies and resources are obstacles to calm abiding;⁶³⁹ not obtaining the discourse of Superiors in accordance with one’s wishes is an obstacle to special insight;⁶⁴⁰ abiding in commotion and being satisfied with inferior [attainments] are obstacles to both of these.⁶⁴¹ Moreover, with respect to that, because of the first one does not exert oneself; because of the second one does not bring the training to completion.”⁶⁴²

“Supramundane Victor, from among the five obstructions, which is an obstruction to calm abiding? Which is an obstruction to special insight? Which is an obstruction to both?”

“Maitreya, excitement and contrition⁶⁴³ are obstructions to calm abiding. Lethargy, sleep, and doubt⁶⁴⁴ are obstructions to special insight. Aspiration to the attributes of the Desire Realm and harmful intent⁶⁴⁵ are obstructions to both of these.”

“Supramundane Victor, at what point is a path of calm abiding thoroughly purified?”

“Maitreya, this [is accomplished] when lethargy and sleep are removed well.”

“At what point is a path of special insight thoroughly purified?” [100]

“This [is accomplished] when excitement and contrition are removed well.”

“Supramundane Victor, how many types of mental distractions do Bodhisattvas abiding in calm abiding and special insight find?”

[The Supramundane Victor] said: “There are five types: (1) mental distraction of taking something to mind; (2) mental distraction externally; (3) mental distraction internally; (4) mental distraction of signs; and (5) mental distraction of assumptions of bad states.⁶⁴⁶ Maitreya, if Bodhisattvas forsake Mahāyānistic mental contemplations

and adopt the mental contemplations of Hearers and Solitary Realizers, this is a distracted mental contemplation.⁶⁴⁷

“If [Bodhisattvas] scatter their minds to the five external qualities of the desire realm, commotion, signs, conceptuality, afflictions, secondary afflictions, and external objects of observation, this is mental distraction externally.⁶⁴⁸

“If [Bodhisattvas] become afflicted by whatsoever secondary afflictions, such as laxity due to lethargy or sleep, or experiencing the taste of meditative absorption, this is mental distraction internally.⁶⁴⁹

“If [Bodhisattvas], abiding in external signs,⁶⁵⁰ [101] mentally contemplate signs that are objects of activity of internal meditative stabilizations, this is the distraction of signs.

“If [Bodhisattvas], due to the collections of assumptions of bad states, think ‘I’ with respect to the feelings that arise in dependence upon internal mental contemplation,⁶⁵¹ this is the distraction of assumptions of bad states.”

“Supramundane Victor, from the first Bodhisattva ground up to the Tathāgata ground,⁶⁵² to what are calm abiding and special insight antidotes?”

“Maitreya, on the first ground, calm abiding and special insight are antidotes to the afflictions of bad transmigrations, and to the thorough afflictions that are actions and the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes. On the second [ground], they are [antidotes] to the arising of the subtle errors that are infractions. On the third [ground], they are [antidotes] to desires in the Desire Realm. On the fourth [ground], they are [antidotes] to attachment to meditative absorption and attachment to phenomena. On the fifth [ground], they are [antidotes] to thoroughly turning away from or directing oneself toward cyclic existence and nirvāṇa.⁶⁵³ On the sixth [ground], they are [antidotes] to the arising of many signs. On the seventh [ground], they are [antidotes] to the arising of subtle signs. On the eighth [ground], they are [antidotes] to obscuration with respect to signlessness and not having dominion with respect to signs.⁶⁵⁴ On the ninth

[ground], they are [antidotes] to not having dominion with respect to teaching doctrine in all aspects. On the tenth [ground], they are [antidotes] to not attaining thorough, complete knowledge of the truth body.”

“Maitreya, on the Tathāgata ground [102] calm abiding and special insight are antidotes to afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience that are more subtle than the very subtle.⁶⁵⁵ Because they are conquered well, one obtains unattached and unobstructed knowledge and vision with respect to everything and abides in the object of observation that is a thorough accomplishment of the purpose, a very pure truth body.”⁶⁵⁶

“Supramundane Victor, how does a Bodhisattva who is earnestly making effort at calm abiding and special insight manifestly, completely purify enlightenment?”⁶⁵⁷

The Supramundane Victor said: “Maitreya, with respect to this, how does a Bodhisattva, having attained calm abiding and special insight — with a mind that is set in meditative equipoise on doctrines in accordance with how they have been heard and considered, beginning with the seven types of suchness — engage in internal mental contemplation of suchness that realizes them well, thinks about them well, and arranges them well?⁶⁵⁸ Through mental contemplation of those in that way, if the mind becomes very withdrawn from even very subtle signs, what need is there to consider coarse [signs]?⁶⁵⁹

“Maitreya, with respect to that, very subtle signs⁶⁶⁰ are these: (1) signs of mental appropriation; (2) signs of experience; (3) signs of cognition; (4) signs of thorough affliction and purification; (5) signs of the internal; (6) signs of the external; [103] (7) signs of both; (8) signs involved in thinking, ‘[I] am working for the sake of all sentient beings’; (9) signs of wisdom; (10) signs of suchness, [true] sufferings, [true] sources, [true] cessations, and [true] paths; (11) signs of compounded phenomena; (12) signs of un compounded pheomena; (13) signs of impermanent phenomena; (14) signs of permanent phenomena;⁶⁶¹ (15) signs of what has a nature

that is associated with suffering as well as with change; (16) signs having a nature of unchangeableness; (17) signs of the characteristics of compounded phenomena; (18) signs of the specific characteristics of those; (19) signs of everything, as in the context of knowing everything as 'everything'; (20) signs of the selflessness of persons; and (21) signs of the selflessness of phenomena.⁶⁶² From the arising of those, the mind is made equanimical.⁶⁶³

"Through entering into such and abiding often in that, when one thoroughly purifies the mind from occasional obstacles, obstructions, and distractions, one thoroughly realizes the seven aspects of suchness as to be known by oneself individually and internally.⁶⁶⁴ This is the path of seeing of that [Bodhisattva]. By attaining this, Bodhisattvas enter into definiteness with respect to reality.⁶⁶⁵ [104] It is also attainment of the first ground in which [Bodhisattvas] are born in the Tathāgata lineage. They also experience the advantages of that ground.⁶⁶⁶ Because they have attained calm abiding and special insight previously, they have attained the two aspects of the objects of observation that are analytical and non-analytical images.⁶⁶⁷ In that case,⁶⁶⁸ by attaining the path of seeing they attain [the stage of] observing the limits of phenomena.⁶⁶⁹ Through entering into the path of meditation [proceeding] higher and higher with respect to the grounds and mentally contemplating those three objects of observation, it is like this: For example, just as a person can remove a very large nail with a small nail, so also, in the same way that a [small] nail expels a [large] nail, one eliminates the signs of the internal, whereby one eliminates all the signs in the class of the thorough afflictions.⁶⁷⁰ When one eliminates the signs, one also eliminates the assumptions of bad states.⁶⁷¹ By overcoming well all signs and assumptions of bad states, gradually proceeding higher and higher on the grounds, one purifies the mind like gold⁶⁷² and manifestly and completely purifies unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. One also attains the object of observation that is a thorough accomplishment of the purpose [i.e., a pure truth body].⁶⁷³ Maitreya, in that way a Bodhisattva who earnestly

practices calm abiding and special insight manifestly and completely purifies unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.”⁶⁷⁴ [105]

“When Bodhisattvas earnestly practice, how do they manifestly achieve the great powers of Bodhisattvas?”⁶⁷⁵

“Maitreya, Bodhisattvas who are skillful⁶⁷⁶ with respect to six topics achieve the great powers of Bodhisattvas: (1) skill with respect to the arising of mind; (2) skill with respect to abiding [of mind]; (3) skill with respect to emergence [of mind]; (4) skill with respect to increasing [of mind]; (5) skill with respect to diminishment [of mind]; and (6) skill in means.⁶⁷⁷

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] wise with respect to the arising of mind? When they know the arising of mind in terms of six aspects, they are wise with respect to the arising of mind as it really is. With respect to that, there are sixteen aspects of the arising of mind.⁶⁷⁸ [The first] a cognition that is a non-realizational and stable vessel is the appropriating consciousness.⁶⁷⁹ [The second] cognitions that observe various aspects are cognitions that are conceptual mental consciousnesses which are only conceptual mental consciousnesses that: simultaneously apprehend objects such as form and so forth; simultaneously apprehend external and internal objects; in a moment, in an instant, in a short time,⁶⁸⁰ simultaneously enter into meditative absorption in many meditative stabilizations; and see many Buddha lands and many Tathāgatas.⁶⁸¹ [The third] cognitions that observe small signs are involved with the Desire [Realm].⁶⁸² The fourth] cognitions that observe great signs [106] are involved with the Form [Realm].⁶⁸³ The fifth] cognitions that observe limitless signs⁶⁸⁴ are involved with the sphere of limitless space and the sphere of limitless consciousness. [The sixth] cognitions that observe subtle signs are involved with the sphere of nothingness. [The seventh] is cognitions that observe final signs which are involved with the sphere of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination.⁶⁸⁵ [The eighth] is cognitions of signlessness that observe the supramundane and cessation.⁶⁸⁶

[The ninth] is involved with suffering: It is [involved with] hell beings. [The tenth] is involved with feelings that are mixed: It has involvement in the Desire [Realm as its object of observation].⁶⁸⁷ The eleventh] is involved with joy: the first concentration and the second concentration. [The twelfth] is involved with bliss: the third concentration.⁶⁸⁸ [The thirteenth] is involved with neither suffering, non-suffering, bliss, nor non-bliss: it ranges from the fourth concentration up to the sphere of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination.⁶⁸⁹ [The fourteenth] is involved with affliction: it is involved with the afflictions and the secondary afflictions.⁶⁹⁰ [The fifteenth] is involved with virtue: it is involved with faith and so forth.⁶⁹¹ [The sixteenth] is involved with the neutral: it is not involved with either of these two.⁶⁹² [107]

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to abiding [of mind]? They [accomplish this] when they know the suchness of cognition just as it is.

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to emergence [of mind]? When [Bodhisattvas] know the two types of bonds — the bonds of signs and the bonds of assumptions of bad states — just as they are, having thoroughly known this, they are skilled in terms of [knowing,] ‘This mind emerges from those.’⁶⁹³

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to increasing [of mind]? [Bodhisattvas] are wise with respect to increasing [through knowing,] ‘It is produced; it increases’ when a mind that is an antidote to signs and assumptions of bad states is produced and increases.⁶⁹⁴

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to diminishment [of mind]? [Bodhisattvas] are wise with respect to diminishment [through knowing,] ‘It diminishes [and decreases]’ when a thoroughly afflicted mind having signs and assumptions of bad states that are discordant with that diminishes and decreases.⁶⁹⁵

“At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to method?⁶⁹⁶ When [Bodhisattvas] meditate on the [eight] liberations,⁶⁹⁷ the [eight] spheres of surpassing,⁶⁹⁸ and the [ten] spheres of totality⁶⁹⁹ [they become wise with respect to

method]. Maitreya, in that way Bodhisattvas have manifestly achieved, will manifestly achieve, and are manifestly achieving the great powers of Bodhisattvas.”⁷⁰⁰

“Supramundane Victor, with respect to the statement by the Supramundane Victor, ‘In the element of nirvāṇa without a remainder of aggregates’⁷⁰¹ [108] all feelings completely cease,’ what are the feelings that cease?”

“Maitreya, in brief two kinds of feelings cease: (1) experiences of the assumptions of bad states that are states;⁷⁰² and (2) experiences of objects that are the fruits of those.⁷⁰³ With respect to that, experiences of the assumptions of bad states that are states should be known as being of four kinds: (1) assumptions of bad states that are experiences of form states; (2) assumptions of bad states that are experiences of formless states; (3) experiences of bad states that are established results; and (4) experiences of bad states that are not established results.⁷⁰⁴ Also, with respect to these, [experiences of bad states] that are established [results] are whatever [have their results] now; [experiences of bad states] that are not established [results] are whatever serve as causes in the future.

“Also experiencers of objects are of four kinds: (1) experiencers of bases; (2) experiencers of property; (3) experiencers of resources; and (4) experiencers of reliances.⁷⁰⁵ With respect to that, in the element of nirvāṇa that has a remainder of aggregates,⁷⁰⁶ when one experiences non-established results — that is to say, feelings that arise from cognitive contact — its discordant class has not ceased in all ways,⁷⁰⁷ and one experiences common [results].⁷⁰⁸ When one experiences established results, at that time those two aspects of feeling cease in all ways; one experiences only a feeling that arises from cognitive contact.⁷⁰⁹ [109] When one thoroughly passes beyond sorrow in the element of a nirvāṇa without a remainder of aggregates, even that ceases. Because of that, all feelings cease in the element of a nirvāṇa without a remainder of aggregates. Because of that, it is said that, ‘All feelings cease.’”⁷¹⁰

Having said this, the Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, "Maitreya, your questioning the Tathāgata concerning the thoroughly pure and thoroughly complete path of yoga, is good, good!⁷¹¹ Accordingly, I also teach this path of yoga purely and completely through the mode of thoroughly realizing it and being thoroughly skilled in it.⁷¹² Also, all of those who have become Buddhas in the past or will do so in the future have taught just this and will teach it. Thus, it is fitting for sons of good lineage and daughters of good lineage to make strong effort at just this."⁷¹³

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

Whatever doctrines are imputed and posited
Are for the great purpose of dilligence with respect to yoga.
Those who correctly make effort in this yoga
In dependence upon these doctrines attain enlightenment.

Those who, looking for an opportunity to dispute these statements,
Take hold of doctrines of liberation, [110]
Are, Maitreya, as far from this yoga
As the sky is distant from the earth.⁷¹⁴

Those wise beings who are firm with respect to the welfare of
sentient beings and do not hope for recompense,
Who, having understood [this yoga,] make effort at the welfare of sentient
beings,
Attain activities that are free from materialistic concern⁷¹⁵
And the supreme joy in all ways.⁷¹⁶

Those who, as a result of desire, teach the excellent doctrine to whomever,

Who have renounced desire [but] revert to it —
 Even though these deluded people
 Obtain the priceless, precious doctrine, they wander in destitution.⁷¹⁷

Therefore, make great effort at abandoning
 Disputation, commotion, elaboration, and attachment;
 In order to liberate worldly beings including gods
 Make great effort in this yoga.⁷¹⁸

Then the Bodhisattva Maitreya spoke thus to the Supramundane Victor:
 “Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in this form [of explanation]
 of doctrine that explains [your] thought? How should it be apprehended?”

The Supramundane Victor said: “Maitreya, this is ‘the teaching of the definitive
 meaning of yoga.’ It should be apprehended as teaching the definitive meaning of
 yoga.”

When this teaching of the definitive meaning of yoga was explained, 600,000
 living beings generated the completely perfect mind of aspiration to enlightenment.
 Three hundred thousand⁷¹⁹ Hearers [111] perfected the eye of doctrine that is free from
 dust and stainless with respect to doctrine.⁷²⁰ One hundred and fifty thousand Hearers
 freed their minds from contamination such that they will not take rebirth. Seventy-five
 thousand Bodhisattvas attained the mental contemplation of the great yoga.⁷²¹

This [completes] the eighth [chapter: The Questions] of Maitreya.

Chapter Nine

Avalokiteshvara

Then Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara⁷²² asked the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, if the ten Bodhisattva grounds⁷²³ are these ten: (1) the Very Joyous (*rab tu dga' ba, pramuditā*); (2) the Stainless (*dri ma med pa, vimalā*); (3) the Luminous (*'od byed pa, prabhākari*); (4) the Radiant (*'od 'phro ba can, arciṣmati*); (5) the Difficult to Overcome (*shin tu sbyang dka' ba, sudurjayā*); (6) the Manifest (*mngon du gyur pa, abhimukhi*); (7) the Gone Afar (*ring du song ba, dūraṃgamā*); (8) the Immovable (*mi g.yo ba, acalā*); (9) the Good Intelligence (*legs pa'i blo gros, sādhumati*); and (10) the Cloud of Doctrine (*chos kyi sprin, dharma-megha*),⁷²⁴ [and] if the Buddha ground (*sangs rgyas kyi sa, buddha-bhūmi*), is the eleventh [ground], by how many purities and by how many limbs are these grounds subsumed?”

The Supramundane Victor said: “Avalokiteshvara, you should know that⁷²⁵ these are subsumed by four purities and eleven limbs. Avalokiteshvara, with respect to that, you should know that: (1) pure thought subsumes the first ground; (2) pure surpassing ethics subsumes the second ground; (3) pure surpassing intention subsumes the third ground; and (4) pure surpassing wisdom [112] subsumes the higher and higher grounds ranging from the fourth up to the Buddha ground. These four purities subsume these [grounds].⁷²⁶

“What are the eleven limbs?⁷²⁷ Avalokiteshvara, Bodhisattvas who engage [in practice] through belief — through thoroughly cultivating the ten doctrinal practices⁷²⁸ in the ground of engagement through belief,⁷²⁹ having passed beyond that ground — enter into the faultless reality of Bodhisattvas.⁷³⁰ Even though that [first ground] is

completed by that limb, because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to engage in introspection with respect to the arising of errors that are subtle infractions (*ltung ba phra mo'i 'khrul ba 'byung ba, sūkṣmāpatti-skhalita-samudaya*) the [second ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷³¹

“Even though that [second ground] is completed by that limb, because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to enter fully into absorption in the worldly meditative stabilizations⁷³² and fully attain retention of what is heard (*thos pa'i gzungs, śruta-dhāraṇī*)⁷³³ that [third ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷³⁴

“Even though that [third ground] is completed by that limb, because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to abide often in those doctrines that are concordant with enlightenment in accordance with how they have been attained and are not able to make their minds dispassionate with respect to craving for meditative absorption and craving for doctrine, that [fourth ground] is not completed by that limb. [113] Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷³⁵

“Even though that [fourth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to analyze the truths or to cultivate the qualities that are concordant with enlightenment which are thoroughly conjoined with method upon having desisted from taking to mind strongly turning away from cyclic existence and strongly approaching nirvāṇa⁷³⁶ — that [fifth ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷³⁷

“Even though that [fifth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas,] not manifestly realizing the workings of the compounded as they really are, are not able to practice often through taking to mind many sobering [phenomena] and signlessness⁷³⁸ — that [sixth ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷³⁹

“Even though that [sixth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to abide often uninterruptedly and continuously in signlessness — that [seventh ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷⁴⁰

“Even though that [seventh ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to desist from forceful exertion⁷⁴¹ at abiding in signlessness or to attain the mastery of signs — [114] that [eighth ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷⁴²

“Even though that [eighth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to attain mastery with respect to teaching of doctrine in all aspects through enumerations, characteristics, etymologies, and divisions — that [ninth ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷⁴³

“Even though that [ninth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to attain and thoroughly experience the completion of a truth body (*chos kyi sku*, *dharma-kāya*) — that [tenth ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained.⁷⁴⁴

“Even though that [tenth ground] is completed by that limb — because [those Bodhisattvas] are not able to attain unobstructed, unattached insight that is exalted wisdom⁷⁴⁵ with respect to all objects of knowledge — that [Buddha ground] is not completed by that limb. Through striving in order to complete that [ground] by that limb, that also is attained. Due to completing that by that limb, all limbs are thoroughly completed. Avalokiteshvara, you should know that these grounds are subsumed by those eleven limbs.”⁷⁴⁶ [115]

“Supramundane Victor, why is the first ground called the ‘Very Joyous’? Why are the grounds up to the Buddha ground called the ‘Buddha ground’ [and so forth]?”⁷⁴⁷

“Because of [bringing] extensive happiness and supreme happiness due to gaining a supramundane mind that is unaccustomed [to the practices of Bodhisattvas] and that is of great importance, the first ground is called the ‘Very Joyous’.⁷⁴⁸

“Because of being devoid of all stains of faulty ethics that are subtle faults, the second ground is called the ‘Stainless’.⁷⁴⁹

“Because of abiding in immeasurable appearances of exalted wisdom that are meditative stabilizations and in retention of what is heard, the third ground is called the ‘Luminous’.⁷⁵⁰

“Because of diffusing the light of exalted wisdom that cultivates qualities that are harmonies with enlightenment through burning the sticks of the afflictions, the fourth ground is called the ‘Radiant’.⁷⁵¹

“Because it is difficult to have mastery with respect to that cultivation of just those qualities that are harmonies with enlightenment through method, the fifth ground is called the ‘Difficult to Train In’.⁷⁵²

“Due to manifestly realizing the arising of compounded phenomena and because of manifestly realizing elevated mental contemplation of signlessness, the sixth ground is called the ‘Manifest’.⁷⁵³

“Because of entering into uninterrupted and continuous mental contemplation of signlessness for a long time and because of subsequent connection with a pure ground, the seventh ground is called the ‘Gone Afar’.⁷⁵⁴ [116]

“Because of spontaneity with respect to signlessness and because of not being shaken by the arising of the afflictions with respect to signs, the eighth ground is called the ‘Immovable’.⁷⁵⁵

“Because of attaining faultlessness and very extensive intelligence in terms of mastery of teaching the doctrine in all aspects, the ninth ground is called the ‘Good Intelligence’.⁷⁵⁶

“Because great cloudlike truth body pervades and covers the collection of assumptions of bad states that are like space, the tenth ground is called the ‘Cloud of Doctrine’.⁷⁵⁷

“Because of becoming manifestly, completely enlightened with respect to all aspects of objects of knowledge and abandoning, without attachment or obstruction, the very subtle [afflictive obstructions and] obstructions to omniscience, the eleventh ground is called the ‘Buddha Ground.’”⁷⁵⁸

“Supramundane Victor, with respect to these, how many obscurations are there? How many discordant classes of assumptions of bad states are there?”

The Supramundane Victor said: “Avalokiteshvara, there are twenty-two obscurations and eleven discordant classes of assumptions of bad states.⁷⁵⁹ On the first ground, there are: (1) great obscurations of exaggerated adherence to persons and phenomena; (2) great obscurations of the afflictions of bad transmigrations; and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.⁷⁶⁰

“On the second [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations of errors that are subtle infractions; (2) great obscurations of the various aspects of the fruitions of actions;⁷⁶¹ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.
[117]

“On the third [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations of desire; (2) great obscurations to the completion of retention of what is heard;⁷⁶² and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the fourth [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations of craving for meditative absorptions; (2) great obscurations of craving for doctrine;⁷⁶³ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the fifth [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations of mental contemplation that is strongly turned away from or directed toward cyclic existence; (2) great obscurations of mental contemplation that is strongly turned away from or directed toward nirvāṇa;⁷⁶⁴ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the sixth [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations to manifestly realizing the arising of the compounded; (2) great obscurations of the arising of many signs;⁷⁶⁵ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the seventh [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations of the arising of subtle signs; (2) great obscurations with respect to the method of taking to mind just signlessness;⁷⁶⁶ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the eighth [ground], there are: (1) great obscuration that is over-exertion with respect to signlessness; (2) great obscurations to mastery with respect to signs;⁷⁶⁷ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the ninth [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations to mastery of retention with respect to immeasurable doctrinal teachings, doctrinal words, doctrinal letters, and increase of wisdom [118] and inspired courage; (2) great obscurations to mastery with respect to inspired courage;⁷⁶⁸ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the tenth [ground], there are: (1) great obscurations to the great clairvoyances; (2) great obscurations to entering into the subtly secret;⁷⁶⁹ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those.

“On the Buddha ground, there are: (1) great obscurations of very subtle attachment to all objects of knowledge; (2) great obscurations of [very subtle] obstacles;⁷⁷⁰ and (3) the discordant class that is an assumption of the bad states of those. Avalokiteshvara, these grounds are posited by way of these twenty-two

obscurations and these eleven assumptions of bad states; [due to these] one does not possess unsurpassed, perfect, complete enlightenment.”

“Supramundane Victor, to the extent that Bodhisattvas who — rending the great net of thorough affliction and completely transcending the great jungle of assumptions of bad states in that way — become unsurpassably, perfectly, completely enlightened, the great benefits and great fruits are marvellous.⁷⁷¹

“Supramundane Victor, by way of how many purities are these [grounds] arranged?”⁷⁷²

“Avalokiteshvara, [they are arranged] by way of eight [purities]: (1) purity of the unusual attitude; [119] (2) purity of mind; (3) purity of compassion; (4) purity of the perfections; (5) purity of perception of and reverence for Buddhas; (6) purity of thoroughly ripening sentient beings; (7) purity of birth; and (8) purity of power.⁷⁷³ Avalokiteshvara, you should know that whatever ranges from the purity of the unusual attitude on the first ground up to purity of power and the progressively higher grounds up to the Buddha ground — the purities ranging from the purity of the unusual attitude up to the purity of power — is a great purity and a supreme purity.

“With respect to that, you should know that, except for the purity of birth on the Buddha ground, those qualities of the first ground are equal to the qualities of the grounds above that, but the qualities individual to each ground are superior [to those of the preceding grounds].⁷⁷⁴ All ten Bodhisattva grounds are surpassable in terms of qualities. You should know that the Buddha ground is unsurpassable in terms of qualities.”

“Supramundane Victor, why is it that, among all births in cyclic existence, a Bodhisattva’s birth is called ‘the most excellent’?”

“Avalokiteshvara, it is because of four aspects: (1) [Bodhisattvas] correctly establish very pure [roots of]⁷⁷⁵ virtue; (2) having [120] individually investigated, they appropriate [what they have learned]; (3) they have⁷⁷⁶ compassion which thoroughly

protects all transmigrators; and (4) they have no afflictions themselves, and they overcome the afflictions of others.”⁷⁷⁷

“Supramundane Victor, why is it that Bodhisattvas proceed by way of extensive wishes, have⁷⁷⁸ auspicious wishes, and have the power of wishes?”⁷⁷⁹

“Avalokiteshvara, it is because of four aspects: (1) Bodhisattvas are also skilled regarding the blissful abode of nirvāṇa;⁷⁸⁰ (2) they are able to quickly attain it;⁷⁸¹ (3) abandoning both that quick attainment and that peaceful abode — even though manifold sufferings without cause and without purpose arise for a long time — they mentally wish for the welfare of sentient beings;⁷⁸² therefore, (4) they are called ‘those who proceed by way of extensive wishes, have⁷⁸³ auspicious wishes, and have the power of wishes’.”

“Supramundane Victor, how many [bases of] training of Bodhisattvas are there?”⁷⁸⁴

“Avalokiteshvara, there are six: (1) giving; (2) ethics; (3) patience; (4) effort; (5) concentration; and (6) wisdom.”⁷⁸⁵

“Supramundane Victor, from among those six bases, how many are trainings in surpassing ethics? How many are trainings in surpassing mind? [121] How many are trainings in surpassing wisdom?”

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that the first three are trainings in surpassing ethics. Concentration is a training in surpassing mind. Wisdom is a training in surpassing wisdom. I explain that effort is omnipresent.”⁷⁸⁶

“Supramundane Victor, from among these six bases of training, how many [belong to] the collection of merit? How many [belong to] the collection of wisdom?”

“Avalokiteshvara, whatever is a training in surpassing ethics [belongs to] the collection of merit. Whatever is a training in surpassing wisdom [belongs to] the collection of wisdom.⁷⁸⁷ I explain that effort and concentration are omnipresent.”

“Supramundane Victor, how do Bodhisattvas train in these bases of training?”

“Avalokiteshvara, they train by way of five aspects: (1) they initially have great interest in the Bodhisattva canon which teaches the excellent doctrine that contains the perfections; (2) after that, they achieve [the mind of enlightenment] by way of the ten aspects of doctrinal practice⁷⁸⁸ and wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditating; (3) they safeguard the mind of enlightenment; (4) they rely on spiritual guides; and (5) they [122] work at uninterrupted application with respect to the class of virtues.”⁷⁸⁹

“Supramundane Victor, why are these six bases of training known to be designated as being six-fold?”⁷⁹⁰

“Avalokiteshvara, it is because of two [reasons]: (1) because they benefit sentient beings and (2) because they are antidotes to afflictions.⁷⁹¹ With respect to that, you should know that three benefit sentient beings and three are antidotes to afflictions.

“Concerning that, because Bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings by way of giving them material goods, they benefit them through giving. Because they benefit [sentient beings] by not impoverishing them, not harming them, nor scorning them, they benefit them through ethics. Through enduring misfortune, injury, and scorn they benefit [sentient beings] by way of patience. They benefit [sentient beings] by way of these three.”⁷⁹²

“Through effort they thoroughly apply themselves to the class of virtues with respect to afflictions that have not been overcome and afflictions that have not been completely destroyed; and afflictions are not able to separate them from application to the class of virtues.”⁷⁹³

“Through concentration they suppress the afflictions. Through wisdom they completely destroy the predispositions. These three are antidotes to the afflictions.”

“Supramundane Victor, why are the other perfections known to be designated as being four-fold?”⁷⁹⁴

“Avalokiteshvara, [123] it is because they serve as assistors to those six perfections.⁷⁹⁵ With respect to that, due to three perfections, for [the sake of] beings who are benefitted, Bodhisattvas thoroughly engage in virtue by way of skill in means that is thoroughly conjoined with the [four] means of gathering [students]. Therefore, I explain that the perfection of skill in means serves as an assistor to the three [perfections].⁷⁹⁶

“Avalokiteshvara, if in this lifetime⁷⁹⁷ — due to many afflictions and due to inferior constituents and belief — Bodhisattvas are unable to meditate uninterruptedly; and due to little power in terms of the unusual attitude, they are unable to set the mind internally;⁷⁹⁸ and — due to not achieving concentration that thoroughly meditates on objects of observation with respect to hearing the Bodhisattva canon⁷⁹⁹ — they are not able to manifestly achieve supramundane wisdom; then, when they take up a little of the collection of merit, the mental wish that their afflictions decrease in the future is their perfection of wishing.⁸⁰⁰

“Due to that, they become able to lessen afflictions and also initiate effort. Therefore, the perfection of wishing serves as an assistor to the perfection of effort. Due to that,⁸⁰¹ in dependence upon relying on excellent beings, listening to excellent doctrines, and taking to mind what is proper, [124] one overcomes weakness with respect to the unusual attitude.⁸⁰²

“Due to achieving power of thought with respect to excellent constituents, that is their perfection of power. Due to this they become able to set the mind internally.⁸⁰³ Therefore, the perfection of power serves as an assistor to the perfection of concentration.

“They engage in concentration that thoroughly meditates on objects of observation with respect to hearing the Bodhisattva canon; that is their perfection of exalted wisdom. Because through that they become able to manifestly achieve

supramundane wisdom, I therefore explain that the perfection of exalted wisdom serves as an assistor to the perfection of wisdom.”⁸⁰⁴

“Supramundane Victor, how does one know this indication of the order of these six perfections to be definite?”⁸⁰⁵

“Avalokiteshvara, it is because they serve as bases for progressively higher achievements.”⁸⁰⁶

“Bodhisattvas who do not pay attention to body and resources completely attain ethics. Those who maintain ethics become patient. Those who are patient initiate effort. Those who initiate effort completely achieve concentration. Those who perfect concentration thoroughly attain supramundane wisdom.”⁸⁰⁷

“Supramundane Victor, into how many aspects are these perfections divided?”⁸⁰⁸ [125]

“Avalokiteshvara, there are three aspects. With respect to that, giving has three aspects: (1) giving of doctrine; (2) giving of material things; and (3) giving of fearlessness.”⁸⁰⁹

“Ethics has three aspects: (1) ethics that overcomes non-virtue; (2) ethics that engages in virtue; and (3) ethics that engages in the welfare of sentient beings.”⁸¹⁰

“Patience has three aspects: (1) patience that endures injury; (2) patience that does not think of [one’s own] suffering at all; and (3) patience that definitely conceives doctrine.”⁸¹¹

“Effort has three aspects: (1) effort that is armor; (2) effort of exertion with respect to virtue; and (3) effort of exertion for the welfare of sentient beings.”⁸¹²

“Concentration has three aspects: (1) blissfully abiding concentration that is an antidote to afflictions and suffering due to being non-conceptual, peaceful, and very peaceful; (2) concentration that manifestly achieves qualities; and (3) concentration that manifestly achieves the welfare of sentient beings.”⁸¹³

“Wisdom has three aspects: (1) observing conventional truths; (2) observing ultimate truths; and (3) observing the welfare of sentient beings.”⁸¹⁴

“Supramundane Victor, why are these perfections [called] ‘perfections’?”⁸¹⁵

“Avalokiteshvara, it is due to five [reasons]: (1) non-attachment; [126] (2) not looking [for reward]; (3) non-unseemliness; (4) non-conceptuality; and (5) thorough dedication.”⁸¹⁶

“With respect to [the first,] non-attachment [refers to] non-attachment to things that are contradictory with the perfections.⁸¹⁷ With respect to [the second,] not looking [refers to] a mind that is not attached to the fruitional results of the perfections or to reward.⁸¹⁸ With respect to [the third,] non-unseemliness [refers to] non-association with phenomena that afflict the perfections and to abandoning non-method. With respect to [the fourth,] non-conceptuality [refers to] non-adherence to the characteristics of these perfections as literal.⁸¹⁹ With respect to [the fifth,] thorough dedication [refers to] wishing for the fruit of great enlightenment by way of practice and accumulation of these perfections.”⁸²⁰

“Supramundane Victor, what things are inimical⁸²¹ to the perfections?”

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that there are six things [that are inimical to the perfections]: (1) viewing as advantageous qualities: (a) desirable happinesses, (b) resources, and (c) abiding in personal pleasure with respect to overlordship;⁸²² (2) making use of body, speech, and mind according to desire;⁸²³ (3) not enduring scorn; (4) abiding in non-exertion and overindulgence;⁸²⁴ (5) engagement with commotion, various worldly [actions,] and distractions;⁸²⁵ and (6) viewing as advantageous qualities elaborations of conventions of seeing, hearing, discriminating, and knowing.”⁸²⁶ [127]

“Supramundane Victor, what is ripening the fruits of these perfections?”⁸²⁷

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that this is also of six types: (1) great resources; (2) going to happy transmigrations; (3) non-enmity, non-dissension, great

happiness and mental happiness; (4) sovereignty over sentient beings; (5) physical non-injury; and (6) one is renowned as very powerful.”⁸²⁸

“Supramundane Victor, what makes these perfections mix with thoroughly afflicted phenomena?”⁸²⁹

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that these are four types of association: (1) non-compassionate endeavor; (2) incorrect endeavor; (3) non-continuous endeavor; and (4) non-purposeful endeavor.”⁸³⁰

“With respect to that, incorrect endeavor is when, with respect to the other perfections, one meditates so as not to be endowed with, and to be separated from, the other perfections which are not that [one that is presently being cultivated].”⁸³¹

“Supramundane Victor, what is non-method?”

“Avalokiteshvara, when⁸³² Bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings by means of these perfections, if they are satisfied by merely providing benefits through [giving] material things and do not establish them in virtuous states after having raised them up from⁸³³ non-virtuous states, this is non-method.”⁸³⁴

“Why is this? [128] Avalokiteshvara, through just that [i.e., through providing material things] sentient beings are not benefitted. It is like this: For example, no matter whether filth is great or small, one is not able to make it pleasant-smelling by any means.⁸³⁵ Similarly, through merely benefitting [by giving] material things to sentient beings — who suffer due to having a nature of the suffering of pervasive conditioning⁸³⁶ — they cannot be made happy by any means⁸³⁷ through merely benefitting them by way of material things. However, whatever establishes [sentient beings] in virtue is the supreme benefit for them.”⁸³⁸

“Supramundane Victor, how many kinds of purity of these perfections are there?”

“Avalokiteshvara, I do not state that there are other purities aside from these five kinds.⁸³⁹ However, in dependence upon just these [I] will explain to you — collectively and specifically — the purities of the perfections.⁸⁴⁰

“With respect to that, you should know that the purities of all the perfections are of seven kinds.⁸⁴¹ What are the seven? They are: (1) Bodhisattvas know doctrine from others and do not seek profit;⁸⁴² (2) not producing exaggerated adherence due to viewing those doctrines; (3) not producing doubt or uncertainty [thinking,] ‘Do these doctrines definitely lead to liberation, or not?’;⁸⁴³ (4) not praising oneself, deprecating others, or despising them; (5) not being arrogant and not acting non-conscientiously; (6) not being content with mere inferior [attainments];⁸⁴⁴ and (7) not being miserly with these doctrines and not being jealous of others.⁸⁴⁵ [129]

“You should know that specific purities of perfections are also of seven kinds. What are the seven specific kinds? They are: (1) Bodhisattvas — correctly taking up and practicing the purities of giving that I have explained as being of seven [kinds] — give pure gifts through [giving] pure things that are [objects of] giving and give gifts purely through purifying ethics, purifying view, purifying mind, purifying speech, purifying exalted wisdom, and purifying stains; so these seven aspects are purities of giving.⁸⁴⁶

(2) “It is like this: Bodhisattvas are wise with respect to all aspects of bases of training of formulated vows; are wise with respect to turning away from infractions; have ethics that are firm with respect to that; have supreme ethics; continually practice [ethics]; continually engage in [ethics]; and train in the bases of training having correctly taken them up.⁸⁴⁷ These seven aspects are purities of ethics.

(3) “It is like this: Due to relying on [belief in] the ripening of their karma, they are not angry in situations in which harm [comes from] all directions and⁸⁴⁸ they do not answer with abuse, reviling, striking [others], threatening [others], nor harming [them] through criticism. Therefore, [130] they do not engage in these and do not hold on to

the predispositions of enmity.⁸⁴⁹ When they confess [their own faults], they do not afflict [their listeners].⁸⁵⁰ They do not dwell on confession.⁸⁵¹ They do not practice patience due to [having] a mind that is fearful or that [desires] material things.⁸⁵² And they do not neglect benefitting [others].⁸⁵³ Thus these seven aspects are purities of patience.

(4) "It is like this: They thoroughly know the sameness of effort.⁸⁵⁴ They do not praise themselves or deprecate others due to that initiation of effort.⁸⁵⁵ They have power, effort, enthusiasm, and firm discipline.⁸⁵⁶ And they do not give up effort with respect to virtuous qualities.⁸⁵⁷ Thus these seven aspects are purities of effort.

(5) "It is like this: They [practice] concentration in a meditative equipoise that thoroughly understands signs. They [practice] concentration in a meditative equipoise that is complete. They [practice] concentration in a meditative equipoise that is partially both.⁸⁵⁸ They [practice] concentration in a powerfully arising meditative equipoise. They [practice] concentration in a non-abiding meditative equipoise. They [practice] concentration in a meditative equipoise that has pliancy.⁸⁵⁹ They [practice] concentration in an immeasurable meditative equipoise that observes and meditates on the Bodhisattva canon.⁸⁶⁰ Thus these seven aspects are purities of concentration.

(6) "It is like this: definite emergence [from cyclic existence] by means of the middle way upon having abandoned the extreme of superimposition and the extreme of deprecation [131] is their wisdom.⁸⁶¹ Also, by way of that wisdom, they also thoroughly and correctly know, just as it is, the meaning of the doors of liberation with respect to the three doors of liberation: (1) emptiness, (2) wishlessness, and (3) signlessness.⁸⁶² They also thoroughly and correctly know, just as it is, the meaning of the natures with respect to the three natures: (1) the imputational [nature], (2) the other-powered [nature], and (3) the thoroughly established [nature].⁸⁶³ They also thoroughly and correctly know, just as it is, the meaning of non-entitiness with respect to the three non-entitinesses: (1) non-entitinesses in terms of character [i.e., imputational natures],

(2) non-entitynesses in terms of production [i.e., other-powered natures], and (3) ultimate non-entitynesses [i.e., thoroughly established natures]. They also thoroughly and correctly know, just as they are, the meanings of conventional truths with respect to the five topics of knowledge.⁸⁶⁴ They also thoroughly and correctly know, just as they are, the meanings of ultimate truths with respect to the seven aspects of suchness.⁸⁶⁵ And — due to special insight that is non-conceptual, free from elaborations, and that abides often in the one mode [i.e., suchness]⁸⁶⁶ and which observes doctrines that are immeasurably mixed — they correctly establish earnestness in terms of the class that is concordant with doctrine.⁸⁶⁷ You should know that these are the seven purities of wisdom.”

“Supramundane Victor, what are the individual functions of those five aspects?”

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that there are five kinds of functions: (1) Because they free from attachment, in this lifetime [Bodhisattvas] conscientiously apply themselves to the mind of enlighten-ment and the perfections by way of uninterrupted and devoted application.⁸⁶⁸ [132]

(2) “Due to being without [wrong] views they thoroughly adhere to the causes [of conscientiousness] in order to be conscientious in the future.⁸⁶⁹

(3) “Because they are without unseemliness, they cultivate the perfections very completely, very purely, and very proficiently.⁸⁷⁰

(4) “Because they are free from conceptuality,⁸⁷¹ due to skill in method they quickly thoroughly complete the perfections.

(5) “Because they thoroughly make dedications, in all their lifetimes — until the time of unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment — they thoroughly attain inexhaustible perfections that have the fruitional results that they wish.”⁸⁷²

“Supramundane Victor, what are the vastnesses of these perfections?”

“Avalokiteshvara, these are: (1) non-attachment; (2) absence of [wrong] views; and (3) thorough dedication.”⁸⁷³

“What is the absence of thorough affliction?”

“It is non-unseemliness and non-conceptuality.”⁸⁷⁴

“What is thorough clarity?”⁸⁷⁵

“It is activity by way of thorough individual investigation.”⁸⁷⁶

“What is non-fluctuation?”

“It is the non-degenerating reality of those who have thoroughly entered the [Bodhisattva] grounds.”⁸⁷⁷

“What is thorough purity?”

“Avalokiteshvara, it is what is included among the ten grounds and what is included within the Buddha ground.”⁸⁷⁸

“Supramundane Victor, why are Bodhisattvas [endowed with] inexhaustible pleasing fruitional results of the perfections and inexhaustible perfections?”⁸⁷⁹

“Avalokiteshvara, [133] it is because one cultivates the establishment of one [perfection] in dependence upon the others.”

“Supramundane Victor, why is it that, just as Bodhisattvas engage in the perfections through faith, they are not similarly intent on the pleasing fruitional results of the perfections?”⁸⁸⁰

“Avalokiteshvara, it is because of five reasons,⁸⁸¹ because (1) they have become causes of exceptional happiness and mental happiness; (2) have become causes of benefits for oneself and others; (3) have become causes of the pleasing fruitional results of those in future lives; (4) have become bases of non-affliction; and (5) because of their nature of unchangeability.”⁸⁸²

“Supramundane Victor, what are the individual powers of those perfections?”

“Avalokiteshvara, you should know that due to thoroughly cultivating the perfections they have four kinds of individual power: (1) the discordant class of: (a) miserliness, (b) faulty ethics, (c) disturbed mind, (d) laziness, (e) distraction, and (f) [wrong] views is abandoned; (2) there is transformation into the collection of

unsurpassable, complete, perfect enlightenment;⁸⁸³ (3) there is benefit for oneself and others in this lifetime;⁸⁸⁴ and (4) pleasing fruitional results that are extensive and inexhaustible are also thoroughly attained in future lives.”⁸⁸⁵ [134]

“Supramundane Victor, from what cause do the perfections arise? What are their results? What is their function?”⁸⁸⁶

The Supramundane Victor said: “Avalokiteshvara, the perfections arise from the cause of compassion.⁸⁸⁷ Their results are the pleasing fruitional results [mentioned previously] and benefits for sentient beings. Their great function is the completion of great enlightenment.”

“Supramundane Victor, if Bodhisattvas’ resources are inexhaustible and they have compassion, why are there poor people in the world?”⁸⁸⁸

“Avalokiteshvara, that is the fault of the individual actions of sentient beings.⁸⁸⁹ If it were not so, if perchance individual sentient beings were not affected by the obstacles created by their own faults,⁸⁹⁰ then they would constantly engage in actions and would have inexhaustible resources, in which case how could any suffering be seen in the world?”⁸⁹¹

“Avalokiteshvara, it is like this: For example, that a hungry ghost — whose body is pained by thirst — sees the water of the ocean as dry is a fault that is the result of the personal actions of that hungry ghost; it is not the fault of the ocean. Similarly, the ocean-like giving of Bodhisattvas is faultless, but the absence of [good] results is the fault of the faulty individual actions committed by sentient beings who are like hungry ghosts.”⁸⁹²

“Supramundane Victor, [135] with what perfection do Bodhisattvas apprehend the non-entityness of phenomena?”

“Avalokiteshvara, it is with the perfection of wisdom.”⁸⁹³

“Supramundane Victor, when in that way — with the perfection of wisdom — they apprehend non-entityness, why do they also not apprehend it with entityness?”⁸⁹⁴

“Avalokiteshvara, [I] do not explain that they do not apprehend non-entityness as without entityness.⁸⁹⁵ Instead⁸⁹⁶ — because non-entityness is known by oneself individually — in the absence of verbal expressions, except for within propounding verbal expressions one is not able to explain it. Therefore, it is said that it is apprehended by way of ‘non-entityness’.”⁸⁹⁷

“Supramundane Victor, when [you say,] ‘perfection’, ‘further perfection’, and ‘great perfection’, what is perfection? What is further perfection? What is great perfection?”⁸⁹⁸

“Avalokiteshvara, with respect to that, although for an immeasurable time Bodhisattvas thoroughly cultivate and possess virtuous qualities such as giving and so forth, still their afflictions arise. They are not able to overcome them, but instead are overcome by them.⁸⁹⁹ It is like this: Those states of small⁹⁰⁰ and middling devotion on the ground of engagement through belief⁹⁰¹ are called ‘perfections’.

“Also, [136] although for an immeasurable time they strongly thoroughly cultivate and possess those virtuous qualities, still when their afflictions arise they overcome them and are not overcome by them. It is like this: Those [states] beginning from the first ground are called ‘further perfections’.”⁹⁰²

“Also, for an immeasurable time they very completely cultivate just those virtuous qualities and possess them, and they also come to have the quality of the non-arising of their afflictions in each and every situation. It is like this: Those [states], beginning from the eighth ground, are called ‘great perfections’.”⁹⁰³

“Supramundane Victor, how many latencies⁹⁰⁴ of afflictions are there on these grounds?”

“Avalokiteshvara, there are three kinds. With respect to assistors that are completely destroyed: (1) on the [first]⁹⁰⁵ five grounds, the arising of non-innate afflictions [would] be an assistor that gives rise to the innate afflictions; because those do not exist in them at that time, they are ‘assistors that are completely destroyed.’⁹⁰⁶

(2) Predispositions that are of little power⁹⁰⁷ are as follows: On the sixth and seventh grounds, due to extremely subtle arising and due to being suppressed by meditation, they do not arise.⁹⁰⁸ (3) Extremely subtle predispositions are as follows: On the eighth ground and those [grounds] above it, the afflictions do not arise and [only] abide as the obstructions to omniscience.”⁹⁰⁹

“Supramundane Victor, [137] into how many kinds of abandonment of assumptions of bad states are these latencies divided?”

“Avalokiteshvara, [they are divided] into three kinds: abandonment of assumptions of bad states that are like something existing on [epidermal] skin⁹¹⁰ are the first and second; [abandonment of]⁹¹¹ the [assumptions of bad states] that are like something existing in subcutaneous skin⁹¹² [and hence are deeper] is the third. I thoroughly explain that the state of having abandoned all assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in the marrow⁹¹³ [which are the deepest of all] — in which predispositions do not exist in any way — is the Buddha ground.”.

“Supramundane Victor, for how many periods of incalculable eons does one thoroughly abandon these assumptions of bad states?”.

“Avalokiteshvara, [one abandons them] for three periods of incalculable eons. One abandons them for incalculable eons of: years, months, half-months, days and nights, days, three hour periods, one and one-half hour periods, moments, instants, and short times.”⁹¹⁴

“Supramundane Victor, what are the characteristics of the arising of afflictions for Bodhisattvas on these grounds? What are their faults?⁹¹⁵ What [good] qualities should be known?”

“Avalokiteshvara, (1) the characteristic [of the arising of afflictions] is an absence of thorough affliction.⁹¹⁶ Why is this? On the first Bodhisattva ground one initially thoroughly knows all of the element of qualities.⁹¹⁷ Therefore, the afflictions of Bodhisattvas arise consciously, and not unconsciously. Thus their characteristic is an

absence of thorough [138] affliction.⁹¹⁸ (2) Because sufferings cannot arise in their continuums, they are faultless.⁹¹⁹ (3) Because they are causes of overcoming sufferings in the realms of sentient beings, the arising of afflictions for Bodhisattvas [leads to] immeasurable [good] qualities.⁹²⁰

“Supramundane Victor, if in that way even the arising of afflictions for Bodhisattvas outshines all the roots of virtue of sentient beings, Hearers, and Solitary Realizers, what need is there to mention that qualities other than those⁹²¹ [would outshine them]? The very meaningful enlightenment [of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas] is marvellous!

“Supramundane Victor, the Supramundane Victor said, ‘Both the Hearer Vehicle and the Great Vehicle are one vehicle’.⁹²² What were you thinking of [when you said that]?”

“Avalokiteshvara, those [topics] having natures of various phenomena⁹²³ that I set forth in the Hearer Vehicle — to wit: teachings concerning the five aggregates, the six internal sense spheres, the six external sense spheres, and so forth — are also definitely explained in the Great Vehicle by way of teaching them in terms of the one mode of the element of qualities.⁹²⁴ Therefore, I do not propound that there are various vehicles.⁹²⁵

“Also, with respect to that — due to understanding [my teachings] according to the literal meaning — some [engage in] superimposition; some deprecate; and some think that there are various vehicles. [I] thought of those [beings] thinking contradictorily and mutually disputing.⁹²⁶ [139]

Then, at that time, the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

Those phenomena that I taught as having various natures
In the Great Vehicle and in the Lower Vehicle
I taught again as having one mode.

Therefore, I do not propound various vehicles.

Thinking in terms of the literal meaning,
[Some beings] also superimpose and deprecate.
They think that those are contradictory and
Come to have minds of various obscurations.⁹²⁷

The collection of the grounds, their names, their discordant classes,
Their distinctive arisings, their aspirations, and their trainings:
These are the Buddha's explanation of the Great Vehicle.⁹²⁸
Those who make effort at these become Buddhas.

Then the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara said this to the Supramundane Victor:
"Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in this form [of explanation]
of doctrine that explains [your] thought? How should it be apprehended?"

"Avalokiteshvara, this is 'the teaching of the definitive meaning of the grounds
and the perfections'. It should be apprehended as 'the teaching of the definitive
meaning of the grounds and the perfections'."

When this teaching of the definitive meaning of the grounds and the perfections
was taught, 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained the Bodhisattva's meditative stabilization that
illuminates the Great Vehicle.⁹²⁹ [140]

This [completes] the ninth [chapter: the Questions of] Avalokiteshvara.

Chapter Ten

Mañjushrī

Then the Bodhisattva Mañjushrī⁹³⁰ asked the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, when⁹³¹ [you speak of] ‘the truth body of Tathāgatas’, Supramundane Victor, what are the characteristics of the truth body of Tathāgatas?”⁹³²

The Supramundane Victor said: “Mañjushrī, the characteristics of the truth body of Tathāgatas are well established transformations of bases⁹³³ due to definite emergence [from afflictions]⁹³⁴ which are thorough cultivations of the [ten] grounds and the [six] perfections. Moreover, you should know that [the truth body] is inconceivable for two reasons: (1) because it is free from elaborations (*spros pa med pa, niḥprapañca*) and free from manifest activity (*mngon par 'du bya med pa, anabhisamskāra*);⁹³⁵ and (2) because sentient beings are manifestly attached to elaborations and manifest activity.”

“Supramundane Victor, with respect to the transformations of bases of Hearers and Solitary Realizers, are they also called ‘truth bodies’?”

“Mañjushrī, they are not.”⁹³⁶

“Supramundane Victor, in that case, what sort of body are they?”⁹³⁷

“Mañjushrī, they are liberation bodies.⁹³⁸ Mañjushrī, in terms of liberation bodies Tathāgatas, Hearers, and Solitary Realizers are similar and equal. In terms of the truth body [Tathāgatas] are superior; therefore, they are superior by way of limitless features of [good] qualities. [141] It is not easy to provide examples for that.”⁹³⁹

“Supramundane Victor, how do you teach the characteristics of Tathāgatas’ births?”⁹⁴⁰

“Mañjushrī, the characteristics of emanation bodies (*sprul pa'i sku, nirmāṇa-kāya*) are like the arising of worldly realms. You should view the arising of the characteristics of emanation bodies as characteristics that are empowered by all the aspects of ornamental qualities of Tathāgatas.⁹⁴¹ [Emanation bodies have production];⁹⁴² the truth body has no production.”⁹⁴³

“Supramundane Victor, what should one view as skill in method with respect to displaying emanation bodies?”⁹⁴⁴

“Mañjushrī, [you should view] skill in method in displaying emanation bodies as in all areas simultaneously displaying: entering into a womb in a lineage that is respected by all as sovereign in all of the Buddha lands of the trichiliocosm or is respected by all as a place of giving; taking birth there; growing up there; enjoying desires; definitely emerging [from home life]; and asceticism; displaying renunciation of that; and displaying the stages of manifest, complete enlightenment.”⁹⁴⁵

“Supramundane Victor, how many kinds of vocal instructions — (1) that thoroughly mature those of realms of trainees who have not yet been matured by way of whatever vocal instructions by bodies that are empowered (*byin gyi rlabs kyi sku, adhiṣṭhāna-kāya*) by Tathāgatas and (2) that thoroughly liberate those who have also been matured by way of just those objects of observation — are there?”⁹⁴⁶ [142]

“Mañjushrī, these vocal instructions of Tathāgatas are three-fold: (1) sūtra instructions; (2) disciplinary instructions; and (3) instructions that are schematic outlines (*ma mo, mātrkā*).”⁹⁴⁷

“Supramundane Victor, what are sūtra [instructions]? What are disciplinary [instructions]? What are [instructions that are] schematic outlines?”

“Mañjushrī, those which teach the categories of phenomena in just a condensed way are sūtras: these are done in terms of four categories, or nine [categories], or twenty-nine [categories].⁹⁴⁸

“What are the four categories? They are: (1) the category of hearing; (2) the category of going for refuge; (3) the category of training; and (4) the category of enlightenment.⁹⁴⁹

“What are the nine categories? They are: (1) the category of designating sentient beings; (2) the category of their resources; (3) the category of their births; (4) the category of their abiding after being born; (5) the category of their thorough affliction and purification; (6) the category of their varieties; (7) the category of what is taught; (8) the category of teacher; and (9) the category of attendants.⁹⁵⁰

“What are the twenty-nine categories? Those concerned with the class of thoroughly afflicted [phenomena] are: (1) the category of collected compounded phenomena; (2) the category of progressive engagement with them; (3) the category of the causes of future arising [of misconceptions] after having produced discriminations of a person with respect to just those; (4) the category of the causes of future arising [of misconceptions] after having produced discriminations of phenomena.⁹⁵¹ [143]

“Those concerned with the class of purified phenomena are: (5) the category of designating objects of observation;⁹⁵² (6) the category of exertion with respect to just those; (7) the category of mentally abiding [in contemplation of them]; (8) the category of abiding peacefully in this lifetime;⁹⁵³ (9) the category of objects of observation that are means for completely transcending all suffering;⁹⁵⁴ (10) the category of thoroughly knowing that: with respect to the three aspects of this, [there are:] (a) the basis of thoroughly knowing error;⁹⁵⁵ (b) the basis of earnestly thoroughly knowing sentient beings,⁹⁵⁶ beginning with the conception of sentient beings [as existing in terms of a self of persons]; and (c) the basis of thoroughly knowing absence of manifest pride internally;⁹⁵⁷ (11) the category of the basis of predispositions;⁹⁵⁸ (12) the category of actualization; (13) the category of meditation; (14) the category of [performing] that as an essential activity; (15) the category of the aspects of that; (16) the category of its objects of observation; (17) the category of skill with respect to performance in terms of

what has been abandoned and what has not been abandoned [yet];⁹⁵⁹ (18) the category of being distracted from that [i.e., meditation]; (19) the category of not being distracted from that; (20) the category of the basis of non-distraction; (21) the category of eliminating aversion to meditation through application;⁹⁶⁰ (22) the category of the benefits of meditation; (23) the category of stability with respect to that; (24) the category of the collection of sovereignties of [144] Superiors;⁹⁶¹ (25) the category of the collection of the class of Superiors and their attendants;⁹⁶² (26) the category of thorough understanding of suchness; (27) the category of complete attainment of nirvāṇa;⁹⁶³ (28) the category of superiority — of even correct worldly views regarding disciplinary doctrine that has been well explained — to all of the correct views of those who are outside of this [i.e., non-Buddhists]; and (29) the category of diminishment due to not cultivating that [disciplinary doctrine].⁹⁶⁴

“It is like this, Mañjushri: With respect to the disciplinary doctrine that has been well explained, one will degenerate due to non-cultivation; it is not due to faults by way of [wrong] views.⁹⁶⁵ Mañjushri, the teachings — in which I [teach] the individual liberation⁹⁶⁶ of Hearers and Bodhisattvas and what is associated with individual liberation — constitute the category of discipline.”⁹⁶⁷

“Supramundane Victor, by way of how many aspects is the individual liberation of Bodhisattvas subsumed?”

“Mañjushri, it is subsumed by way of seven aspects: (1) teachings concerning rites of correct adoption;⁹⁶⁸ (2) teachings concerning sources of defeat;⁹⁶⁹ (3) teachings concerning the category of sources of infractions;⁹⁷⁰ (4) teachings concerning the nature of infractions;⁹⁷¹ (5) teachings concerning the nature of non-infraction; (6) teachings concerning emerging from infractions; and (7) teachings concerning abandonment of vows.

“Moreover, Mañjushri, these which I have differentiatingly taught having set them forth in terms of eleven types of characteristics are called ‘schematic outlines’.

With respect to that, [145] what are the eleven types of characteristics? They are: (1) the conventional character, (2) the ultimate character;⁹⁷² (3) the characteristics of objects of observation of the phenomena that are the [thirty-seven] harmonies with enlightenment;⁹⁷³ (4) the characteristic of aspects;⁹⁷⁴ (5) the characteristic of nature;⁹⁷⁵ (6) the characteristic of the fruits of that; (7) the characteristic of describing the experience of that; (8) the characteristic of phenomena that are interruptions of that; (9) the characteristic of phenomena that are concordant with that; (10) the characteristic of disadvantages of that; and (11) the characteristic of benefitters of that.

“Mañjushrī, with respect to [the first,] you should view the conventional character as being of three types: (1) thoroughly teaching persons;⁹⁷⁶ (2) teaching the imputational nature; and (3) teaching the movements, activities, and actions of phenomena.

“With respect to [the second,] the ultimate character should be viewed in terms of the teaching of suchness in seven aspects.⁹⁷⁷ The characteristic of objects of observation should be viewed in terms of teaching all aspects of phenomena that are objects of knowledge.⁹⁷⁸

“The characteristic of aspects should be viewed in terms of teaching the eight types of analytical procedure. What are the eight types of analytical procedure? [They are analytical procedures concerning:] (1) truth;⁹⁷⁹ (2) positings;⁹⁸⁰ (3) faults;⁹⁸¹ (4) [good] qualities;⁹⁸² (5) modes; (6) engagement; (7) reasoning; and (8) condensing and elaborating.⁹⁸³

“With respect to that, truth is whatever is suchness. Positings are: (a) positing persons; [146] or (b) positing the entityness of imputations; or (c) positing categorically, differentiatingly, or answering after having asked a question;⁹⁸⁴ or (d) positing a position; or (e) positing an answer to the secret⁹⁸⁵ and to the differentiated.⁹⁸⁶ Faults are the disadvantages of thoroughly afflicted phenomena that I have indicated in

many forms [of explanation].⁹⁸⁷ [Good] qualities are the benefits of purified phenomena that I have indicated in many forms [of explanation].

“Modes should be known in terms of six aspects: (1) the mode of the meaning of suchness; (2) the mode of attainment;⁹⁸⁸ (3) the mode of explanation;⁹⁸⁹ (4) the mode of abandoning the two extremes;⁹⁹⁰ (5) the mode of the inconceivable;⁹⁹¹ and (6) the mode of [Buddha’s] thought.⁹⁹² Engagement [refers to] the three times [i.e., past, present, and future], the three characteristics of compounded phenomena,⁹⁹³ and the four conditions.⁹⁹⁴

“Analytical procedure should be known in terms of four aspects: (1) analytical procedure [looking into] dependence; (2) analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions; (3) analytical procedure [looking into] logical correctness;⁹⁹⁵ and (4) analytical procedure [looking into] the nature.⁹⁹⁶

“With respect to that, regarding analytical procedure [looking into] dependence: Those which serve as causes and those which serve as conditions that produce compounded phenomena and [bring about] subsequent designation of conventions are [the focus of] analytical procedure [looking into] dependence.⁹⁹⁷ Those which serve as causes and those which serve as conditions that bring about appropriation of phenomena, or [their] establishment, or [their] performance of functions after being produced [147] are [the focus of] analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions.⁹⁹⁸ Those which serve as causes and those which serve as conditions for proving meanings that have been made into theses and propounded and for causing these to become known are [the focus of] analytical procedure [looking into] logical correctness.⁹⁹⁹

“Moreover, in brief, there are two types [of analytical procedure looking into logical correctness]: (1) pure and (2) impure.¹⁰⁰⁰ With respect to those, the characteristics of the correct [type] are five-fold. The characteristics of the incorrect [type] are seven-fold.

“What are the characteristics of the correct [type? They are:] (a) the characteristic of directly observing something; (b) the characteristic of directly observing a basis of something; (c) the characteristic of associating an example of its type; (d) the characteristic of thorough establishment; and (e) the characteristic of teaching in the manner of delineating very pure scriptures.¹⁰⁰¹

“With respect to that, directly observing in the world: (i) the impermanence of all compounded phenomena; (ii) the suffering [inherent in] all compounded phenomena; (iii) the selflessness of all phenomena; or (iv) things that are concordant with such¹⁰⁰² constitute the characteristic of directly observing something.

“[The characteristic of directly observing a basis of something is] directly observing: (i) analytical procedure [looking into] impermanence¹⁰⁰³ that is based on the fact that all compounded phenomena are momentary, the existence of another world [i.e., future lives], and non-wastage of virtuous and non-virtuous actions;¹⁰⁰⁴ (ii) directly observing that various sentient beings are based on various karmas; [148] or (iii) directly observing that the happiness or suffering of sentient beings is based on their virtuous or non-virtuous actions. By means of these, one makes inferences with respect to what is not¹⁰⁰⁵ observed directly. These and [reasonings] concordant with such¹⁰⁰⁶ constitute the characteristic of directly observing a basis of something.

“Furthermore, you should know that [the following things constitute] the characteristic of associating an example of [a thing’s] own type:¹⁰⁰⁷ (i) associating [examples] of what is renowned in all worlds concerning observations about the disintegration and arising of internal and external compounded phenomena; (ii) associating [examples] concerning observations about the arising and so forth of suffering; (iii) associating [examples] concerning observations about their lack of autonomy; (iv) associating [examples] of what is renowned in all worlds concerning observations about the fortunes and troubles of others; and (v) things that are concordant with such.¹⁰⁰⁸

“You should know¹⁰⁰⁹ that — because the characteristic of directly observing something, the characteristic of directly observing a basis of something, and the characteristic of associating an example of its type are definite as one in terms of what is to be established by them¹⁰¹⁰ — these constitute the characteristic of thorough establishment.

“Mañjushrī, you should know that the characteristic of teaching in the manner of delineating very pure scriptures consists of explanations by omniscient persons, such as, ‘Nirvāṇa is peace’ and things that are concordant with such. [149] Thus, by way of these five characteristics, analytical reasonings are thoroughly purified. Because they are thoroughly purified, you should rely¹⁰¹¹ on them.”

“Supramundane Victor, by way of how many aspects should the characteristics of omniscient persons be known?”¹⁰¹²

“Mañjushrī, [one should know them] by way of five [aspects: (1) the omniscient person] is one who is well renowned and elevated in all worlds as omniscient;¹⁰¹³ (2) is endowed with the thirty-two marks of a great being;¹⁰¹⁴ (3) eliminates the doubts of all sentient beings by way of the ten powers;¹⁰¹⁵ (4) due to the four fearlessnesses,¹⁰¹⁶ the words of [the omniscient person’s] doctrinal teachings are free from the objections and disputes of all opponents;¹⁰¹⁷ and (5) in his/her disciplinary doctrine, the eight branches of the path of Superiors are apparent and the four virtuous endeavors are apparent.¹⁰¹⁸ In that way, you should know that elevation, marks, elimination of doubts, freedom from objections and freedom from disputes, and observing virtuous endeavors are the five characteristics of omniscient persons.

“Analytical procedures [looking into] logical correctness¹⁰¹⁹ are purified by way of: (1) direct valid perception; (2) valid inference; (3) valid believable scriptures; and (4) the five characteristics.

“What are the seven kinds of characteristics of [reasonings] that are not thoroughly purified? [They are:] (1) the characteristic of objects of observation that are

concordant with what is other than those; (2) the characteristic of objects of observation that are not concordant with what is other than [150] those; (3) the characteristic of objects of observation that are concordant with everything; (4) the characteristic of objects of observation that are not concordant with everything; (5) the characteristic of associating examples of another type; (6) the thoroughly non-established characteristic; and (7) the characteristic of the teachings of impure scriptures.¹⁰²⁰

“With respect to that, [the statement] — ‘All phenomena are just known by the mental consciousness’ — is [an example of] the characteristic of objects of observation that are concordant with everything. Moreover, [the statement] — ‘Because each and every one of the discordant [characteristics]¹⁰²¹ of signs, [natures],¹⁰²² activities, qualities, causes, and effects are discordant with each other, they are definitely mutually discordant’ is [an example of] the characteristic of objects of observation that are discordant with everything.

“Mañjushri, because the characteristic of objects of observation that are discordant with everything exists in the characteristic of objects of observation that are concordant with what is other than that as well as examples, they are not definite as one with what is to be established;¹⁰²³ therefore, this is ‘the characteristic of thorough non-establishment’. Because the characteristic of objects of observation that are concordant with everything exists in the characteristic of objects of observation that are non-concordant with what is other than that as well as examples, they are not definite as one with what is to be established; therefore, this is ‘the characteristic of thorough non-establishment’.

“Because of their being thoroughly non-established, these analyses are not thoroughly purified by reasoning. Because they are not purified, they should not be taught.¹⁰²⁴

“With respect to that, [151] you should know that [the characteristic of associating examples of dissimilar type] and the characteristic of [the teachings of] very

non-correct scriptures are non-correct by way of their own nature.¹⁰²⁵ With respect to that, whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, the existence of reality and the sphere of the abiding of phenomena are [the basis of] analytical procedure [looking into] the nature.¹⁰²⁶

“It is like this: Manifestly condensing by way of condensing and elaborating consists of progressively thoroughly differentiating teachings in terms of individual doctrinal phrases, dealing with them finally.¹⁰²⁷ These explanations of mine — concerning the [thirty-seven] qualities that are harmonies with enlightenment, the [four] mindful establishments and so forth, which apprehend objects of observation that are associated with aspects — are the characteristics of the nature of those. The manifest establishment — of mundane and supramundane qualities that are the fruits of that due to abandoning afflictions that are associated with the mundane and supramundane — is the characteristic of attaining the results of that.¹⁰²⁸ Thoroughly knowing just that by way of liberative exalted wisdom and also extensively explaining and teaching others constitute the characteristic of describing the experience of that.¹⁰²⁹ Those afflicted phenomena — that are bases of obstruction with respect to cultivating just these qualities that are included among the harmonies with enlightenment — constitute the characteristic of phenomena that are interruptors of that.¹⁰³⁰ The phenomena that enhance any of those constitute the characteristic of phenomena that are concordant with that.¹⁰³¹ [152]

“The faulty states that interrupt [those] constitute the characteristic of objects of observation that are faults.¹⁰³² Mañjushri, you should know that those qualities that concord [with such] constitute the characteristic of benefitters.”¹⁰³³

Then the Bodhisattva Mañjushri spoke again to the Supramundane Victor: “Supramundane Victor, please teach the quintessential meanings by which Bodhisattvas enter into the indirect thought of the profound doctrines spoken by the Tathāgata — all of the quintessential meanings of Bodhisattvas in these discourses, disciplinary

[teachings], and schematic outlines — that are unshared with those who are outside of this [i.e., non-Buddhists].”¹⁰³⁴

[The Supramundane Victor said:] “Listen, Mañjushri, and I will explain to you all of the quintessential meanings, in order that Bodhisattvas may enter into that which I have said in indirect speech.

“Mañjushri, all of those thoroughly afflicted phenomena and purified phenomena are unfluctuating and without personhood. Therefore, I teach that phenomena in all aspects are without functions.¹⁰³⁵ Also, it is not the case that thoroughly afflicted phenomena are thoroughly afflicted at first and later become purified. Nor is it the case that purified phenomena [153] are later purified but are thoroughly afflicted at first.¹⁰³⁶

“With respect to that, childish ordinary beings¹⁰³⁷ — relying on views that predispose them toward exaggerated adherence to phenomena in the collection of assumptions of bad states¹⁰³⁸ and to an inherent nature of phenomena and persons¹⁰³⁹ — apprehend ‘I’ and ‘mine’ and due to this give rise to mistaken manifest activity, [thinking:] ‘I see’, ‘I hear’, ‘I bring’, ‘I experience’, ‘I touch’, ‘I know’, ‘I eat’, ‘I do’, ‘I am afflicted’, and ‘I am pure’.

“When some thoroughly know reality just as it is¹⁰⁴⁰ they thoroughly abandon the collection of assumptions of bad states,¹⁰⁴¹ they do not abide in all afflictions, and they thoroughly attain a state that is very pure and free from elaborations,¹⁰⁴² a non-compounded state that is free from manifest activity.¹⁰⁴³ Mañjushri, you should know that¹⁰⁴⁴ this is the entire quintessential meaning.”

Then, at that time the Supramundane Victor spoke these verses:

Thoroughly afflicted phenomena and purified phenomena
Are all without functions and without personhood.
Therefore, I explain that they are without functions.

They are not afflicted previously or purified subsequently.¹⁰⁴⁵

Those who — in dependence upon views [caused by] predispositions — give
rise to
[Thoughts of] ‘I’ and ‘mine’ with respect to the collection of assumptions of
bad
states, [154]

Give rise to thoughts [such as,] ‘I see’, ‘I eat’, ‘I do’,
‘I am thoroughly afflicted’, or ‘I am purified’.¹⁰⁴⁶

Those who — thoroughly knowing [reality] just as it is,
Who thoroughly abandon the collection of assumptions of bad states —
Attain a very pure state that has no basis for the afflictions,
Is free from elaborations and uncompounded.¹⁰⁴⁷

“Supramundane Victor, how should one know [the characteristics of] the arising of the
mind of a Tathāgata?”¹⁰⁴⁸

“Mañjushrī, Tathāgatas are not distinguished by way of mind, mentality, or
consciousness, but¹⁰⁴⁹ you should know that the arising of the mind of a Tathāgata that
is free from manifest activity is like an emanation.”¹⁰⁵⁰

“Supramundane Victor, if¹⁰⁵¹ the truth body of Tathāgatas is free from all
manifest activity, how is it that the arising of their minds can be free of manifest
activity?”

“Mañjushrī, it is due to the previous manifest activity of cultivating method and
wisdom.¹⁰⁵² Mañjushrī, it is like this: For example, even though during mindless sleep
there is no manifest activity of awakening, later — due to the force of former manifest
activity — one will awaken.¹⁰⁵³ Also, even without a manifest effort to rise from¹⁰⁵⁴

absorption in cessation one will rise due to the force of former manifest activity.¹⁰⁵⁵ Just as the mind arises [after] sleep and [155] absorption in cessation, so you should know that the arising of the mind of a Tathāgata is from the previous manifest activity of cultivating method and wisdom.”¹⁰⁵⁶

“Supramundane Victor, do the emanations of Tathāgatas have minds or not?”¹⁰⁵⁷

“Mañjushrī, because they are not autonomous and are empowered by other minds, they do not have minds nor do they lack minds.”¹⁰⁵⁸

“Supramundane Victor, what is the difference between ‘the spheres of activity of Tathāgatas’ and ‘the domains of Tathāgatas’?”

“Mañjushrī, the spheres of activity of Tathāgatas are the thoroughly pure Buddha lands, ornamented with limitless, inconceivable qualities that are common to all Tathāgatas.¹⁰⁵⁹ The domains of Tathāgatas are the five realms, all the aspects of: (1) the realms of sentient beings; (2) worldly realms; (3) realms of phenomena (*chos kyi khams*, *dharma-dhātu*); (4) realms of discipline; and (5) all the realms of methods of discipline.¹⁰⁶⁰ This is the difference between these two.”

“Supramundane Victor, how should the characteristics of the manifest, complete enlightenment of Tathāgatas, their turning the wheel of doctrine, and their great, thorough passing beyond sorrow [i.e., nirvāṇa] be known?”

“Mañjushrī, they are¹⁰⁶¹ of a non-dual character. [156] They are neither manifestly, completely enlightened, nor not manifestly, completely enlightened; nor do they turn the wheel of doctrine, nor not turn the wheel of doctrine; nor do they have a great, thorough passing beyond sorrow, nor do they lack a great, thorough passing beyond sorrow.¹⁰⁶² This is because the truth body is very pure and emanation bodies are revealed everywhere.”¹⁰⁶³

“Supramundane Victor, through viewing, hearing, and revering emanation bodies, how is it that sentient beings generate merit? How is it known that they arise from Tathāgatas?”

“Mañjushrī, it is due to the cause of thoroughly observing Tathāgatas and because emanation bodies are also blessed by Tathāgatas.”

“Supramundane Victor, if [Tathāgatas] are as if without manifest effort, why is it that the great light of exalted wisdom arises for sentient beings only from the truth body of Tathāgatas and immeasurable images of emanation bodies arise, but [those things]¹⁰⁶⁴ do not arise from the liberation bodies of Hearers and Solitary Realizers?”

“Mañjushrī, it is like this: For example — though they are similarly without manifest activity, a great illumination appears to sentient beings only from water-crystals and fire-crystals of the orbs of the moon and sun, but does not arise from water-crystals and fire-crystals that are different from those¹⁰⁶⁵ — [157] that is due to the fact that very powerful sentient beings have blessed them and due to the power of the karma of sentient beings.¹⁰⁶⁶

“Son of [good] lineage, the image of a seal arises from a very precious gem that has been polished by a jeweler, but does not arise from one that has been polished by those who are other [than jewelers].¹⁰⁶⁷ Similarly, the light of exalted wisdom and images of emanations arise from the truth body of Tathāgatas because it has been completely established from having thoroughly trained by way of cultivating method and wisdom that observe the immeasurable element of qualities;¹⁰⁶⁸ but they do not arise from a mere liberation body.”

“Supramundane Victor, thinking of what did the Supramundane Victor say, ‘Due to the power of the blessings of Tathāgatas [and Bodhisattvas, there appear]¹⁰⁶⁹ the marvellous bodies of humans in the Desire Realm; [such as]¹⁰⁷⁰ a body of a Kṣatriya or a Brahman like a great *śāla* tree;¹⁰⁷¹ the marvellous bodies of gods who

partake of the Desire Realm; all the marvellous bodies of gods who partake of the Form Realm; and all the marvellous bodies of gods who partake of the Formless Realm.”¹⁰⁷²

“Mañjushri, by means of the blessings of Tathāgatas, Tathāgatas teach, just as they are, paths and vehicles through which one can thoroughly attain all marvellous bodies in all ways by means of those blessings of paths and vehicles.¹⁰⁷³ [158] Those who enter these paths and vehicles thoroughly attain marvellous bodies in all ways. Those who abandon and revile these paths and vehicles and who have very bitter and angry thoughts regarding me encounter physical woes of all kinds and woes in terms of all resources at the time of their deaths. Mañjushri, by this form [of explanation] also you should know in this way that not only do marvellous bodies arise from the power of Tathāgatas’ blessings; but also the production of physical woes arises from the power of Tathāgatas’ blessings.”

“Supramundane Victor, in worldly realms that are not thoroughly pure,¹⁰⁷⁴ what [things] are common (*mod pa, sulabha*), and which are rare (*dkon pa, durlabha*)?¹⁰⁷⁵ In thoroughly pure [worldly realms,] what [things] are common, and what are rare?”

“Mañjushri, in worldly realms that are not thoroughly pure, eight things are common, and two are rare. It is like this: (1) Forders; (2) suffering sentient beings; (3) distinctions of lineage, family, patrilineage, wealth, and traditions;¹⁰⁷⁶ (4) practitioners of faulty [159] actions;¹⁰⁷⁷ (5) those of degenerated ethics;¹⁰⁷⁸ (6) bad transmigrations;¹⁰⁷⁹ (7) Hinayanists; and (8) Bodhisattvas of inferior thoughts and practices are common.¹⁰⁸⁰ [In such worlds:] (1) Bodhisattvas thoroughly abiding in excellent thoughts and practices; and (2) the arising of Tathāgatas are rare.

“Mañjushri, in thoroughly pure worldly realms, [the situation] is the opposite of this.¹⁰⁸¹ You should know that [the previously cited] eight things are rare and the two [latter things] are common.”

Then the Bodhisattva Mañjushri said to the Supramundane Victor: "Supramundane Victor, what is the name of this teaching in¹⁰⁸² this form [of explanation] of doctrine that explains [your] thought? How should it be apprehended?"

The Supramundane Victor said to him: "Mañjushri, it is 'the definitive instruction establishing the activities of Tathāgatas'. Mañjushri, it should be apprehended as 'the definitive instruction establishing the activities of Tathāgatas'."

When this definitive instruction establishing the activities of Tathāgatas was explained, 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained correct knowledge concerning the perfect truth body.¹⁰⁸³ [When the Supramundane Victor had spoken, the youthful Mañjushri, the entire assembly, and the worlds of gods, humans, demi-gods, and scent-eaters praised this teaching of the Supramundane Victor.]¹⁰⁸⁴

This concludes the Mahayāna Sutra [entitled,] 'The Superior [Sutra] Explaining the Thought' [and] 'The Chapter Teaching the Ascertainment of the Collections of Qualities [of Tathāgatas]'.

THE CONCEPT OF THE ULTIMATE (*DON DAM PA*, *PARAMĀRTHA*) IN THE
SAMDHINIRMOCANA-SŪTRA:
ANALYSIS, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES
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Notes to the Translation

¹The phrase, “Thus have I heard: at one time” (*’di skad bdag gis thos pa dus gcig na, evaṃ mayā śrutam ekasmin samaye*) is the standard way of introducing Buddhist sūtras. It serves to authenticate the subsequent teachings as coming from Buddha’s mouth. According to Buddhist tradition, it was originally used at the first Buddhist council at Rājagṛha, at which 500 Foe Destroyers (*dgra bcom, arhat*) convened to set down the Buddha’s words in writing. They prefaced their recitations with the formula “Thus have I heard: at one time” in order to certify their personal acquaintance with a particular teaching. See: “Thus Spoke the Blessed One...” by Yuichi Kajiyama, in Lewis Lancaster, ed., *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems* (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 93-99; “Thus Have I Heard...” by John Brough, in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* vol. XIII, 1950, part 2; George Bond, *The Word of the Buddha* (Columbo, 1982), pp. 8-33; Otto Franke, “The Buddhist Councils at Rājagaha and Vesāli”, in *Journal of the Pāli Text Society*, 1908, pp. 1-80; Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1976, p. 143; and Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *The Buddhist Councils* (Calcutta, 1976), pp.1-29.

In his commentary on the sūtra (*’phags pa nges par dgongs pa’i ’grel pa’i mdo’i ṭī kā, ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra-ṭīkā*, Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, *mdo ’grel*, vol. *ti* [118], p. 71.2), the Korean scholar Wonch’uk (Tibetan Wen Tsheg; Chinese Yüan-tse) states that “this is called ‘an introduction that produces belief’ since it generates faith in others”; undoubtedly this is because it attests that the speaker has first-hand knowledge of the veracity of the text.

Kajiyama (“Thus Spoke the Blessed One...”, p. 93) notes that this formula has been interpreted in two ways by Western scholars: (1) Brough (“Thus Have I

Heard...”, p. 417) links *ekasmin samaye* with *śrutam*, and so he reads the phrase as, “Thus have I heard at one time”; (2) the Pāli Text Society’s editions of the canon all link *ekasmin samaye* with *viharati*, and so they read, “Thus have I heard: at one time...”. Brough states that his preference for the first reading is based on a number of commentaries attributed to Indian authors who link *ekasmin samaye* with *evam mayā śrutam*, and he cites a statement by Stäel-Holstein from the preface to his edition of the *Commentary to the Kāśyapa-parivarta* (Peking, 1933, p. iv; cited by Brough, p. 417):

All Western authorities seem to regard *ekasmin samaye* as belonging to the following *viharati*, but in all Tibetan and Mongolian preambles known to me a punctuation mark separates the equivalent of *ekasmin samaye* from the following words. The question as to whether *ekasmin samaye* belongs to *śrutam* or to *viharati* is discussed in a number of Buddhist commentaries attributed to Indians, and most of them seem to regard *ekasmin samaye* as belonging to the preceding words *evam mayā śrutam*.

Contrary to the conclusions of Brough and Stäel-Holstein, I think that the positioning of the words in the Tibetan indicate that the phrase should be read, “Thus have I heard: at one time”. If their reading were actually preferred by the Tibetan translators it would seem that *dus gcig na (ekasmin samaye)* should occur at the beginning of the phrase, since it would be very ungrammatical in Tibetan to place it after the verb (*thos pa*). Brough argues that the Tibetan translators were simply following the word order of the original Sanskrit, and he concludes that the fact that *dus gcig na* follows the verb does not indicate that it should be separated from it, but I think that it is clear evidence to the contrary. If the Tibetans had wished to link the phrase they would have translated it as *dus gcig na 'di skad bdag gis thos pa*. Although it is true that the Tibetan translators probably tried to follow Sanskrit word order whenever possible, it is doubtful that they would have done so in a situation where this would lead to an incorrect reading of a passage.

²“Supramundane Victor” is an epithet of the Buddha, and translates the Tibetan term *bcom ldan 'das*, an interpretive translation of the Sanskrit *bhagavan*. This reflects the etymology of this term that came to be commonly accepted in Tibet, which relates *bhagavan* to the Sanskrit root $\sqrt{bhañj}$, “to break, shatter, split...to rout, put to flight, defeat (an army)” (from Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, p. 744; see also William D. Whitney, *Roots, Verb-forms, and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language*, Leipzig, 1885, p. 108).

The term *bhagavan* is often translated as “Blessed One” on the basis of another etymology, which relates it to the root \sqrt{bhaj} , “to divide, distribute, possess, have, partake of, enjoy”. According to this etymology, a *bhagavan* is someone who is “fortunate, prosperous, happy...illustrious...venerable” (Monier-Williams, p. 743). In other words, he is “blessed” with good qualities, endowed with excellences, etc.

The Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary (London, 1972, p. 495) correctly states that the first etymology is “a fanciful exegetic explanation of the term and its meaning” and not a strict etymology, but it is found in a number of Sanskrit and Pāli texts and is reflected in the Tibetan translation of *bhagavan* with the term *bcom ldan 'das*, which is by far the most common rendering of this term in Tibet. It is also found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (tr. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bruxelles, 1940, Tome I, pp. 1-2), where Buddha is said to be called “*bhagavan*” because he has destroyed all blindness (i.e., ignorance), has rescued the world from the mire of transmigration, and has eliminated all defilements. In a note to this passage (note 2), la Vallée Poussin provides a possible reason why the Tibetan translators felt the need to distinguish Buddha as a “Supramundane” Victor (indicated with the word *'das*, “to transcend, surpass, rise above”): he states that the authors of the *Vinayavibhāṣā* distinguish four permutations of this term, since (1) some Buddhas are not called *bhagavan*, namely Solitary Realizers (*pratyekabuddha*), because they are “autonomous” (*svayambhū*) in the sense of having attained enlightenment by themselves, and they do not complete the perfection of giving (*dāna-pāramitā*) and so

forth; (2) some Bodhisattvas are called *bhagavan* in their last lifetime but are not fully enlightened Buddhas; (3) all Buddhas are called *bhagavan*; (4) Hearers (*śrāvaka*) and so forth can be called Buddhas because they have attained a form of enlightenment (*bodhi*) but are not called *bhagavan*.

Wonch'uk's explanation reflects the first etymology (vol. *ti* [118], p. 13.9): "You should know that a Supramundane Victor is one who has progressively destroyed the four contaminations by eliminating the contaminations of [wrong] views, the contaminations of attachment, the contaminations of ignorance, and the contaminations of desire." This explanation is also found in the *Visuddhimagga* (VII.210-11): "Because he has destroyed covetousness, hatred, delusion...he is called *bhagavā*".

The same text, however (VII.209ff.), provides another explanation that accords with the second etymology: "*Bhagavā* is an appellation of respect and reverence for the best of all beings distinguished in virtues....*Bhagavā* is not a name given by the mother....It arises as the consummation of emancipation. This appellation of *Bhagavā* arises in the Buddhas...with the attainment and realization of omniscience at the foot of the Bodhi Tree." It further states that etymologically the term applies to Buddha because of his attainment of supramundane qualities and his overcoming of all faults. Jang-chup-dzu-trül's (*byang chub rdzu 'phrul*) *Commentary on the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra* ('*phags pa nges par dgongs pa 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa, ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna*, Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, 1985, vol. *cho* [205], p. 12.6) contains a similar explanation. It states that Buddha is called "*bhagavan*" due to being endowed with six types of excellences: "autonomy, thorough purity, good form, renown, glory, greatness and so forth." This explanation is also found in the *Hevajra-tantra* (I.16.15). Jang-chup-dzu-trül adds that Buddha is autonomous "because he is free from being under the influence of other factors due to afflictions." He is thoroughly pure "due to heating and thoroughly burning the fuel of the afflictions with the heat of the fire of exalted wisdom." He has good form "because

he has the thirty-two supreme marks of a great being and so forth” (see chapter ten of this sūtra). He is renowned “due to the fulfillment of all distinctive qualities.” He is glorious “because he is an object of reliance for all transmigrators.” He has greatness “because he uninterruptedly brings about help and happiness for all sentient beings in all ways.” Jang-chup-dzu-trül also makes reference to the first etymology by adding that Buddha is called “*bhagavan*” due to defeating the four Demons (see note 14). Haribhadra also refers to both explanations in his *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (Wogihara edition, p. 7.25-27). He first states that Buddha is called *bhagavan* because he has destroyed (*bhagnāvan*) the afflictive obstructions (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*) and the obstructions to omniscience (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*), and then he indicates that he is also called *bhagavan* because he is endowed with good qualities. The *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (Chengdu, n.d., p. 756) also refers to both etymologies in its explanation of the term *bcom ldan 'das*: it states that Buddhas are termed Supramundane Victors because they “have conquered the four Demons and are endowed with six good qualities” (*bdud bzhi bcom zhing / legs pa'i yon tan drug dang ldan pa*). They are “supramundane” because they “have passed beyond the limits of the two, cyclic existence and peace [i.e., nirvāṇa]” (*srid zhi gnyis kyī mtha' las 'das pa*).

As these sources indicate, both explanations of this term were widely known in India and Tibet. They were also known in China, as indicated by Wonch'uk's commentary, but the Chinese translations of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* render *bhagavan* through transliterations. Hsüan-tsang (T 676, vol. 16, Hong Kong, 1979, p. 677.2) transliterates it as *p'u ga fan* (溥伽梵), Bodhiruci (T 675, vol. 16, p. 665.2) renders it as *p'o ga p'o* (婆伽婆), Paramārtha (T 677, vol. 16, p. 711.2) renders it as *p'o ga p'o* (1982, 婆伽婆). Hsüan-tsang's choice of 溥 may indicate a preference for the second etymology, since this character can mean ‘extensive’, ‘vast’, etc., but more probably it is just a transliteration of *bhagavan*.

I have chosen to follow the first etymology because it is the one reflected in all Tibetan texts of the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* that I have consulted (these are

discussed in the Preface to the Translation). It was generally accepted among Tibetan translators and, as we have seen, among many Indian scholars, who apparently felt a need to draw out the meaning of the term in a way that is not based on the actual meaning of the Sanskrit root \sqrt{bhaj} , from which *bhagavan* originally derived. Instead, they rearranged letters in order to associate it with the root $\sqrt{bhañj}$, which had connotations that indicated something of what distinguishes a Buddha, who is not simply blessed with good qualities, but is the person who has destroyed all ignorance and attachment, who has overcome all faults and afflictions and attained the highest supramundane state. It should also be noted that this etymology is not simply a Tibetan innovation, but is derived from Indian sources (as is indicated by the explanations of the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, and *Visuddhimagga*). Rather, it probably reflects the current dominant Indian position at the time of translation of the Buddhist canon because the Tibetan translators are well-known for their scrupulousness in rendering Sanskrit texts.

There are, however, some instances of *bhagavan* being translated into Tibetan in accordance with the second etymology, in which case it is rendered as *legs ldan* or *legs ldan byed* (see, for instance, Shoko Watanabe, *Glossary of the Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā*, *Acta Indologica*, vol. 5, Naritasan, 1985, p. 246), but this seems to be rather uncommon.

See also: *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Columbo, 1967), vol. 2.4, pp. 644-, which reports a number of explanations of this term; Étienne Lamotte's translation of the *Ta chih tu lun* (*La Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, Tome I, Louvain, 1949, pp. 115-126); Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātrantika* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1987), p. 442 n. 61 and *The Heart Sūtra Explained* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 24-5; and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 13.4.

³Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 15.3) identifies the seven substances as: (1) gold; (2) silver; (3) *vaiḍūrya* [see note 61]; (4) *karketana* (Tib. *spug*, a kind of clear

gem of two kinds, one variously colored and one yellow-green, according to Tsay-dēn-shap-drung's (*tshe brtan shabs drung*) *Dictionary*, entitled *Dag yig thon mi'i dgongs rgyan*, New Delhi, 1969, p. 206); (5) *marakata* (*rdo'i snying po*) a red gem, also called *margada* according to Tsay-dēn-shap-drung, p. 180; (6) red pearl (*mu tig, mukti*); and (7) *kakkatara* (*ke ke ru*), a yellow-green gem.

Commenting on the same passage in the sūtra, Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 107.2), quoting Ācārya Paramārtha (*slob dpon yang dag bden pa*), states that "gold" refers to a precious substance of gold color, and "silver" refers to a precious substance of white color. *Vaiḍūrya* is a precious substance of blue color that does not disintegrate when burned. *Karketana* is a precious substance of greenish-yellow color. Red pearl is a precious substance that arises from red creatures. *Marakata* is also a precious substance of red color; or, according to Ācārya Asvabhāva (*slob dpon ngo bo nyid med*), the term refers to *indranila*, *mahānila*, etc. (see note 300), which are blue gems of the god Indra. *Kakkatara* is a precious substance of greenish-blue color. For further discussion of these substances, see *Rin po che brtag thabs mdor bsdus nyung gsal* by Ngag dbang blo bzang (*Ngag dbang blo bzang gsung 'bum*, Indian blockprint, n.d., vol *ha*) and Lamotte's translation of Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* (*Somme* pp. 318 and 62*).

In an article discussing his Chinese restoration of Wonch'uk's *Commentary*, Shōju Inaba indicates that the reference to "*slob dpon yang dag bden pa*" is matched in the Chinese text by a reference to "*Chen-ti san-ts'ang*", or Ācārya Paramārtha. See Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Tibetan Translation of the *Chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu*", in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott eds., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization* (Berkeley, 1977), p. 107.

⁴Lamotte (*Somme*, p. 318) states that the light issues from the seven substances, or that the light issues from the pure Buddha land in which the palace resides.

⁵According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 16.5), “laid out limitlessly” (*mtha’ yas pa rnam par gzhas pa, ananta-vyavasthāna*) means that it is “limitless in number and limitless in area” (*grangs mtha’ yas dang yul mtha’ yas*), and is “dwelling in a distinctively superior way, or dwelling in various aspects, or abiding limitlessly” (*khyad par du ’phags par gnas pa’am / rnam pa sna tshogs su gnas pa’am / ’byam klas par gnas pa*). According to Lamotte (*Somme* p. 318), this means that the various sections of the palace were set up and decorated according to a previously fixed plan. Thus the phrase indicates that it is well laid out.

⁶The word “area” translates the Tibetan *dkyil ’khor* (Sanskrit: *maṇḍala*). The term *maṇḍala* refers both to sacred areas, such as the palace being described in this passage of the sūtra, as well as diagrams used to represent them. These diagrams symbolize aspects of Buddhist iconography and soteriology and are often used in meditation, but in this passage *dkyil ’khor* simply refers to a place or area, the celestial palace of the Buddha.

The “three worlds” (*kham s gsum pa, traidhātuka*) referred to in the sūtra passage are: the Form Realm (*gzugs kham s, rūpa-dhātu*), the Formless Realm (*gzugs med kham s, arūpya-dhātu*), and the Desire Realm (*’dod kham s, kāma-dhātu*).

The palace “transcends the three worlds” (*kham s gsum pa las yang dag par ’das pa, traidhātuka-samatikrānta*) because it does not belong to them since it is not the result of fruitional results of actions. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 17.6) states that this implies that it is like nirvāṇa in that it is a realm that has passed beyond sorrow. According to Lamotte (*Somme* p. 318), this means that the *maṇḍala* is limitless and immeasurable, which indicates the perfection of measurement of the palace.

⁷Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 18.1) identifies “that which is beyond the world” (*’jig rten las ’das pa de*) as non-conceptual exalted wisdom (*mi rtoḡ pa’i ye*

shes, nirvikalpaka-jñāna). He adds that when the passage refers to “the supreme root of virtues” (*bla ma'i dge ba'i rtsa ba, uttara-kuśala-mūla*) “that very pure mundane exalted wisdom that is attained subsequent to that non-conceptual exalted wisdom is the root of virtues” (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes de'i rjes las thob pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes de nyid dge ba'i rtsa ba*). This agrees with the discussion of the parallel passage in *Somme* p. 319.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 116.5), it is “beyond the world” due to completion of causes. The supreme root of virtues is the cause of the arising of the palace, and this root is identified as “non-conceptual exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment” (*mi rtog pa'i rjes thob ye shes, nirvikalpaka-prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*), which transcends the three worlds. On page 118.2 he adds that *Nye ba'i 'od* explains that the palace is a manifestation of the pure mind of the Buddha, and “except for cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*), the jewels and so forth do not exist”. This means that it exists only due to the completely pure mind of the Buddha.

⁸According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 19.1), “one who has mastery” (*dbang sgyur, vaśībhūta*) refers to “a yogin who has achieved the [ten] spheres of totality and so forth [these are listed in *Tshig mdzod* p. 2451; see also note 699] and who has mastery with respect to all desires for things” (*zad par gyi skye mched la sogs pa grub pa'i rnal 'byor pa dngos po rnam la 'dod dgur dbang sgyur ba*). See also *Somme* p. 319.

⁹The term “Tathāgata” (*de bzhin gshegs pa*), literally, “Thus-Gone-One”, is an epithet of the Buddha. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 105.2) comments that the phrase “abode of the Tathāgata” indicates that “because Buddha abides in doctrines of non-arising, non-ceasing, and non-abiding, this is an abode of a Buddha.” He has reached this state due to entering into all four concentrations [see note 540], becoming fully liberated, entering into meditative stabilizations in which mind is absent and eliminating all suffering,

entering into meditative stabilizations observing emptiness and eliminating wrong views, entering into meditative stabilizations observing wishlessness and eliminating all desire, entering into meditative stabilizations observing signlessness and eliminating all deprecation and all mental afflictions. See also Asaṅga's *Bhāṣya*, p. 5 and *Somme*, p. 319. Regarding Buddha's palace, see also *Somme* notes p. 51.6* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930-36), p. 90.

¹⁰According to *Somme* p. 319, these are only those Bodhisattvas who have entered into the great grounds (probably the eighth ground and above), and these are not Hearers and so forth.

¹¹This is the standard cast of observers who are generally present at the Buddha's Mahāyāna sermons. These beings gather around Buddha when he teaches, but their rôle is primarily passive. As Lamotte (*Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1976, p. 759) states:

Cette cosmologie religieuse, qui apparaît constituée des les plus anciens textes, forme la toile de fond devant laquelle se déroule la geste du Buddha. Les dieux y interviennent comme spectateurs plutôt qu'en acteurs: ils entourent le Buddha plus qu'ils ne le servent.

Devas (Iha) are the gods of Hinduism, for instance Brahmā and Indra, who are often said to be present at the preaching of Buddhist sūtras (see Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1899, pp. 492-3; Lamotte, op. cit., pp. 759-760; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, London, 1972, pp. 329-30; *Compendium* pp. 59-60; and *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 1 and 16-21).

Nāgas (klu) are serpent-like beings with bodies of snakes and human heads said to inhabit the waters or the city of Bhoga-vatī under the earth. Their king is named Virūpākṣa, they are said to be endowed with miraculous powers and have capricious

natures (Monier-Williams, op. cit., pp. 532-3; Lamotte, op. cit., p. 760; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* p. 349; and *Kośa* ch. 3 p. 31).

Yakṣas (*gnod sbyin*) are the eight attendants of Kubera (or Viṣṇu), demons who live in the earth, air, lower heavens, and forests. They are endowed with great powers, and are sometimes beneficent and sometimes malignant and violent, while others (mainly the females, called *yakṣiṇī*) are devourers of human flesh (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 838; Lamotte, op. cit., p. 760; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 545; and *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 160-1).

Gandharvas (*dri za*) are celestial musicians whose king is named Dhṛtarāṣṭra. They live in the region of the air and the heavenly waters, and are especially associated with the Cāturmahārājika realm. Their special duty is to guard the heavenly *soma*, which the gods obtain through their intervention (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 346; Lamotte, op. cit., p. 760; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 244; *Compendium* pp. 60 and 68; and *Kośa* ch. 3 p. 31).

Asuras or demi-gods (*lha ma yin*) are sometimes considered the chief of the evil spirits, the opponents of the gods, with whom (especially Indra) they wage constant war, primarily motivated by intense envy for the superior fortunes of gods. They are defined as “not *devas*”, “ugly” and “without wine” (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 121; Lamotte, op. cit., p. 760; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 89; *Compendium* p. 60; and *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 11 note 2).

Garuḍas (*nam mkha' lding*) are golden winged birds, the vehicles of Viṣṇu, lords of the winged race and natural enemies of *nāgas* (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 348; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 246; and *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 29, 31).

Kimnaras (*mi 'am ci*; literally: ‘what sort of man?’) are the musicians of Kubera, with men’s bodies and horses heads (or horses bodies and human heads), described as being men and yet not men (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 283; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 215).

Mahoragas (*lto 'phye chen po*) are large-bellied demons shaped like boas who are said to be lords of the soil (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 802; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 527).

Non-humans (*mi ma yin, amanuṣya*) are beings other than humans, often ghosts or malignant spirits (Monier-Williams, op. cit., p. 80; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary*, p. 73; Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, vol. 2, p. 62).

See also *Somme* pp. 319-20; Sylvain Lévi, "Le catalogue géographique des Yakṣa", in *JA*, 1915, pp. 20-138; Jean Przyluski and M. Lalou, "Notes de Mythologie bouddhique", in *HJAS*, III, 1938, pp. 40-6; A.K. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas* (2 vols.), Washington, 1928-31; M. de Visser, *The Dragon in China and Japan* (cited by la Vallée Poussin, *Kośa*, ch. 3, p. 31 note 3); and *Kośa*, ch. 3, pp. 36-53.

¹²See *Somme* p. 320, which states that in a pure Buddha land the joy and bliss of doctrine serve as nourishment.

¹³*Somme* p. 320 states that this means that in such Buddha lands there are no sufferings caused by afflictions.

¹⁴"Demon" translates the term *bdud* (Skt. *māra*), the Buddhist Satan. According to Buddhist mythology, there are many Demons, whose goal is to tempt people into ignorance. They are portrayed as taking on the appearances of Foe Destroyers (*arhat*), Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas in order to teach false doctrines to gullible people. There are four main types of Demons: (1) the Demons of the aggregates (*phung po'i bdud, skandha-māra*); (2) the Demons of the Lord of Death (*'chi bdag gi bdud, mṛtyu-māra*); (3) the Demons of the afflictions (*nyon mongs pa'i bdud, kleśa-māra*); and (4) the Demons who are sons of gods (*lha'i bu'i bdud, devaputra-māra*). This list is found in Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 12) and Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp.

129.7 and 193.2). Wonch'uk (p. 129.7) adds that their function is to harm virtuous qualities, and this is why they are called Demons. See also *Somme* p. 320.

¹⁵According to *Somme* p. 320, this means that it is the abode of the Tathāgata, and is superior to all other abodes.

¹⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 24.1) explains that “mindfulness” (*dran pa, smṛti*) refers to wisdom arisen from hearing “due to manifestly perfecting non-mistaken [understanding] of the meaning when it is heard”. He adds that “intelligence” (*blo gros, mati*) “is wisdom arisen from thinking due to being produced from intelligence with respect to definite realization through understanding the meaning one has heard”; and “realization” (*rtogs pa, pratipatti*) “is wisdom arisen from meditation due to realizing suchness through the power of meditation.” Wonch'uk has an almost identical explanation (which differs from Jang-chup-dzu-trül's in that it substitutes *spyod pa* for *rtogs pa*), and he attributes it to a commentary by *Nye ba'i 'od* (vol. *ti* [118], p. 131.3; see also *Somme* p. 321). He adds (131.7) that “the great mindfulness of Tathāgatas is non-conceptual exalted wisdom, because they thoroughly abide in the meaning of suchness through the power of mindfulness. Great intelligence is exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment (*rjes thob ye shes, prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*), because it differentiates the ultimate and conventional characters of phenomena.” For more on wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditating, see note 325.

¹⁷Calm abiding (*zhi gnas, śamatha*) and special insight (*lhag mthong, vipaśyanā*) are the main topics of chapter eight of this sūtra. See especially note 498; see also *Somme* p. 321.

¹⁸According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 25.1), emptiness (*stong pa nyid, śūnyatā*) refers to the selflessness of phenomena (*chos bdag med, dharma-nairātmya*).

The meditative stabilizations (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*) which observe that constitute the great door of liberation of emptiness. With respect to signlessness (*mtshan ma med pa, animitta*): signs refer to forms, sounds, scents, tastes, and tangible objects, men, women, birth, aging, sickness, death and so forth. The absence of these is signlessness. Nirvāṇa is the entity in which all signs are eliminated. Meditative stabilizations that observe signlessness constitute the great door of liberation of signlessness. Wishlessness (*smon pa med pa, apraṇihita*) refers to absence of desires in the sense of wishes. “When observing the sufferings of the three realms, thinking, ‘[I] have no wishes for those,’ due to not sowing aspirations for those, this is wishlessness.” The great door of liberation of wishlessness is a meditative stabilization that observes this. Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 133.3) has a similar explanation, which he attributes to *Nye ba’i ’od*. See also *Somme* p. 321.

According to Ālo-sang-dā-yaṅ (*blo bzang rta dbyangs*, in his *Brief Expression*, p. 62), these are called “doors of liberation” because “the way that those who want liberation from cyclic existence attain it is to cause those objects to appear to their minds, realize them just as they are, and familiarize with them in meditation. Until one generates in one’s own continuum the subjective three doors of liberation, the minds that realize the lack of true existence, there is no medium for making the journey to liberation (*thar pa la ’gro sa med*).” The translation is by Jules Levinson. My thanks to him for giving me a copy of his transcript of this translation.

Asvabhāva’s *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana* (p. 282a.8; reported in *Somme* pp. 120-1) states:

Because suchness is changeless it is the general characteristic of all phenomena. A scripture states, ‘In reliance upon just that, all sentient beings are the Tathāgata-essence.’ ‘Emptiness’ is devoid of imputations. ‘Reality-limit’ is that which meets the limit of truth. Signlessness [is so called] because it is free from all the signs of form and so forth (*de bzhin nyid ni gzhan du mi ’gyur ba’i phyir chos thams cad kyi spyi mtshan nyid yin te / de nyid la brten*

*nas sems can thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'o zhes gsung rab
las 'byung ngo // stong pa nyid ces bya ba ni kun brtags pa med pa'o // yang
dag pa'i mtha' zhes bya ba ni bden pa'i mur thug pa'o // mtshan ma med pa
ni gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan ma thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir ro).*

¹⁹According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 26.1), the “jewelled lotuses” (*rin po che'i padma*, *ratna-padma*) are “lotuses having the nature of precious jewels” (*rin po che'i rang bzhin gyi padma*). They are called “great kings” (*rgyal po chen po*, *mahārāja*) because “they are both great kings of precious substances and also great kings of lotuses” (*de nyid rin po che'i rgyal po chen po yang yin la padma'i rgyal po yang yin*).

He also provides a different interpretation (p. 26.2): “Alternatively, the jewelled lotuses are the lotuses of the retinue that arise from the blessings of Bodhisattvas. The ‘great kings’ are the gurus of those Bodhisattvas and so forth. These great kings of doctrine are just those great lotuses which arise from the virtuous roots of Buddhas, who are Supramundane Victors. [The palace is] ‘ornamented by limitless collections of qualities’ (*yon tan gyi tshogs mtha' yas pas brgyan pa'i bkod pa*; this phrase does not appear in *Ādōk* p. 5.4, but is found in Lamotte’s version (*Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, Louvain, 1935), p. 31; D p. 3.3; P p. 3a.5; L p. 3.1; N p. 2b.6, C p. 2b.4; and K p. 3a.6) in that it is ornamented by various ornaments which are established from the great qualities of Buddhas, their powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth.” See also Wonch’uk pp. 134.7-135.2; and see Asaṅga’s *Bhāṣya* (p. 5.5), where he divides the praise of the palace into eighteen parts. *Somme*, p. 321 goes on to describe other qualities of the palace not found in *Ādōk* or the other texts of the *Samdhinirmocana* mentioned above. See *Somme* notes pp. 61*-62*, which gives other references for the qualities of the palace.

²⁰The following list of Buddha's qualities also appears in *Somme* pp. 134-143. On pp. 135-6, the twenty qualities of his "mind of good understanding" (*legs par thugs su chud pa'i blo*, according to *Dok* p. 5.4; *D* p. 3.4; *P* p. 3a.5; *L* p. 3.3; *N* p. 3.1; *C* p. 2b.4; and *K* p. 3a.6) are discussed. Note that Lamotte p. 32 has a different reading from the Tibetan texts [viz., *shin tu rnam par dag pa'i blo*, "very pure mind"], which he indicates (p. 32 note a) is a Tibetan translation of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text; this is not found in any Tibetan text I have seen.

According to *Somme* pp. 134-143, all of the following qualities cited are elaborations of this first one, and refer back to Buddha's "mind of good understanding". Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 27.6) states that a "mind of good understanding" is one that "understands the varieties of compounded and un-compounded phenomena and how they actually exist" ('*dus byas dang 'dus ma byas kyi chos ji snyed yod pa nyid dang / ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid thugs su chud pa*). This entails "realizing well that which is to be realized, realizing completely perfectly, and realizing entirely" (*rtogs par bya ba legs par rtogs pa dang / yongs su rdzogs par rtogs pa dang / ma lus par rtog pa*). See also Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], pp. 136.5-137 and Asaṅga's *Bhāṣya* (p. 6.1), which also discusses this attribute.

²¹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], pp. 28.1) asserts that saying that Buddha does not possess the two behaviors means that Buddha "does not have the two, the afflictive obstructions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*, *kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstructions to omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa*, *jñeyāvaraṇa*) that are the behaviors of children (*byis pa*, *bāla*) and Hearers (*nyan thos*, *śrāvaka*)" [respectively]. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 139.3-141.2) goes on to list twenty-one qualities of the palace.

²²Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 142.5) explains that the phrase "abiding by way of the abiding of a Buddha", according to Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, means that [Buddha] "abides without abiding" (*gnas pa med par gnas pa*),

and this refers to the non-abiding nirvāṇa (*mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa*, *apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*) in which Buddhas abide.

²³Dok (p. 5.6) reads: *sgrib pa mi mnga' bas rtogs par thugs su chud pa*. Lamotte p. 32, L p. 3.5, and N p. 3.3 read: *sgrib pa med pa'i rtogs par thugs su chud pa*. P p. 3a.7, D p. 3.5, and C p. 2b.6 read: *sgrib pa med pa'i rtogs pa thugs su chud pa*.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 143.3), this refers to four qualities (although he only lists three): “abiding in the truth body (*chos kyi sku la gnas pa*); thought (*dgongs pa*); and not having discrepancies in performances of actions (*phrin las mdzad pa tha dad pa mi mnga' ba*)”. He then cites an explanation from a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* which states that “thought” refers to the complete enjoyment body (*longs spyod pa'i sku*, *saṃbhoga-kāya*), and “performance of actions” refers to emanation bodies (*sprul sku*, *nirmāṇa-kāya*). He adds: “In terms of those three, all the Tathāgatas of the ten directions and the three times are similar and non-different; therefore, they have ‘attained [sameness with all Buddhas]’.” See also *Bhāṣya* p. 6.4.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 38.2), the “obstructions” that Buddhas lack are the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, which Buddhas have abandoned “through having cultivated the paths of Superiors (*'phags pa'i lam*, *ārya-mārga*), which are antidotes to all the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience”.

²⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 146.4) explains that this refers to “the quality of correctly positing doctrines” (*chos yang dag par rnam par bzhag pa'i yon tan*). He then cites Vasubandhu, who explains that this means that “these correct doctrines that are sūtras and so forth that are immeasurable and inconceivable are not objects of knowledge by ordinary beings. In dependence upon Buddhas, doctrines that are taught are ‘posited’; they are not objects of knowledge by children. Therefore, they are ‘inconceivable’.” Wonch'uk then states that according to a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* the

doctrines that Buddha posits are of twelve kinds (these are listed at the beginning of chapter eight). These are not objects of knowledge by ordinary beings because they are “inconceivable”, but because Tathāgatas expound their doctrines even children (*byis pa*) come to understand. Wonch’uk then cites Asvabhāva, who also indicates that the twelve types of doctrinal teachings are what is posited, but “because this positing also is not an object of engagement (*spyod yul*) of the minds of children who are ordinary beings and because it is supramundane it is ‘inconceivable’.”

²⁵Dok p. 6.1 reads: *dus gsum mnyam pa nyid mthar phyin pa / 'jig rten gyi khams du khyab pa'i sku dang ldan pa*. Lamotte p. 32 reads: *dus gsum la mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa / 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad du zhugs pa'i sku dang ldan pa*. P p. 3a.8, D p. 3.6, L p. 3b.1, N p. 3a.5, and C p. 2b.7 read: *dus gsum la mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa / 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad du zhugs pa'i sku lnga dang ldan pa*.

See *Bhāṣya* (p. 6.5), which discusses these qualities. The main point of this enumeration of qualities is that Buddha’s activities have no limitations in terms of time and space, and his emanation bodies exist in all worldly realms in order to aid sentient beings.

²⁶Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 152.7) states that *Nye ba'i 'od* explains that this means that “the bodies of Tathāgatas are not born from imagination of what is unreal (*yang dag pa ma yin pa kun tu rtog pa*, *abhūta-parikalpa*); this is because [Buddhas] do not have the afflictive afflictions, the afflictions of actions, and the afflictions of birth. This is because the the bodies of Tathāgatas are not imagined by way of thorough afflictions” (*de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku ni yang dag pa ma yin pa kun tu rtog pa las 'khrungs pa ni ma yin te / nyon mongs pa dang las dang skye ba'i nyon mongs pa mi mnga' ba'i phyir ro // de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku ni kun nas nyon mongs pa rnams kyis rnam par rtags pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro*). Thus their bodies are not constructed as a

result of unreal conceptuality and so cannot be imagined by others who have not attained this state.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 32.4), the body of a Tathāgata is “unimagined” (*rnam par ma brtags pa, nirvikalpa*) because it is free from all elaborations (*spros pa, prapañca*), and so cannot be imagined by ordinary beings, whose bodies are produced from conceptual thought and elaborations. He states: “The bodies of ordinary beings arise from conceptuality. Moreover, from elaborations imagination [arises]; from conceptuality actions and afflictions arise; from actions and afflictions a body of suffering is produced. That body is a body that has thorough afflictions; but because Tathāgatas are free from all elaborations they do not have conceptuality. Therefore, [Buddhas] do not have bodies that are produced by actions and afflictions. Because their unimagined bodies are inconceivable they are distinguished through the quality of thoroughly appropriating a body that is free from thorough afflictions.”

²⁷ĀDok p. 6.2 reads: *byang chub sems dpa' thams cad kyis* [Lamotte p. 32, *Bhāṣya* p. 7.2: *kyī ye shes yang dag par blangs pa*. P p. 3b.1, D p. 4.1, L p. 3b.2, N p. 3b.1, and C p. 2b.8 all agree with ĀDok. See *Bhāṣya* (p. 7.2) for an explanation of this phrase.

²⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 155.7), citing Vasubandhu as his source, states that this refers to the non-dual truth body. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 33.5) states that the abode of a Buddha is non-dual “due to the characteristic of non-difference.... This is due to [Buddha's having] completely abandoned the two behaviors [see note 21].”

²⁹The phrase in brackets is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 32, P p. 3b.2, and D p. 4.2, which insert *sa*, which is omitted in ĀDok p. 6.4.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 31.3) comments that the state of a Buddha is “without ends or middle” (*mtha’ dang dbus med pa, anantamadhya*) because “due to the characteristic of thoroughly abandoning the extremes of compounded and un compounded it is without ends; and due to the characteristic of thoroughly not eliminating objects, it is without middle. Alternatively, due to the characteristic of abandoning the extremes of former and later, it is without ends. Due to the characteristic of not abiding in that way it is without middle. ‘Sameness’ [refers to] the level of a Buddha, without ends or middle, the sameness of the compounded and the un compounded.”

The “element of qualities” is the *dharma-dhātu* (*chos kyi dbyings*). What this seems to indicate is that the extent of the Buddha’s body, like the element of qualities, is infinite. Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 162.2) states that this means that “through the power of abiding constantly in this element of qualities, in the future benefits are established.” He cites *Nye ba’i ’od* to the effect that the element of qualities is “the result of cultivating the path”.

In the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (Yamaguchi edition, p. 49.17) and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (see *Compendium* p. 18), the element of qualities is equated with suchness (*tathatā, de bzhin nyid*), reality-limit (*bhūta-koṭi, yang dag pa’i mtha’*), signlessness (*animitta, mtshan ma med pa*), the ultimate (*paramārtha, don dam pa*), and emptiness (*śūnyatā, stong pa nyid*). Contrary to *Nye ba’i ’od* (who according to Wonch’uk views the element of qualities as a result of cultivating the path), Vasubandhu indicates that it is a cause by means of which one attains good qualities. He states (*Madhyānta-vibhāga*, p. 50.22), “because it is the cause of the qualities of Superiors it is the element of qualities” (*āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ*). In the sūtra system, the qualities (*chos, dharma*) referred to are the qualities of Superiors (*’phags pa, ārya*), and the element (*dbyings, dhātu*) is that which, when meditated upon, leads to actualization of these qualities. The term *dhātu* derives from Sanskrit $\sqrt{dhā}$, meaning “to hold” or “to sustain”.

My translation of *dharmā-dhātu* as “element of qualities” is based on the explanation of this term given by Jeffrey Hopkins in *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom, 1983) p. 873, note 557. His source is a passage in Ngak-wang-bel-den’s (*ngag dbang dpal ldan*) *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba’s) ‘Great Exposition of Tenets’, Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought* (*grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor*, Sarnath, Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964), which reads: “It is called element of qualities because meditation within observing it acts as a cause of the qualities (*chos*) of Superiors” (*khyod la dmigs nas sgom pas ’phags chos kyi rgyu byed pas chos dbyings zhes bya la*). Hopkins (p. 873) adds: “Emptiness, being uncaused, is not itself a cause (element), but meditation on it causes the development of marvelous qualities; thus, emptiness comes to be called a cause, an element producing those qualities.” This agrees with Jikido Takasaki’s statement (*A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga*, Serie Orientale Roma #33, Rome: IsMEO, 1966, p. 290) that in the term *dharmatā-dhātu*, *dharmatā* often refers to “element”, and is “something substantial”. Takasaki also notes that the term *dharmā-dhātu* often has the meaning of “cause” (*hetu*), which agrees with Hopkins’ statement that it serves as a cause in terms of which the qualities of Superiors are produced. See also: Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980), pp. 178-9; and Wonch’uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 499, where he equates the element of qualities with the Tathāgata lineage.

A similar idea is found in Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Peking vol. 112, p. 241.1.8; Otani *Sde dge, sems tsam* vol 12, p. 53b.7):

What is the suchness of virtuous phenomena? It is the two types of selflessness, emptiness, signlessness, reality-limit, the ultimate; it is also the element of qualities. Why is suchness called suchness? Because it is changeless. Why is emptiness so called? Because it does not serve as a cause of the afflictions. Why is signlessness so called? Because it pacifies signs. Why is reality-limit so called? Because it is a non-mistaken object of

observation. Why is the ultimate so called? Because it is the sphere of activity of the supreme exalted wisdom of Superiors. Why is the element of qualities so called? Because it is the cause of all of the qualities of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Buddhas (*chos dge ba rnams kyi de bzhin nyid gang zhe na / bdag med pa rnam pa gnyis dang / stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang / yang dag pa'i mtha' dang / don dam pa ste / chos kyi dbyings kyang de yin no // ci'i phyir de bzhin nyid la de bzhin nyid ces bya zhe na / gzhan du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir stong pa nyid ces bya zhe na / kun nas nyon mongs pa ma rgyu ba'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir mtshan ma med pa zhes bya zhe na / mtshan ma nye bar zhi ba'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir yang dag pa'i mtha' zhes bya zhe na / phyin ci log med pa'i dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir don dam pa zhes bya zhe na / 'phags pa'i ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul yin pa'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir chos kyi dbyings zhes bya zhe na / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas dang / sangs rgyas kyi chos thams cad kyi rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro*).

There is also a similar thought expressed in Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasamgrahopani-bandhana* (p. 282a.8; reported in *Somme* pp. 120-1):

The element of qualities [is so called] because it is the cause of pure qualities. Here the term element is a word for cause (*chos kyi dbyings ni rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams kyi rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro // dbyings kyi sgra ni 'dir rgyu'i tshig ste*).

³⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 162.5) cites Vasubandhu to the effect that the exalted wisdom of Tathāgatas is like space in that it is inexhaustible. Asvabhāva is quoted as stating, "just as space is limitless, boundless, inexhaustible, unobstructed, unproduced, unceasing, unchanging, and provides an environment for all physical things at all times, so the truth body has the characteristic of the continual establishment of help and happiness for all sentient beings."

³¹These are the disciples of Buddha who hear his words and practice them in accordance with their capacities. They constitute one of the three main types of Buddhist practitioners, the others being Solitary Realizers (*rang sangs rgyas*, *pratyeka-buddha*; see note 42) and Bodhisattvas (*byang chub sems dpa'*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 47.3) states that they are called “Hearers” because they hear Buddha’s teachings and proclaim them. See also: Wonch’uk vol. *ti* [118], pp. 169-70; *Bhāṣya*, p. 8; *Compassion* pp. 102-3; and *ME*, pp. 840-45, which gives etymologies for this term.

³²Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 173.1) states that their minds are liberated due to being free from desire and their wisdom is liberated due to being free from ignorance. See also *Bhāṣya* (p. 8), where the praise of Hearers is divided into four parts.

³³According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 50.1), this means that they are endowed with six limbs of ethics: (1) abiding in possession of ethics; (2) being bound by the vows of individual liberation (*so sor thar pa*, *pratimokṣa*); (3) perfect rites; (4) perfect objects of activity; (5) the view of concern for very subtle forms of unseemliness; and (6) engaging in training after having thoroughly adopted the bases of training.

³⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 179.3) comments: “Because they agilely enter into the meaning of the disciplinary doctrine taught by Tathāgatas they [have] agile wisdom (*shes rab myur ba*, *āśuprajñā*). Because they enter into its many meanings they [have] rapid wisdom (*shes rab mgyogs pa*, *javanaprajñā*)....Because they enter into the subtle meaning [of Buddha’s teachings] they [have] sharp wisdom (*shes rab rno ba*, *ṭikṣṇaprajñā*). Due to attaining the wisdom of definite emergence from cyclic existence they possess wisdom of definite emergence (*nges par 'byung ba'i ye shes*,

niḥsaraṇaprajñā)." The qualifier *nges par* is omitted in *Ādok* p. 6.7, but is found in Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.5, and D p. 4.4. See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 53.2.

According to Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary), "'Emerge' ('*byung*) means to be liberated. 'Definite' (*nges*) means that one has to do this (*dgos thag chod*). It is a firm decision. I *must* attain liberation from cyclic existence. It is not okay if I do not. Thinking that it would be nice to get out of cyclic existence is not sufficient. It is not firm. You need a firm wish. *Ādzong-ka-ba* (*tsong kha pa*) said that you have the intention to renounce cyclic existence when you do not admire the marvels of cyclic existence even for a moment and day and night you wish to leave cyclic existence" [tr. Jules Levinson]. The passage Gan-den Tri-ba to which is referring in the last sentence is from the *Lam gtso rnam gsum*, 1.10-11, which reads: '*khor ba'i phun tshogs la yid smon skad cig tsam yang mi skye zhing nyin mtshan kun tu thar pa don gnyer blo*.

³⁵With respect to "wisdom of definite realization" (*nges par rtogs pa'i shes rab*; this term is found in Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.5, and D p. 4.4; *Ādok* reads: *nges par 'byed pa'i shes rab*, "wisdom of definite discrimination") Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 179.5) explains that it is so called "because this wisdom of definite emergence from cyclic existence serves as the cause of realizing nirvāṇa. It is 'extensive' (*yangs pa, vipula*) because it is subtle, greatly vast, and highly realized. Because the wisdom of these Hearers is superior to that of other Hearers with dull faculties, it is said to be 'unequalled' (*mnyam pa med pa, asama*); and 'because due to this wisdom one obtains the supreme object' [i.e., nirvāṇa,] it is the 'precious jewel of wisdom' (*shes rab rin po che, prajñā-ratna*)." See also page 180 for alternate explanations.

³⁶Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 180.7 identifies the three knowledges (*rig pa gsum, trividya*) as: (1) knowledge that is a clairvoyance that clearly realizes recollections of

past states (*sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa shes pa mngon sum du byed pa'i mngon par rig pa*, *pūrvanivāsanānusmṛti-sākṣātkāra-abhijñā*); (2) knowledge that is a clairvoyance that clearly realizes transmigration and birth ('*chi 'pho ba dang skye ba shes pa mngon sum du byed pa mngon par shes pa'i rig pa*, *cyutupapāda-sākṣātkāra-abhijñā*); and (3) knowledge that is a clairvoyance that clearly realizes the extinction of contaminations (*zag pa zad pa shes pa mngon sum du byed pa'i mngon par shes pa'i rig pa*, *āsravakṣaya-sākṣātkāra-abhijñā*). See also: Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 53.6; *Compendium* p. 101; *Kośa* ch. 7 p. 108; *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* p. 617.

³⁷Dok p. 7.2 reads: *mtshong ba'i chos la bde bar gnas pa'i mchog thob pa*. Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.6, and D p. 4.5 read: *tshe 'di la...*

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 184.1) explains: "Because in that way [these] Hearers have attained meditative stabilizations that are the actual four concentrations in this life their bodies and minds abide pleasantly; therefore 'they abide pleasantly in this life.'"

³⁸Dok p. 7.2 reads: *yon tan yongs su sbyong ba chen po*. Lamotte p. 33 reads: *yon yongs su sbyong ba chen po*. P p. 3b.6, D p. 4.5, L 4a.2, and C p. 3a.6 read: *yongs su sbyong ba chen po*. See *Kośa* ch. 4, pp. 237 and 240.

³⁹Dok p. 7.2 reads: *spyod lam rang gi zhi ba phun sum tshogs pa*. Lamotte p. 33, P p. 3b.6, and D p. 4.5 read: *spyod lam rab tu zhi ba phun sum tshogs pa*. See *Kośa* ch. 2, p. 320 and ch. 4, p. 64.

⁴⁰Dok p. 7.3 reads: *sna tshogs*. Lamotte p. 34, P p. 3b.7, and D p. 4.6 read: *tha dad pa*.

⁴¹According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 57.2), the “great state” (*gnas chen po, mahāvihāra*) in which they abide is the Great Vehicle (*theg pa chen po, mahāyāna*).

⁴²Solitary Realizers (*rang sangs rgyas, pratyekabuddha*) are Hīnayānists who attain nirvāṇa by themselves without depending upon a teacher. For a fuller description, see: *Compendium* II.1; *ME* p. 845 n. 495; *Compassion* pp. 104-5 and 250-1 note 25; and Ria Kloppenborg, *The Paccekabuddha* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

⁴³*ĀDok* p. 7.5 reads: *chos chen po'i ro'i dga' ba dang bde bas brtan pa*. *Lamotte* p. 34, *P* p. 3c.1, and *D* p. 4.7 read: *chos kyi ro'i dga' ba dang bde ba chen pos brtan pa*.

⁴⁴The adjective “great” is added on the basis of *Lamotte* p. 34, *P* p. 3c.2, and *D* p. 5.1, which read: *'jigs pa chen po lnga*. *ĀDok* p. 7.6 reads: *'jigs pa lnga*.

The “five great fears” (*'jigs pa chen po lnga, pañca-mahābhaya*) are the fears of beginners on the Bodhisattva path. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 195.1) identifies these as: (1) fear concerning livelihood (*'tsho ba med pa'i 'jigs pa, ājivikā-bhaya*); (2) fear of disapproval (*tshigs su bcad pa med pa'i 'jigs pa* or *mi bsngags pa'i 'jigs pa, aśloka-bhaya* or *akīrti-bhaya*); (3) fear of death (*'chi ba'i 'jigs pa, maraṇa-bhaya*); (4) fear of bad transmigrations (*ngan song gi 'jigs pa* or *ngan 'gro'i 'jigs pa, durgati-bhaya*); and (5) fear that is timidity when addressing assemblies (*'khor gyi nang du bag tsha ba'i 'jigs pa, pariśacchāradya-bhaya*). The Sanskrit equivalents are from Louis de la Vallée Poussin (*Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā-vṛtti*, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970, p. 46 n. 3), who has the same list. Wonch'uk states that the five fears are completely abandoned when one attains the level of the pure unusual attitude (*lhag bsam, adhyāśaya*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 60.5) states that this indicates the “great thorough purity” (*yongs su dag pa chen po*) of these Bodhisattvas. Regarding

the five great fears, see also *Kośa* ch. 4, pp. 248 and 128 and *Vibhaṅga* (tr. P.A. Thiṅṅila, London: Pāli Text Society, 1969), p. 489.

⁴⁵*Dōk* p. 7.6 reads: *phyir mi ldog pa'i sa bgrod pa gcig pur gyur pa*. Lamotte p. 34, P p. 3c.2, and D p. 5.1 read: *phyir mi ldog pa'i sa bgrod pa gcig par gyur*.

The “irreversible grounds” (*phyir mi ldog pa'i sa, avaiivartika-bhūmi*) are stages beyond which a Bodhisattva is no longer capable of backsliding, which Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 195.3) identifies as the eighth through tenth grounds. Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 60.7 only states that this refers to the eighth ground. He writes, “When one attains a level on which one is prophesied to omniscience one has progressed to the irreversible grounds. Because of operating by way of manifest activity on the seven former grounds they have not attained the irreversible grounds, which are free from manifest activity.” Wonch'uk cites the same explanation (which he attributes to *Nye ba'i 'od*), and both he and Jang-chup-dzu-trül indicate that this quality indicates the “great realization” (*rtogs pa chen po*) of these Bodhisattvas.

⁴⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 61.3 identifies these grounds as being great love (*byams pa chen po*) and great compassion (*snying rje chen po*).

⁴⁷The Sanskrit rendering of these names is taken from Lamotte, p. 34. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 202.1) states that according to the explanations of the '*Phags pa'i tshigs nges par 'grel pa'i mdo* and the texts of the Sarvāstivādins Maitreya and so forth are tenth ground Bodhisattvas who will attain Buddhahood in one more lifetime, and who presently reside in Tuṣita. He adds, however, that this does not accord with Mahāyāna explanations. He cites several opinions of Mahāyāna thinkers, including that of the author of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, who holds that these Bodhisattvas are completely enlightened in this very lifetime. See also note 178.

⁴⁸Dok p. 8.2, P p. 3c.3, D p. 5.2, and K p. 4b.2 read: *tshul bzhin kun 'dri*. Lamotte p. 34 reads: *tshul bzhin kun 'dris*.

⁴⁹His name literally means 'Explainer of the Thought That is the Profound Meaning' (Tib.: *don zab dgongs pa nges par 'grel*). Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 212.2) states that this Bodhisattva is so named "because this Bodhisattva explains by way of the mode of the profound meaning through the four correct analyses" (*byang chub sems dpa' des so so yang dag par rig pa bzhis don zab mo'i tshul gyis rnam par 'grel pa'i phyir*). The four correct analyses are discussed in chapter ten of this sūtra.

Note the unusual structure of this chapter: this is the only chapter in the sūtra in which the Buddha does not speak. It is a dialogue between the two Bodhisattvas mentioned at the beginning of this section, Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana and Vidhivat-paripṛcchaka, and Buddha does not appear in the conversation.

⁵⁰This term (*rgyal ba'i sras, jina-putra*) is an epithet of Bodhisattvas. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 213.1) cites Paramārtha's *Brjed byang*, which explains that they are said to be children of the Buddha because they have five qualities. They are: (1) seeds (*sa bon*), because these Bodhisattvas "are able to obtain the seed of Buddhahood due to belief in the Great Vehicle"; (2) mothers (*yum*), "because the perfection of wisdom gives birth to the qualities of Buddhas"; (3) wombs (*mngal gyi gnas*), "since, because the concentrations and meditative stabilizations of Bodhisattvas are abodes, they are [like] wombs"; (4) nurses (*ma ma*), since "because love and compassion thoroughly cause the achievement of the path through sustaining Bodhisattvas they are [like] nurses"; and (5) father-like (*yab dang 'dra ba*), since "because the transformations of the basis (*gnas gyur, āśraya-parāvṛtti*) that take place from the first ground to the Buddha ground approximate [the state of] a Buddha they are 'like a father'." He adds (line 7) that the *Yogācārabhūmi* explains that a Buddha is a 'Conqueror' (*rgyal ba, jina*) "because of having conquered Demons who are Forders, obstructions and so

forth and because he outshines many [others] by way of birth, lineage and so forth” (*mu stegs can dang nyon mongs pa'i bdud la sogs pa las rgyal bar gyur pa'i phyir dang / skye gnas dang gdung rgyud la sogs pas mang po zil gyis gnon pa'i phyir ro*). See *Compassion* pp. 107-9.

⁵¹The term “son of [good] lineage” (*rigs kyi bu, kula-putra*) is often used as a form of polite address in Buddhist sūtras. The *Tshig mdzod* (p. 2686) states that this is “a name of endearment which a Master uses for disciples” (*slob dpon gyis rang gi slob ma rnams la 'bod pa'i gces ming*).

According to Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary on Ālo-sang-dā-yang's *Brief Expression*), this refers to Bodhisattvas who have generated a mind of the pure unusual attitude (*lhag bsam dag pa'i sems bskyed*) and have entered the first Bodhisattva ground, at which point they are said to belong to Buddha's lineage and to surpass all Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Ālo-sang-dā-yang (p. 88) states: “On this ground, since one has been born into the lineage of the Tathāgata, the King of Dharma, one outshines Hearers and Solitary Realizers by way of lineage and, when one gives gifts of one's own body, resources, and roots of virtue — due to having destroyed utterly the possibility of generating manifest miserliness whether one is awake or dreaming — one gives them without observing the three spheres, like moving something from one's right hand to one's left hand.”

Gan-den Tri-ba comments: “This ground means the first ground. The Tathāgata refers to Buddha, who is described as a king. He is not a king of a country or of wealth, but of dharma. That this Bodhisattva is born into the lineage of the Tathāgata means that he is a child of the Conqueror, Buddha, who is a king of dharma....A Bodhisattva outshines (*zil gyis gnon*) them [i.e., Hearers and Solitary Realizers] by way of lineage because no matter how many good qualities a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer possesses, he does not have an altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment

which is a pure unusual thought, and thus does not possess the factor that brings one near to Buddhahood" [tr. Jules Levinson].

As these sources indicate, the common translation of this term as "son of good family" is misleading, since it implies that Buddha is congratulating high-born Hindus (i.e., Brahmins or Kshatriyas) on their caste, whereas he is indicating that the person he addresses is a member of his own lineage, that is to say, a Bodhisattva who is recognized by Buddha as his spiritual son.

See also: *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* pp. 222-3 and David Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Boston: Shambhala, 1987), pp. 190-1.

⁵²These two terms, compounded ('*du byas, saṃskṛta*) and uncompounded ('*du ma byas, asaṃskṛta*), are a common division that includes all phenomena. "Compounded" refers to phenomena that arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. It literally means 'put together' or 'made', and its opposite term, uncompounded, refers to whatever is not produced in dependence upon causes and conditions. According to Asaṅga's *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (I.11), everything that is subject to arising (*utpāda*), extinction (*vyaya*), and abiding and change (*sthityanyathātva*) is the compounded.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 217.5) states that the 'compounded' is so called because it is produced from the accumulation of many conditions. Quoting the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*bye brag tu bshad pa chen po*), he states: "Whatever phenomena subsist on the activity of aggregation by causes and conditions and are related with such are compounded." Those that do not are uncompounded.

On page 218.1 he quotes Asaṅga to the effect that the uncompounded is non-conceptual, and hence Wonch'uk draws the conclusion that the compounded is associated with conceptuality. He adds that the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* states: "Whatever also appears in terms of production, cessation, abiding, and change is 'compounded'. Whatever lacks production, cessation, abiding, and change is 'uncompounded'." He adds that a commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom provides

an alternative explanation: “Whatever is apprehendable is ‘compounded’. Whatever is not apprehendable is ‘uncompounded’.” On line 5 he cites another alternative explanation from a commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom: “Whatever is apprehended in terms of signs is ‘compounded’; whatever is not apprehended in terms of signs is ‘uncompounded’.” He adds (p. 219.2) that one scholar equates the compounded with the other-powered nature (*gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid, paratantra-svabhāva*), and the uncompounded with the thoroughly established nature (*yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid, pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). He indicates that he considers this to be a correct explanation.

On page 220.2 he states: “The root of compounded phenomena is produced from incorrect thoughts. Due to incorrect thoughts afflictions are produced. Because of afflictions, karmas are produced. Due to karmas, ripening [of karma] is generated. Incorrect thoughts arise from apprehending objects. Since these very objects do not truly exist, due to error [ordinary beings] exaggeratedly adhere to them as existent. Because those very objects do not [truly] exist, those incorrect thoughts also do not exist. Since incorrect thoughts do not exist, afflictions are also non-existent. Because afflictions do not exist, karmas are also non-existent. Because karmas are non-existent, ripening [of karma] is also non-existent. Because even their root is not real, all compounded phenomena are also unreal.”

According to Geshe Belden Drakba (oral commentary), the term ‘compounded’ has two meanings: (1) it can mean that when causes and conditions are brought together then their effect will occur; or (2) it can mean that causes and conditions have already been brought together and their effect has been established. According to Wonch’uk (p. 13.3), there are three kinds of uncompounded phenomena: (1) space (*nam mkha’*, *ākāśa*); (2) analytical cessations (*so sor brtags ’gog, pratisamkhyā-nirodha*); and (3) non-analytical cessations (*so sor brtags min gyi ’gog pa, apratisamkhyā-nirodha*).

Although Wonch’uk lists space as an uncompounded phenomenon, it is unclear in both the sūtra and the commentaries where space (*nam mkha’*, *ākāśa*) fits into this

division. The sūtra mentions it in several places and indicates that it is unchanging, omnipresent, and not produced from causes and conditions, and so it cannot be included within the compounded. On the other hand, the sūtra indicates that the un-compounded is to be equated with the thoroughly established nature (*yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid, pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*) and the ultimate (*don dam pa, paramārtha*), and although the ultimate is compared to space in chapter seven of the sūtra (in the sense that both are omni-pervasive) there is no question that in the sūtra and its commentaries space is not ultimate. Thus it does not seem to belong anywhere in the division of reality put forth in this text, but it is accepted as a reality and is mentioned several times in the sūtra.

The main point of this section in the *Samdhinirmocana* is that neither of these designations ultimately reflects the true nature of phenomena; rather, they are merely designated conventionally and have no ultimate validity. This idea is found in Wonch'uk's commentary on p. 222.3, where he states: "Because even the compounded is not compounded the un-compounded is also similarly not un-compounded. Because they are imputed in this way, 'compounded' and 'un-compounded' are inexpressible." See also *Visuddhimagga* XIV.456 and *Compendium* pp. 29 and 102.

⁵³There are a number of possible interpretations of this passage, and the text itself does not give a clear indication of how it should be taken. For instance, the statement that the terms "compounded" and "un-compounded" are mere conventional designations used by Superiors could be based on the Mahāyāna idea that Buddha teaches many doctrines that are expedient devices aimed at enhancing the understanding of a particular audience but which are not his final thought. They are only provisionally true and were taught for a particular purpose. An important theme in this sūtra is that this work differentiates well which teachings are to be taken as definitive and which are not, and this passage could be concerned with indicating that the differentiation of phenomena into compounded and un-compounded is non-definitive.

On the other hand, this text also exhibits a distrust of names and conceptualizations, and in a number of places we are told that names and conventional designations do not express the true nature of a thing. They do not express either its particular characteristics in the manner in which they are experienced in conventional direct experience, nor do they convey the existential reality of direct experience of their final nature. In addition to simply indicating that the distinction between “compounded” and “uncompounded” is not definitive, this passage seems to imply a more general warning against reliance on names and concepts, that any name one attaches to something does not truly express what its referent is, but instead indicates conceptual ideas about that referent. This does not seem to entail, however, that names are to be abandoned (since the *sūtra* freely utilizes many terms without qualifying their usage), but rather that one should be cautious about uncritically accepting them as accurate designations of their referents.

⁵⁴This phrase is fairly ambiguous in Tibetan, and the translation reflects this. *Dok* p. 9.2, *P* p. 3d.3, *D* p. 6.1, *V* p. 83c.5, *Lamotte* p. 35, and *K* p. 5a.1 read: ‘*du byas dang ’dus ma byas su ma gtogs pa gang ci brjod kyang de yang de dang ’dra ba nyid du gyur*. The meaning seems to be that any expression about any phenomenon is merely a conventional designation and has no ultimate validity.

⁵⁵*Dok* p. 9.3 and *K* p. 5a.2 read: *dngos po med pa ni brjod pa yang med pas / dngos po de yang gang zhe na*. *Lamotte* p. 35 reads: “Since non-things are also lacking expression, what are things?” (*brjod pa ni dngos po med pa can yang ma yin te / dngos po de ’ang gang zhe na*). *P* p. 3d.3 and *D* p. 6.1 are almost identical to *Lamotte*.

According to *Bhāṣya* p. 9.4, this refers to Buddha’s teaching about the other-powered character (*gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid, paratantra-lakṣaṇa*).

⁵⁶According to *ME* (pp. 378-390), a Superior (*'phags pa, ārya*) is a person who has attained the path of seeing (*mtshong ba'i lam, darśana-mārga*), the third of the Buddhist paths. In Mahāyāna, this means that such a person has had direct experience of emptiness (*stong pa nyid, śūnyatā*). All beings below this level of attainment are referred to as ordinary beings (*so so'i skyes bu, prthagjana*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 76.4), however, only states that these Superiors are "Buddha's Hearers" (*sangs rgyas kyi nyan thos rnams*). Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 233.6) states: "Because they are thoroughly endowed with the uncontaminated paths of Superiors [and] because they have become distant from sinful qualities, they are called 'Superiors'."

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 76.4) states: "'wisdom' [refers to] wisdom of calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are mixed [see chapter eight]; this is because it is not of various aspects. 'Vision' is wisdom of calm abiding and special insight that observe doctrines that are unmixed; this is because it is of various aspects."

⁵⁷According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 76.6), "the suchness of phenomena, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, the non-dual character has the character of non-duality, and so it is 'inexpressible'." (*brjod du med pa, anabhilāpya*).

⁵⁸According to *Bhāṣya* p. 9.4, this refers to Buddha's teaching about the other-powered character (*gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid, paratantra-lakṣaṇa*).

⁵⁹See *Bhāṣya* p. 9.5, which states that this refers to the thoroughly established character (*yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid, pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*).

⁶⁰Dok p. 11.1, P p. 3e.6, D p. 7.3, V p. 83d.6, and K p. 5b.5 read: *bstan na*. Lamotte p. 36 reads: *bsnang na*, and he translates this (p. 171) as "*fait apparaître*".

⁶¹*Vaidūrya*, according to Chandra Das (*A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 877), can refer to three different types of lapis-lazuli: (1) a yellow lapis-lazuli called a *mañjuri*; (2) a green lapis-lazuli called a *sugata*; and (3) a white lapis-lazuli called a *sūnya*.

In his discussion of the analogy of the magician's illusion, Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 238.3) compares the magician to the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*, *ālaya-vijñāna*), which from beginningless time has created things that are unreal. The magician's skillful assistants are compared to the seven collections of consciousness, which are subordinate to the basis-consciousness. On p. 239.3 he compares the sticks, stones, etc. that serve as the basis of the magician's illusory creations to the seeds (*sa bon*, *bija*) in the basis-consciousness. The jewels, horses, etc. that the audience perceives are like fruits (or results: '*bras bu*, *phala*). On p. 241.3 he cites Paramārtha's opinion that the childish ordinary beings referred to in this passage are "ordinary beings with the views of small children; they are [beings with] great desire....[They are beings who are] 'susceptible to generating the views of Forders' (*mu stegs can*, *tīrtika*).” He adds: “Here [the term] ‘children’ indicates those with an ignorant nature. ‘Obscured’ indicates that they are susceptible to bewilderment. This is the basis for generating exaggerated adherence....‘Those without knowledge’ are susceptible to disordered wisdom. This indicates that due to the power of bewilderment they have exaggerated adherence to real compounded and uncompounded phenomena.”

The simile of the magician's illusion is an important one, and is found in many Mahāyāna treatises as a description of the nature of reality. In one of his lectures on Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Seventy Topics* (*don bdun cu*, from an unpublished manuscript of Jeffrey Hopkins' translation, which was kindly lent to me by the translator), Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (in the context of discussing the Yogācāra-Svāntarika-Madhyamaka system) said: “In the example of the magician's illusion, the illusory objects do have a mode of subsistence only due to the fact that things are appearing to an erroneous consciousness, an eye consciousness that is affected by a *mantra*. In

terms of positing objects as existing, objects such as tables, chairs, and so forth do not appear to erroneous consciousnesses but to non-defective consciousnesses. Through appearing to such consciousnesses a mode of subsistence is posited to them; thus they do have a mode of subsistence. But we see objects as if they had their own independent mode of subsistence, just as the audience sees illusory objects as if they existed totally in their own right. They may exist in their own right, but only through the power of their appearing to the mind....The magician knows the source of his illusions' appearance; so he does not believe in them. This is like a person who has understood emptiness and remembers it; even though objects still seem to exist in a certain way, he does not believe in it. If someone came into the audience who had missed the *mantra* throwing, he would just see the stone or stick. This is like a Buddha. A Buddha has neither the false appearance nor an agreement with a false appearance. Therefore, through the example of a magician's illusion you can get some idea of what it is like to posit an independent existence to something that does not have it" [transcript, p. 156]. For other discussions of the example of a magician's illusions, see Sylvain Lévi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* p. 59.5-21 and Ronald Davidson, *Buddhist Systems of Transformation*, University Microfilms, 1985, pp. 232-5, which discusses this passage in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*.

⁶²See *Bhāṣya* p. 9.5, which states that this means that they emphatically adhere to their own views.

⁶³The adverb "closely" is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 36, P p. 4a.1, D p. 7.6, and V p. 83e.2, which insert *nye bar*, which is omitted in *Ādok* p. 11.6 and K p. 6a.2.

⁶⁴The word order in *Ādok* p. 12.1-2 and K p. 6a.3 is different from that of Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.3, D p. 7.7, and V p. 83e.2. *Ādok* and K read: *gang 'di ltar snang ba 'di ni*

glang po che'i tshogs ma yin no. Lamotte etc. read: *glang po che'i tshogs [snang ba: omitted in V] gang yin pa 'di ni med do*.

⁶⁵Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.5, and D p. 8.2 differ from *Dok* p. 12.4 and K p. 6a.7 in stating that these beings think that the creations exist: *sgyu ma byas pa 'di ni yod*. *Dok* and K read: *'di ni sgyu ma byas pa yin no*.

⁶⁶*Dok* p. 12.4 and K p. 6a.7 read: *'di ni mig slu bar byed pa snyam du sems shing*. Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.5, and D p. 8.2 read: *mig slu bar byed pa 'di ni yod do snyam du sems cing*.

⁶⁷*Dok* p. 12.5 and K p. 6a.8 read: *don ji lta ba bzhin du*. Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.6, and D p. 8.3 omit *ji lta ba bzhin du*.

⁶⁸The adverb “closely” is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 37, P p. 4a.7, and D p. 8.3, which insert *nye bar*.

⁶⁹Ordinary beings (*so so'i skye bo*, *prthagjana*) are beings who have not reached the path of seeing (*mthong lam*, *darśana-mārga*), and so have not directly perceived emptiness (*stong pa nyid*, *śūnyatā*). Due to this, they assent to the false appearances of things and do not perceive them in terms of their true nature, i.e., emptiness. As *Abhidharmasamuccaya* I.1 states, they lack the qualities of Superiors (*'phags pa*, *ārya*); see note 56 and *Somme* notes p. 39*.

⁷⁰*Dok* p. 13.5 and K p. 6b.7 read: *'jug par 'gyur ba*; omitted in Lamotte p. 38, P p. 4b.4, and D p. 9.1. The word order of Lamotte, P, and D is also very different from that of *Dok* and K.

⁷¹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 82.2) states that the example of these magical illusions illustrates the nature of the phenomena of ordinary existence, which are cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*). The assertion that phenomena are cognition-only is discussed in chapter eight of this sūtra. Jang-chup-dzu-trül states that the import of this section is a demonstration that external phenomena are cognition-only in the sense that external objects do not exist (*phyi rol gyi dngos po yod pa ma yin*). See also *Somme* notes pp. 21-2*.

⁷²See *Bhāṣya* p. 9.2-6.

⁷³*Dōk* p. 14.1 and *K* p. 7a.2 read: *ye shes*. *Lamotte* p. 38, *P* p. 4b.7, and *D* p. 9.3 read: *shes pa*.

⁷⁴According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 256.1), this line indicates the faults of elaborations (*spros pa, prapañca*). The statement that they "abide in duality" refers to (the dichotomy of) compounded and the uncompounded. His discussion focuses on elaborations of speech (*smra ba'i spros pa, vāda-prapañca*), which he divides into eight types of conceptuality of the unreal (*yang dag pa ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pa, abhūta-parikalpa*). He adds: "Because children are obscured due to differentiating dualistically and due to bewilderment with respect to inexpressible objects of activity they greatly delight in and exaggeratedly adhere to the two types of phenomena — compounded and uncompounded — and to the eight types of elaborations." He then cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*: "Because children do not thoroughly understand suchness in that way, on this basis the eight [types of] conceptions arise, whereby the three [types of] phenomena arise and all the worlds of sentient beings and environments are produced. Also, regarding the eight conceptions, the first is conception of entityness: this [refers to] any differentiations of the specific entitynesses of all phenomena and conceptions of 'form' and so forth. The second [type] is conception of attributes: this

[includes] conceptions [such as,] 'This is demonstrable'; 'This is not demonstrable' with respect to those very things that are nominally designated as form and so forth. The third [type] is conception that apprehends wholeness: [conceptions] apprehending self, sentient beings, houses, armies, forests, etc. with respect to those very things that are nominally designated as form and so forth. The fourth [type] is the conception that thinks 'I'. The fifth [type] is the conception that thinks 'mine': [conceptions] apprehending phenomena that are associated with contamination and that are associated with appropriation as 'I' and 'mine'. The sixth [type] is conception of the pleasant. The seventh [type] is conception of the unpleasant. The eighth [type] is conception that is reversed from those two. [The last three] respectively are explained as being 'conceptions arisen from things that are beautiful, non-beautiful, and neither of those'."

According to Hsüan-tsang (*slob dpon hyan tsang*; cited by Wonch'uk on p. 257.1-2), these eight types of elaborations "are undefiled and neutral fruitions that have a nature of knowledges that one is born with. In another way, they have a nature that is conceptual and analytical." He adds, "With respect to the phrase, 'give rise to three [types of] phenomena': The first three conceptions produce the bases of elaborations of conceptuality and the things that are objects of observation of the six sense powers and the six objects [of their corresponding senses]. The middle two conceptions produce the view of the transitory collection (*'jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāya-dṛṣṭi*) and the pride of thinking 'mine'. The last three respectively produce desire, hatred, and delusion. With respect to that, because the basis and the object of observation of the sense powers serve as supports they generate the view of the transitory collection and the pride of thinking 'I'; and because the view of the transitory collection and the pride of thinking 'I' serve as supports one generates desire, hatred, and delusion. Therefore, you should know that the factors of workings of all the worlds of sentient beings and environments are entirely indicated by these three phenomena."

⁷⁵Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 83.2) states that the first line indicates the class of pure phenomena (see *ME* pp. 204-212 for a list of these) and the second line indicates the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena. The third and fourth lines indicate the faults of those who abide in the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena. He adds (p. 83.5): "The statement — 'Those children, obscured by ignorance, delight in elaborations of speech and abide in duality' — indicates that those children, obscured by ignorance, delight in elaborations of speech due to not knowing that which is endowed with a character that is ultimately inexpressible [text correction: read *par* for *pas*]; and due to not knowing that which is endowed with a non-dual character they accumulate phenomena of the discordant class by way of the character of duality from the standpoint of abiding in duality." The last two lines indicate that those children who do not understand (or who wrongly understand) the ultimate that is ineffable and of a non-dual character "will certainly be born again and again in the three bad transmigrations as sheep, oxen, and so forth and — having rejected those who propound that all phenomena are cognition-only — they will be reborn here in cyclic existence for a long time". These lines "indicate the faults of those who abide in the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena".

This entire chapter, beginning with the question of Bodhisattva Vidhivat-paripṛcchaka (p. 4), is quoted by Asaṅga in his *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (Peking 5539, vol. 110, pp. 83.2.7-84.2.2). He quotes it in connection with his discussion of the character of the ultimate (*don dam pa'i mtshan nyid, paramārtha-lakṣaṇa*). He says that the ultimate has five characteristics: "(1) it is a character that is inexpressible; (2) it is a character that is non-dual; (3) it is a character that completely transcends the sphere of argumentation; (4) it is a character that completely transcends difference and non-difference; and (5) it is a character that is everywhere of one taste." He then indicates that the main point of the first chapter is an explanation of why the ultimate is said to be "a character that is inexpressible and non-dual".

According to Gung-tang (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me*, 1762-1823) — in his *Commentary* on Āzong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po*, entitled *Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying* (Sarnath: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965, pp. 73-4) — this chapter settles the principle of cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam*, *vijñapti-mātra*), that is, the non-duality of subject and object (from Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, University Microfilms, 1984, pp. 54-5).

⁷⁶This Bodhisattva's name literally means 'Elevated [Through] Doctrine' (Tibetan: *chos 'phags*). According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 266.4, citing a commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom), he is so named "because sentient beings vastly increase roots of virtue through [his] teaching doctrines in accordance with their interests" (*mos pa ji lta ba bzhin du chos ston pas sems can rnams dge ba'i rtsa ba rgya cher 'phel bar bya ba'i phyir*).

⁷⁷The Sanskrit rendering of these names is taken from Lamotte, p. 39. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 267.4) states that Dharmodgata went from this world to the land called "Renowned" (Tib.: *grags pa can*) and ripened sentient beings there. Wonch'uk reports (line 6) that Paramārtha states that in relation to our world Kīrtimat is in the eastern direction and very distant (*shar phyogs shin tu ring po*).

⁷⁸The translation of this passage is based on Lamotte's text, p. 39, P p. 4c.2, and D p. 9.6, which read: *sngon gyi dus rnams kyi shin tu snga ma zhig na*. The word order of these texts also differs from that of Ādok pp. 14-15 and K p. 7a-b in that this phrase occurs at the beginning of Dharmodgata's statement, whereas in Ādok and K it occurs three lines into it. Ādok p. 15.1 and K p. 7b.8 read: *bdag sngon gyi gdugs rnams kyi*

ches snga zhig na. Lamotte notes (p. 39 note a) that Asaṅga's *Bhāṣya* also reads *gdugs* (see *Bhāṣya* p. 10.4).

According to *Bhāṣya* p. 10.4, the "early periods" were previous ages during which the Supramundane Victor became enlightened.

⁷⁹The term "Forder" (*mu stegs pa*, *tirthika*) refers to non-Buddhist schools in general. According to Tibetan etymologies (see *ME*, pp. 320-21), they are called "Forders" because their treatises set forth paths leading to high status within cyclic existence or purport to outline ways of crossing over (or fording) the river of cyclic existence altogether. In devotional Hinduism, a *tirtha* is a 'crossing-over-place', a spot (often on the shore of a sacred river such as the Ganges) where a god descended to earth, and which as a result is particularly auspicious as a spot for 'crossing-over', i.e., for getting out of cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*). The verb *tarati* also has the same sense of crossing over.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 86.3), "Forders" are "those arguers who are the masters of different tenet systems and textual systems and collections of monks associated [with them]" (*rtog ge pa grub pa'i mtha' dang gzhung lugs tha dad pa rang rang gi mkhan po dang dge 'dun gyi tshogs dang bcas pa dag go*). The term *tirthika* is often translated as 'heretic', but if these explanations are accurate this is far too negative a term, and so I have chosen to render it with the more literal reading 'Forder'.

⁸⁰The phrase "two-pointed mind" (*blo gros...gnyis can*, *vimati*) refers to a mind that moves in two directions because of doubt (*the tshom*, *vicikitsā*). See *Bhāṣya* p. 10.7.

⁸¹*Dōk* p. 15.3 and *K* p. 7b.3 read: *blo gros mi mthun pa*. Lamotte p. 39, *P* p. 4c.6, and *D* p. 10.1 read: "who had bad (or inferior) minds" (*blo gros ngan pa*).

¹²Ādok p. 15.4 and K p. 7b.3 read: *gcig la gcig kha shags* [K: *gshags*] *kyis brtsad par bgyis / yid byung bar bgyis / gnod par bgyis / mtho btsam par* [K: *pa*] *bgyis / skur pa btab par bgyis te*. Lamotte p. 39, P p. 4c.6, and D p. 10.2 read: “forcefully harmed each other, struck each other, hid from each other, hurt each other, and ruined each other” (*gcig la gcig stobs kyis gnod pa bgyis / zher 'debs pa bgyis / gab gab bgyis / mnan* [P: *gnan*] *par bgyis / tshar gcad pa bgyis te*).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 89.5) states that these Forders cannot understand the ultimate due to five faults: “(1) the fault of thorough searching (*kun du tshol ba'i nyes pa*); (2) the fault of manifest pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi nyes pa*); (3) the fault of exaggerated adherence (*mngon par zhen pa'i nyes pa*); (4) the fault of imputation (*'dogs pa'i nyes pa*); and (5) the fault of argumentation (*rtsod pa'i nyes pa*)”. This list is also found in *Bhāṣya* p. 9.6.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 276.3) comments: “Because those different [groups] were differently minded in terms of various kinds of views that arise from the root of the view of the transitory collection (*'jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), each was discordant with the other.” Because of their discordance they did not have the teachings of the four noble truths in any way.

¹³The Tibetan term is *kye ma* (Skt.: *aho, hā*), which is used to express sorrow or despair.

¹⁴Lamotte p. 39 inserts a *ma* particle after the term “actualization” (*mngon sum du bgyi ba, sāṅsātkāra*), which is found in P p. 4c.8, but not in Ādok p. 15.6, K p. 7b.5, D p. 10.3, L p. 8b.1, or N p. 8b.6, V p. 84c.1 (although it is found in C p. 6b.5). Lamotte, P, and C read: *mngon sum du ma bgyi ba*. I think that the insertion must be an error, since Tathāgatas do realize and actualize the ultimate.

⁸⁵The Tibetan (Dok p. 15.5, K p. 7b.5, Lamotte p. 39, P p. 4c.8, and D p. 10.3) reads: *rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid* (Skt.: *sarvatarka-samatikrānta-lakṣaṇa*).

In this chapter, “argumentation” (*rtog ge, tarka*) refers to logical debate which engages in hairsplitting distinctions and verbal gamesmanship and fails to understand the deeper significance of what is being discussed. Śer-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay (*ser shul dge bshes blo bzang phun tshogs*) — in his commentary on the “Mind-Only” (*sems tsam*) section of D̄zong-ka-ba’s *The Essence of the Good Explanations* (*legs bshad snying po*, which focuses on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*), entitled *Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bres zab don gsal ba'i sgron me* (Mysore: Sera Byes Monastery, n.d., L.C. #75-90632), p. 23a.2 — lists four signs of argumentation. He states that it belongs to the sphere of activity (*spyod yul*) of: (1) signs (*mtshan ma*); (2) expressions (*brjod pa*); (3) conventions (*tha snyad*); and (4) dispute (*rtsod pa*). This accords with the sense in which this term is used in the *sūtra* and this indicates that argumentation is something to be avoided, since it prevents one from realizing the ultimate.

Although in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* its connotations are always negative, however, this is not so in all of Indian philosophy, and in Nyāya treatises it is seen as a valuable way of getting at the truth. Karl Potter (*Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Princeton, 1977, p. 203) writes:

Tarka is sometimes rendered *reductio ad absurdum*, which is not altogether inaccurate, since *tarka* involves proposing a false hypothesis and then by showing it false proving the truth of its negation, or at any rate helping to prove the truth of its negation.

According to Gautama, *tarka* involves reasoning from causes in order to ascertain the nature of a thing whose nature is not known (*avijñātataṭṭve arthe kāraṇopapattita taṭṭvajiñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ*; *Nyāya-sūtras*, I.1.40). It is distinguished from *anumāna* (inference), but can serve as an aid to a *pramāṇa* (a means of correct

knowledge). It is said to be a way of settling doubts concerning a conclusion that one reaches based upon a *pramāṇa*.

An example of *tarka* reasoning given by Varadarāja (the author of the *Tārkikarākṣa*; this text is summarized in Karl Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume II: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, pp. 629-640; see especially pp. 637-640) is the case of a person who looks at an area of ground and does not perceive a pot there, and then — doubting whether there might be an unperceived pot on the ground — reasons that pots have a nature that allows them to be perceived. Thus, if there were a pot on the ground it would be perceivable, but since he does not see a pot he concludes that there is no pot on the ground (see Lawrence Davis, “*Tarka* in the Nyāya Theory of Inference”, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 9, 1981, pp. 105-120).

In Nyāya, *tarka* is seen as a valuable type of reasoning that can be used to supplement and test the *pramāṇas*, but in this sūtra it is definitely used in a negative sense and seems to refer to sophistry and mere quibbling that overlooks what is important. According to the thought of the sūtra, the ultimate must be perceived directly through yogic direct perception, and arguing about its nature or characteristics necessarily misses the point. Vasubandhu also sees *tarka* in this way: (1) in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Étienne Lamotte, “*Le Traité de l'Acte* de Vasubandhu (*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*)”, in *MCB* IV, 1935-36, p. 197) he states: “You arguers do not understand in accordance with the meaning of scripture” (*rtog ge pa khyod rnams kyis lung gi don ji lta ba bzhin ma rtogs pas*); (2) in the concluding remarks of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (V.31; in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, p. 462) he states that the treatise is called “Differentiation of the Middle and Extremes” (*madhānta-vibhāga*) “because it is not of the sphere of activity of argumentation and because it cannot be distinguished by disputants” (*tarkasyāgocaratvāt paravādibhirabhedyatvācca*); (3) in the conclusion of the *Viṃśatikā* (V.22; in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, p. 421), however, he seems to be saying that he himself is an arguer: “But it is not possible for

people like me to consider [cognition-only] it in all of its aspects because it is not of the sphere of activity of argumentation" (*sarvaprakārā tu sā mādrśaiścintayitum na śakyate / tarkāviṣayatvāt*).

This attitude toward *tarka* is also found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (I.12), where it is said that the Mahāyāna is not a subject for argumentation:

Contingent, indefinite, not comprehensive,
Obscured, and disheartening as well,
The assertions of arguers are the realm of children;
Thus, this [Mahāyāna] is not the realm of that [argumentation].

*niśrīto 'niyato 'vyāpti sāmśkrītaḥ khedavānapi /
bālāśrayo matastarkastasyāto viṣayo na tat //*

[S. Bagchi, ed., *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* of Asaṅga, Darbhanga, 1970, p. 5.2-3].

See also Sthiramati's commentary on this passage, where he states that argumentation is "contingent" (*aniyata*) because it is based on the argumentation of past philosophers, and it leads to indefiniteness in terms of doctrine.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 84.4) states that the condensed meaning of this whole chapter is the teaching that the ultimate is a character that completely transcends all argumentation. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 278.2) states that this character has five aspects: (1) it is known internally, individually, by oneself; (2) it is a signless sphere of activity; (3) it is inexpressible; (4) it is complete elimination all conventionalities; and (5) it is a character that pacifies all disputation.

¹⁶Dok p. 16.1 and K p. 7b.7 read: *bśhad*. Lamotte p. 40, P p. 4d.2, and D p. 10.5 read: *bsnyad*.

¹⁷As will be developed in the seventh chapter of this sūtra, the “ultimate” (*don dam pa, paramārtha*) refers to something that is non-compounded, lacks production and cessation, and is an object of observation for purification of obstructions. In the *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath ed., p. 47.14), Ḍzong-ka-ba cites Vasubandhu’s division of the ultimate into three types (in *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭikā*, ed. Susumu Yamaguchi, p. 125.9): (1) objective ultimate (*artha-paramārtha, don don dam pa*), e.g., suchness (*tathatā, de bzhin nyid*); (2) attainment ultimate (*prapti-paramārtha, thob pa don dam pa*), e.g., nirvāṇa (*mya ngan las ’das pa*); and (3) practice ultimate (*pratipatti-paramārtha, sgrub pa don dam pa*), e.g., a path (*marga, lam*).

According to Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup’s (*dpal ’byor lhun grub*) *Commentary on Ḍzong-ka-ba’s text* (entitled *Legs bshad snying po’i dka’ ’grel bstan pa’i sgron me*, Delhi: Rong tha mchog sprul nam pa gnyis, 1968, p. 47.6), suchness is an ultimate because an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an ultimate [consciousness] and it [suchness] is the appearing object or object of activity of that consciousness. Nirvāṇa is an ultimate because it is the ultimate object of attainment. Exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise are ultimates because they take the ultimate as their object of observation.

Although this division of the ultimate is found in Vasubandhu, Ḍzong-ka-ba, and Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup, however, the sūtra is only talking about the first type. Regarding why ultimates (*don dam pa, paramārtha*) are so named, Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup states (p. 47.9) that it is because they are objects (*don, artha*) and because they are high (*dam pa, parama*). This etymology is also found in the *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭikā*, p. 125.12-13. See also Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup p. 79, where he lists three types of conventionalities, and p. 80, where he lists synonyms of the ultimate. And see Asaṅga’s *Bhāṣya* p. 11.

¹⁸Ḍok p. 16.2 and K p. 7b.8 read: *don dam pa ni ’phags pa rnams kyi so so* [K: *sor*] *rang gi rig pa yin par ngas bshad la*. Lamotte p. 40 reads: ...*rang gi rig*. P p. 4d.3

and Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 278.1 agree with *Ā*ok and K, whereas D p. 10.5 agrees with Lamotte.

Wonch'uk (p. 278.4) comments: "Due to observing the object of suchness by way of a Superior's non-conceptual exalted wisdom, they manifestly realize their own internal nature" (*'phags pa rnams kyi rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyis de bzhin nyid kyi yul la dmigs pas / nang gi rang gi ngo bo nyid mngon par rtogs pa'o*).

⁸⁹This pattern repeats throughout this and later chapters. It seems to mean that each explanation establishes a different meaning which should help Dharmodgata to understand the character of the ultimate. The Tibetan term *rnam grangs* (Skt.: *paryāya*), which literally means 'enumeration', is translated here as 'form', because each example is one form of explanation which, along with the others enumerated by Buddha, should help Dharmodgata to get a complete picture. An explanation of this term is given by Sthiramati in his *Commentary* to Vasubandhu's *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (commentary to verse I.14, Susumu Yamaguchi, ed. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭīkā*, Tokyo, 1966, p. 62), where he explains that the list of terms given in the verse (i.e., suchness, reality-limit, signlessness, the ultimate, and the element of qualities) are 'forms' or 'enumerations' (*paryāya*, *rnam grangs*) of emptiness. The meaning expounded in Sthiramati's commentary is that each of these terms is cognitively synonymous with emptiness, that each constitutes a portion of the meaning of suchness. This does not mean that terms that are *paryāya* are actual synonyms, but rather that they have common referents. In other words, their meanings and associations overlap, but each indicates a particular perspective through which the ultimate can be viewed.

I think that the meaning of the term *rnam grangs* in the *Samdhinirmocana* is similar to the one expounded by Sthiramati, since each of the explanations that will be given concerning the ultimate will indicate a portion of the meaning of the ultimate, and each one will add another facet to Dharmodgata's understanding. See also Asaṅga's *Paryāyavastu* (*Sde dge sems tsam* vol. *hi*, especially pp. 45a-47b).

⁹⁰Text correction: *Ḍok* p. 16.5 reads: *la yang dag par 'das*. This has been corrected to *las yang dag par 'das* on the basis of *K* p. 8a.1, *Lamotte* p. 40, *P* p. 4d.7, and *D* p. 10.7.

⁹¹*Ḍok* p. 16.7 reads: *shes par bya'o*. *K* p. 8b.2, *Lamotte* p. 40, *P* p. 4d.7, and *D* p. 11.2 read: *rig par bya'o*.

⁹²Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 290.6), in commenting on this passage, quotes the *Tshig nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*: "Moreover, Dharmodgata, I explain that suchness is a complete elimination of four types of things: (1) seeing (*mthong ba*); (2) hearing (*thos pa*); (3) differentiating distinctions (*bye brag phyed pa*); and (4) consciousnesses (*rnam par shes pa thams cad*). But conceptuality and analysis arise within observing these four things."

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 91.6) states: "[This passage] indicates that due to the faults of positing — in dependence upon conventions such as seeing and so forth that living beings and so forth exist — one does not understand the ultimate. [The phrase,] 'in dependence upon conventions such as seeing and so forth' indicates that in dependence upon conventions of seeing, hearing, differentiating distinctions, and consciousness one posits selves, sentient beings, souls, and persons and so forth as existent due to apprehending [them] as enjoyers and agents. Also, due to positing [them] as selves one does not understand the ultimate; therefore, this is the fault of positing [such]."

⁹³*Ḍok* p. 17.2 and *K* p. 8a.4 read: *shes par bya'o*. *Lamotte* p. 40, *P* p. 4e.1, and *D* p. 11.3 read: *rig par bya'o*.

⁹⁴Ādok p. 17.3 and K p. 8a.8 insert *lhung ba*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 40, P p. 4e.1, and D p. 11.3-4. I have omitted it in my translation, since it does not seem to fit and because it does not accord with the parallel structure of the previous passages.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 92.2) comments: “The passage — ‘Furthermore, Dharmodagata...realm of dispute’ — indicates that due to the faults of dispute in which there is attachment and anger with respect to one’s own and others’ positions which are posited in a mutually discordant way one does not understand the ultimate. [The phrase,] ‘mutually discordant positings’ [indicates that] one disputes due to positing discordant tenet systems and textual systems through the power of exaggerated adherence to phenomena and attachment to one’s own position and anger toward the positions of others on this basis. One who is attached to positions and disputes due to exaggerated adherence to phenomena does not understand the ultimate; therefore, just these are the faults of argumentation....Argumentation arises with respect to discordances of non-realization or wrong realization, but because this [i.e., realization of the ultimate] is the opposite of that [i.e., argumentation,] all disputation is completely eliminated.” See also *Kośa* ch. 1 pp. 40-44, which states that conceptions (*saṃjñā*, ‘*du shes*) are the basis of quarrels among philosophical systems, and that feelings (*vedanā*, *tshor ba*) are the basis for disputes among ordinary beings.

⁹⁵This passage is translated with the aid of Lamotte, p. 40, P p. 4e.2, and D p. 4, which read: *skyes bu gang zag ji srid 'tsho ba'i bar du tsha ba dang kha ba'i ro bsten bsten* [P, D: *sten sten*] *pas ni sbrang rtsi'i ro 'am / sha kha ra'i ro la brtag pa 'am / rjes su dpag pa 'am / mos par mi nus so*. Ādok p. 17.4 and K p. 8b.1 read: *skyes bu gang zag ji srid 'tsho'i bar du tsha ba dang kha ba la 'dris pas sbrang rtsi'i ro 'am / kha ra'i ro la brtag pa 'am / rjes su dpag pa 'am / mos par mi nus so*. This passage is discussed in *Bhāṣya*, p. 11.

⁹⁶Dok p. 17.5 and K p. 8b.2 break this with a connective particle *shing*, but Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.3, and D p. 11.5 do not.

⁹⁷Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 94.2) defines “the happiness of inner solitude” (*nang gi rab tu dben pa'i bde ba*, *ādhyātmikam praviveka-sukham*) as: “The happiness of an actual concentration that has been attained (*bsam gtan gyi dngos gzhi thob pa'i bde ba*)” [see note 540]. See also *Somme* notes p. 53*.

⁹⁸Dok p. 17.6 and K p. 8b.3 read: *smra ba*. Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.5, and D p. 11.6 read: *kun tu smra ba*.

⁹⁹Dok p. 17.7 and K p. 8b.4 read: *nang gi 'phags pa'i mi smra bar gyur pa'i bde ba*. Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.5, and D p. 11.6 read: *nang gi mi smra ba 'phags pa'i bde ba*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 314.1) states that this means that “just as those — who are involved with the conventionalities of cyclic existence for a long time and who delight in and exaggeratedly adhere to worldly conventionalities — do not understand the peace of continual bliss [of nirvāṇa], so due to involvement with the sphere of activity of conventionalities, those who are associated with conceptualty and analysis are also unable to understand the character of the ultimate truth, the sphere in which conventionalities are completely eliminated.”

¹⁰⁰Dok p. 18.1, K p. 8b.5: *rnam par rig pa'i tha snyad*. Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.6, and D p. 11.7: *rnam par shes pa'i tha snyad*.

¹⁰¹Dok p. 18.1 breaks this with a connective particle *shing*, but K p. 8b.5, Lamotte p. 41, P p. 4e.6, and D p. 11.7 do not.

¹⁰²According to *Compendium* I.1, this is the transitory collection ('jig tshogs, satkāya) of aggregates (*phung po, skandha*) that we ordinarily view as a real 'I' and 'mine'. See *ME* pp. 258-9 and *Compassion* p. 116.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 94.7), the nirvāṇa referred to is "the element of a nirvāṇa without remaining aggregates" (*phung po lhag med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings*). See *Somme* notes pp. 47*-48*.

¹⁰³*Dok* p. 18.2: *nga yir*; *K* p. 8b.6: *nga 'ir*; *Lamotte* p. 41: *bdag gir*; *P* p. 4e.7, *D* p. 12.1: *bdag gi*.

¹⁰⁴*Dok* p. 18.3, *K* p. 8b.7: *nga'i ba med pa / kun 'dzin pa med*; *Lamotte* p. 41: *bdag gir yongs su 'dzin pa med pa nyid*; *P* p. 4e.7, *D* p. 12.1: *bdag gi yongs su 'dzin pa med pa nyid*. In *Lamotte's* version (p. 41), this phrase reads: "...the lack of thoroughly apprehending 'mine' of those in Uttarakuru" (*byang sgra mi snyan pa dag gi bdag gir yongs su 'dzin pa med pa nyid*).

¹⁰⁵According to *Monier-Williams* (*A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 178), this is one of the nine divisions of the world in traditional Indian cosmology. This is the country of the northern Kurus, situated in the north of India, and described as a country of eternal beatitude. It is said to be square, measuring 20,000 *yojanas* per side, and the beings who live there have life-spans of 1,000 years. In addition to their long lifespans, the inhabitants are said to have exceptionally pleasant lives and to be naturally virtuous. See *Visuddhimagga*, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Pāli Text Society, 1975), p. 15.

Monier-Williams (p. 294) identifies the Kurus as a people of India, and states that Uttarakuru is the northernmost of the four *mahādvīpas* (great continents), or principal divisions of the known world. Uttarakuru was probably situated near the country of the Pāñcalas, beyond the northernmost range of the Himalayas.

¹⁰⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 93.3) states that these five examples are given because there are five types of orientation: “(1) limited orientation (*sel bar mos pa*); (2) orientation toward desire (*'dod pa la mos pa*); (3) orientation toward conceptuality (*rnam par rtog pa la mos pa*); (4) orientation toward conventionalities (*tha snyad la mos pa*); and (5) orientation toward apprehending [the transitory collection] as an I (*bdag gir 'dzin pa la mos pa*).” Each example is posited in terms of a particular type of orientation.

Regarding the first example, Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 307.2) states: “Just as those persons who always only partake of bitter tastes are unable to understand, infer, or imagine the taste of honey, so also householders abide in cyclic existence for a long time and always partake of the taste of worldly agitation and coarse sufferings. Therefore, they are unable to understand, infer, or imagine the very auspicious taste of pure behavior, the bliss of thorough emergence [from the household life]. Therefore, the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* explains, ‘When, out of correct faith, one thoroughly emerges from the home to the homeless [life], because of being released from the various forms of obstructors that are the afflictions of friends and relatives, the misfortunes that reside in a household, and great sufferings, this is the bliss of definite emergence.’”

¹⁰⁷ĀDok p. 18.4 and K p. 9a.1 read: *so so rang gi mtshan med spyod yul te*. The phrase in brackets is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 41, P p. 5a.1, and D p. 12.3, which read: *so so rang rig mtshan med spyod yul te*.

¹⁰⁸This entire chapter is quoted in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* (Peking 5539, pp. 84.2.2-85.5.2). Asaṅga indicates that in this chapter Buddha is discussing the meaning of the third of the five qualities of the ultimate (see note 75), that it is a character completely transcending argumentation (see note 85). This idea is also expressed by Gung-tang (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me*, 1762-1823, in his commentary on Ādzong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po*, entitled *Bstan bcos legs bshad snying po las*

sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba, Lhasa: *Gung thang gsung 'bum*, n.d., vol. *kha*, pp. 8-9).

¹⁰⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 316.6) states that his name is given to him because of his good qualities: "Because his correct exalted wisdom and exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment are uncontaminated virtues and free from affliction, he is called 'Very Pure Intelligence' (Dok, K: *shin tu rnam dag blo gros*; Lamotte, P, D: *blo gros shin tu rnam dag*; Wonch'uk: *shin tu rnam par dag pa'i blo gros*)."

¹¹⁰This reading is aided by Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.3, and D p. 12.2, which read: *don dam pa ni phra ba / zab pa tha dad pa dang tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid*. Dok p. 18.6 and K p. 9a.3 read: *don dam pa phra zhing zab ste gcig dang tha dad pa las yang dag pa'i [K: par] mtshan nyid*.

¹¹¹Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 317.3) comments that Buddhas are said to be "wondrous" (*ngo mtshar*, *āścarya*) because "Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, have two types of qualities: benefits for themselves and benefits for others. Moreover, in order to express praise for the benefits for themselves, [the sūtra] states, 'Supramundane Victor...wondrous'. In order to express praise of the benefits for others, [the sūtra] states, 'Supramundane Victor...said well'."

¹¹²Dok p. 18.7 and K p. 9a.4 read: *'dir sa phyogs gcig cig na*. Lamotte p. 42 N p. 10b.6 have a simpler reading: *sa phyogs zhid na*. P p. 5a.5, L p. 10a.5, D p. 12.5, C p. 8a.4, and V p. 84e.5 read: *sa phyogs shig na*.

¹¹³Dok p. 19.1, K p. 9a.5: *shin tu mang ba*; Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.5, and D p. 12.6: *rab tu mang po*.

¹¹⁴An extra line is inserted in *Ḍok* (p. 18), making eight lines on this page instead of the usual seven. This line is the last line before the verses that concluded the last chapter in Lamotte (p. 41), P (p. 4e.8), D (p. 12.2), and K (p. 8b.7), which read: Lamotte: *chos 'phags de bzhin du rtog ge pa thams cad kyis kyang don dam pa rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid brtag pa 'am / rjes su dpag pa 'am mos par mi nus so*. *Ḍok* and K read: *chos 'phags de bzhin du rtog ge pa thams cad kyis / rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid don dam pa la brtag pa 'am / rjes su dpag pa 'am / mos par mi nus so*.

Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary) identifies the “ground of engagement through belief” as the first two paths, the path of accumulation (*tshogs lam*, *sambhāra-mārga*) and the path of preparation (*sbyor lam*, *prayoga-mārga*), in which one’s practice is motivated by desire to emulate the exalted states of beings in the higher grounds. According to Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (oral commentary), this is called “engagement through belief” because at this stage one is an ordinary being (*so so'i skye bo*, *prthag-jana*) and so does not realize emptiness directly (*mngon sum du*), but by way of belief [from an unpublished transcript of his lectures, p. 85]. According to *Mahāyānasamgraha* III.3, entering this level involves taking interest in the fact that all phenomena are cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam*, *viññapti-mātra*). See *Somme* pp. 155-6 and notes p. 29*; *Abhidharmasamuccaya* III.2; and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. N. Dutt, Patna, 1966), pp. 218.8-222.23, and Sāgaramegha’s *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyāna* (Otani Sde dge, *sems tsam* vol. 11), pp. 328a.3-333a.4.

Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 321.6), quoting Vasubandhu’s *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya*, states that Bodhisattvas on this level engage in religious practice through belief because “since they do not directly realize suchness, in dependence upon belief they practice their practices by way of effort” (*de bzhin nyid mngon sum du ma byas pas / mos pa la brten nas brison 'grus kyis spyod pa rnam spyod do*).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 98.5) states that even though they are at this level they are unable to understand the ultimate due to two types of obscurations:

“(1) thorough obscuration with respect to imputations (*gdags pa la shin tu rmongs pa*); and (2) thorough obscuration with respect to reasoning (*rigs pa la shin tu rmongs pa*).”

Kensur Yeshe Thupten (oral commentary), discussing the first two paths (which constitute the ground of engagement through belief), remarked: “They are actual grounds (*sa dngos gzhi*) because of the factor of method, but not grounds of thorough completion (*yongs rdzogs*) because the two collections [of merit and wisdom] are not complete. One must accumulate the collections for three periods of innumerable great eons. The first of those three is not complete until one achieves the path of seeing. Here, even though the factor of method is complete, the factor of wisdom (*shes rab*) is not complete. That is why it is called ‘engagement through belief’” [tr. Jules Levinson].

¹¹⁵Dok p. 19.1 and K p. 9a.5 read: *phan tshun nas lhags te tshogs nas*. Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.6, and D p. 12.6 have a different reading: *phan tshun nas mchis shing mchis nas 'dus te mchis nas*; and they place this phrase later in the passage.

¹¹⁶Dok p. 19.2, K p. 9a.5, L p. 10a.6, and D p. 12.7 read: *la brtsams te*. The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 42, P p. 6, N p. 10b.7, C p. 8a.5, and V p. 84e.6, which read: *bsam pa las brtsams te*.

¹¹⁷According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 96.7), the condensed meaning of this chapter is the teaching of (the ultimate’s) “character of completely transcending difference or non-difference” (*tha dad pa dang tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid*). He also divides this discussion into four parts: (1) positing the character of the ultimate (*don dam pa'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhang pa*); (2) positing the character of obscurations with respect to that (*de la shin tu rmongs pa'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhang pa*); (3) positing the character of examples of those (*de dag gi dpe'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhang pa*); and (4) positing the character of condensing those topics (*de dag gi dngos po bsdu ba'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhang*

pa). The first ranges from p. 14 line 1, “Supramundane Victor....” up to line 6, “...wondrous.” The second part begins on line 7 and ends on p. 20 line 4, “...not oriented properly.” The third part begins on line 5 and ends with the final line of p. 21. The fourth part is comprised of the concluding verses.

¹¹⁸This phrase is translated with the aid of Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.6, and D p. 12.6, which read: *de na*. *Ḍok* p. 19.2 and K p. 9a.6 read: *de la*.

¹¹⁹The words “not suitable as” (*mi rung*) are not found in Lamotte, P, or D, and occur only in *Ḍok* p. 19.3 and K p. 9a.7, which read: *tha dad pa ma yin par mi rung gi*. Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.7, and D p. 12.7 read: *tha dad pa ma lags pa ma lags kyi*.

¹²⁰*Ḍok* p. 19.4, K p. 9a.8: *kha cig ni the tshom dang yid gnyis su gyur nas*; Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5a.8, D p. 13.1: *the tshom du gyur pa'i blo gros can / yid gnyis su gyur pa kha cig ni*.

¹²¹*Ḍok* p. 19.5 and K p. 9b.1 insert *zer*, which is absent in Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.1 and D p. 13.1.

¹²²*Ḍok* p. 19.5, K p. 9b.1: *bden par smra ba ni gang / brdzun par smra ba ni gang*. Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.1, D p. 13.2: *gang ni med par mchi ba lags / gang ni shob be mchis lags*.

¹²³“Properly oriented” translates *tshul bzhin zhugs pa* (Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.2, D p. 13.2: *tshul bzhin du zhugs pa lags*), and “improperly oriented” translates *tshul bzhin ma yin par zhugs pa* (Lamotte, P, D: *tshul bzhin du ma lags par zhugs pa lags*).

¹²⁴ $\bar{D}ok$ p. 19.7 and K p. 9b.5 insert *kyang*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.3, and D p. 13.3, which have a *kyang* after the words “having heard that” (*mthong nas*) which is not found in $\bar{D}ok$ or K. Also, the instrumental reading is found only in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 19.7 and K p. 9b.3, which end this phrase with an instrumental particle (*pas*), which is not found in Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.3, or D p. 13.3.

¹²⁵Note the difference in word order in the different texts: the term “ultimate” (*don dam pa*) is placed earlier in Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.3, and D p. 13.3 than in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 19.7 and K p. 9b.5. I think $\bar{D}ok$ and K have a clearer reading, since the placement of *don dam pa* in the sentence clearly shows that it should go with the term “character” (*mtshan nyid*).

¹²⁶The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 42, P p. 5b.3-4, D p. 13.4, L p. 10b.6-7, N p. 11b.4-5, C p. 8b.3-4, and V p. 85a.2-3, and are not found in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.1. “Just” translates *sha stag*; “obscured” translates *rmongs pa*; and “unskilled” translates *mi mkhas pa*. See $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20 line 3, where *blun pa* replaces *rmongs pa* and *mi mkhas pa* occurs.

¹²⁷The instrumental reading (“because”) is only found in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.3 and K p. 9b.6, which end this phrase with...*mi shes pas*. Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.6, and D p. 13.5 read:...*mi shes pa*.

“Even” (*kyang*) is only found in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.2 and K p. 9b.5, and is omitted in Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.5, and D p. 13.5. “All” translates *kun* in $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.2 and K p. 9b.5, and *thams cad* in Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.5, and D p. 13.5.

¹²⁸ $\bar{D}ok$ p. 20.3, K p. 9b.6: *blun pa*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.6, and D p. 13.5: *rmongs pa*.

¹²⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 325.4) comments that they are “childish” (*byis pa, bāla*) because of having ignorant natures (*ma rig pa'i bdag nyid*). They are “obscured” (*rmongs pa*) because they are distinguished by their ignorance (*ma rig pa las rnam par 'byed pa*). They are “unclear” (*mi gsal ba*) because they still have not attained the faculty of knowing all of the unknown (*da dung mi shes pa kun shes pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*). They are “unskilled” (*mi mkhas pa*) because they still have not attained the faculty of omniscience (*da dung kun shes pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*), and are “not properly oriented” (*tshul bzhin ma lags*) because they still have not attained faculties endowed with omniscience (*da dung kun shes pa dang ldan pa'i dbang po ma thob pa'i phyir*). Wonch'uk concludes (line 7): “Therefore, they have not directly realized the mode of ultimate suchness that is a character which is neither one nor different (*des na gcig dang tha dad pa ma yin pa'i mtshan nyid don dam par de bzhin nyid kyi tshul mngon du ma gyur pa yin no*).” See also *Bhāṣya* p. 11.

¹³⁰Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.7, and D p. 13.6 read: “those who individually investigate in that way” (*de ltar so sor rtog pa dag ni*). *Ā*Dok p. 20.4 and K p. 9b.7 read: *de ltar zhugs pa [K: rnam] ni*.

¹³¹*Ā*Dok p. 20.4, K p. 9b.7: *shes pa*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.7, D p. 13.6: *rtogs pa*.

¹³²*Ā*Dok p. 20.5 and K p. 9b.8 have: *'o na*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5b.8, and D p. 13.7.

¹³³“Even” (*kyang*) occurs only in *Ā*Dok p. 20.6, and not in K p. 9b.8, Lamotte, P p. 5b.8, or D p. 13.7. They also differ in that Lamotte, P, and D read: *byis pa so so'i skye bo*, while *Ā*Dok and K read: *so so'i skye bo*.

¹³⁴Dok p. 20.6 and K p. 10a.1 read: *so so'i skye bor gyur bzhin du bla na med pa'i grub pa dang / bde ba'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob par 'gyur ro*. Lamotte p. 43: *so so'i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par yang 'gyur*.

¹³⁵Dok p. 20.6-7, K p. 110a.1: *yang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.1, D p. 14.1: *bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang 'gyur ro*.

¹³⁶Dok p. 20.7, K p. 10a.2: *de ste yang*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.1, D p. 14.1: *gal te*.

¹³⁷Dok p. 20.7, K p. 10a.2: *de'i phyir*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.2, D p. 14.1: *des na*.

¹³⁸Dok p. 20.7, K p. 10a.2: *bden pa mthong ba yang*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.2, D p. 14.2: *bden pa mthong ba rnam kyang*.

¹³⁹Dok p. 21.1, K p. 10a.3: *bcings pa*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.22, D p. 14.2: *'ching ba*.

¹⁴⁰Dok p. 21.2 and K p. 10a.4 use an instrumental ending (*bas*), but Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.3, and D p. 14.2 use conditional endings (*na*).

¹⁴¹In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (see *Compendium* p. 8) and the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi* (see K. Shukla's edition, Patna, 1973, pp. 271 and 171ff.) Asaṅga indicates that the bonds of assumptions of bad states (*gnas ngan len gyi bcings pa*; Lamotte, P, D: *gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba, dauṣṭhulya-bandhana*) are certain obstructions of body (*lus sgrib, kāyāvaraṇa*) and of mind (*yiḍ sgrib, manas-āvaraṇa*). Some writers of the Ge-luk-ba school also add a third type, obstructions of speech (*ngag sgrib, vāg-āvaraṇa*). These

are said to be caused by influences of past karma, in imitation of past activities, and are what remain after the afflictions (*nyon mongs*, *kleśa*) have been destroyed.

According to Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary), these are the subtle motivations toward non-virtuous actions that remain after the passions motivating one to perform them have been overcome. An example of obstructions of body is the case of a person who sees a monkey and begins jumping up and down like a monkey. An example of obstructions of speech is someone's being verbally abusive toward a person passing by, or speaking profanity, but without any harmful intent. *Ālo-sang-dā-yang* (*Brief Expression* p. 117) gives the example of calling someone *rmangs mo*, which Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary) states implies that that person is the lowest and most inferior. Although Buddha has prohibited such verbal abuse, Foe Destroyers (*dgra bcom*, *arhat*) sometimes still engage in this unconsciously.

An example of obstructions of mind, according to *Ālo-sang-dā-yang*, is "an unclarity of mind...with respect to the status of objects of knowledge that are difficult to realize, such as the fact that even though Maudgalyāyana looked for a long time with his clairvoyance he did not realize that his mother had taken birth in the worldly realm Having Rays of Light (*'od zer can*). This is said to be due to the power of there existing in one's continuum predispositions established by the afflictions, the three poisons, which generate those [bad situations]" [tr. Jules Levinson]. He then cites Kay-drup's (*mkhas grub*) *Stong thun chen mo* to the effect that these are classed as obstructions to omniscience (*shes sgrib*, *jñeya-āvaraṇa*).

In a discussion of calm abiding (*zhi gnas*, *śamatha*), Geshe Gendun Lodrö (oral commentary) discussed a class of assumptions of bad mental states that obstruct the development of calm abiding. He identifies these as consciousnesses that arise from the seeds of previous negative activities that prevent the mind from developing pliancy (*shin sbyangs*, *praśrabdhi*): "What is the function of assumptions of bad mental states that mental pliancy removes? When a yogi makes effort at cultivating meditative stabilization, there are factors that interrupt unimpeded setting of the mind on the object of

observation and that interrupt the abandonment of afflictions. These assumptions of bad mental states are therefore included in the class of afflicted phenomena. They are factors of a sense of heaviness....The assumptions of bad mental states are consciousnesses." Some of these serve as obstructions to calm abiding (*zhi gnas*, *śamatha*) and special insight (*zhi gnas*, *śamatha*), and one gets rid of them through developing physical and mental pliancy.

Calm abiding "interrupts their manifest function of interrupting meditative stabilization", but according to Gendun Lodrö one does not completely eradicate all of the assumptions of bad states until the attainment of Buddhahood. When one attains calm abiding their force is greatly diminished and they only manifest sporadically, but they continue to be present in one's psychophysical continuum until the attainment of Buddhahood. They are more difficult to remove completely than the afflictions, and it is said that in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer there are still assumptions of bad mental and physical states. Gendun Lodrö gives the example of Foe Destroyers (*dgra bcom*, *arhat*) who suddenly jump as if they are playing. This is caused by distraction. Bodhisattvas also have bad mental and physical states that are contradictory with vows they have taken. For instance, while eating food, a Bodhisattva might be distracted and, without thinking, do something foolish. The manifest functioning of the grossest levels of bad mental states is stopped when mental pliancy is attained, and one progressively lessens their force during the course of attaining the ten Bodhisattva grounds. These are the opposite of mental pliancy because they prompt the mind to follow previously established patterns of behavior. According to Gendun Lodrö, Bodhisattvas gradually overcome these along with the obstructions to omniscience (*shes sgrib*, *jñeya-āvaraṇa*) and afflictive obstructions (*nyon mongs sgrib*, *kleśa-āvaraṇa*) during the course of training in the ten grounds.

In the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi* (Ötani Sde dge, *sems tsam* vol. 6, p. 100b.1), Asaṅga writes: "What are the assumptions of bad states of body and mind that are purified? It is like this: the arisings of assumptions of bad states of body and mind [that arise] from

physical hardship and physical tiredness are purified through analysis by way of other modes of behavior. And the arisings of bad states of body and mind [that arise] from too much conceptuality and too much analysis are purified through the method of internal mental calm abiding; or they are purified naturally. And the arisings of bad states of body and mind [that arise] from the mind's having been withdrawn and the mind's having become slack due to the entanglements of obscuration and sleepiness are purified through higher wisdom that differentiates phenomena and through very pure mental contemplation; or they are purified naturally. And the the bad states of body and mind of the class of afflictions from which one has not separated and to which one is always connected due to not abandoning the afflictions are purified through having cultivated a correct path." The corresponding passage in K. Shukla's Sanskrit edition of the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi* (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973) is on p. 271.13, but my translation is based on the Tibetan Sde dge text due to the number of errors in Shukla's text, which is a poorly edited version of an apparently corrupt manuscript.

In the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (Ötani Sde dge, *sems tsam* vol. 7, p. 119b.3; edited by Lambert Schmithausen, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmi*, in *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Sud- und Ostasiens*, Heft 8, Wein, 1969, pp. 157-80), Asaṅga writes: "In brief, with respect to assumptions of bad states there are two types: (1) assumptions of bad states that are contaminated (*zag pa'i gnas ngan len, āsrava-dauṣṭhulya*) and (2) assumptions of bad states that are associated with contamination (*zag pa dang bcas pa'i gnas ngan len, sāsrava-dauṣṭhulya*). With respect to those, because assumptions of bad states that are contaminated are afflictions that are to be abandoned by [a path of] meditation, Foe Destroyers are free from every one of these. Moreover, these are simply states that are bad due to their mode of unserviceability with respect to the bodily consciousness as well as latencies (*bag la nyal, anuśaya*). With respect to assumptions of bad states that are associated with contamination, even though one has eliminated their latencies, they are produced by former contamination and are polluted by contamination. Due to such

a mode of unservicability, they are cases of abiding in a bad way that are naturally very subtle and very miniscule. Assumptions of bad states that are associated with contamination are ‘predispositions of afflictions’ (*nyon mongs pa’i bag chags, kleśa-vāsanā*). Moreover, Foe Destroyers and Solitary Realizers have not abandoned them, but only Tathāgatas have abandoned them. The complete elimination of the predispositions of these is an ‘unshared quality of Buddhas’ (*sangs rgyas kyi chos ma ’dres pa, aṇḍika-buddha-dharma*)”. On p. 195a.3 of the same text (Schmithausen p. 155), assumptions of bad states are said to have five characteristics of unservicability: (1) heaviness (*lci ba nyid, gurutva*); (2) rigidity (*sra ba nyid, dr̥dhatva*); (3) obscuration (*sgrib pa nyid, āvaraṇatva*); (4) loss of affinity (*sgyid lug pa, avaśada*); and (5) non-facility (*mi bzod pa nyid, akṣamata*) due to not having mastery (*dbang sgyur ba med pa, niḥvaśavartā*). See also Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna* pp. 66-70.

According to Geshe Gendun Lodrö (in his discussion of cultivating calm abiding), the main of the bad physical states is that which causes a lack of enthusiasm or a lack of wanting to engage in meditative stabilization. Since this is the main of these bad states, it is the one mentioned by Asaṅga in his *Śrāvakabhūmi* in connection with assumptions of bad physical states. Some Tibetan commentators explain them as winds (*rlung, prāṇa*), currents of energy whose force is gradually lessened as physical and mental pliancy increase during meditative training. The explanations from Geshe Gendun Lodrö are from an unpublished transcript of talks given at the University of Virginia, which were generously lent to me by Jeffrey Hopkins, who translated the talks.

For further discussion of these bad states, see *ME*, pp. 86-7; *Meditative States*, p. 73; *Somme*, notes p. 17*, where Lamotte provides several references; *Compendium* I.4, which discusses the meaning of *dauṣṭhulya*; Pradhan’s version of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Santiketan: Visva-Bharati #12, 1950), pp. 76.14-19, which contains a list of twenty-four assumptions of bad states; N. Tatia’s version of the

Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal, 1976), pp. 92.4-93, which comments on this list; *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* pp. 124a.7-b.3, which contains a list of fifteen; and Wonch'uk, vol. *ti* [118], pp. 333-37, where he cites several different interpretations of these.

¹⁴²Dok p. 21.2, K p. 10a.5: *bden pa mthong ba des bla na med pa'i grub pa dang / bde ba'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob par yang mi 'gyur zhing / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang mi 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 43, P p. 5c.3, D p. 14.3: *bden pa mthong bas grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob pa 'ang [P p. 5c.4, D p. 14.3: par yang] mi 'gyur / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang mi 'gyur ro*.

¹⁴³Dok p. 21.5, K p. 10a.7: *bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyang mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang mi rgya bas*; Lamotte pp. 43-4, P p. 5c.6, D p. 14.4: *bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar mi 'gyur ba*.

¹⁴⁴Dok p. 21.5: *des na*; K p. 10a.7: *de bas na*; Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.6, D p. 14.5: *de'i phyir*.

¹⁴⁵Dok p. 21.6, K p. 10b.1: *khyod kyis rnam grangs 'dis 'di ltar...shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.7, D p. 14.5: *rnam grangs des na khyod kyis 'di ltar...rig par bya'o*.

¹⁴⁶Dok p. 21.7, K p. 110b.2: *bden pa mthong ba 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang ma bral ba'ang ma yin te / bral ba nyid yin la*; Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.8, D p. 14.6: *bden pa*

mthong ba rnams 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi / bral ba kho na yin pa dang.

¹⁴⁷Ādok p. 22.1, K p. 10b.2: *bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma bcings pa las ma grol ba'ang ma yin te / rnam par grol zhing.* Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5c.8, D p. 14.6: *bden pa mthong ba rnams 'du byed kyi mtshan ma' i 'ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi / rnam par grol ba yin pa dang.*

¹⁴⁸Ādok p. 22.2 and K p. 10b.3 insert *kyang*; omitted in Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.1, D p. 14.7.

¹⁴⁹Ādok p. 22.2, K p. 10b.3: *rnam par grol la de gnyis ka las rnam par grol na;* Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.1, D p. 14.7: *rnam par grol ba dang / 'ching ba de gnyis ka las rnam par grol na.*

¹⁵⁰Ādok p. 22.6, K p. 10b.7: *...du zin na ni;* Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.4, D p. 15.3: *gal te...gyur na.*

¹⁵¹Ādok p. 22.6, K p. 10b.7: *de'i phyir;* Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.4, D p. 15.3: *des na.*

¹⁵²Text correction: Ādok p. 22.6 inserts an extra and unnecessary *nas*, which is omitted in K p. 10b.7, Lamotte p. 44, P, and D.

¹⁵³Ādok p. 22.6, K p. 10b.7: *...du lhung ba;* Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.4, D p. 15.3: *...du gtogs par.*

¹⁵⁴Ādok p. 23.1: *spyi'i mtshan nyid du gyur par mi rung ngo*; K p. 10b.7: *don dam pa'i mtshan nyid du gyur par mi rung ngo*; Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.6, D p. 15.4: *spyi'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma yin par 'gyur ro*.

In Buddhist philosophy, the term “general character” (*spyi'i mtshan nyid*, *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) has different meanings. In Ge-luk-ba epistemology, for instance, it is defined as “a phenomenon that is not naturally established, but is merely posited by terms or thought” (*sgra rtogs btags pa tsam yin gyi rang mtshan du ma grub pa'i chos*). Since it is posited by thought, it does not disintegrate moment by moment, and so is considered to be permanent (*rtag pa, nitya*) and is a non-functioning phenomenon (*dngos med kyi chos, avastu-dharma*).

In this passage, however, it does not seem to have this meaning, but instead refers to a quality that all phenomena have. This is developed in chapter seven of this sūtra.

¹⁵⁵Lamotte p. 44, P p. 5d.7, and D p. 15.5 insert *thams cad*, which is omitted in Ādok p. 23.2 and K p. 11a.2.

¹⁵⁶Ādok p. 23.6, K p. 11a.6: *khyad par med pa*; Lamotte p. 45, P p. 5e.3, D p. 16.1: *bye brag med pa*.

¹⁵⁷Ādok p. 23.7, K p. 11a.7: *btsal bar bya bar yang mi 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 45: *yongs su 'tshal* [P p. 5e.4, D p. 16.2: *'tshol*] *bar yang mi 'gyur ro*.

¹⁵⁸Ādok p. 23.7, K p. 11a.7: *rnam par rig pa*; Lamotte p. 45, P p. 5e.4, D p. 16.2: *rnam par shes pa*.

¹⁵⁹Ādok p. 24.1, K p. 11a.8: *de ste yang*; Lamotte p. 45, P p. 4e.5, D p. 16.2: *gal te*.

¹⁶⁰Dok p. 24.1, K p. 11a.8: *rang bzhin med pa tsam nyid*; Lamotte p. 45, P p. 5e.5, D p. 16.2: *ngo bo nyid med pa tsam nyid*.

¹⁶¹Dok p. 24.2 and K p. 11b.1 join these phrases with a connective particle *la*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 45, P p. 5e.5, and D p. 16.3.

¹⁶²According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 347.3), in this analogy the conch is an example illustrating the character of compounded phenomena (*'du byed rnam kyī mtshan nyid kyī dper*), and whiteness is compared to the ultimate truth (*don dam pa'i dben pa*) because it pervades all the nature of the form [of the conch] (*gzugs kyī ngo bo nyid kun la khyab pa'i phyir*). On p. 352.1 he adds that the ultimate and conventionalities exist in mutual dependence (*don dam pa dang kun rdzob ni phan tshun ltos pa las yod pa*). This is presumably because they are of one entity, and so neither could exist without the other, just as neither the conch nor its whiteness could exist independently of the other.

¹⁶³Dok p. 25.2, K p. 12a.1: *pi wang [K: bang] gi sgra snyan pa nyid* (Skt.: *viṇā-śabda-priyatva*); Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.3, D p. 16.7: *pi bang gi sgra'i snyan pa nyid*. The *viṇā* is a seven stringed Indian instrument similar to a lute.

¹⁶⁴Dok p. 25.2, K p. 12a.2, Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.4, D p. 17.1: *a ka [K: ga] ru nag po'i dri zhim pa nyid, kṛṣṇāgaru-saugandhya*. The agaru tree is *Amyris agallocha*, *aloë vera*.

¹⁶⁵Dok p. 25.3, K p. 12a.3, Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.5, D p. 17.1: *na le zham gyi tsha ba nyid, marica-uṣṇatva*. *Na le zham* is *mesua roxburghii*, a small tree with fragrant blossoms.

¹⁶⁶Dok p. 25.4, K p. 12a.4, Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.5, D p. 17.2: *a ru ra'i bskā [P: ska] ba nyid, haritaki-kaśāyatva*. This plant is said to be a universal medicine.

These examples are cited by Jam-yang-shay-ba ('*jam dbyangs bshad pa*, in his *Dbu ma chen mo*, Buxador: Gomang, 1967, pp. 525ff.) in a discussion of the relation between the two truths, the conventional truth (*kun rdzob bden pa, samvṛti-satya*) and the ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa, paramārtha-satya*). According to the Ge-luk-ba tradition, the relationship is one of sameness of entity and difference of isolate, which I think accords with the intent of this section. Jam-yang-shay-ba cites passages from this section of the *Samdhinirmocana*, and states that the two truths must be seen as being related within being of one nature, or as two aspects of the same thing, like a conch and its white color. My thanks to Guy Newland for providing me with a draft copy of his translation of the two truths section of the *Dbu ma chen mo*.

These examples would seem to indicate that even when a Bodhisattva apprehends the ultimate conventional phenomena do not disappear for that Bodhisattva's mind, but in the Ge-luk-ba system it is taught that when one apprehends the ultimate nothing else appears except the ultimate, and one does not perceive conventionalities at all. Only Buddhas have the ability to simultaneously perceive the ultimate and conventionalities at the same time. In any case, as this passage shows, the two truths are intimately related, and are different aspects of the same thing. Conventional truths exist, but their truthness does not exist. They are, however, consistent on the conventional level, although they are not ultimately true, and they only have validity on a conventional level. Ultimate truths, by contrast, are ultimately true but, as these examples indicate, conventional truths do exist.

¹⁶⁷Dok p. 25.5, K p. 12a.4: *shing bal gyi 'da' ba 'jam pa [Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.5, D p. 17.2: pa'i] nyid, tūlapicu-ślakṣaṇatva*.

¹⁶⁸Dok p. 25.6: *mar gyi snying ku*; Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.6, D p. 17.3: *mar la mar gyi snying khu*; K p. 12a.5: *mar la mar gyi snying ku, ghr̥ta-maṇḍatva*.

¹⁶⁹The *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (in the *Lakṣaṇa-samuccaya*, “Prakāra-prabheda”, I.2) lists these as: (1) natural or innate (*tadātmā*) contamination; (2) connections (*sambandha*) to contamination; (3) bonds (*bandha*) of contamination; (4) consequences (*anubandha*) of contamination; (5) disposal (*anukūlya*) toward contamination; (6) and succession (*anvaya*) of contamination. Gan-den Triḥa Jam-ḥel-shen-pen (oral commentary) stated that the term “contaminated things” also refers to things such as houses, gold, and silver, which are polluted (*slad pa*) by afflictions, but they do not possess afflictions in the sense that one’s mind may possess afflictions.

¹⁷⁰Dok p. 25.7, K p. 12a.7: *chos thams cad la gang zag la bdag med pa nyid*; Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.7, D p. 17.4: *chos thams cad la gang bdag med pa nyid*.

¹⁷¹Lamotte p. 46, P p. 6a.8, and D p. 17.4 add an extra phrase. Dok p. 26.1 and K p. 12a.8 read: ‘*dod chags kyi ma zhi ba’i mtshan nyid ni ’dod chags dang tha dad pa ma yin pa’i mtshan nyid dam / tha dad pa’i mtshan nyid du gdags sla ba ma yin no*. Lamotte, P, and D read: ‘*dod chags kyi ma zhi ba’i mtshan nyid dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid kyang ’dod chags dang mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin pa ’am / mtshan nyid tha dad du gdags par sla ba ma yin pa dang*.

¹⁷²Dok p. 26.3, K p. 12b.2: *gdags sla ba ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.3, D p. 17.6: *gdags par mi bzod do*.

¹⁷³Dok p. 26.3, K p. 12b.2: *de lta bur*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.3, D p. 17.6: *de ltar*.

¹⁷⁴Dok p. 26.5, K p. 12b.4: *bsgrags shing mngon par phye nas btags te rab tu bstan to*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.4, D p. 17.6: *bsnyad shing gsal bar byas / rnam par phye / gdags par byas / rab tu bstan to*.

¹⁷⁵Dok p. 26.6, K p. 12b.6: *gcig dang tha dad par gang rtog pa*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.5, D p. 18.1: *gcig dang tha dad du yang gang rtog pa*.

¹⁷⁶See chapter eight and note 498.

¹⁷⁷Dok p. 26.7, K p. 12b.6: *zhi gnas lhag mthong goms bya ste / mtshan ma dag gi bcings pa dang / gnas ngan len gyi bcings pa las / skye bo rnam par grol bar 'gyur*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.6, D p. 18.1: *skye ba po yi [P, D: yis] lhag mthong dang / zhi gnas goms par byas nas ni / gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba dang / mtshan ma'i 'ching las rnam grol 'gyur*.

This entire chapter is quoted in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (pp. 84.5.2-86.1.4). Asaṅga indicates that in this chapter Buddha expounds the meaning of the fourth characteristic of the ultimate, that it is a character that completely transcends sameness and difference (see notes 110-111). Gung-tang (*gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me*, 1762-1823) — in his commentary on D̄zong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po* (entitled *Bstan bcos legs bshad snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba*, Lhasa: *Gung thang gsung 'bum*, n.d., vol. *kha*), pp. 8-9 — states that in this chapter Buddha demonstrates that the two truths are different isolates (*ldog pa tha dad*), within being one entity (*ngo bo gcig*). This means that they can be separated by thought, like a table and its color, but they are one entity.

¹⁷⁸Several Tibetan scholars have noted that this is the only chapter in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* in which the questioner is not a tenth ground Bodhisattva. Subhūti (*rab 'byor*) is a Hearer (*nyan thos*, *śrāvaka*) and is the main interlocuter in

some Perfection of Wisdom sūtras. His high position in these sūtras is probably due to Buddha's praise of Subhūti in Hīnayāna sūtras as being the foremost of his disciples in understanding of emptiness. See Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 359.5-6 on this point.

As Gung-tang (pp. 73.13-74.6) points out, the second Dalai Lama's (*rgyal ba dge 'dun gya mtsho*, 1475-1542) commentary on the difficult points of the *Legs bshad snying po* (entitled *Rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsung 'bum las drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me*, blockprint from the library of H.H. The Dalai Lama, n.d., p. 6a.3) does not include this chapter among the ten chapters of questions by tenth ground Bodhisattvas. He counts the introduction as the first chapter, and Gung-tang speculates that this may be due to the fact that Gyel-tsap's (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*, 1364-1432) work on Perfection of Wisdom (*Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa don gsal ba'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan*, Lhasa: *rGyal tshab rje gsung 'bum*, n.d., vol. *kha*) speaks of ten tenth ground Bodhisattvas questioning Buddha, and due to the fact that Subhūti is not mentioned in the introduction to the sūtra, while the ten Bodhisattvas are.

This explanation is an attempt on Gung-tang's part to explain an obvious mistake on the part of the second Dalai Lama. He suggests that the Dalai Lama did not actually intend to eliminate the "Subhūti" chapter as a chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana*, since it is clear from the sūtra itself that it is a chapter, and Asaṅga's *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (Peking 5539, vol. 110 pp. 86.1-87.2.3) treats it as such. Also, in this as well as in other sūtras, the first chapter begins at the end of the introduction. Rather, according to Gung-tang, he does not count it as a chapter *by a tenth ground Bodhisattva*. Despite Gung-tang's clever explanation, however, it seems that the Dalai Lama was simply mistaken in stating that there are ten chapters by tenth ground Bodhisattvas, since the introduction is not a separate chapter of questions by a Bodhisattva, but merely sets the scene of the sūtra. Also, the "Subhūti" chapter is

clearly a separate chapter, it follows the same pattern as the other nine chapters, and is referred to as a chapter in the colophon at the end of the section.

According to Gung-tang (pp. 73.13-74.6) and Jay-dzün Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen (*rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan*, 1469-1546, in his *Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi spyi don rgol ngan tshan gcod rin po che'i phreng ba*, (from a printing of this *Collected Works*), Byllakuppe, Karnataka, n.p.d., p. 6b.2), the main import of this chapter is that the two truths are undifferentiated in the element of qualities (*chos kyi dbyings*, *dharma-dhātu*). This note is based on Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (unpublished manuscript), pp. 129-132.

¹⁷⁹Dok p. 27.2, K p. 12b.8: *sems can gang dag mngon pa'i nga rgyal can mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyis mngon du zin cing shes pa brda sprod pa ni du tsam yod par shes*; Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.7, D p. 18.3: *gang dag mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyis mngon du zin cing shes pa brda sprod par byed pa'i sems can ni ji tsam zhig yod par shes*.

Boastful pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal*, *abhimāna*, one of the seven types of pride) is usually based on little knowledge and understanding, according to Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary), and causes a person to perceive through the medium of his/her misunderstandings and to claim to understand more than he/she actually does. According to Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (I.2) and Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 360.4), it is a type of pride that leads one to imagine that one has attained advanced spiritual states that one has not actually reached. The same idea is also found in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvali*, verse 411.

According to Wonch'uk (p. 360.6, citing Paramārtha's *Tshig nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*), those who are overcome by boastful pride are ordinary beings, while those who are not are Superiors. See also *Bhāṣya* p. 12 for a discussion of this topic.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 106.3) lists three kinds of boastful pride: “(1) boastful pride of apprehended objects (*gzung ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal*); (2) boastful pride of apprehending subjects (*'dzin pa'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal*); and (3)

boastful pride of thoroughly differentiating characters (*mtshan nyid rab tu dbye ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal*)".

He adds: "The first type of boastful pride is a matter of thinking and identifying to others one's own understanding, which views various phenomena that are apprehended objects, such as the aggregates and so forth; therefore, one thinks, '[I] understand the ultimate' and expounds one's own understandings to others." The second type of pride "is a matter of thinking that just as the characters of phenomena — the aggregates and so forth — are mutually different, so the suchness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena of these phenomena is also of different characters. One teaches one's understanding, which views various doctrines subsequent to those; therefore, one expounds one's understanding."

¹⁸⁰"You" (*khyod kyis*) is omitted but implied in *Ā*Dok p. 27.3 and K p. 13a.1, and is included in Lamotte p. 47, P p. 6b.7, and D p. 18.3.

¹⁸¹*Ā*Dok p. 27.4, K p. 13a.3: *snyam bgyid*; Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.2, D p. 18.4: *shes zhig mchis par 'tshal lags kyi*.

¹⁸²Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.2, D p. 18.4: *bcom ldan 'das bdag gis*; omitted in *Ā*Dok and K. "Think" translates *snyam bgyid*; Lamotte, P, D substitute: *'tshal lags te*.

¹⁸³*Ā*Dok p. 27.5, K p. 13a.4: *bdag dus gcig na gdon pa na nags khrod chen po zhig tu* [*K: na*] *mchis na / bdag gi mdab de na*; Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.3, D p. 18.5: *bdag dus gcig cig na / dgon pa nags khrod chen po zhig na mchis pa'i tshe / de na bdag gi nye 'khor na*.

¹⁸⁴Ādok p. 27.6, K p. 13a.4: *dge slong shin tu mang ba dag cig gnas bcas shing dgon pa nags khrod chen po na mchis te*; Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.4, D p. 18.6: *dge slong rab tu mang po dag cig kyang dgon pa nags khrod chen po na rten cing gnas lags te*.

¹⁸⁵Ādok p. 27.6, K p. 13a.5: *dge slong de dag snga dro'i dus kyi tshe phan tshun nas 'dus te lhags nas*; Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.4, D p. 18.6: *bdag gis snga dro'i dus kyi tshe dge slong phan tshun nas mchis shing mjal nas*.

¹⁸⁶The translation of this passage is aided by Lamotte p. 48, P p. 6c.5, and D p. 18.7, which read: *chos rnam pa sna tshogs dmigs pa'i mngon par rtogs pa ston pas shes pa brda sprod par bgyid de*. Ādok p. 27.7 and K p. 13a.5 read: *chos [la: omitted in K] rnam pa sna tshogs su dmigs pas mngon par rtogs pa'i ston pas shes pa brda sprod pa mthong ste*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 377.1) remarks: "Having [only] apprehended the meaning literally (*sgra ji bzhin du don bzung nas*) they do not understand the emptiness of phenomena, the ultimate, which is imperceptible and of one taste (*dmigs su med pa ro gcig pa*), due to which they generate boastful pride; whereupon, they think, 'I understand the final ultimate.'" On p. 380.2 he concludes a discussion of the characteristics of the aggregates (*phung po'i mtshan nyid*) with the statement: "Because they do not understand as it is the knowledge [that the ultimate is] of one taste, they generate a conception thinking, 'This is correct understanding.' Because of this conception, error arises. Because of error, they produce boastful pride." He also states that all of the understandings that they expound are based on dualistic and discursive thinking that involves making distinctions between cause and effect, production and cessation and so forth, and which does not understand the sameness of taste of the ultimate nature of all phenomena.

¹⁸⁷*Ḍok* p. 27.7, *K* p. 13a.6: *de dag las kha cig ni*; Lamotte p. 48, *P* p. 6c.5, *D* p. 18.7: *de na kha cig ni*.

¹⁸⁸These are the five aggregates (*phung po*, *skandha*) that are the constituents of all impermanent phenomena, and are the basis on which we impute the notions of 'I' and 'mine': form (*gzugs*, *rūpa*); feeling, (*tshor ba*, *vedanā*); discrimination ('*du shes*, *saṃjñā*); compositional factors ('*du byed*, *saṃskāra*); and consciousness (*rnam par shes pa*, *vijñāna*). For a discussion of these, see *Visuddhimagga* XIV.433, *Abhidharmasamuccaya* I.1, *Le Traité des Cinq Agregats (Pañcaskandaprakaraṇa de Vasubandhu)* by Jean Dantinne (Bruxelles, 1980), and Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), pp. 49-82, which contains an English translation of the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*.

¹⁸⁹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 109.4) states that their "observation of the signs of the aggregates" (*phung po'i mtshan ma dmigs pa*, *skandanimittopalambha*) is done "from the point of view of thoroughly analyzing their own signs" (*rang gi mtshan ma yongs su brtags pa'i sgo nas*). Their "observation of the production of the aggregates" (*phung po'i skye ba [Ḍok, K: bar] dmigs pa*, *skandhotpāḍopalambha*) and "observation of the disintegration of the aggregates" (*phung po'i [Ḍok, K: po] 'jig pa [Ḍok, K: par] dmigs pa*, *skandha-vināśopalambha*) are done "from the point of view of general characteristics and thorough investigation" (*spyi'i mtshan nyid dang yongs su brtags pa'i sgo nas*). He adds: "These two indicate the aspects of true sources and true sufferings of the aggregates" (*de dag gnyis ni phung po rnam kyī kun 'byung ba dang sdug bsngal gyi bden pa'i rnam pa ston to*). Observation of "the cessation of the aggregates" (*phung po'i [Ḍok, K: po] 'gog pa [Ḍok, K: par]*, *skandha-nirodha*) refers to true cessations ('*gog pa' bden pa*, *nirodha-satya*), and observation of "the actualization of the cessation of the aggregates" (*phung po'i [Ḍok,*

K: po] 'gog pa mngon du bgyid pa [Dok, K: bgyi bar], skandha-nirodha-sākṣātkāra) refers to true paths (*lam gyi bden pa, mārga-satya*).

¹⁹⁰The sense spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*) are the abodes of perception or sensation. There is a sixfold enumeration and a twelvefold enumeration of these (see *ME* pp. 279-280 and 273-4). The sixfold division is: form sense sphere (*gzugs kyi skye mched, rūpa-āyatana*); sound sense sphere (*sgra'i skye mched, śabda-āyatana*); scent sense sphere (*dri'i skye mched, gandha-āyatana*); taste sense sphere (*ro'i skye mched, rasa-āyatana*), and tangible object sense sphere (*reg bya'i skye mched, sparśa-āyatana*). Each sense sphere encompasses the range of potential objects of observation of its respective sense, and the members of each sphere serve as sources of perceptions. For example, a blue form (which is a form sense sphere) gives rise to an eye consciousness perceiving blue. A visible form is called a form sense sphere because it is a cause that gives rise to continued perception of similar type (i.e., later moments of similar eye-consciousnesses).

The twelvefold division is: (1) form (*gzugs, rūpa*); (2) sound (*sgra, śabda*); (3) scent (*dri, gandha*); (4) taste (*ro, rasa*); (5) tangible object (*reg bya, sparśa*); (6) phenomenon (*chos, dharma*); and (7) eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po, cakṣur-indriya*); (8) ear sense power (*rna'i dbang po, śrotendriya*); (9) nose sense power (*sna'i dbang po, ghrāṇendriya*); (10) tongue sense power (*lce'i dbang po, jīhvendriya*); (11) body sense power (*lus kyi dbang po, kāyendriya*); and (12) mind sense power (*yid kyi dbang po, mano-indriya*) Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 382.6) indicates that the twelvefold division is being referred to here. For a discussion of these, see *ME* pp. 222, 279-280, and *Compendium* pp.135-136.

The *Visuddhimagga* (XV.481-2) states that the *āyatanas* extend the effort of the mind and mental factors and bear the negative effects of rebirth. It further states that the term *āyatana* has the connotations of basis, meeting place, or place of birth. They are

said to serve as a basis for sense experiences and to be reasons for them, since sense experiences cannot exist in their absence. See also *Kośa* ch. 1 pp. 37 and 40-43.

¹⁹¹Dependent arising (*rten cing 'brel ba'i 'byung ba*, *pratitya-samutpāda*) refers to cause and effect. According to *Kośa* ch. 3 p. 60, every compounded phenomenon (see note 52) is a dependent arising because it comes into being in dependence upon causes and conditions, abides because of causes and conditions, and disintegrates because of causes and conditions. For a discussion of dependent arising, see *ME*, pp. 275-284 and 659-676, *Somme* notes pp. 11-12, and *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 60-118.

¹⁹²According to *Kośa* ch. 3, pp. 119-128, these are: (1) material sustenance (*khamṣ kyi zas*, *kavalikāhāra*), which is necessary for sustaining the body; (2) food of touch (*reg pa'i zas*, *sparsāhāra*), which is the sense of mental satisfaction that one experiences when a desire is fulfilled; just as material food nourishes the body, so this nourishes the mind when a desire is fulfilled; (3) food of intention (*[yid la] sems pa'i zas*, *manah-samcetanāhāra*), which is an action (*las*, *karma*) that impels the next lifetime; since it generates the next lifetime, it is called a nourisher or sustenance; and (4) food of consciousness (*rnam shes kyi zas*, *vijñānāhāra*), which Geshe Gendun Lodrö (unpublished manuscript) equates with consciousness understood as the third member of the twelve limbs of dependent arising: "Just as the action that impels a future lifetime is called a sustenance, so the consciousness that is imprinted with that action and which will at the time of the effect of that action in the future life be imprinted with other karmas is called a nourisher or sustenance." See *Visuddhimagga* XI; *Kośa* ch. 3 pp. 119-128; Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 383.2; *Compendium* p. 50; *Somme* pp. 59-60 and notes p. 15*; and Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 135-162.

¹⁹³Text correction: *Dok* p. 28.3 reads: 'jigs; amended to 'jig per *K* p. 13b.1, Lamotte p. 48, *P* p. 6c.8, *D* p. 19.2.

¹⁹⁴These are: (1) the truth of suffering (*sdug bsngal bden pa*, *duḥkha-satya*); (2) the truth of the origin of suffering (*kun 'byung bden pa*, *samudaya-satya*); (3) the truth of the cessation of suffering (*'gog bden pa*, *nirodha-satya*); and (4) the truth of the eightfold path which overcomes suffering (*lam bden pa*, *mārga-satya*). See Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], pp. 383.5-385.2, where he elaborates on these.

¹⁹⁵*Dok* p. 28.5: *spang par*; *K* p. 13b.3: *spang bar*; Lamotte p. 48, *P* p. 6d.1, *D* p. 19.3: *spangs pa*.

¹⁹⁶*Dok* p. 28.5; *K* p. 13b.3: *bsgom par*; Lamotte p. 49, *P* p. 6d.1, *D* p. 19.3: *sgom pa*.

¹⁹⁷The words in brackets are added on the basis of Geshe Rabten's commentary on *Āzong-ka-bā's Legs bshad snying po* (entitled *Drang nges rnam 'byed legs bshad snying po dka' gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo dga' ston*, Indian blockprint, n.d., p. 9.3), which discusses a similar passage in chapter seven of this sūtra that is quoted by *Āzong-ka-bā (Legs bshad snying po*, Sarnath edition p. 4) and indicates that these should be related with the four truths.

¹⁹⁸In the *Kośa*, there are three divisions of *dhātus*: (1) a sixfold division: earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness (see ch. 1, p. 49); (2) an eighteenfold division: the six senses, their six objects, and the six consciousnesses that arise from them (see ch. 1, pp. 37 and 51); and (3) a threefold division: Form Realm (*gzugs khams*, *rūpa-dhātu*); Formless Realm (*gzugs med khams*, *ārūpya-dhātu*); and Desire Realm (*'dod khams*, *kāma-dhātu*; see ch. 3, pp. 6-7). See the following two notes.

¹⁹⁹According to D̄zong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath edition, p. 6.2), the *khamṣ tha dad pa* (Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.2, D p. 19.4: *khamṣ sna tshogs pa nyid, dhātu nānātva*) are the eighteen *dhātus*: the six senses, their six objects, and the six consciousnesses that they give rise to. D̄zong-ka-ba takes issue with Wonch'uk, who identifies both the "various" and "manifold" constituents as referring to the eighteen constituents. On p. 385.5 Wonch'uk states: "The eighteen constituents — ranging from the constituents that are eye-constituent, form-constituent, and eye-consciousness constituent through to the constituents that are mind-constituent, phenomenon-constituent, and mental-consciousness-constituent — are the 'various constituents' (*khamṣ bco brgyad po mig gi khamṣ dang / gzugs kyi khamṣ dang / mig gi rnam par shes pa'i khamṣ nas yid kyi khamṣ dang / chos kyi khamṣ dang yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i khamṣ kyi bar du gang yin pa de ni khamṣ sna tshogs yin no*)." See also Wonch'uk p. 549.1.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 110.2) has a different identification of these. He states: "The constituents of sentient beings, ranging up to their 80,000 modes of behavior — these being by way of modes of divisions of the lineages of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Tathāgatas and desire and so forth — are called 'various'.... With respect to the 'manifold constituents': If one condenses the division of constituents with respect to these various constituents, there are four types: (1) the naturally abiding constituent; (2) the constituent arisen from previous familiarization; (3) the constituent that is suitable as an object of purification; and (4) the constituent that is not suitable as an object of purification." He adds that there are also limitless other divisions with respect to each of these.

²⁰⁰The *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath edition p. 6.2-4) and Geshe Rabten's commentary on it (p. 9.4) identify the *khamṣ du ma* (Lamotte p. 49: *dhātu aneka(tva)*) as the six: earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. D̄zong-ka-ba states that, although some commentaries explain the *khamṣ tha dad pa* and *khamṣ du ma*

differently, he has chosen to explain them in this way in accordance with the seventh chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which in many ways parallels this chapter. According to Gung-tang (pp. 86.14-89.10), Buddha taught (in the *Khams mang po'i mdo*, *Dhātubhūka-sūtra*, Tohoku 297) that the eighteen constituents and the six constituents are established by way of their own character as bases of conception of the thought consciousness apprehending them. Like the five aggregates, the constituents are that in which one travels in cyclic existence. As with the aggregates, Buddha spoke of the abandonment and thorough knowledge of these as being established by way of their own character as bases of conception by the thought consciousness apprehending them.

In the seventh chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana*, Bodhisattva Paramārtha-samudgata mentions Buddha's earlier teachings on this topic and asks him to explain them in light of the new teachings presented in this sūtra. Gung-tang (pp. 86.14-89.10) points out that in Buddha's answer he specifically mentions the eighteen and six constituents, and this is Gung-tang's basis for identifying *khams tha dad pa* and *khams du ma* respectively as referring to the eighteen and six constituents.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 385.5), however, thinks that both refer to the eighteen constituents from the viewpoint of their having internal differences in each of the eighteen, and thus being various; and so they are called *khams du ma* because they pervade all sentient beings in the manner of being their bases of designation. Lamotte (p. 179) apparently agrees with him, since he adds the word "*dix-huit*" in brackets as referring to both types. Wonch'uk (p. 549.1) states: "In that the eighteen constituents are a character that is different from one to the next one these are just called the 'various constituents'. In that those same eighteen constituents serve as bases of distinctions of immeasurable sentient beings, they are just called the 'manifold constituents' (*khams bco brgyad po dag gcig las gcig tha dad pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni khams sna tshogs pa nyid ces bya'o* / *khams bco brgyad po de dag nyid sems can tshad med pa rnam kyī rten gyi bye brag tu gyur pa ni khams du ma nyid ces bya ste*."

Gung-tang states that Wonch'uk's explanation may be based on Asaṅga's *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, which speaks of the various constituents and manifold constituents in the same way, and he cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* (on p. 549.2) to support his contention.

According to Gung-tang, Ḍzong-ka-ba's explanation is based on what comes later in the sūtra, while Wonch'uk's, based on Asaṅga, is in accord with the *Myrabola-sūtra*, (*Ba ru ra'i mdo, Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit*) and on Maitreya's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-kārikā* (Tohoku 4029; Peking 5521, vol. 108), which explain the constituents of sentient beings as being various. Gung-tang states that this is made clear in Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, but Asaṅga's explanation is not given in reference to the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*; rather, it refers to the *Dhātubahuka-sūtra*. Gung-tang rejects Wonch'uk's explanation on this basis. Ḍzong-ka-ba (p. 6.2) states: "Although the commentaries [of Wonch'uk and so forth] explain the various and manifold constituents otherwise, when these are put together with later accounts in the sūtra [i.e., the *Samdhinirmocana*] they can be taken as the eighteen constituents and the six constituents."

According to Gung-tang (pp. 88.18-89.10), the reason that Buddha spoke of both eighteen and six constituents is that the eighteen are all-inclusive, but the six are useful in establishing selflessness. He quotes Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* to the effect that we should realize that the self cannot be imputed in dependence on any of the six. This note is based on Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (unpublished manuscript, pp. 140-151). I am indebted to Professor Hopkins for outlining the issues in Tibetan scholarship on this topic for me.

²⁰¹These are: establishment in mindfulness of body (*lus, kāya*), feelings (*tshor ba, vedanā*), mind (*sems, citta*), and phenomena (*chos, dharma*), and these are attained with the lesser path of accumulation (see *ME*, p. 205, *Compassion*, pp. 224-5, *Kośa* ch. 6, p. 158, and *Compendium* pp. 118 and 169). According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (A

khu blo gros rgya mtsho, in his *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel rin chen sgron me* (Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982), p. 55.2-3), these are wisdoms (*shes rab*), and their opposite is unknowingness (*mi shes pa nyid*).

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 387.7) states that according to the *Bstan bcos yang dag pa'i rig pa* they are called mindful establishments "because wisdom is thoroughly held through the power of mindfulness, whereby it is caused to abide continuously" (*shes rab ni dran pa'i stobs kyis yongs su bzung nas gnas par byed pa'i phyir*). Due to the power of wisdom one gains from cultivating those, mindfulness is able to remain on its objects.

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (III.2), they involve concentration and wisdom with respect to achieving cessation of various types of defilements. According to the *Abhidharmakośa* (VII.76) and the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (XX.53), there are three types of mindful establishments, which are based upon disciples' understanding Buddha's teachings and putting them into practice. See *Compendium* p. 169, note 3, p. 118, and p. 169; *Somme* p. 286, 292 and notes p. 59*; and *Kośa* ch. 4.

²⁰²Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 389.6) cites this as "characteristics of the mindful establishments" (*dran pa nye bar gzhas pa'i mtshan nyid*).

²⁰³According to *Compendium* p. 116, the four "antidotes to the discordances" (*Dok* p. 28.7; *K* p. 13b.6: *mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi gnyen po*; Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.4, D p. 19.5: *mi mthun pa'i phyogs dang gnyen po*) are: (1) antidotes of the basis (*gzhi'i gnyen po*, *ādhāra-pratipakṣa*); (2) the antidote of removal (*thag sring ba'i gnyen po*, *dūrtbhāva-pratipakṣa*); (3) the antidote of abandonment (*spong ba'i gnyen po*, *prahāṇa-pratipakṣa*); and (4) the antidote of eradication (*rnam par sun 'byin pa'i gnyen po*, *vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣa*). See also *Kośa* ch. 5 p. 103.

²⁰⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 389.7) states that "meditative cultivation of the mindful establishments" (*dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bsgoms* [Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.6, D p. 19.5; K p. 13b.7: *bsgom*] *pa, smṛtyupasthāna-bhāvanā*) refers to a path of preparation (*sbyor ba'i lam, prayoga-mārga*) of the mindful establishments.

²⁰⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 390.1) states: "...this is an uninterrupted path (*bar chad med pa'i lam, ānantarya-mārga*): the eight forbearances" (*bzod pa, kṣānti*).

²⁰⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 390.1) states: "...this is path of release (*rnam grol lam, vimukti-mārga*): the eight consciousnesses" (*shes pa brgyad po*).

²⁰⁷ĀDok p. 29.6; K p. 13b.8: *mi nyams pa*; Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.5, D p. 19.6: *mi bskyud pa, asaṃpramoṣatā*. The *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 6.4) also reads *mi bskyud pa*, but either can translate *asaṃpramoṣatā*. See for instance Edward Conze, *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966), pp. 94 and 412; and Susumu Yamaguchi, *Index to the Prasannapadā Madhyamaka-vṛtti* (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1974), p. 68. ĀDzong-ka-bā (p. 6.4) equates *mi bskyud pa* with *mi brjed pa* (non-loss).

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 390.2) states: "...this is a path of meditation (*bsgom pa'i lam, bhāvanā-mārga*): [the levels] up to the vajra-like mind" (*rdo rje lta bu'i sems, vajropama-citta*).

²⁰⁸According to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3), "further arising" (ĀDok p. 29.2; K p. 13b.8: *phyir zhing 'byung ba*; Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.5, D p. 19.6: *slar zhing 'byung ba*) refers to a person familiarizing himself with the antidotes (*gnyen po*) through actualizing them repeatedly.

²⁰⁹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 390.2), "increasing" refers to a path of no more learning (*mi slob lam, aśaikṣa-mārga*), or the levels after the "vajra-like mind" (see note 207).

A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3) states that "increasing and extending" means increasing those antidotes through the power of familiarity and extending them limitlessly. Unlike leaping into the air, there is no limit to how far the antidotes can be extended. This same analogy is used in Gyel-tsap's (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*) *Thar lam gsal byed* (a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*) to explain how one can progressively overcome the obstructions and develop compassion, wisdom, etc. limitlessly (*Rnam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Sarnath, 1974, pp. 288-293). See also Dharmakīrti's root verse in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (ed. D. Shastri, p. 146), where he indicates that the mind is able to increase its qualities limitlessly because it has a stable basis. The Sanskrit verse reads:

If the basis [i.e., mind] were not stable

Its qualities would not increase.

And so such a nature is not found

(*syāccāsthiraśrayaḥ /*

viśeṣo naiva vardheta

svabhāvaśca na tādrśaḥ).

See also Joe Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Philosophy of Mind-Only*, University Microfilms, 1984, pp. 288-9, which contains an oral commentary on this verse by Ven. Denma Losang.

This passage of the *Samdhinirmocana* reflects an important presupposition found in the discussions of meditation found in this sūtra, that there are three types of meditation: (1) meditating for the sake of attaining that which one has not yet attained (*ma thob pa thob pa'i phyir du sgom pa*); (2) meditating for the sake of the non-deterioration of that which has been attained (*thob pa mi myams pa'i phyir sgom pa*); and (3) meditating for the sake of increasing that which has already been attained (*thob*

zin gong 'phel du 'gro ba'i phyir sgom pa). This idea is mentioned in the discussions in the eighth chapter concerning the cultivating of meditative states relating to calm abiding and special insight.

²¹⁰According to *Compendium* p. 120, the four thorough abandonings (*yang dag par spong ba, samyak-pradhāna*) are: (1) abandoning of non-virtuous phenomena already generated (*sdig pa mi dge ba'i chos skyes pa rnams yongs su spang pa, utpannākuśala-dharmaprahāṇa*); (2) non-generation of non-virtuous phenomena not yet generated (*sdig pa mi dge ba'i chos ma skyes pa rnams mi skyed pa, anutpannākuśala-dharmāropaṇa*); (3) increasing of virtuous phenomena already generated (*dge ba'i chos skyes pa rnams 'phel ba, utpanna-kuśala-dharmavṛddhi*); and (4) generation of virtuous phenomena not yet generated (*dge ba'i chos ma skyes pa rnams bskyed pa, anutpanna-kuśala-dharma-ropaṇa*). These are attained with the middling path of accumulation, and are termed “thorough abandonings” because “the mode of practice is suitable, when supplemented by the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, to lead one to Buddhahood” [*ME* p. 206]. See also: (1) *Compassion*, p. 225; (2) *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.11, XVI.67; (3) Edward Conze, *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom* (London, Luzac & Co., 1961), pp. 146-7; (4) *Visuddhimagga*, XXI.679; (5) *Kośa* ch. 5 p. 283; (6) *Abhidharma-samuccaya* I.4; and (7) Wonch'uk vol. *ti* [118], p. 399.4. The opposite of the thorough abandonings is laziness, according to A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3).

²¹¹These are the four factors involved in developing supernatural powers. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 395.1) identifies these as: (1) the basis of magical emanation that is aspiration (*'dun pa'i rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa, chanda-ṛddhi-pāda*); (2) the basis of magical emanation that is effort (*brtson 'grus kyi rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa, virya-ṛddhi-pāda*); (3) the basis of magical emanation that is mental attention (*sems kyi rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa, citta-ṛddhi-pāda*); and (4) the basis of magical emanation that is an

analytical meditative stabilization (*dpyod pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa, mīmāṃsā-samādhi-rddhi-pāda*). The Sanskrit equivalents are from *Kośa* ch. 6, p. 285. Wonch'uk (p. 395.1) cites the *Abhidharmakośa*, which states that they are “bases” “because they serve as bases of extraordinary qualities” (*yon tan khyad par can rnams kyi gnas su gyur pa'i phyir*).

According to the *Visuddhimagga* (XII.385), they are called “bases” because they have “the sense of accomplishing, which is another way of effecting, and because by them beings are accomplished, thrive, and attain excellence.... These are the group of the remaining mind and mental factors which are the basis in the sense of foundation of concentration of purpose and activities of effort associated with the consciousness of higher knowledge which go under the name of magical emanations.” The conclusion of the chapter is that they lead to achievement of the power of magical emanations and are the basis for this achievement.

For a description of how one establishes these four bases, see *Visuddhimagga* XII. For a description of the meditative stabilization that combines these, see the discussions of *chanda-vīrya-citta-mīmāṃsā-samādhi* in *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* XVIII.52 and *Madhyāntavibhāga* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi), p. 91.12. See also: *ME* p. 206; *Compassion* p. 225; *Kośa* ch. 6, pp. 281-83; and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* I.4. These “bases” are attained on the great path of accumulation according to *ME* p. 206, and according to A-ku Ļo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3) their discordant factor is distraction.

²¹²Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 396.5) identifies these as: (1) faith (*dad pa, śraddhā*); (2) effort (*brtson 'grus, vīrya*); (3) mindfulness (*dran pa, smṛti*); (4) meditative stabilization (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*); and (5) wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*). The Sanskrit equivalents are from *Kośa* ch. 6, p. 286 and *Mahāvīyutpatti* XLI. According to *ME* p. 206 the powers are attained on the levels of heat and peak of the path of preparation. Their discordant factor is non-interest, according to A-ku Ļo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3). Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 396.5) describes them in detail. See also:

Abhidharmasamuccaya I.4 and *Kośa* ch. 2 (pp. 111, 116, 119, 156) and ch. 4, pp. 219 and 223.

²¹³Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 396.6) identifies the five forces are: faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom, and according to *ME* p. 206 these are attained on the levels of forbearance and supreme mundane qualities of the path of preparation. The discordant factor of the five forces is little strength of mindfulness and introspection, according to A-ku Āo-drö-gya-tso (p. 55.2-3). See *Kośa* ch. 6 p. 283 and pp. 286-7, which describes the difference between the powers and the forces.

²¹⁴According to Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 398.1), the seven branches of enlightenment (*byang chub kyi yan lag bdun*, *sapta-bodhyaṅga*) are: (1) mindfulness (*dran pa*, *smṛti*), (2) discrimination of phenomena (*chos rnam par 'byed pa*, *dharma-vicaya*), (3) effort (*brtson 'grus*, *virya*), (4) joy (*dga' ba*, *priti*), (5) pliancy (*shin tu sbyangs pa*, *praśrabdhi*), (6) meditative stabilization (*ting nge 'dzin*, *śamādhī*), and (7) equanimity (*btang snyoms*, *upekṣā*). The Sanskrit equivalents are from *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi), p. 93.5. According to *ME* p. 206 these are attained with the path of seeing. See *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* XVIII.58; *Abhidharma-samuccaya* I.IV; *Kośa* ch. 2 p. 158, ch. 4 p. 68, and ch. 6 p. 281.

²¹⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 399.7) identifies these as: (1) correct views (*yang dag pa'i lta ba*, *samyag-dṛṣṭi*), (2) correct realization (*yang dag pa'i rtog pa*, *samyak-samkalpa*), (3) correct speech (*yang dag pa'i ngag*, *samyag-vāc*), (4) correct aims of actions (*yang dag pa'i las kyi mtha'*, *samyak-karmānta*), (5) correct livelihood (*yang dag pa'i 'tsho ba*, *samyag-ājīva*), (6) correct effort (*yang dag pa'i rtsol ba*, *samyag-vyāyāma*), (7) correct mindfulness (*yang dag pa'i dran pa*, *samyak-smṛti*), and (8) correct meditative stabilization (*yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin*, *samyak-samādhī*). The

Sanskrit equivalents are from *Kośa* ch. 6 p. 246. According to *ME* p. 206 they are attained with the path of meditation. See Wonch'uk p. 400.1 for a description of these.

²¹⁶Lamotte p. 49, P p. 6d.8-6e.1, and D p. 20.2-3 repeat *mtshong* twice; *Dok* p. 29.6 and K p. 14a.5 only have one occurrence.

²¹⁷*Dok* p. 29.7, K p. 14a.5: *chos rnam pa sna tshogs su dmigs pas mngon par rtogs pa ston pas shes pa brda sprod de*; Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.1, and D p. 20.3: *chos rnam pa sna tshogs pa'i mngon par rtogs pa ston pas shes pa brda sprod par bgyid cing*.

²¹⁸Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 111.5) states: "This indicates that thoroughly established suchness, the ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena is everywhere of one taste in the sense of being free from distinctions with respect to all phenomena that are apprehended objects, phenomena that are apprehending subjects, and phenomena that are of thoroughly differentiated characters." A similar idea can be found in the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra* (ed. Kyoo Nishio, Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1982, II.2.1). See also John Keenen, *A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1980, especially pp. 594-601. The *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra*, like the *Samdhinirmocana* (see p. 29 of this translation) compares the ultimate to space, which pervades everywhere and is undifferentiated and of one taste.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 105.2), the central theme of this chapter is this statement that (the ultimate) is of a character that is everywhere of one taste (*ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid, ekarasa-lakṣaṇa*). He divides this teaching into four parts: (1) positing the character of manifest pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi mtshan nyid rnam par gzhas pa*); (2) positing the character of the antidotes to manifest pride (*mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi gnyen po'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhas pa*); (3) positing the character of examples of those (*de dag gi dpe'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhas pa*); and (4) positing the character that subsumes the phenomena that are those (*de dag gi dngos po bsdu*s).

pa'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhas pa). The first part ranges from p. 22 line 2, "Subhūti..." up to p. 26 line 23, "...outside this [teaching]." The second part begins with line 24 and ends at p. 28 line 14, "...the ultimate." The third part begins on p. 29 line three, "Subhūti..." and ends on line 18, "...everywhere of one taste." The concluding verses comprise the fourth part.

²¹⁹The word "just" is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.1, and D p. 20.3, which insert *sha stag* (omitted in *Ḍok* p. 30.1 and K p. 14a.7). "View" translates *lta ba*, which is found in *Ḍok* and K, but not in Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.2, and D p. 20.3. Lamotte, P, and D would be translated as: "These prideful venerable persons are just overcome by boastful pride and expound their understandings due to boastful pride" (*tshe dang ldan pa 'di dag ni mngon pa'i nga rgyal can mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyis mngon du zin cing shes pa brda sprod par bgyid sha stag lags so*). Compare *Ḍok* p. 30.1 and K p. 14a.7: *tshe dang ldan pa 'di dag thams cad kyang / mngon pa'i nga rgyal can / mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyis mngon du zin par lags so*.

²²⁰*Ḍok* p. 30.1 and K p. 14a.7 read: *de bas na*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.3, and D p. 20.4, but seems to correspond to *gang gi slad du*, which is found in Lamotte, P, and D, but omitted in *Ḍok* and K.

²²¹Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.3, and D p. 20.4 add the phrase "supremely difficult to realize" (*mchog tu rtogs par dka' ba*), which is omitted in *Ḍok* p. 30.2 and K p. 14a.8.

²²²Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.4, and D p. 20.5 add the phrase *don dam pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid ni bcom ldan 'das*, which occurs later in *Ḍok* (lines 3-4).

²²³ĀDok p. 30.6, K p. 14b.5: *bsgrags shing mngon par phye nas btags te rab tu bstan to*; Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.7, D p. 20.7: *bsnyad cing gsal bar byas rnam par phye gdags par byas rab tu bstan no*.

²²⁴ĀDok p. 30.7, K p. 14b.5: *phung po rnams kyi rnam par dag pa dmigs pa*; Lamotte p. 50, P p. 6e.7, D p. 21.1: *phung po rnams la rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 406.2) comments that the *Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* states that an object of observation for purification has three aspects: (1) it is permanently changeless (*rtag tu rnam par 'gyur ba med*); (2) it is a nature of virtue and happiness (*dge dang bde ba'i ngo bo nyid*); and (3) it is manifestly accomplishes everything (*thams cad mngon par 'grub par 'gyur*).

²²⁵This list is referred to by scholars of the Ādra-ṣhi-kyil (*bkra shis 'khyil*) College of the Ge-luk-ṣa school of Tibetan Buddhism (e.g., Gung-tang and A-ku Āo-drö-gya-tso, who are followers of Jam-yang-shay-ṣa) as the “seven pronouncements” (*bka' stsal bdun*) of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*: the aggregates, sense spheres, dependent arising, sustenances, truths, constituents, and mindful establishments. The last category is composed of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment: the four mindful establishments, four thorough abandonings, four bases of magical emanations, five powers, five forces, seven branches of enlightenment, and eight branches of the path of Superiors.

²²⁶ĀDok p. 31.4, K p. 15a.2: *bar du 'ang*; Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.3, D p. 21.4: *bar la*. ĀDok p. 31.4 and K p. 15a.1 indicate that a range is indicated by using the particle *nas* prior to this (omitted in Lamotte, P, and D, which have *dang*). Lamotte, P, and D also follow *bar la* with the phrase: *rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa de 'ang*, which is omitted in ĀDok and K.

²²⁷ĀDok p. 31.5 and K p. 15a.2 insert *kyang*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.4, and D p. 21.5.

²²⁸ĀDok p. 31.6, K p. 15a.3: *shes nas*; Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.5, D p. 21.5: *rtogs nas*.

²²⁹Note the great differences in word order and word choice between ĀDok and K and Lamotte, P, and D: ĀDok p. 31.6, K p. 15a.3 read: *so sor de ma yin pa'i phung po rnams dang / skye mched rnams dang / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang / zas rnams dang / bden pa rnams dang / khams rnams dang / dran pa nye bar gzhas pa rnams dang / yang dag par spong ba rnams dang / rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa rnams dang / dbang po rnams dang / stobs rnams dang / byang chub kyi yan lag rnams dang / 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa'i de bzhin nyid [don: omitted in K] dam pa chos la bdag med pa / so sor yongs su tshol bar mi byed do [K: de]. Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.5, D p. 21.5 read: *yang de las gzhan pa'i phung po rnams dang / khams rnams dang / skye mched rnams dang / rten cing 'brel par [P, D: bar] 'byung ba dang / zas rnams dang / bden pa rnams dang / dran pa nye bar bzhas [P, D: gzhas] pa rnams dang / yang dag par spong ba rnams dang / rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa rnams dang / dbang po rnams dang / stobs rnams dang / byang chub kyi yan lag rnams so so dang / 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa so so la de bzhin nyid don dam pa bdag med pa yongs su tshol bar mi byed kyi.**

²³⁰ĀDok p. 32.1, K p. 15a.6: *de bzhin nyid kyi rjes su 'jug pa dang / gnyis su med pa'i ye shes iu yang dag par rten pa de nyid kyi thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid don dam pa khong du chud cing mngon du rtogs par 'gyur te gzhan du ni ma yin no; Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.7, D p. 21.7: de bzhin nyid kyi rjes su 'brang ba gnyis med pa'i shes pa la rten pa de nyid kyi don dam pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid nges par 'dzin pa dang / mngon par rtogs pa kho nar byed de.*

²³¹Dok p. 32.3, K p. 15a.7: *de lta bas na*; omitted in Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7a.8, and D p. 22.1.

²³²Dok p. 32.3, K p. 15a.8: *shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 51, P p. 7b.1, and D p. 22.1: *rig par bya'o*.

²³³Dok p. 32.6, K p. 15b.3: *yang mtshan nyid tha dad du zin na*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.3, D p. 22.3: *yang [Lamotte: 'ang] mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na ni*.

²³⁴Dok p. 32.7, K p. 15b.4: *'o na ni de bzhin nyid don dam pa chos la bdag med pa / rgyu dang bcas shing rgyu las 'brel te 'byung bar 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.3, D p. 22.1: *des na de bzhin nyid don dam pa chos bdag med pa yang [Lamotte: 'ang] rgyu dang bcas pa yin zhing rgyu las byung ba yin par 'gyur ro*.

²³⁵Dok p. 32.7, K p. 15b.3: *rgyu las 'brel te byung ba yin na ni / 'dus byas su 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.4, D p. 22.4: *rgyu las byung ba nyid yin na ni 'dus byas yin par 'gyur ro*.

²³⁶Dok p. 33.1, K p. 15b.5: *'dus byas yin na ni / don dam par mi 'gyur te / don dam pa ma yin pa'i phyir / don dam pa gzhan zhig yongs su btsal bar 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.4, D p. 22.4: *'dus byas nyid yin na ni don dam pa yin par mi 'gyur ro // don dam pa ma yin na ni don dam pa gzhan zhig yongs su btsal dgos par 'gyur ro*. My translation borrows the word “necessary” (*dgos par*) from Lamotte, P, and D.

²³⁷Dok p. 33.1, K p. 15b.6: *'di lta ste*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.5, D p. 22.5: *gang gi phyir*.

²³⁸The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.6, D p. 22.5, which add *dgos*.

²³⁹*Dok* p. 32.2, K p. 15b.7: *de las*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.6, D p. 22.6: *de'i*.

²⁴⁰*Dzong-ka-ba* (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 17.10) reports that Wonch'uk states that these terms (*rtag pa rtag pa'i dus*, *nityakāla* and *ther zug ther zug gi dus*, *śāśvatakāla*) imply respectively a backwards looking orientation and a forward looking orientation. *Dzong-ka-ba* (p. 17.18) also states that Wonch'uk glosses "permanent, permanent time" as "former, former time" (*snga ma snga ma'i dus*) and that "everlasting, everlasting time" is glossed as "later, later time" (*phyi ma phyi ma'i dus*), but these exact glosses are not found in any of the four places (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 416, 512, 525, and 567) where Wonch'uk mentions the terms *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus* and *ther zug ther zug gi dus*. However, on p. 525.6 Wonch'uk says that someone else's (*kha cig*) opinion equates *ther zug ther zug* with *phyi ma phyi ma*, but he does not claim this position as his own.

On p. 416.5 Wonch'uk states: "The suchness that is of one taste is (1) without oneness in the past from the beginning; therefore [the sūtra says,] 'permanent, permanent time'. It is (2) without oneness in the future; therefore [the sūtra says,] 'everlasting, everlasting time'" (*ro gcig pa'i de bzhin nyid gzod ma nas sngar yang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas / rtag pa rtag pa'i dus zhes bya'o / phyis kyang gcig pa nyid ma yin pas / ther zug ther zug gi dus zhes bya ste*). On p. 567.6, in a discussion of the uncompounded (*'dus ma byas*, *asamskṛta*) he states: "Because it abides as the reality of phenomena in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, it is uncompounded" (*rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos rnam kyī chos nyid du rnam par gnas pa'i phyir 'dus ma byas pa'o*).

Noriaki Hakamaya ("A Consideration on the *Byams Shus kyī Le'u*", in *Indo-bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, vol. 14.1, Dec. 1975, pp. 20-30) has noted a similarity between this passage and the Maitreya chapters in the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*

and the *Aṣṭadaśa-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*. On the basis of the *Prajñāpāramitā* passages and their Tibetan translations, he has concluded that *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus* should be Sanskritized as *nityaṃ nityakālam*, and *ther zug ther zug gi dus* should be rendered as *dhruvaṃ dhruvakālam* (p. 28). He further renders this whole passage into Sanskrit, based on the Sanskrit of the *Prajñāpāramitā* passage, as follows:

*yā utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā nityaṃ nitya-kālam dhruvaṃ
dhruva-kālam dharma-sthāpanāya sthitaiveyaṃ dharmāṇām dharmatā
dhātuḥ / evaṃ yat tena parikalpita-lakṣaṇena tasya paratantra-lakṣaṇasya
nityaṃ nitya-kālam dhruvaṃ dhruva-kālam apariniṣpannatvaṃ
niḥsvabhāvatā idaṃ pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam //.*

See also la Vallée Poussin's version of the *Śālistamba-sūtra* (*Bouddhisme: Études et Matériaux*, London, 1913, p. 73.4-9) and Bhattacharya's version of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Calcutta, 1957, p. 229.3-4), which have passages that are similar to this one.

²⁴¹Dok p. 33.3, K p. 15b.8: *chos rnam kyī chos nyid chos gnas pa'i dbyings de ni
'dug pa yin gyi gzhan du ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.7, D p. 22.7: *chos gnas par
bya ba'i phyir chos rnam kyī chos nyid dbyings de ni rnam par gnas pa kho na yin
pa*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 117.1) equates the "element of reality" (*chos nyid dbyings*, *dharmatā-dhātu*) with the thoroughly established nature: "The element of reality is the thoroughly established nature that is the element of qualities, i.e., reality" (*yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyī chos kyī dbyings te chos nyid do*). See note 29.

²⁴²Dok p. 33.5: *nam mkha' ni gzugs kyī bye brag mtshan nyid tha dad pa rnam pa du
ma sna tshogs la mtshan ma med cing rnam par 'phel bar mi rtog mi 'byung te*; K p.
16a.1: *nam mkha' ni gzugs kyī bye brag mtshan nyid tha dad pa rnam pa du ma sna*

tshogs la mtshan ma med cing rnam par mi rtog mi 'gyur te; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7b.8, D p. 22.7: *nam mkha' ni [P: la] gzugs kyi rnam pa sna tshogs du ma mtshan nyid tha dad pa la mtshan ma med pa rnam par rtog pa med pa 'gyur ba med pa ste*.

²⁴³Dok p. 33.6, K p. 16a.3: *thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o*; Lamotte p. 52, P p. 7c.1, D p. 23.1: *thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya'o*.

²⁴⁴Commenting on this example, Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 117.6) states: “With respect to [the example of] space, since it is of a character that is an absence of the entityness of forms, that very absence of the entityness of those is not distinguished with respect to difference in terms of difference from those. The ultimate is also like that” (*nam mkha' ni / gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i mtshan nyid yin pas de dag gi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni / de dag tha dad pas tha dad du dbyer med do // don dam pa yang de dang 'dra'o*).

²⁴⁵This entire chapter is quoted by Asaṅga in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (pp. 86.1.5-87.2.3). He indicates that in this chapter Buddha discusses the fifth characteristic of the ultimate (see note 75), that it is a character that is everywhere of one taste. This concludes the discussion of the characteristics of the ultimate, which Asaṅga states is the main topic of the first four chapters. Gung-tang (pp. 8-9) states that the main theme of this chapter is a demonstration that there are no distinctions in the element of qualities (*chos kyi dbyings, dharma-dhātu*).

²⁴⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 422.6) cites an explanation from the '*Phags pa sangs rgyas kyi sa'i 'grel pa*, which why he is named “Extensive Intelligence” (*blos gros yangs pa, viśālamatī*) “because he has thoroughly completed the profound and the vast, he thoroughly understands” (*zab cing rgya che pa yongs su rdzogs pa dang / shin tu*

rtogs pa'i phyir). On line 7, he quotes the '*Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i 'grel pa*: "Because he does not have any ignorance concerning the various forms of discourse related to the scriptures and commentaries of those who have emerged [from home life] and of householders, he is called 'Extensive Intelligence'" (*rab tu byung ba dang / khyim pa rnam kyi gtsug lag dang 'grel pa'i gtam rnam pa sna tshogs mi shes pa gang yang med pas blo gros yangs pa zhes bya'o*). On p. 423.1, quoting the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, he states that this Bodhisattva is so named "because the objects of activity of [his] wisdom are measureless and limitless" (*shes rab de nyid tshad med pa dang / mtha' yas pa'i spyod yul yin pa'i phyir*). On the preceding page he also cites an explanation from Paramārtha.

²⁴⁷According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 121.3), in this chapter "mind" (*sems, citta*) refers to the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*). Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog*, in *Collected Works of Guñ than dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me*, vol. 2, New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972, pp. 16b.1-17b.2) presents the same opinion, and Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 421.4) states that basis-consciousness should be equated with mind "because having collected the seeds of phenomena, it gives rise to phenomena" (*chos rnam kyi sa bon bsags nas chos rnam 'byung ba byed pa'i phyir*) [see note 261].

"Sentience" (*yid, manas*), according to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 121.3), refers to (1) afflicted sentience (*nyon mongs pa can gyi yid, klišṭa-manas*), the seventh consciousness in the Yogācāra system of psychology and to (2) a just-ceased consciousness and a consciousness that has been transformed (*'gags ma thag pa dang gnas su gyur pa'i rnam par shes pa*). See also Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi*, p. 16b.1), who also identifies sentience with afflicted sentience.

"Consciousness" (*rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*), according to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 121.3), refers to the six collections of operating consciousnesses (*'jug pa'i rnam*

par shes pa'i tshogs drug, i.e., eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.). See also Wonch'uk (p. 421.5), and Gung-tang (p. 16b.1), who also identify consciousness with the six consciousnesses. See also *Compendium* I.1 and *Somme* I.7-8. In *Compendium* I.2, Asaṅga states that the function of mind is to act as a support for name and form (*ming dang gzugs, nāma-rūpa*). For more on the nature and functions of mind, basis-consciousness, afflicted sentience, and consciousness, see: *Somme* p. 16 and notes pp. 4*, 5*, and 6*. *Somme* p. 29 states that these terms are not synonymous and should be understood as referring to three distinct things.

According to Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi* p. 16b.1), in general these terms are synonymous. This idea is also found in the *Abhidharmakośa* (see, for example, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Varanasi, 1970, p. 208), where Vasubandhu states that “mind, sentience, and consciousness are equivalent” (*cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham*). The same statement can also be found in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (Pāli Text Society ed., p. 506) and Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikāvṛtti* (ed. A. Shastri, p. 10; Tibetan: Peking 5558, vol. 234.1.3). In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, however (I.13), Asaṅga disagrees with this and states that those who hold that mind, sentience, and consciousness are equivalent are incorrect.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 121.3), in a discussion of the term “secrets” (*gsang ba, guhya*), states: “Their entities (*ngo bo, bhāva*), states (*gnas pa, sthita*), objects of observation (*dmigs pa, ālambana*), companions (*grogs, sahāya*), functions (*las, karma*), and their existence (*de'i yod pa nyid, astitva*), and divisions (*rab tu dbye ba, prabheda*) are naturally hidden phenomena for those who are outsiders and some from among those who are of our system.”

²⁴⁸Dok p. 34.4, K p. 16a.8: *gsang ba la mkhas pa gdags par 'dogs*; Lamotte p. 54, P p. 7c.5, D p. 23.: *gsang ba la mkhas par 'dogs na yang* [Lamotte: 'ang] *ji tsam gyis 'dogs lags*.

²⁴⁹There is a passage identical to this at the beginning of chapter seven, “Paramārthasamudgata” (Dok pp. 46-7), which is quoted by Gung-tang (pp. 74.6-75.13) to the effect that the Bodhisattvas in this sūtra (who are all on the tenth Bodhisattva ground) do not actually have these questions, but are questioning the Supramundane Victor for the benefit of other beings for whom the questions and answers are relevant. Since all these Bodhisattvas have attained the initiation of “great light rays,” according to Gung-tang, they have nothing to learn that they do not already know, and so they ask questions for the benefit of trainees less advanced on the path.

²⁵⁰Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 424.6) states that Buddha praises Vishālamati by saying that his question is “good, good” (*legs so legs so, sādhu sādhu*) because his intention in asking it is to benefit others: “Because of eliminating the doubts of many companions and because of extensive benefits (*’khor mang po’i the tshom gcod cing phan yon che ba’i phyir*), [Buddha] says, ‘good, good!’” Since Vishālamati is a tenth ground Bodhisattva, he does not have this question himself, but asks it for the benefit of others who do.

²⁵¹These are: (1) hell beings (*dmyal ba, nāraka*); (2) hungry ghosts (*yi dwags, preta*); (3) animals (*dud ’gro, tiryak*); (4) humans (*mi, manuṣya*); (5) demigods (*lha ma yin, asura*); and (6) gods (*lha, deva*). For a discussion of these see *Kośa* ch. 3, pp. 11-15 and Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 447.3-449.7).

²⁵²Dok p. 35.2, K p. 16b.5: *mngon par grub cing skye bar ’gyur yang rung ste*; Lamotte p. 55, P p. 7d.1, D p. 24.1: *mngon par ’grub cing ’byung bar ’gyur ba der dang por*.

²⁵³These are described in detail by Wonch’uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 449.7-551.7).

²⁵⁴According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 136.6), these are “two causes that operate in association with the basis-consciousness and are linked with it. The two types of internal appropriators are: appropriators of physical sense powers that are associated with supports (*rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa*) and appropriators of predispositions to exaggeratedly apprehending imputational natures (*kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags len pa*). With respect to ‘appropriators of physical sense powers that are associated with supports’: regarding ‘supports’, those supports of physical sense powers are whatever is counted as the physical aggregates that are apprehended. The ‘physical sense powers’ are the five physical sense powers.” See also Wonch'uk pp. 457.1-462.2.

According to Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary) the first type consists of sensory bases which are actively functioning with the consciousnesses to which they relate in an uncommon way. The members of the second type are similar to those of the former type, but they do not directly activate any consciousnesses. An example of this second type is the sense basis of the notion of “I” when one is asleep, at which time it does not perform any specific activity.

²⁵⁵Ādok p. 35.2, K p. 16b.5: 'di ltar gnas dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can nye bar len pa dang / mtshan ma dang / ming dang / rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags nye bar len pa rnam pa gnyis la rten nas / der thog ma kho nar sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin cing chags la 'phel zhing rgyas pa dang yangs par 'gyur ro; Lamotte p. 55, P p. 7d.2, D p. 24.1: 'di ltar len pa rnam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang / mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa la rten nas / sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 138.5) explains that “ripening” (*rnam par smin cing*) means “establishing the results of previous actions at the time of making

the transition between lives within the combination of semen and blood". The mind "forms" (*chags*; Lamotte, P, D, Jang-chup-dzu-trül: operates: 'jug) because "at that time, in terms of the birth-place, (1) the aspect of the form that is the combination of the semen and blood of father and mother and (2) the basis-consciousness move into a womb and become one establishment and abiding (*grub bde gcig, eka-yogakṣema*).". The mind "develops" (*rgyas*) "due to continuous operation subsequent to that". "Increase" (*'phel ba*) takes place "at the time of the arising of the operating consciousnesses". It "expands" (*yangs par 'gyur*) "due to the infusion of predispositions by those operating consciousnesses".

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 452.3) comments that this passage refers to the maturation of the seed-consciousness. He adds: "On the occasion of taking birth in those transmigrations, initially, when making the transition between lives, the mind that is a consciousness [containing] all seeds matures. Initially, when the gap between lives has been connected, due to the maturation of the consciousness containing the seeds the zygote is manifestly established; this is called 'connecting the gap between lives'."

He adds that the *Yogācārabhūmi* states: "With respect to that, the two, father and mother, become desirous. When they arrive at the point where they have strong desire, just at the end of that period the time of ejaculation comes. After that, from the two of them two drops — of semen and blood — without doubt arise. Those two drops of semen and blood of those two mix in the mother's place of conception; like the cream of cooled off milk that has been boiled, forming into something like cream, it coagulates and forms. The accumulator maturing all seeds, the appropriator of a body, the basis-consciousness operates." A Sanskrit passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* that appears to be the same as this one is cited and translated by Lambert Schmithausen in his *Ālaya-vijñāna* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), pp. 127-8.

Due to the force of previously generated desires, a being who is about to be reborn feels desire toward his future parents. If the being is to be reborn as a male, it

will feel desire toward its future mother, and if it will be a female, it will feel desire toward its future father. Moreover, the type of being it will feel desire for is determined by the nature of its past karma. If its karma destines it for rebirth as a human, then it will feel desire for human parents, and if it will be reborn as an animal, then it will feel desire for animal parents, and so forth. It will be drawn toward a male and female who are about to copulate and who are appropriate for its future life situation. This is the completion of the process of rebirth, when the future father impregnates the future mother, and the being takes rebirth in the appropriate life situation. For a more complete description of this process, see Lati Rinbochay and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Death, Intermediate State, and Rebirth In Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Snow Lion, 1979).

When a being dies, the continuum of that being ceases, and a new continuum takes its place. This is effected by the ripening of the seeds of the previous *ālaya-vijñāna*. Thus the substantial continuum of the consciousness continues, although a new existence has begun. The *ālaya-vijñāna* of this life is not, however, the same as that of the previous lifetime, and this passage seems to indicate that the predispositions (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*) act as the mechanism by which the transition is effected.

At the beginning of a new life, a being has the karmic latencies of past lives (referred to as seeds), which begin to manifest themselves in the new continuum. They then grow and develop, and as the new life progresses, they in turn lead to production of new predispositions, and so the process continues and maintains itself.

In this connection, it should be noted that the *ālaya-vijñāna*, when it is purified at the beginning of the eighth Bodhisattva ground and above, is no longer called *ālaya-vijñāna*, but is then referred to as *vipāka-vijñāna* (*rnam par smin pa rnam pa shes pa*), the “thoroughly maturing consciousness”.

In a previous discussion of the workings of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, Wonch’uk (p. 441.3) commented: “Due to the *ālaya-vijñāna*, through the force of thoroughly maintaining the three types of predispositions [see note 260] the continuity of the gap between lives is not cut off.” See also Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in Mind-*

Only, pp. 122 and 869, which presents Gung-tang's views on the connecting and appropriating functions of the basis-consciousness.

According to the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, the three types of predispositions are: (1) predispositions of verbalization (*mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags, abhilāpya-vāsanā*); (2) predispositions of apprehending a self (*bdag du 'dzin pa'i bag chags, ātmagrāha-vāsanā*); and (3) predispositions of the limbs of cyclic existence (*'khor ba'i yan lag bag chags, saṃsārāṅga-vāsanā*). See *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, tr. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1929), pp. 478-80 and Wilson pp. 177-8 and 387-394. According to the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, the first type of seeds includes seeds that predispose a person to make differentiations regarding individual compounded phenomena. This has two types: (a) manifest expressions that define meanings, which are expressions of vocal differentiation with respect to meanings; and (b) manifest expressions that define objects, which are phenomena of minds and mental factors that understand objects. The second type include seeds that predispose one to incorrectly conceiving 'I' and 'mine'. It also has two types: (a) innate conceptions of self, which are conceptions of 'I' and 'mine' that are objects of abandonment by a path of meditation (*sgom lam, bhāvanā-mārga*); and (b) the imputational conception of 'I', which is a conception of 'I' and 'mine' that is an object of abandonment by a path of seeing (*mthong lam, darśana-mārga*). Due to these two conceptions, sentient beings make distinctions of 'I' and 'other'. The third type of predisposition includes seeds that induce fruition of the three realms of existence. They are also of two types: (a) virtues that are associated with contamination, which are any actions that induce desirable effects; and (b) non-virtues, which are any actions that induce undesirable effects.

²⁵⁶They are not twofold because the physical sense powers are absent in the Formless Realm, but the predispositions are present. For more on this, see Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 462.2) and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 496-502.

On p. 457.6, Wonch'uk quotes the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*: "In brief, the basis-consciousness operates by way of two types of object of observation: (1) by way of cognitions that are internal impellers and (2) by way of characteristics of thoroughly uninterrupted cognitions of aspects of external environments. With respect to that, cognitions that are internal impellers are predispositions of exaggerated adherence to the imputational nature and forms that are supports and sense powers. Moreover, these are in realms with physical forms [i.e., the Form Realm and the Desire Realm]. In the Formless [Realm,] there are only the impelling predispositions."

²⁵⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 462.7), citing the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, expands on this: "Because it thoroughly holds the seeds of phenomena, thoroughly holds the bases of physical sense powers, and thoroughly holds the connection between lives, it is called the 'appropriating consciousness'." See also *Somme* pp. 14-15 and Wilson pp. 10 and 57.

²⁵⁸*Dok* p. 35, *K* p. 17b.1, Lamotte p. 55, *P* p. 7d.5, *D* p. 24.3: *grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa* (Sanskrit: *eka-yogakṣema*). This term can mean "security" or "the keeping safe of property" (M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1899), p. 856). Monier-Williams states that it is generally regarded as a *dvandva* compound meaning "acquisition and preservation of property", and can refer to the security that comes from yogic realization. In this context, however, these meanings are inappropriate, and *bde* should be equated with *gnas*, which means abiding. My source for this is Jeffrey Hopkins (*ME*, p. 860 n. 511), whose source is the Outer Mongolian scholar Ngak-wang-bel-den (*ngag dbang dpal ldan*, commonly referred to as Bel-den-chö-jay (*dpal ldan chos rje*), born 1779), who states in his *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets,' Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought, Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings

Press, 1964) that in the expression *grub bde gcig*, *bde* is to be equated with *gnas*. See also *Somme*, notes p. 4*, which provides a number of references for this term.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 464.4) glosses this term as "concordant in terms of being of one nature" (*bdag nyid gcig tu mthun pa*). See also Wonch'uk p. 461.6 and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 426-7 and 869-70.

²⁵⁹Ādok p. 35.6, K p. 17a.1: *de ltar de'i lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i phyir 'brel pa dang / rab tu 'brel pa kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya'o*; Lamotte p. 55, P p. 7d.4, D p. 24.3: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar de lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro*.

The *ālaya-vijñāna* (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*) is one of the more important terms in this sūtra, and was appropriated by, and expanded upon, in the Yogācāra tradition. It is sometimes translated by Western scholars as "storehouse consciousness," since it acts as the repository of the predispositions that one's actions produce. It stores these predispositions until the conditions are proper for them to manifest themselves. The Tibetan translators rendered it as 'basis-of-all' (*kun gzhi*) because it serves as the basis for all of the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, which are said to arise from stable predispositions (*bṛtan pa'i bag chags*, *dhruva-vāsanā*) within the *ālaya-vijñāna*. See Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālaya-vijñāna*, pp. 1-7. Regarding the term "stable predispositions", see Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider & Company, 1980), p. 36 and note 524 below.

According to Ge-luk-ba presentations of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, it is said that it is a consciousness although it is not able to induce ascertainment of things that appear to it. Wilson (p. 148) reports that the Ge-luk-bas explain this idea as follows:

Because the mind-basis-of-all is a cognitive phenomenon, its nature is to be clear and knowing. However, because it is a direct perceiver, that is, because it apprehends its objects without the mediation of an abstract mental image as

conceptual cognizers do, the mind-basis-of-all is an awareness to which an object appears, but which cannot ascertain or induce later ascertainment of that object.

Wilson adds that the Ge-luk-bas' assertion that it is a consciousness and thus is clear and knowing (*gsal zhing rig pa*) is based on Vasubandhu's statement in the *Triṃśikā* (verse 3a), that the basis-consciousness "[although] unknowing, is a knower" (Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 422): *asamviditaka...vijñaptikam*; Otani *Sde dge, sems tsam* vol. 14, p. 1b.3: *rnam par rig pa mi rig pa*). Gung-tang elaborates on this idea (Wilson pp. 360-362), and he states that Ge-luk-ba doxographers classify it as "an awareness to which [an object] appears [but] is not ascertained" (*snang la ma nges pa'i blo, aniyata-pratibhāsa-buddhi*) because it is a direct perceiver in the sense that objects appear to it without the mediation of an abstract mental image (*don spyi, artha-sāmānya*), but it is not able to induce later ascertainment of the object. He cites D̄zong-ka-ba's *Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa 'grel* (verse six):

The basis-of-all is a knower in that it is a cognition and, therefore, an object appears to it. It is unknowing because it is unable to induce ascertainment of that object. It is a mind which does not realize its object — it does not eliminate superimpositions with regards to that object.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 124.6) states: "If the basis-consciousness did not exist, appropriation of a body would be impossible; initial operation [of consciousness] would be impossible; clear operation [of consciousness] would be impossible; seeds would be impossible; karma would be impossible; bodily feelings would be impossible; meditative absorptions in which mind is absent would be impossible; and transmigration of consciousness would be impossible." He states that if the *ālaya-vijñāna* did not exist there could be no appropriation of a new body for five reasons: "(1) Because the basis-consciousness arises from having previously manufactured a karma, it appropriates the body, but the operating consciousnesses arise from present

conditions; thus, those cannot appropriate the body. This is the first reason. (2) Moreover, because the basis-consciousness is neutral, it appropriates the body, but the operating consciousnesses are seen to be virtuous and non-virtuous; thus, they could not appropriate the body. This is the second reason. (3) Moreover, because the basis-consciousness is a type [of consciousness] that is included within [the class of] neutral fruitions, it appropriates the body, but the operating consciousnesses are neutral fruitions; thus, whatever is a type [of consciousness] that is included within [the class of] neutral fruitions is not [per Peking vol. 144, p. 221.4.1: *ma*; this appears to have been mistakenly deleted in *Sde dge* p. 125.3] observed [as being of this type]. Therefore, they cannot appropriate the body. This is the third reason. (4) Moreover, because the basis-consciousness abides pervading the entire body it appropriates the body, but operating consciousnesses individually arise specific places. Those places from which that consciousness arises are conjoined with that [consciousness], and those places from which the consciousness does not arise are not conjoined [with it]; thus, they cannot appropriate the body. That is the fourth reason. (5) Moreover, through a continuum of moments of appropriation [beginning with] the first [moment], the basis-consciousness simultaneously appropriates the body but, the operating consciousnesses arise sometimes, and sometimes they do not arise. Therefore, if the basis-consciousness did not exist, there would be the fault that the body would have to be appropriated again and again. This is the fifth reason. So, because there would be the faults of: (1) the arising [of the operating consciousnesses] from present conditions, (2) their being virtuous and non-virtuous, (3) their not being of the class of [neutral] fruitions, (4) their [being associated with] specific places, and (5) repeated appropriation of the body, if the basis-consciousness did not exist, appropriation of the body would be impossible. Thus, because these faults would occur, it should be understood that the basis-consciousness exists.” Passages containing some of the same reasonings can be found in Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (see N. Tatia ed., p.

11.17) and Jinaputra's *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* (Peking vol. 113, p. 89.1.1). These reasonings are discussed by Gung-tang on pp. 424-465 of Wilson's translation.

See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 164.5-164.7, where he states that it is necessary for maintaining continuity and to enable the mind to arise again after meditative absorptions in which mind is absent and in which conceptions are absent. For Jang-chup-dzu-trül and Wonch'uk (and the Yogācāra tradition generally), the existence of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is established both through reasonings based on the necessity of its existence for continuity and by citations from scriptures that assert its existence (such as the *Samdhinirmocana* and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*). See for instance Jang-chup-dzu-trül pp. 125.1-128.1, and Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 463.2-466.7), where he describes the functions of the *ālaya-vijñāna* in detail; and Jinaputra's *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya* (Peking 5555, vol. 113, pp. 89.1.2-89.4.6), where he outlines eight reasonings establishing its existence. See also Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālaya-vijñāna* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), pp. 1-6 and 197-207 and Joe B. Wilson pp. 1-55 and 182 (where he discusses the need that Buddhist philosophers have felt to establish their positions both by reference to scripture and by reasoning). On p. 128 Wilson lists the five states in which (according to Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, verses seven and sixteen) mind is absent): (1) rebirth as a god in the Discriminationless heaven; (2) the meditative absorption of non-discrimination; (3) the meditative absorption of cessation; (4) mindless sleep; and (5) mindless fainting. Wilson explains each of these states on pp. 128-130.

²⁶⁰These are of three kinds. See note 256.

²⁶¹Dok p. 35.6, K p. 17a.2: *de ltar de ni gzugs dang / sgra dang / dri dang / ro dang / reg bya dang / chos rnam kyis kun nas bsgrubs shing rab tu bsags pas na sems zhes kyang bya ste*; Lamotte p. 55, P p. 7d.5, D p. 24.4: *sems zhes kyang bya ste / 'di ltar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dang chos [rnam kyis; not in P,*

D, L p. 19b.2, N p. 20a.3] kun tu bsags [in Lamotte, L, N; P, D: btsags] pa dang nye bar bsags [in Lamotte, L, N; P, D: btsags] pa yin pa'i phyir ro.

This passage plays on the Sanskrit word *citta*, which is being fancifully etymologized as being derived from the verbal root \sqrt{ci} , which means to gather together, pile up, accumulate. Thus, *citta* is what accumulates the predispositions.

According to *Āzong-ka-ba* (*Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa 'grel*, Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1984, pp. 4.12-6.9) and Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i mjug ngog*, pp. 5a and 11b, as per Joe B. Wilson, the *Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 234ff. and 325ff.), the *ālaya-vijñāna* has seeds within it that ripen into eye-consciousnesses; when these become activated, an eye-consciousness results. Wilson explains that according to these Ge-luk-ba scholars it is not that the *ālaya-vijñāna* is a part of the eye-consciousness itself. As he says, there are eight consciousnesses, and although the seeds for an eye-consciousness come from the *ālaya-vijñāna*, this does not mean that some portion of the *ālaya-vijñāna* becomes an eye-consciousness. He adds that some other interpretations of this system hold that the *ālaya-vijñāna* contains all other consciousnesses and that each consciousness is a movement within the *ālaya-vijñāna*, like waves on the ocean. The present passage in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* states that the operating consciousnesses are produced from seeds that abide in and depend upon the *ālaya-vijñāna*, which seems to support the latter position.

In the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (ch. I.5), Asaṅga explains why it is called the "appropriating consciousness": "Why is it called the 'appropriating consciousness'? Because it is the cause of all the physical sense powers and the support that appropriates all bodies. It is like this: as long as one is still alive, it holds the five physical sense powers such that they do not disintegrate. Also, when the connection between lives is made, because it appropriates rebirth, the body is appropriated" (translated from the Tibetan text of Lamotte's *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, Louvain, 1973, Tome I, pp. 4-5). See also Tome II, pp. 14-15, where Lamotte

translates parts of Vasubandhu's commentary on this passage. The etymology of the term *citta* is discussed at length by Wilson, pp. 409-420. See also Wilson pp. 111-115 and 138, which discusses Gung-tang's definition of the basis-consciousness; pp. 117-19 and 769-70, which discusses the idea that it is neutral (*lung du ma bstan pa*, *avyākṛta*) and uncontaminated; and pp. 122-4 and 869-70, which discusses its function of providing continuity between lifetimes.

²⁶²Dok p. 36.1, K p. 17a.4: 'byung bar 'gyur ro; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7d.7, D p. 24.5: 'byung ngo.

²⁶³Dok p. 36.1, K p. 17a.4: *de la rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i mig dang gzugs rnams la brten nas / mig gi rnam par shes pa 'gyur ste / mig gi rnam par shes pa de dang lhan cig rjes su 'jug pa / dus 'thun pa / spyod yul 'thun pa / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa 'byung ngo*; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7d.7, D p. 24.4, L p. 19b.4: *de la rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i mig dang gzugs rnams la rten nas / mig gi rnam par shes pa 'byung ste / mig gi rnam par shes pa [de dang lhan cig rjes su 'jug pa dus mtshungs pa spyod yul mtshungs pa; not in P, N p. 20a] rnam par rtog pa'i [yid kyi; not in P, N p. 20a] rnam par shes pa 'ang [D: yang] 'byung ngo*.

The first of these two sentences appears to indicate that there is an external world, while the second seems to be implicitly denying it. In the first, we are told that there are three factors operating in the production of an eye consciousness: an eye, a form, and consciousness. The eye here probably refers to the eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po*, *cakṣur-indriya*), which is the empowering condition (*bdag rkyen*, *adipati-pratyaya*). Form, which is the observed object condition (*dmigs rkyen*, *ālambana-pratyaya*) is divided into two types, shape and color, which are the factors that are observed by an eye sense power and that give rise to corresponding perceptions. Consciousness refers to a previous moment of consciousness, which in Buddhist epistemology is said to be a necessary precondition for later moments of consciousness.

This is the immediately preceding condition (*de ma thag rkyen, samanantara-pratyaya*). In general, Buddhist texts that accept this model also assert the existence of an external world, since the implication is that eye, form, and consciousness are different entities.

The second sentence, however, provides a different twist, and seems to be interpreting this in the context of a cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*) position. If a form and an eye-consciousness arise “engaged with, in one instant with, and in the same range as” (*lhan cig rjes su 'jug pa / dus mtshungs pa / spyod yul mtshungs pa; saha-anugata / samakāla / samaviṣaya*) a conceptual mental consciousness of it, then this implies that they both arise in the same moment. Since form is the cause and the eye consciousness is the effect, this implies that they are both of the same entity, since if they were of different entities they should arise in separate moments. The sūtra also presents a theory of seeds deposited in the basis-consciousness that give rise to perceptions and so forth, and this passage seems to be connected with this idea. The import of this passage seems to be that cause and effect arise from a single source (since they occur in the same moment), and so they must be of the same entity. This also leads to a doctrine of idealism, since if objects and consciousnesses arise in the same moment and are of the same entity then there is no ultimate distinction between forms and consciousnesses, which leads to the conclusion that mind and its objects are of one entity. In order for there to be external objects, perception of an object must precede mental consciousness of it — they must occur in separate moments. A similar idea is developed by Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi*, pp. 5a-b; per Wilson, pp. 146-7), where he indicates that since mind and its objects arise simultaneously, without any temporal distinction between them, they must be of one entity. Wilson reports that Gung-tang also states that if one asserts the basis-consciousness, one must deny external objects (p. 5a.2; per Wilson, pp. 146-7).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 145.3) comments that “functions together with” means that “it arises together with an eye-consciousness. This indicates a

positing of operation of an eye-consciousness and a conceptual mental consciousness by means of simultaneous entities. 'At the same time' [means that] their arising is free of former and later with respect to just the moment [of arising]. This indicates a positing of operation of an eye-consciousness and a conceptual mental consciousness by way of the cause of the one being the [cause of] the other. [The phrase,] 'same object of activity' indicates that they arise in terms of an uninterrupted interval with respect to just one object of observation. This indicates that an eye-consciousness and a conceptual mental consciousness have [one] object of observation; hence what operates is consciousness".

On p. 158.2 he adds: "Here, with respect to indicating the divisions of the operations of consciousness: In brief — (1) an eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po*, *cakṣur-indriya*) that arises simultaneously; (2) form as an object of observation; (3) an eye-consciousness that arises along with that; and (4) a mental consciousness that arises from the basis of arising simultaneously from them — are asserted as arising at the same time without [distinctions of] former and later, in just one moment. Why is this? The eye sense power is a basis that arises simultaneously with an eye-consciousness, and form is that specifically characterized phenomenon that generates the aspects of whatsoever is a form of an eye consciousness; the mental consciousness that is produced from a basis that is produced simultaneously with that is said to be 'the arising of a conceptual mental consciousness that operates at the same time as an eye consciousness, and with the same object'; therefore, those do not differ in time. With respect to that, some think that when the Supramundane Victor's said, 'In dependence upon an eye and a form, an eye consciousness arises' [the words] 'in dependence' [mean that] in dependence upon the meeting of an eye and a form in the first moment, in the second moment an eye consciousness arises, and — because in the third moment a conceptual mental consciousness that is induced by that is produced — there is a difference of time. This is not the view of this [sūtra]. 'In dependence' is merely indicating the mode of arising of an effect in dependence upon dependently arisen

similar causes, and there is no former and later with respect to time....Here, [the phrase,] 'in dependence upon an eye and a form' [means that] the two are causes, and consciousness is an effect. Therefore, [the phrase,] 'in dependence upon a cause, an effect is produced' indicates the modes of cause and effect, but in actuality the two are of one time. It is like this: eye is a basis that arises simultaneously with an eye consciousness, and form is a character of that which gives rise to whatever is a form of an eye consciousness; thus these do not have former and later."

²⁶⁴Dok p. 36, K p. 17a, P p. 7d.7, D p. 24.6, L p. 19.6, and N p. 20.6 only mention the body consciousness, but the other consciousnesses are implied in the text, and are added in brackets in Lamotte (p. 56) on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text.

²⁶⁵Dok p. 36.5, K p. 17a.7: *gal te mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig lan cig 'byung bar gyur na rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa / mig gi rnam par shes pa dang spyod yul 'thun pa gcig kyang lan cig 'byung ngo*; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.1, D p. 24.7: *gal te mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig lhan cig 'byung na ni mig gi rnam par shes pa dang spyod yul mtshungs pa / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa gcig kho na lhan cig 'byung ngo*.

²⁶⁶The word "only" has been added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.3, and D p. 25.2, which read: *yid kyi rnam par shes pa gcig kho na*. When the text speaks of one mental consciousness arising once, the phrase "having the same object of activity as the five collections of consciousness" might mean that the ideational mental consciousness would have the same object as whichever one of the types of objects gave rise to it.

²⁶⁷The word "only" has been added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.4, and D p. 25.2, which insert *kho na*.

²⁶⁸Dok p. 37.2, K p. 17b.2: *mang po*; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.4, D p. 25.3: *rab tu mang po dag*.

²⁶⁹Dok p. 37.2, K p. 17b.2: *yang*; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.5, D p. 25.3: *zhing*.

²⁷⁰Dok p. 37.2, K p. 17b.3: *chu klung de nyid rgyun*; Lamotte p. 56, P p. 7e.5, D p. 25.3: *chu'i klung de rang gi rgyun gyis rgyun*.

²⁷¹Lamotte (p. 57) reproduces the Sanskrit for this passage based on a quotation from Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* (ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1932, p. 33), which appears to cite this passage:

tadyātha viśālamate / mahata udakaughasya vahataḥ sa ced ekasya taraṅgasyotpattipratyayah pratyupasthito bhavaty ekam eva taraṅgam pravartate / sa ced dvayoh sambahulānām taraṅgāṇām utpattipratyayah pratyupasthito bhavati / sambahulāni taraṅgāni pravartante / na ca tasyodakaughasya srotasā vahataḥ samucchittir bhavati na parikṣayah prajñāyate.

²⁷²Dok p. 37.4, K p. 17b.5: *gzugs brnyan gyi rang bzhin du 'gyur ba yang ma yin la / yongs su zad par yang mi mngon no*; Lamotte p. 57, P p. 7e.7, D p. 25.5: *gzugs brnyan gyi dngos por yongs su 'gyur ba yang [Lamotte: 'ang] ma yin la yongs su sbyor bar yang mi mngon no [Lamotte: ngo]*.

²⁷³For a discussion of these analogies, see *Somme*, notes p. 4*.

²⁷⁴Dok p. 37.5, K p. 17b.6: *gnas shing brten nas*; Lamotte p. 57, P p. 7e.8, D p. 25.5: *rten cing gnas nas*.

²⁷⁵Dok p. 37.6, K p. 17b.7: *mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig lan cig 'byung ngo*; Lamotte p. 57, P p. 7e.8, D p. 25.5: *mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig kho na lan [P: lhan] cig 'byung ngo*.

²⁷⁶The word “simultaneously” has been added on the basis of Lamotte p. 57, P p. 8a.1, and D p. 25.7, which read: *car lan cig 'byung ngo*. Dok p. 37.7 and K p. 17b.2 read: *lan cig 'byung bar 'gyur ro*.

Each of these collections of consciousness is itself a collection of individual consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, ear consciousness, etc.

Lamotte (p. 57) also reproduces this passage from page 33 of Sthiramati's *Trimśikā-bhāṣya*:

*evam eva viśālamate / tadoghashāntīyam ādarśasthāntīyam ādānavijñānam
saṃniśrītya pratiṣṭhaya sa ced ekasya cakṣur-vijñānasyotpatti-pratyayaḥ
pratyupasthito bhavati / ekam eva cakṣur-vijñānam pravartate / sa ced yāvat
pañcānām vijñānakāyānām utpatti-pratyayaḥ pratyupasthito bhavati /
pañcānām vijñāna-kāyānām pravṛttir bhavati.*

²⁷⁷Dok p. 38.1, K p. 18a.1: *gsang ba la mkhas par ni 'gyur mod gyi*; Lamotte p. 57, P p. 8a.2, D p. 25.7: *gsang ba la mkhas pa yin yang*.

²⁷⁸Dok p. 38.2, K p. 18a.2: *gnas par*; omitted in Lamotte p. 57, P p. 8a.3, D p. 26.1, L p. 20b.6, N p. 21a.6.

²⁷⁹In other words, this reason alone is not sufficient for Bodhisattvas to merit the designation: “wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness” (*sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa'i gsang ba la mkhas pa*). As we will see, they must also directly realize the ultimate in order to be worthy of this designation.

²⁸⁰Ādok p. 38.2, K p. 18a.2: *gang tshun chad*; omitted in Lamotte p. 57, P p. 8a.3, D p. 26.1, L p. 20b.7, N p. 21a.6.

²⁸¹Lamotte p. 57, P p. 8a.4, D p. 26.2, L p. 20b.7, N p. 21a.7 join this passage to the next one with the connective particle *dang*, which is omitted in Ādok p. 38.3 and K p. 18a.3.

²⁸²The word “seed” (*sa bon*, *bija*) has been added in brackets on the basis of Wilson’s translation (*The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 108-111) of Āzong-ka-ba’s *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ gnas rgya cher ’grel pa legs par bshad pa’i rgya mtsho* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), p. 8a.7 and of Gung-tang’s *Yid dang kun gzhi dka’ gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i ’jug ngog*, p. 14b.3-4 (Wilson pp. 324-5), which state that there are two types of basis-of-all (*kun gzhi*): the seed-basis-of-all (*kun gzhi sa bon*) and consciousness-basis-of-all (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). Wilson reports that Āzong-ka-ba contends that the seed-basis consists of the predispositions deposited in the basis-consciousness, and is only imputedly existent (*rtags yod*, *prajñaptisat*), while the fruitional basis, the basis-consciousness, is substantially existent (*rdzas yod*, *dravyasat*). The predispositions abide in a person’s psychophysical continuum as potentialities until conditions conducive to their manifestation occur, and then they produce their effects, which accord with the actions that originally gave rise to them. Virtuous actions give rise to good effects, non-virtuous actions lead to bad effects, and neutral actions produce neutral effects. According to Āzong-ka-ba (as reported by Wilson), if the text does not state that the basis-consciousness is being referred to, one should assume that this means that the seed-basis is the subject of discussion. I decided to follow this division proposed by Āzong-ka-ba and Gung-tang since the text makes a

distinction between “basis” and “basis-consciousness”, and their division indicates a plausible reason for this distinction. See Wilson, pp. 108-111 and 324-5.

²⁸³Ādok p. 38.3, K p. 18a.4, Lamotte p. 57, N p. 21a.7, L p. 21a.1, C p. 16b.3: *bsags pa*; P p. 8a.4, D p. 26.2: *btsags pa*.

²⁸⁴The idea in this paragraph seems to be that when one sees the ultimate, one does not see *ālaya*, etc. — one sees only the ultimate, which at other points in the text is equated with emptiness and suchness (see, for instance, Ādok pp. 31.5 and 40.7). An interesting implication of this is that although the Bodhisattvas referred to view only the ultimate — and do not see mind, sentience, and consciousness, etc. — they are still wise with respect to them. This seems to imply that although mind and so forth are not being viewed directly, when one directly realizes the ultimate one knows the secrets of mind, etc. in their true nature. Since by realizing the ultimate one becomes wise with respect to the final nature of things, one can be said to be “wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness”.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], pp. 486.7) quotes Paramārtha's *Brjed byang*: “Because, as stated earlier, when these Bodhisattvas who perceive consciousness, form, and so forth know them conventionally, the Supramundane Victor does not indicate that these persons ‘know the meaning of the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness’. Similarly, as stated earlier, with regard to those who do not perceive the meaning of consciousness, the Supramundane Victor does not indicate that these persons ‘know the meaning of the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness’. This indicates that when they know that conceptuality of the unreal does not exist that is ‘correct’. It is like this: when they understand the root secret they come to clearly understand even the branches of conceptuality of the unreal.” The main thrust of his comments seems to be that a Bodhisattva who transcends conventional designations and who no longer views

psychological reality in terms of conventional designations and distinctions becomes “wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and consciousness”.

²⁸⁵Dok p. 39.3, K p. 18b.3: *sa bon thams cad chu bo bzhin du 'bab*; Lamotte p. 58, P p. 8b.2, D p. 26.7, L p. 21b.2, N p. 21b.7, C p. 17a.2, V p. 88b.1: *sa bon thams cad chu bo'i klung ltar 'bab*.

²⁸⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 489.6), citing Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, states: “It is profound (*zab pa, gambhira*) because it is very difficult for its depth to be fathomed by the intelligence even of the wise of the world (*'jig rten gyi mkhas pa'i blos kyang gting dpag par dka' ba'i phyir*). It is subtle (*phra ba, sūkṣma*) because it is difficult to know even for Hearers (*nyan thos rnams kyis kyang shes par dka' ba'i phyir*). Therefore, [Buddha] does not teach this [basis-]consciousness to Hearers and so forth, because they do not seek extremely subtle omniscience. With respect to [the phrase,] ‘having all seeds, flowing like a river’: Because it continues from one moment to another, it flows without its continuum being cut off, like a river. With respect to [the phrase,] ‘I do not teach this to children’: it is not revealed to those having a view of self. This is because those who conceive of a self apprehend that as being a unitary, unchanging self that exists for as long as cyclic existence lasts.”

The passage from the sūtra is partially quoted by Vasubandhu in the *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* (verse 32), and more completely by Sthiramati in his *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya* (ed. S. Lévi, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Paris, 1932, p. 34). The passage in Sthiramati's *bhāṣya* reads:

ādāna-vijñāna gambira-sūkṣmo
ogho yathā vartati sarva-bijo /
bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi
mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ //

This is somewhat different from *Dok*. The passage from Sthiramati would be translated as:

The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
 Flowing like a river, having all seeds,
 Has not been taught by me to children
 So that they do not imagine it to be like a self.

According to Gung-tang (*Yid dang kun gzhi*, p. 31b.3; per Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in Mind-Only*, p. 606), it is not taught to children because there is a danger that they might think that the basis-consciousness is “like a lord, exercising power over the aggregates and so forth, or as being like the permanent, self-arisen *Īśvara* who creates all environments and beings, or as being like [the Sāṃkhya’s] nature (*prakṛti*), which is the root of the emanation of all transformations” [tr. Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in Mind-Only*, p. 606]. According to Gung-tang (as reported by Wilson), the fact that the basis-consciousness is causally connected with its effects eliminates such qualms. Wilson adds that this is because *Īśvara* and *prakṛti* are permanent phenomena, do not rely on anything else, and are non-functioning things (as is the I (*bdag*, *ātman*) propounded by the Vedānta school), while the basis-consciousness is impermanent, it changes moment by moment, and it performs functions. See also pp. 423-4, where Wilson cites Tibetan commentaries that hold that it is “profound” because it is “difficult to fathom by worldly scholarship”, and “subtle” due to being “difficult for Hearers...to understand”.

The entire chapter of the sūtra is quoted in Asaṅga’s *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (pp. 87.2.1-88.2.1). In the first four chapters, according to Asaṅga, Buddha discussed the characteristics of the ultimate, and in this chapter he discusses the character of mind (*sems kyi mtshan nyid*, *citta-lakṣaṇa*). With respect to the concluding verse of the sūtra, Asaṅga states, “[The basis-consciousness] makes possible appropriation, initial [operation of consciousness] clear [operation of consciousness], one’s physical feelings

[arisen] from seeds, meditative stabilizations in which mind is absent, and concordant transmigrations.”

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 120.6), “the condensed meaning of this fifth chapter is, in brief, the teaching of the character of mind” (*le'u lnga pa 'di'i bsdus pa'i don ni mdor bsdu na sems kyi mtshan nyid bstan pa yin no*). Wilson reports that Gung-tang (in his commentary on the *Legs bshad snying po*, p. 8-9; Wilson p. 55) asserts that the main theme in this chapter is the teaching of the basis-consciousness. See also *Somme* pp. 14.4 and 23-24.

²⁸⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 493.5) discusses the meaning of this Bodhisattva's name: “With respect to [the name] ‘Source of Qualities’ (*yon tan 'byung gnas, guṇākara*): because of accumulating the causes of [good] qualities for immeasurable eons, this is a case of a designation of a name from a causal point of view. Due to accumulating both types of bases of [good] qualities — the collections of merit and wisdom — he is [called] ‘Source of Qualities’” (*yon tan 'byun gnas zhes bya ba ni bskal pa dpag tu med pa nas yon tan gyi rgyu bsags pas 'di ni rgyu las ming du btags pa ste / bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs yon tan rnams kyi gzhi rnam pa gnyis bsags pa'i phyir yon tan 'byung gnas zhes bya'o*).

²⁸⁸Ādok p. 39.6, K p. 18b.6: '*dogs*; Lamotte p. 59, P p. 8b.5, and D p. 27.2 read: “when you designate [this], why do you designate it?” (*'dogs na 'ang [P, D: yang] ji tsam gyis 'dogs lags*).

²⁸⁹Lamotte p. 60, P p. 8b.7, and D p. 27.4 read: “...your reason for thinking to ask the Tathāgata...” (*de bzhin gshegs pa la khyod don 'di ni [P, D: nyid] 'dri bar sems pa [P: dpar] ni*; Ādok p. 40.1 and K p. 18b.3 read: *gang khyod de bzhin gshegs [K: gshe] pa la don 'di 'dri ba ni*).

²⁹⁰Dok p. 40.2, K p. 19a.1: *chos rnam kyī mtshan nyid khyod la bshad kyis nyon cig*; Lamotte p. 60, P p. 8b.8, D p. 27.4: *nyon cig dang / chos rnam kyī mtshan nyid la mkhas pa khyod la bshad par bya'o*.

²⁹¹Dok p. 40.3, K p. 19a.3: *gang ji snyed du tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir / chos rnam kyī ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming gi brdas rnam par bzhaḡ pa'o*; Lamotte p. 60, P p. 8c.1, D p. 27.4: "It is that which is posited nominally and terminologically as the entities and attributes of phenomena in accordance with how they are conventionally designated" (*ji tsam du rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir chos rnam kyī ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming dang brdar rnam par bzhaḡ pa gang yin pa'o*).

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 496.4), citing the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, writes: "Why is it called 'imputational'? Because mental consciousness, having the aspects of immeasurable conceptions, just gives rise to error, [it is termed] 'imputational'. Because its own character does not truly exist, but is merely perceived conceptually, it is [called] 'imputational'. He then cites Vasubandhu's commentary: "[The phrase.] 'a character that gives rise to error' means that: it has a character of unreal, erroneous objects of observation. 'Its own-character does not truly exist' [because] its nature does not truly exist."

²⁹²This passage, as Lamotte points out (p. 189 n. 5), refers to the twelve links of dependent origination (*rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba, pratitya-samutpāda*). Compositional factors (*'du byed, saṃskāra*) are the second of the twelve links. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 505.4) states that the "great aggregates of suffering" (*sdug bsngal gyi phung po chen po, mahatā duḡkha-skanda*) "indicates that there is no beginning or end to the accumulation of suffering".

On p. 504.7 Wonch'uk comments that the first part of the formula ("because this exists, that arises", *'di ltar 'di yod pas 'di 'byung*; Lamotte p. 60, P p. 8c.3, D p. 27.7: *'di yod pas 'di 'byung la*) "indicates that the meaning is that [effects] arise from

conditions unalterably. This means that 'due to the existence of a small condition exists, an effect phenomenon just exists; an alteration of conditions that will give rise to an effect does not exist.'"

The second part of the formula ("because this is produced, that is produced": 'di skye pa'i phyir 'di skye ba ste; Lamotte, P, D: 'di skyes pa'i phyir 'di skye ba 'di lta ste) "indicates that objects are produced from conditions that are impermanent. This is because production of an effect from causes that do not give rise to any phenomenon is not established." The phrase, "due to the condition of ignorance, compositional activity [is produced]" "indicates that [effects] are produced from conditions that are potencies. Although phenomena are unfluctuating and impermanent, any effect does not arise from any condition. Why is this? Since there are different divisions of potencies of phenomena, it is said that 'there are [the links of dependent arising] ranging from the arising of compositional factors due to the power of ignorance up to the arising of old age and death due to the power of birth.'"

Previously, on p. 498.7, citing the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* as his source, he explained why the other-powered character is so named: "Because it arises from seeds that are its own predispositions, it is powered by other conditions. Also, having arisen — since its nature is not able to abide for more than a moment — it is 'other-powered'."

²⁹³Dok p. 40.7, K p. 19a.6: *brtson 'grus kyi rgyu*; Lamotte p. 61, N p. 22b.6: *rtul ba'i rgyu*; P p. 8c.4: *btul ba'i rgyu*; D p. 28.1, L p. 22b.1: *rtun pa'i rgyu*.

²⁹⁴Dok p. 40.7, K p. 19a.6: *yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa'i rgyus*; Lamotte p. 61, P p. 8c.4, D p. 28.1: *legs par tshul bzhin yid la byas pa'i rgyus*.

In an earlier discussion of the thoroughly established character, Wonch'uk (vol. ii [118], p. 499.7), quoting the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, stated: "Because it does not change into something else, because it is an object of observation for purification,

because it is the supreme of all virtuous phenomena, it is called the 'thoroughly established nature' in the sense of being supreme." On p. 500.1, quoting Vasubandhu, he stated: "'Because it does not change into something else', it is not a false phenomenon. It is like a minister who is free from falsity. With respect to [the phrase,] 'It is the thoroughly established nature that in the sense of being supreme': because it is an object of observation for purification and because it is the supreme nature, it is 'the thoroughly established nature'." Wonch'uk adds (line 5, quoting the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*) that the statement that it is "thoroughly complete" (*yongs su rdzogs pa*) "means that it is all-pervasive" (*kun tu khyab pa'i don*). It is "thoroughly differentiated from the own-character of the obstructibility of forms and so forth" (*gzugs kyi thogs pa dang bcas pa la sogs pa'i rang gi mtshan nyid las rnam par 'byed do*). Secondly: it is thoroughly established. This indicates that it is permanent. It is differentiated from impermanence and so forth of generally characterized phenomena. This is because they are generally characterized phenomena, but they lack permanence. Thirdly: It is the suchness of phenomena. This indicates that it is not false. It is differentiated from space and the self of Formers and so forth. This is because although it is taught that these are permanently pervasive and permanent this is false."

²⁹⁵Ādok p. 40.7, K p. 19a.7: *de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang*; Lamotte p. 61, P p. 8c.4, D p. 28.1: *...rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa*.

²⁹⁶This passage is translated with the aid of Lamotte p. 61, P p. 8c.6, D p. 28.2, and N p. 22b.7, which treat "the imputational character" as the subject of the sentence, unlike Ādok p. 41.1 and K p. 19a.8, which insert the accusative particle *du*. Ādok and K read: *skyes bu gang zag rab rib can gyi mig la rab rib kyi skyon yod pa de lta bur ni kun btags pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o*; Lamotte, P, and D read: *skyes bu gang zag rab rib*

can gyi mig la rab rib kyi skyon chags pa de lta bur ni kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid [D, L 22b.3: du] blta bar bya'o.

Texts that refer to the term “clouded vision” (*rab rib*, *timira*) use it to indicate a wide range of defects of vision, including occluded or hazy vision, seeing spots, lines, dots, etc. The implication in this passage is that the imputational character is like the chimera seen by a person with faulty vision, and has absolutely no reality. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 517.4) states: “Through the power of clouded vision existing in the eye, an eye-consciousness and a mental consciousness that [arises] at the same time are generated through the power of those two consciousnesses a conceptual mental consciousness cognizes circular hairs and so forth in the second moment.” On p. 518.5, citing the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, he adds: “Due to the degeneration of an eye sense power that is affected by jaundice of the eye, blue is perceived as yellow.”

For other discussions of “clouded vision”, see: *Madhyamaka-kārikā-vṛtti*, ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (Osnabrück, 1970), ch. 18, p. 373; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (Osnabrück, 1970), pp. 102 and 109; *Viṃśatikā-kārikā-vṛtti*, verse 2 and commentary; *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, ed. S. Lévi (Paris, 1925), p. 3.12; and Atsushi Kanazawa, “Khapuṣpa and Timira”, in *Bukkyō Gaku*, vol. 23, 1987, pp. 1-22.

²⁹⁷ĀDok p. 41.4, K p. 19b.3: *mig yongs su dag cing mig la rab rib kyi skyon chags pa med par gyur nas*; Lamotte p. 61, P p. 8c.8, D p. 28.4: *mig yongs su dag cing mig la rab rib kyi skyon chags pa dang bral bar gyur pa na*.

²⁹⁸ĀDok p. 41.4, K p. 19b.3: *mig de'i rang bzhin gyi spyod yul ma nor ba'i spyod yul de lta bur ni yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o*; Lamotte p. 61, P p. 8d.1, D p. 28.4: *mig de nyid kyi rang bzhin gyi spyod yul ma nor ba'i spyod yul de lta bur ni yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid blta bar bya'o*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 187.6) comments: “Non-entitiness in the sense of non-entitiness in terms of character should be understood to be an utter non-existence in terms of both conventional and ultimate truths, like a sky-flower. The ‘other-powered character’ is the entitiness of internal and external phenomena that are dependently arisen through the power of other conditions. Because the entitinesses of things that are apprehended objects and apprehending subjects are produced due to the power of other causes and conditions, it is ‘the other-powered character’. Like a magician’s activity, non-entitiness in the sense of non-entitiness in terms of production and non-entitiness in terms of the ultimate should be understood as existing only as a conventional truth. The ‘thoroughly established character’ is correct knowledge and suchness that are distinguished by having been transformed and by being the suchness of phenomena.”

On p. 213.5 he adds: “The imputational character is a character that is posited in the manner of names and terminology but is not posited by way of its own character; therefore, since it is utterly non-existent in terms of both truths it is a non-entitiness due to being a non-entitiness in terms of character. The other-powered character is produced by the power of other conditions but is not [produced] by way of its nature; therefore — since it exists merely [like] a magician’s illusions in terms of conventional truths — it is a non-entitiness due to being a non-entitiness in terms of production, and — since it does not have ultimate non-entitiness because it is not an object of observation of purification it is not an ultimate non-entitiness because it is not an ultimate truth. Therefore, it is a non-entitiness, and the thoroughly established character is the ultimate, and the ultimate is distinguished by being the non-entitiness of all phenomena and — because it is both the ultimate truth and a non-entitiness — it is a non-entitiness due to being the ultimate non-entitiness.”

²⁹⁹Dok p. 41.5, K p. 19b.4, P p. 8d.2, D p. 28.5, N p. 23a.5, L p. 22b.7, C p. 18b.1, V p. 83d.2: *gang gi tshe tshon*; Lamotte p. 61: *gang gi tshe tshe na*. I think that Lamotte's text is a misreading, since none of the other texts agree with it.

³⁰⁰An *indranila* (Dok, K, D, L, Wonch'uk: *an da rnyil*; Lamotte, P, N: *an dha rnyil*) is a blue-colored celestial gem, said to resemble a sapphire. Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 522.3) states that an *indranila* is "a blue-colored [gem] with divine powers", and the "sapphire" (*mithon ka chen po, mahānila*) referred to in the passage as a wish-fulfilling gem (*yid bzhin nor bu, cintā-maṇi*). See also note 3.

For a discussion of this example, see Bhavya's *Tarkajvālā*, chapter 5, verse 21 and commentary, in which he outlines the example and then argues that it is an improper analogy.

³⁰¹Dok p. 41.6, K p. 19b.6, L p. 23a.2: *nor bu rin po che padma r'a ga ltar*; Lamotte p. 62: *nor bu rin po che pa dma ral lta bur*; P p. 8d.3: *nor bu rin po che pad ma ral lta bur*; D p. 28.4: *nor bu rin po che pad ma r'a ga lta bur*; N p. 23a.6: *nor bu rin po che pad ma ral lta bur*.

³⁰²Dok p. 41.7 and K p. 19b.6 insert *kyang*, which is omitted in Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8d.3, and D p. 28.8.

³⁰³Dok p. 41.7, K p. 19b.7: *nor bu rin po che mar gad ltar*; Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8d.4, D p. 28.7, L p. 23a.3, N p. 23b.1: *nor bu rin po che pa ma rgad lta bur*; V p. 88d.3: *nor bu rin po che padma r'a ga lta bur*.

³⁰⁴Dok p. 42.1, K p. 19b.8: *de'i tshe gser du snag bar 'gyur te*; Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8d.5, D p. 29.1: *de'i tshe ni gser lta bur snang bar 'gyur zhing*.

³⁰⁵Dok p. 42.2, K p. 20a.1: *shel shin tu dang ba tshon dang phrad pa de bzhin du ni gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun btags pa'i mtshan nyid kyi tha snyad kyi bag chags su blta'o*; Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8d.6, D p. 29.1, N p. 23b.3, L p. 23a.5, V p. 88d.5: [*shel shin tu gsal ba la*: omitted in P, D, N, L, V] *tshon dang phrad pa de lta bur ni gzhan gyi dbang gi [V: gis] mtshan nyid la kun brtags [V: btags] pa'i mtshan nyid kyi tha snyad kyi bag chags [D, L: su] blta bar bya'o*.

This is a difficult passage to translate, both in terms of the grammar and the thought. Grammatical particles vary in the different versions, and it is very difficult to decide how they should be taken in this passage. I have chosen the reading that seems most likely and most in accord with the different versions I am consulting.

One of the difficulties concerns the analogy itself. The predispositions seem to be compared to the imputational character, but predispositions are not imputations, but rather are dependent-arising, existent phenomena that are able to produce effects. The conventions or appearances that they induce, however, would seem to belong to the imputational character. Thus, perhaps these appearances are the imputational character that is being referred to, rather than the predispositions per se.

In the example, the other-powered character is being compared to the very clear crystal, and the imputational character is being compared to the colors that it comes in contact with. The problem in this analogy is that existents (the colors and the predispositions) are being compared to a non-existent imaginary, the imputational character.

³⁰⁶Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8e.1, and D p. 29.4 insert *nor bu rin po che*, which is omitted in Dok p. 42.5 and K p. 20a.4.

³⁰⁷Dok p. 42.6, K p. 20a.4: *yongs su ma grub cing / rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su rang bzhin med pa de bzhin du [K: gyi]*; Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8e.1, D p. 29.4, N p. 23b.7, L p. 23a.3, C p. 18b.6, V p. 88e.2: *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus*

dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid med pa [nyid: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] de lta bur ni.

³⁰⁸*Dok p. 42.7, K p. 20a.5: yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o; Lamotte p. 62, P p. 8e.2, D p. 29.5: yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid blta bar bya'o.*

³⁰⁹*Dok p. 42.7, K p. 20a.5: ming dang 'brel pa'i mtshan ma la brten te; Lamotte p. 63, P p. 8e.3, D p. 29.6: mtshan ma dang 'brel ba'i [P, D: pa'i] ming la [P: las] brten nas.*

³¹⁰This passage is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 63, P p. 8e.4, D p. 29.6, L p. 23a.6, and N p. 24a.6, which insert a crucial negative particle (*med*) in the last phrase, which reads: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen pa med pa la brten nas ni yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid rab tu shes so*. This negative particle is omitted in *Dok* and *K*.

The meaning of the passage seems to be that when we become involved with names, then what we know is the illusory phenomena of the imputational character. When we misconceive the other-powered character as the imputational character, then what we know are the phenomena of the other-powered character. When we no longer misperceive the other-powered character as the imputational character, then we know the thoroughly established character.

³¹¹*Dok p. 43.7 and K p. 20b.5 insert gang tshun chad; this is omitted in Lamotte p. 64, P p. 9a.2, and D p. 30.4, which read: gang gi phyir.*

³¹²*Dok p. 43.7, K p. 20b.6: chos rnam s kyi kun btags [K: brtags] pa'i rang bzhin yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes shing / chos rnam s kyi gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid dang / yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid dang / mtshan nyid med pa dang /*

kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes la / mtshan nyid med pa'i chos yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes na / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rab tu spong zhing / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rab tu spangs na / rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rtogs par 'gyur pa de tsam gyis na; Lamotte p. 64, P p. 9a.2, D p. 30.4: chos rnams kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid dang gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid dang yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes shing mtshan nyid med pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes la / mtshan nyid med pa'i chos yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes nas / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rab tu spong zhing kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rab tu spangs na rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid kyi chos 'thob par 'gyur ba de tsam gyis na.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 538.1), citing the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, comments: "In that way, through entering into [understanding of] the character of objects that appear in the manner of mental verbalizations, those Bodhisattvas enter into [understanding of] the imputational nature. Through entering into [understanding of] cognition-only, they enter into [understanding of] the other-powered nature. How do they enter into [understanding of] the thoroughly established nature? They enter after having reversed even conceptions of cognition-only." At this level, even appearances of cognition-only do not arise. He adds (line 6), "At that time, since objects of observation and observers are equalized for those Bodhisattvas, the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of equality arises. Therefore, those Bodhisattvas have entered into [understanding of] the thoroughly established nature."

³¹³See the discussion of this passage in *Bhāṣya* p. 13.1.

³¹⁴Ādok p. 44.5, K p. 21a.4: *skye bo bag med nyes brlag le lo can*; Lamotte p. 64, P p. 9a.7, D p. 31.1, L p. 24b.6, N p. 25a.2, C p. 20a.2, V p. 89b.1: *skye bo bag med nyes [in P, D, L, N, C, V; Lamotte: kyis] bcom le lo can*.

³¹⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 543.2) quotes this passage as follows:

Due to understanding phenomena just as they are,
They abandon the characters of thoroughly afflicted phenomena.
Having abandoned the characters of thoroughly afflicted phenomena,
Thoroughly pure phenomena are obtained.

Those who do not consider the faults of compounded phenomena,
Who are overcome by laziness and non-conscientiousness
Always fluctuate with respect to phenomena; therefore,
Separation from characters is nirvāṇa.

He adds that this chapter is “the chapter [explaining] the character of non-entityness”. On p. 542.6 he states: “With respect to [the term,] ‘fluctuating phenomena’: Because the phenomena of cyclic existence first arise and later cease, and because they cycle among the three existences, they are ‘fluctuating phenomena’.... With respect to [the phrase,] ‘They are objects of compassion due to degenerating in terms of non-existence and existence’: Due to laziness, they apprehend phenomena as non-existent and apprehend fluctuating phenomena as just existent; therefore, due to the power of those [conceptions of] non-existence and existence, they are faulty. Due to those faults, they become objects of great pity.”

Ādok p. 44.6 and K p. 21a.4 read: *brtan dang g.yo ba med yod chos rnam la // ma rung byed pa snying brtser bya ba yin*. The translation of the last five lines is aided by Lamotte pp. 64-5, P p. 9a.7, D p. 31.1, which read: *skye bo bag med nyes [Lamotte: kyis] bcom le lo can // 'du byed skyon la rtog par mi byed pa // brtan med g.yo ba yod pa'i chos rnam la // rab tu nyams pas snying brtser bya ba yin*.

The meaning of *Ḍok* and *K* is less clear, but a translation of the same lines would be:

Non-conscientious, degenerate (*nyes brlag*), lazy beings

Do not consider the faults of compounded phenomena.

[Because] they do not apply themselves to stable, non- fluctuating phenomena

They are objects of compassion.

This entire chapter is quoted by Asaṅga in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (pp. 88.2.2-89.2.2). He indicates that the subject of this chapter is the character of phenomena (*chos rnams kyi mtshan nyid, dharma-lakṣaṇa*). Wilson reports that Gung-tang (pp. 8-9; per Wilson p. 55) thinks that the main theme of this chapter is the teaching of the three natures.

³¹⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 544.7) discusses why he is named "Exalted by the Ultimate" (*don dam yang dag 'phags, paramārthasamudgata*): "the 'ultimate' is the object to be attained, and it is the object of the supreme exalted wisdom, due to which it is called 'ultimate'. With respect to [the term] 'exalted': because the exalted wisdom that is the means of attainment arises from observing the ultimate, he is 'exalted'" (*don dam zhes bya ba ni thob par bya ba'i yul te / ye shes dam pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir don dam zhes bya'o // yang dag 'phags zhes bya ba ni thob par byed pa'i ye shes don dam pa dmigs pa las skyes pa'i phyir yang dag 'phags zhes bya'o*).

³¹⁷*Ḍok* p. 44.7, *K* p. 21a.5: 'di na bdag gcig pu dben pa zhig na mchis [*mchis: omitted in K*] na / 'di snyam du sems la yongs su rtog pa skyes te; Lamotte p. 65, P p. 9b.1, D p. 31.2: 'di na bdag gcig pu dben pa zhig na mchis pa'i tshe / sems kyi yongs su rtog pa 'di lta bu skyes lags te.

³¹⁸*Ḍok* p. 45.1, *K* p. 21a.6: *bshad*; Lamotte p. 65, P p. 9b.2, D p. 31.3: *bka' stsal*.

³¹⁹Jeffrey Hopkins reports (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, pp. 19 and 22) that in the *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 5.15; per Hopkins' translation, p. 19), *Āzong-ka-bā* refers to Wonch'uk's explanation that "own-character" in this context refers to the "uncommon character" (*thun mong ma yin pa'i mtshan nyid*) of the aggregates and so forth, but that *Āzong-ka-bā* contends that this explanation is incorrect. Rather, according to Hopkins, *Āzong-ka-bā* states that this section of the sūtra is clearly speaking about establishment by way of an object's own character with respect to imputational natures, and not the absence of a unique characteristic. Hopkins adds that *Āzong-ka-bā* thinks that Wonch'uk's position could not be the thought of the sūtra, since imputational natures do have unique characteristics, but they do not have establishment by way of their own character. Furthermore, in a classroom discussion of this idea Hopkins added that since even imputational natures have an uncommon characterization, if Wonch'uk's explanation were the correct one this would lead to the fallacy that the sūtra would have no way of explaining non-entityness in terms of character with respect to imputational natures.

³²⁰*Ādok* p. 45.2, *K* p. 21a.7: *phung po rnams la ji lta ba de bzhin du*; Lamotte p. 66, *P* p. 9b.2, *D* p. 31.4: *phung po rnams kyi ji lta ba bzhin du*.

³²¹See chapter four and notes 188-215.

³²²*Ādok* p. 45.3, *K* p. 21a.8: *bden pa rnams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyang bshad*; Lamotte p. 66: *bden pa rnams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyang bka' stsal*; *P* p. 9b.3, *D* p. 31.4, *L* p. 25a.4, *N* p. 25a.6, *C* p. 20a.8, *V* p. 88b.6: *bden pa rnams kyi mtshan nyid kyang bka' stsal*. Lamotte (p. 66 note a) states that his reading of *rang gi mtshan nyid* is based on Hsüan-tsang's text.

³²³The term “meditative cultivation” (*bsgom pa*) is found in *ĀDok* p. 45.5, K p. 21b.1, P p. 9b.6, D p. 31.6, and L p. 25a.7, C p. 20b.7, and omitted in N p. 25b.2 and V p. 89b.8. Lamotte p. 66 adds it in brackets and refers to Hsüan-tsang’s text p. 693e.23.

³²⁴*ĀDok* p. 45.6, K p. 21b.3: *mi nyams pa*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9b.6, D p. 31.6: “non-forgetfulness” (*mi bskyud pa*).

³²⁵*ĀDok* p. 45.6, K p. 21b.3: *phyir zhing 'byung ba dang / 'phel zhing rgyas pa 'ang bshad*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9b.6, D p. 31.7: *slar zhing 'byung ba dang / 'phel zhing yangs pa nyid kyang bka' stsal*. Regarding these terms, see notes 208 and 209.

³²⁶The phrase “in many ways” (*rnam grangs du mar*) occurs in *ĀDok* p. 45.7 and K p. 21b.1, but is omitted in Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9b.6, D p. 31.7, L p. 25b.4, and N p. 25b.7.

³²⁷*ĀDok* p. 46.2 and K p. 21b.6 end this passage with *nas*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9c.1, and D p. 32.2 end it with *la*. Both of these particles indicate that this passage leads into the following one.

³²⁸*ĀDok* p. 46.2, K p. 21b.6: *chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa [K: med pa] / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa [K: pa'o] zhes kyang bka' stsal na*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9c.1, D p. 32.2, L p. 25b.4, N p. 25b.6, C p. 20b.8, V p. 89c.4: *chos [omitted in N, C] thams cad ngo bo nyid med [P, D, L, N, C, V: ma mchis] pa / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa zhes kyang bka' stsal lags na*. On p. 193 n. 2, Lamotte gives several Sanskrit formulations of this passage and cites other texts where it appears.

³²⁹Dok p. 46.4, K p. 21b.7: *ci las dgongs te bcom ldan 'das kyis*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9c.2, D p. 32.3: *bcom ldan 'das kyis ji ltar dgongs nas*.

³³⁰Dok p. 46.5, K p. 22a.1: *bcom ldan 'das la bdag don 'di nyid zhu ste / bcom ldan 'das kyis ci las dgongs nas / chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa / chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa zhes [kyang: omitted in K] bka' stsal*; Lamotte p. 66, P p. 9c.3, D p. 32.4, L p. 25b.6, N p. 26a.1, C p. 21a.2: *bcom ldan 'das kyis ci la dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa [pa is omitted in P] / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bka' stsal pa'i don de nyid bcom ldan 'das la bdag yongs su zhu lags so*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 552.4) states that Paramārthasamudgata's question implies that the two sets of teachings (the teachings concerning the aggregates and so forth and the teachings concerning non-entityness and so forth) are mutually contradictory (*phan tshun 'gal ba*). He adds that the meaning of the question is: "Supramundane Victor, with respect to the statements concerning non-entityness and so forth, of what were you thinking?"

³³¹The word "virtue" is inserted on the basis of Lamotte p. 67, P p. 9c.5, D p. 32.6, N p. 26a.4, and L p. 26a.2, which read: *dge ba tshul bzhin skyes pa*. Dok p. 47.1 and K p. 22a.4 read: *tshul bzhin skyes pa*.

³³²Dok p. 47.2, K p. 22a.5: *ngas gang la dgongs te...zhes bshad pa nyon cig*; Lamotte p. 67, P p.9c.7, and D p. 32.7: *nyon cig dang / ngas ci las dgongs nas...zhes gsungs pa khyod la bshad par bya'o*.

³³³The wording of this passage is very significant. The text is not implying that Buddha was mistaken in what he said, or that he did not know what he was talking

about. He said what he meant to say, and meant what he said, but he said it for a specific reason. Buddha teaches different people in different ways according to their predispositions and what will be most helpful to them. He knows what effect his teachings will have on his audience, and knows how each person will understand his words.

Paramārthasamudgata's question is thus not asking Buddha whether he has changed his mind in giving the new teachings of this sūtra, but rather is asking Buddha to clarify the intentions behind his earlier teachings in light of the teachings being given in this text.

Jeffrey Hopkins reports (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, pp. 129-131) that Gung-tang (pp. 74.6-75.13) thinks that the passage indicates that Paramārthasamudgata does not actually have this qualm, since he is a tenth ground Bodhisattva, and would have long since overcome any doubts and qualms. He is asking this question for the benefit of the beings in the audience, who might have such qualms in their minds. Hopkins adds that the Second Dalai Lama (*dge 'dun rgya mtsho*) — in his *Rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsung 'bum las drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i sgron me* (blockprint from the Library of H.H. The Dalai Lama, n.d., p. 6b.4; reported in Hopkins pp. 129-131 and p. 150) — expresses the same idea, and points out that all of the interlocutors in the sūtra except Subhūti are tenth ground Bodhisattvas, who are just below the level of Buddhas.

When I questioned Geshe Palden Dragpa on this point, however, he said that since the sūtra is supposed to be of definitive meaning (*nges don*), and since Paramārthasamudgata states that he has this qualm, it must be a qualm that was actually in his mind, and so he could not be a tenth ground Bodhisattva. If he did not actually have this qualm, then the sūtra would be of interpretable meaning (*drang don*).

My own opinion is that since Buddha himself indicates that Paramārthasamudgata is asking his questions for the benefit of the audience, this suggests that he

is beyond the level where he would have such a question. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain Buddha's praising him for asking this in order to benefit sentient beings.

Hopkins (*Reflections on Reality*, p. 132) reports that according to Ge-luk-ba traditions this passage is concerned with a seeming discrepancy in Buddha's teachings. In the first wheel (Hinayāna) teachings, Buddha taught that phenomena are established by way of their own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), but in the middle wheel (the Perfection of Wisdom teachings) he appeared to contradict his earlier teaching by stating that all phenomena are without entityness, are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally passed beyond sorrow. In a Buddhist context, these two states of affairs are incompatible, and the task of the third wheel is to explain the thought behind Buddha's teachings, what he meant when he taught the earlier two wheels.

This does not mean that Paramārthasamudgata himself actually has the qualm that he is presenting Buddha with. As Gung-tang (pp. 73.13-74.6; reported by Hopkins pp. 129-131) points out, Paramārthasamudgata is a tenth ground Bodhisattva, and as such knows exactly what Buddha meant when he gave the teachings of the first two wheels. Hopkins (p. 132) adds that according to the Ge-luk-ba tradition sharp Bodhisattvas such as Paramārthasamudgata understand Buddha's intention from just his teachings in the second wheel, but Paramārthasamudgata is asking these questions out of compassion for the less advanced beings who were confused by Buddha's earlier teachings and who need to have Buddha spell out for them exactly which phenomena are established by way of their own character, and which lack such establishment.

This also appears to be the import of the passage on p. 56 of the sūtra in which Buddha states that some sentient beings who have reached an exalted level of spiritual attainment are able to easily understand Buddha's teachings without needing to have them explained to them:

[When] sentient beings — who have generated great roots of virtue, have purified the obstructions, have ripened their continuums, who have great faith and have accumulated great collections of merit and wisdom — hear this doctrine, they understand, just as it is, this which I explained with a thought behind it, and they develop belief in that doctrine. They also realize, by means of their exalted wisdom, the meaning just as it is. Also, through cultivating their realization, they very quickly attain the very final state.

This passage implies that they have no need of the explanations offered in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, since they already understand the meanings behind Buddha's words without becoming fixated on what they say on the literal level. As we will see, Paramārthasamudgata will label the teachings of the *Samdhinirmocana* as the “third wheel of doctrine”, which clarifies the misconceptions that arose in some of Buddha's followers as a result of his earlier teachings. The third wheel is referred to by Ḍzong-ka-ba and his followers as the “Wheel of Good Differentiation” because Buddha makes clear how his earlier teachings should be understood. But according to Ḍzong-ka-ba and the sūtra, these differentiations are not needed by the most advanced of Buddha's disciples and appear to be directed to those who are still confused by their tendency to take his words too literally and have not yet advanced to a level where they are able to grasp the meaning behind the words. See, for instance, *Legs bshad snying po* (Samath edition) pp. 27-29 and Ḍel-jor-hlün-drup's *Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'grel bstan pa'i sgron me* (Delhi: Rong tha mchog sprul nam pa gnyis, 1969), pp. 32-36.

³³⁴Ḍok p. 47.4, K p. 22a.7: ngo bo nyid med pa / rnam pa gsum 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa dang / skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa la dgongs nas ngas chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bshad do; Lamotte p. 67, P p. 9c.8, D p. 33.1: ngas chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum po 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / skye ba ngo

bo nyid med pa nyid dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bstan to.

For a bibliography of these terms, see *Somme* notes p. 23*, and for a bibliography of the three natures see notes pp. 1*-18*.

³³⁵Lamotte p. 67, P p. 9d.1, and D p. 33.2 insert *de la*, which is omitted in *Ā*Dok p. 47.4 and K p. 22a.8.

³³⁶*Ā*Dok p. 47.5, K p. 22a.8: *gang kun btags pa' mtshan nyid de*; Lamotte p. 67: *kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa'o*.

³³⁷*Ā*Dok p. 47.6, K p. 22b.1: *ming gi brdas rnam par gzhag pa'i mtshan nyid de*; Lamotte p. 67, P p. 9d.2, D p. 33.3: *ming dang brdar rnam par bzhag pa'i mtshan nyid yin gyi*.

³³⁸*Ā*Dok p. 48.1, K p. 22b.3: *gzhan gyi rkyen gyi stobs kyis 'byung gi*; Lamotte p. 68, P p. 9d.4, D p. 33.4: *rkyen gzhan gyi stobs kyis byung ba yin gyi*.

³³⁹The passage in brackets is added on the basis of what has gone before, and seems to be indicated by earlier parallel passages; it is also added in Lamotte, p. 68, P p. 9d.5, and D p. 33.5, which read: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i chos gang dag skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa de dag ni don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa 'ang* [*P, D: yang*] *yin no*. *Ā*Dok p. 48.2 and K p. 22b.4 read: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i chos gang dag skye ba ngo bo nyid med pas ngo bo nyid med pa de dag ni don dam pa ngo bo nyid med do*.

³⁴⁰*Ā*Dok p. 48.3, K p. 22b.5: *gang chos rnams kyi rnam par dag pa dmigs pa de ni ngas don dam pa zhes yongs su bstan to*; Lamotte p. 68, P p. 9d.6, D p. 33.6: *chos*

rnams la rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni ngas don dam pa yin par yongs su bstan la.

In his commentary on the *Legs bshad snying po*, Ābel-jor-hlūn-drup (p. 47.2-47.5) explains that an “object of observation for purification” (*rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa*, *viśuddhālamhana*) refers to the ultimate, which does not have either production or disintegration. Citing the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, he states (p. 48.1): “That suchness that is the object of the exalted wisdom purifying the two obstructions [i.e., the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience,] is the thoroughly established nature and is the object of observation of purification (*sgrib gnyis rnam par dag par byed pa'i ye shes kyi yul du gyur pa'i de bzhin nyid de nyid yongs grub dang rnam dag gi dmigs par*).” See also the discussions of this term in *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi), pp. 11.22-12.6, 46.9-46.15, and 113.18-113.22.

In an oral commentary on this section of Ābel-jor-hlūn-drup's text, Geshe Palden Dragpa stated: “The only thing that is a true ultimate is that thing which is taken as the object of a path that will purify obstructions. Since other-powered natures do not have that quality of being an object of observation of a path of purification, they lack the entity of the ultimate....The true object of observation must be something that — through observing it again and again — will purify obstructions. That is not true for other-powered natures. Because meditating on emptiness has this effect of purifying obstructions, [emptiness] is the main object of meditation.”

³⁴¹The word “moreover” is added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte p. 68, P p. 9d.7, and D p. 33.7, which insert *gzhan yang*; this is omitted in Ādok p. 48.4 and K p. 22b.7.

³⁴²These phrases are connected in Lamotte p. 68, P p. 9d.8, and D p. 33.7, which read: *de ni don dam pa yin la*. Ādok p. 48.5 and K p. 22b.8 also indicate that they should go together with a connective particle *yang*. Ādok reads: *don dam pa yang de yin no*.

³⁴³According to Geshe Palden Dragpa (oral commentary), the term “thoroughly distinguished” (*rab tu phye ba, prabhāva*) “has the meaning of drawing out a very precise boundary, meaning that ‘it is not any more than this, it is not any less than this, it is just this much’: this precise sense that the thoroughly established nature is an ultimate that is distinguished by being just this negative of something, nothing more and nothing less.”

³⁴⁴ĀDok p. 48.6, K p. 23a.1: 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa ni nam mkha'i me tog lta bur blta'o; Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9a.1, D p. 34.1: 'di lta ste dper na / nam mkha'i me tog ji lta ba de lta bur ni mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid blta bar bya'o. The words “for example” translate *dper na*, which is omitted in ĀDok and K.

Jeffrey Hopkins translates (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, pp. 33-4) a passage in the *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 13.11) in which ĀDzong-ka-ba comments on this passage: “The similarity of imputational natures with a flower of the sky is an example of their merely being imputed by thought, and is not an example of their not occurring among objects of knowledge” (*kun brtags nam mkha'i me tog dang 'dra ba ni rtog pas btags pa tsam gyi dpe yin gyi shes bya la mi srid pa'i dpe min no*). In other words, it does not indicate that all imputational natures are non-existent.

³⁴⁵ĀDok p. 48.7, K p. 23a.1: de la 'di lta ste / skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa ni sgyu ma byas pa lta bur blta ste; Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9e.1, D p. 34a.2: de la 'di lta ste dper na / sgyu ma byas pa ji lta ba de lta bur ni skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang blta bar bya.

Geshe Palden Dragpa (oral commentary) explains that this means that other-powered natures are like magical illusions in that they appear to exist in a certain way, but they do not exist in that way. See chapter one, in which the example is given of a

magician who gathers sticks and stones together and, through chanting a *mantra*, causes people to see elephants, armies, and jewels.

³⁴⁶There are differences of translation in the editions I have consulted with regard to this phrase, and it has been translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9e.2, D p. 34.2, L p. 27a.5, and N p. 27a.5, which read: *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de las gcig kyang blta bar bya'o*. *Ā*Dok p. 48.7 and K p. 23a.2 read: “Also, apart from those, they are also to be viewed as being without the entityness of the ultimate” (*de dag las gcig kyang don dam pa ngo bo nyid [med pa: omitted in K] nyid du blta'o*). *Ā*Dok and K are somewhat confusing in that the previous sentence ends with a continuative (*ste*), which indicates that the translator(s) saw this and the following passage as going together. This is also indicated by the adverbial accusative particle (*du*) before the verb. In terms of meaning, however, there appears to be a break here, since the previous passage discusses the other-powered character and this one discusses the ultimate. This break is indicated in Lamotte’s text and in *Ā*Dzong-ka-*ba*’s citation of this passage in the *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath edition, p. 13.5-6); translated by Jeffrey Hopkins (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition), p. 33. I think that the key to understanding the intent of this passage is found in Lamotte, P, D, L, and N, which indicate that the ultimate non-entityness is the object to be viewed in this way. This also makes sense given that the next sentence begins with: “With respect to that...” (*de la*), which indicates that it is pursuing a topic that has already been introduced, i.e., the ultimate non-entityness.

Hopkins (p. 33) translates *Ā*Dzong-ka-*ba*’s citation of this passage as follows: “The ultimate non-entityness is to be viewed as something beyond those [other two types of non-entityness]” (*don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de las kyang gcig kyang blta bar bya'o*).

³⁴⁷Dok p. 49.1, K p. 23a.2: *de la 'di lta ste / nam mkha' gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa tsam gyis rab tu phye zhing kun tu 'gro ba de bzhin du de dag las gcig don dam pa ngo bo nyid med par blta ba ni gang chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba kun tu 'gro ba'o*; Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9e.2, D p. 34.2, L p. 27a.5, N p. 27a.6: *de la 'di lta ste dper na / nam mkha' [P, D, L, N: mkha'i] gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid tsam gyis rab tu phye ba dang / thams cad du song ba ji lta ba de lta bur ni don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba dang thams cad du song ba gcig blta bar bya ste.*

In a discussion of this passage, Geshe Palden Dragpa (oral commentary) pointed out a problem with this formulation: If the ultimate is a character that equally pervades all phenomena and is the same in everything (as the sūtra suggests) then, since this is said to be the reality of phenomena, the reality of a pillar should be the same as the reality of a pot, although they are different factualities. Even more problematic from a Buddhist point of view, a Buddha's reality would be the same as that of an ordinary being. Geshe Drakpa's solution to this problem is his contention that one must differentiate between discussions of the reality of particular phenomena and the reality that pervades all phenomena. In other words, although the ultimate character does pervade all phenomena and is of one taste everywhere, this does not mean that the reality of a particular phenomenon pervades everywhere. This means that pots and pillars (and Buddhas and ordinary beings) are different, but are similar in that they are empty of being established by way of their own character as the referents of conceptual consciousnesses.

³⁴⁸Dok p. 49.2, K p. 23a.4: *ngas ngo bo nyid med pa rnam pa 'di gsum la dgongs te / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bshad do*; Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9e.4, D p. 34.3: *ngas ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum po de dag las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bstan to.*

³⁴⁹Ādok p. 49.4, K p. 23a.6: *gang rang gi mtshan nyid kyis med pa de ni ma skyes pa'o / gang ma skyes pa de ni ma 'gags pa'o / gang ma skyes ma 'gags pa de ni gzod ma nas zhi ba'o / gang gzod ma nas zhi ba de ni rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa ste / de la yongs su mya ngan las bzla bar bya ba ci yang med pas na*; Lamotte p. 69, P p. 9e.5, D p. 34.5, L p. 27b.2, N p. 27b.2: *'di ltar rang gi mtshan nyid kyis med pa gang yin pa de ni ma skyes pa yin / ma skyes pa gang yin pa de ni ma 'gags pa yin / ma skyes pa dang [P: /] ma 'gags pa gang yin pa de ni [P, D, L, N: /] gzod ma nas zhi ba yin / gzod ma nas zhi ba gang yin pa de ni rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa yin / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa gang yin pa de la ni / yongs su mya ngan las 'das par bya ba [P: bzla bar byar; D: bzla bar bya; L, N: 'da' bar bya ba] cung zad kyang med de.*

Jeffrey Hopkins reports (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, p. 37) that in the *Legs bshad snying po* Ādzong-ka-bā (Sarnath edition, p. 17.3) identifies “sorrow” with the afflictions, and Hopkins also reports (p. 44) that Geshe Rabten (p. 30.1) comments that this means that the thoroughly established nature is not naturally devoid of the afflictions without depending on an antidote. Hopkins (p. 37) translates Ādzong-ka-bā’s comments as follows:

[Buddha] stated as the reason why imputational natures do not have production and cessation that they are not established by way of their own character. Therefore, [this] also indicates that if production and cessation exist, they [must] be established by way of their own character and indicates that other-powered natures have production and cessation that are established by way of their own character. Since what are devoid of production and cessation are uncompounded, such are unfit to be phenomena of the thorough afflictions, due to which they are indicated as being quiescent from the start and naturally passed beyond sorrow. For sorrow here is the afflictions.

³⁵⁰In the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* (p. 71.3.8), Asaṅga states that when Buddha said that all phenomena are unproduced and so forth, he was “thinking only of non-entityness in terms of character” (*mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kho na las dgongs ste*).

In an oral commentary on this passage, Geshe Palden Dragpa stated: “These things are called ‘quiescent from the start’ (*gzod ma nas zhi ba, ādiśānta*) because they are not afflicted phenomena and therefore are not impure. The reason that thoroughly established phenomena are not produced and are unceasing is that they are permanent.” He added that the passage is carefully worded, and it does not state that these phenomena exist at all times, since when a pot, for instance, is destroyed, its emptiness no longer exists. However, even though its emptiness no longer exists, one cannot say that the emptiness changed, since it is merely an absence of true existence, and this cannot change.

³⁵¹Dok p. 49.7, K p. 23b.1: *chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa [K: par] dgongs nas...ngas bshad do*; Lamotte p. 70, P p. 9e.8, D p. 34.7: *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba las dgongs nas ngas...bstan to*.

³⁵²Dok p. 50.2, K p. 23b.2: *'di ltar chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa chos rnam kyī chos nyid / 'dus ma byas pa nyid / nyon mongs pa thams cad dang bral ba nyid de ni rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su rnam par gnas pa'o*; Lamotte p. 70, P p. 10a.1, D p. 35.1: *'di ltar don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba ni rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su rnam par gnas pa kho na yin la / de ni chos rnam kyī chos nyid du 'dus ma byas pa nyon mongs pa thams cad du bral ba yin te*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 567.6) comments that because it abides in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time it is uncompounded. Because it is uncompounded, it is unproduced and unceasing. See also note 240.

³⁵³Dok p. 50.3, K p. 23b.3: *gang rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos nyid de nyid kyis gnas pa ni 'dus ma byas te / 'dus ma byas pa'i phyir de ni ma skyes pa'o // de ma 'gags pa'o // nyon mongs pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir de gzod ma nas zhi ba'o // de rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'o*; Lamotte p. 70, P p. 10a.3, D p. 35.2: *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos nyid de nyid kyis rnam par gnas pa 'dus ma byas pa gang yin pa de ni 'dus ma byas pa'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa yin la / de ni nyon mongs pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir gzod ma nas zhi ba dang / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa yin te.*

³⁵⁴Dok p. 50.5, K p. 23b.5: *de bas na chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa la yang dgongs nas*; Lamotte p. 70, P p. 10a.4, D p. 35.4: *de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba las dgongs nas.*

³⁵⁵Bel-jor-lhün-drup (pp. 30.6-31.6) relates the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra's* discussion of the three types of phenomena to form (*gzugs*, *rūpa*). He bases his discussion on a Perfection of Wisdom sūtra (p. 30.6), and, reflecting the fact that Perfection of Wisdom sūtras generally speak of specific phenomena as being non-existent (*med pa*) or lacking entityness (*ngo bo nyid med pa*), he divides forms into imputational forms (*kun btags pa'i gzugs*), forms that are imputations (*rnam par btags pa'i gzugs*), and reality-forms (*chos nyid kyī gzugs*). See pp. 30.7-31.5. This interpretation is also found in Wonch'uk's commentary (vol. *ti* [118], p. 512.1), and his basis is also a Perfection of Wisdom sūtra

Commenting on this idea, Geshe Palden Dragpa stated: "Imputational form would be form's being established by way of its own character as a basis of designation by names. Imputed form is that which is suitable as form (*gzugs su rung*

ba), and is so-called because it must be the basis of designation of an imputation. Reality-form is form's not being established by way of its own character as a basis of designation of names. The only real form is the second. The name 'form' has been imputed to the other two."

This does not mean that one is dividing all phenomena into three classes and deciding what type of non-entitiness they have, but that one is taking each phenomenon and dividing it into three classes and positing three kinds of non-existence with respect to it. *Bel-jor-hlün-drup*'s explanation is an interesting one, particularly in that it uses the words of the *sūtra*, i.e., *gzugs* and *med*, and so his idea is an extension of the thought of the *sūtra*, in which there are three types of form and three types of non-existence. This connects the thought of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* with the Perfection of Wisdom *sūtras*. Since the *Samdhinirmocana* divides all phenomena into three types, this seems to me to be a legitimate extension of the *sūtra*'s thought.

³⁵⁶*Dok* p. 50.6, *K* p. 23b.7: *gang gi phyir / sems can gyi kham na sems can rnam kyis kun btags pa'i ngo bo nyid la ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong la*; *Lamotte* p. 70, *P* p. 10a.5, *D* p. 35.4: *ngas ni sems can gyi kham na sems can rnam kyis kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong zhing*.

³⁵⁷*Dok* p. 51.2, *K* p. 24a.2: *ji lta ji ltar rjes su tha snyad btags pa*; *Lamotte* p. 70, *P* p. 10a.8, *D* p. 35.7: *ji lta ji ltar rjes su tha snyad 'dogs pa*.

³⁵⁸According to *Jang-chup-dzu-trül* (vol. *cho* [205], p. 221.3), this refers to "the basis-consciousness that is infused with the predispositions of imputations" (*kun btags pa'i bag chags kyis bsgos pa kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*).

³⁵⁹These are latent tendencies toward future actions that are caused by one's own karmic actions. In Buddhist psychology, it is generally held that performance of a

particular action or type of action predisposes an individual to continued performance of similar actions in the future. If one regularly engages in virtuous actions, then one will be inclined to continue to do so in the future, and if one regularly engages in non-virtuous actions, then one will be inclined to perform non-virtuous actions of concordant types in the future. For more on the predispositions, see: *Compendium* pp. 74 and 172 and *Somme* ch. I.2.

³⁶⁰Lamotte (pp. 70-71) has a less ambiguous reading of this passage, and the translation given here is based on both his text and *Dōk*. *Dōk* p. 51.2 and K p. 24a.2 read: *de lta de ltar tha snyad btags pas / sems yongs su bsgos shing tha snyad gdags pa'i rjes su 'brel pa 'am / tha snyad btags pa bag la nyal gyis gzhan gyi dbang dang / yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun btags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen no* [K: *to*]; Lamotte pp. 70-71, P p. 10a.8, and D p. 35.7 read: *de lta de ltar tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems tha snyad btags pa dang rjes su 'brel pa 'am / tha snyad btags pa bag la nyal gyis gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen no*.

³⁶¹*Dōk* p. 51.4, K p. 24a.4: *ji lta ji ltar...de lta de lta bur*; Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.1, D p. 36.1: *ji lta ji ltar...de lta de ltar*.

³⁶²Lamotte (p.71) adds the thoroughly established nature here (in brackets on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's text), but I think that the insertion is unjustified, since what is being discussed here is not the real thoroughly established nature. Rather, the passage is discussing the imputation of imputational natures to the other-powered nature, which appear to exist in the way that they are conventionally perceived. The thoroughly established nature, however, is only the mere absence of the imputational nature that is imputed to the other-powered nature and is the ultimate nature of phenomena that is only perceived by Superiors. Because of its very nature, it is not something that can be

conceived in terms of imputational natures. That the insertion of the thoroughly established character by Hsüan-tsang and Lamotte is unjustified is also indicated by the fact that it is not found in any of the Tibetan texts that I have consulted (*Doḥ* p. 51.4, *K* p. 24a.4, *P* p. 10b.1, *D* p. 36.1, *N* p. 28b.2, and *L* p. 28b.3 all only mention the other-powered nature.

³⁶³This seems to mean that the other-powered nature is generated in the sense that these misconceptions perpetuate its afflicted state. The phrase “in the future” (*phyi ma la, āyatyām*) probably refers to future lives, and these will be afflicted since the other-powered nature is afflicted.

³⁶⁴The thorough afflictions of actions (*las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa, karma-saṃkleśa*) and the thorough afflictions of lifetimes (*tshe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa, kāla-saṃkleśa*; Lamotte p. 71, *P* p. 10b.3, *D* p. 36.2: *skye ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa, utpatti-saṃkleśa*) probably refer to the seventh and tenth members of the chain of dependent origination, feeling (*ishor ba, vedanā*) and existence (*srid pa, bhava*).

These are connected with the third member, consciousness (*rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*), which is divided into two parts, cause consciousness (*rgyu dus kyi rnam par shes pa*) and effect consciousness (*'bras dus kyi rnam par shes pa*). According to Jeffrey Hopkins, cause consciousness is connected with action (*las, karma*), the second member of the chain of dependent origination, since it is the consciousness in which the karma is infused as a predisposition (*bag chags, vāsanā*). The effect consciousness refers to the mind that is produced at the beginning of the next life, which would be included within the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes.

Cause consciousness refers to the consciousness at the moment of the infusion of the predispositions of a particular action. It is not included in this list of two, three, and seven, but effect consciousness is, and the members ranging from effect consciousness through to feeling are identified as taking place almost entirely in the

womb. These members of dependent arising, from effect consciousness (3b) through to feeling (7), are the projected effects. Ignorance (1), attachment (8), and grasping (9), are the afflictions (*nyon mongs pa, kleśa*). Action (2) and existence (10) are affected by these, and consciousness (3) (which in this context is interpreted as the effect consciousness (3b)) is the first moment of the new lifetime. This is the beginning of the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes. The remaining members, through to the development of the new lifetime (through number (7), feeling), and birth (11) and aging and death (12), are similarly affected by the prior thorough afflictions that are actions. These are thoroughly afflicted phenomena, beginning with the stages in the womb and continuing through to full development, and then up to aging and death. The thorough afflictions that are lifetimes refer to those seven branches, effect consciousness (3b) through to feeling (7), as well as to birth (11) and aging and death (12). This scheme requires multiple lifetimes to bring all of the effects of afflictions to fruition (see *ME*, pp. 275-83).

With respect to the rest of the parts of the chain of dependent origination, this scheme includes birth (*skye ba, jāti*) and aging and death (*rga shi, jaramaraṇa*) within that lifetime, and similarly also includes name and form (*ming gzugs, nāma-rūpa*), attachment (*sred pa, tṛṣṇā*), grasping (*len pa, upādāna*), and so forth, which all occur during that lifetime. See verses 109-111 of Nāgārjuna's *Suhrillekha*, and the commentary by Rendawa Zhon nu Lo-dro in *Nāgārjuna's Letter*, tr. Geshe Lobsang Tharchin and Artemus B. Engle (Dharmasala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), and *Compendium*, II.2.2. According to Ge-luk-ba explanations, these are also related to the three paths (*lam gsum, mārga traya*) discussed in the *Ratnāvali* (see Michael Hahn, ed., *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvali*, Bonn, 1982, I.36, pp. 16-17), but Nāgārjuna does not make this connection himself in the text.

This topic is discussed by Paṅ-chen Śō-nam-drak-ba's (*pan chen bsod nams grags pa*) in his *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par*

bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me (Gangtok: Namgyal Institute, n.d., pp. 577-59; this source was pointed out to me by Geshe Sangyay Samdrup). This work is a commentary on Maitreya's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and is the main textbook (*yig cha*) in the Lō-ṣel-ling college of Dre-bung monastery for the study of Perfection of Wisdom (*phar phyin, prajñāpāramitā*). Paṇ-chen, following the Ge-luk-ba tradition of commentary on Nāgārjuna's works, connects the three thorough afflictions with the branches of dependent arising. He states that there are three kinds of thorough afflictions: (1) the afflictive afflictions (*nyon mongs pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa*); (2) the thorough afflictions that are actions (*las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa*); and (3) the thorough afflictions that are bases (*gzhi'i kun nas nyon mongs pa*, which correspond to the thorough afflictions that are lifetimes, *tshe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa*).

Paṇ-chen also lists identifiers (*ngos 'dsin*) for each of these: "The first is the three, the ignorance which is included within the inner divisions of the twelve branches [of dependent arising] and the two, attachment and grasping (*yan lag bcu gnyis kyi nang tshan du gyur pa'i ma rig pa dang sred len gnyis te gsum*); the second is the two, action and existence (*'du byed [kyi las] dang srid pa gnyis*); and the third is the remaining seven, consciousness and so forth" (*rnam shes sogs lhag ma bdun*; p. 577).

Paṇ-chen then goes on to cite several sources which deal with this topic, including the *Dbu ma rten 'brel snying po* (which Geshe Sonam Rinchen of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, identifies as Tohoku 3836, the *Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdaya-kārikā*, attributed to Nāgārjuna (*klu sgrub*); see *Nāgārjuniana* by Christian Lindtner (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 170-71), Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, and Asaṅga's *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*. The passage quoted from Asaṅga's work only lists the afflictive afflictions (which are equated with ignorance, attachment, and grasping) and the thorough afflictions that are actions, which are equated with action, consciousness, and existence. Pan-chen then goes on to describe in some detail each of the twelve branches of dependent arising. My thanks to Jeffrey Hopkins, Geshe Sangyay Samdrup, and Geshe Sonam Rinchen

for their help in finding sources for this note. See also Wonch'uk (vol. *ti* [118], p. 578.7-581.7) and Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], pp. 359-62) for their discussions of these. And see the discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (ed. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1957), pp. 160.10-228.6.

³⁶⁵Dok p. 51.6, K p. 24a.6: *yun ring por gal te sems can dmyal bar ram / yang na dud 'gror ram / yang na yi dwags [K: dag] su 'am / yang na lhar ram / yang na lha ma yin du 'am / yang na mir 'khor zhing kun tu rgyug ste / 'khor ba las mi 'da' 'o*; Lamotte p. 71, D p. 10b.3, D p. 36.2, N p. 28b.4, L p. 28b.5: *yun ring por yang na sems can dmyal ba rnams dang / yang na dud 'gro rnams sam / yang na yi dwags [P, D, N: dags] rnams sam / yang na lha rnams sam / yang na lha ma yin rnams sam / yang na mi rnams kyi nang du kun tu rgyug cing 'khor bar 'gyur te / 'khor ba las mi 'das pa'i [P, D, N, L: 'da' ba'i] phyir ro*.

³⁶⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 2.3) thinks that at this point Buddha begins explaining his thought with respect to the three types of non-entityness. From this point on he describes the type of beings to whom he taught the first two wheels, and also why such teachings are suitable and beneficial for them.

³⁶⁷This refers to other-powered natures. Other-powered natures do not lack the entityness of production, since they are produced. Their being produced is what makes them other-powered natures. Jeffrey Hopkins reports (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, 1989 edition, p. 480-481) that Jam-yang-shay-ba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721) — in his *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtha'i dpyod 'khrul bral lung rigs bai dur dkar po'i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong* (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973), p. 71.3 — makes a distinction between *skye ba'i ngo bo nyid med pa* and *skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa*, and my translation reflects Jam-yang-shay-ba's contention (as reported by

Hopkins) that the genitive particle ('i) should not be read in between *skye ba* and *ngo bo nyid med pa*, because this is non-entityness *in terms of* production, rather than non-entityness *of* production. This may seem like a fine distinction but, as Hopkins notes, it is important for the Ge-luk-ba interpretation of this sūtra, which stresses the fact that other-powered natures are produced, and thus exist and are able to perform functions, whereas non-existent imaginaries (such as the horns of a rabbit) that are included within the imputational character are not produced, cannot perform functions, and so do not exist.

As Hopkins notes, another way of taking this in the Ge-luk-ba system is to interpret production as referring to self-production, and so other-powered natures are without self-production although they are produced. As Jam-yang-shay-ba (per Hopkins) points out, however, it is incorrect to insert the genitive particle, since this would imply that other-powered natures lack production completely.

³⁶⁸Dok p. 51.7, K p. 24a.7: *sems can gang dag sngon*; Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.4, D p. 36.3: *sems can gang dag dang po nyid nas*.

³⁶⁹Dok p. 52.1: *mos pa mi mnga' ba*; Lamotte p. 71, D p. 36.4, L p. 28b.7, K p. 24a.8: "who do not have much belief" (*mos pa mi mang ba*); P p. 10b.5, N p. 28b.7: *mos pa mang ba*.

"Belief" translates the Tibetan term *mos pa* (Skt. *adhimokṣa*, *adhimukti*), and in this translation is distinguished from "faith" (*dad pa*, *śraddhā*). In Ge-luk-ba epistemology, belief is classified as one of the five determining mental factors (*yul nges lnga*, *pañca-viśayapratiniyama*), so named because they determine the makeup of a main mind. In *ME* (p. 246), Jeffrey Hopkins states: "Belief holds an ascertained object to be just as it was ascertained; it has the function of keeping the mind from being captivated by another view. For instance, when one considers Buddha and other teachers and analyzes to discover which is an undeceiving refuge, one ascertains that only

Buddha is the teacher of an undeceiving refuge. Then, when the doctrine taught by him and the spiritual community properly achieving his doctrine are ascertained by valid cognition as undeceiving, a firm belief in them as final refuges is gained.” The main upshot of this is that belief is mainly based on reasoning, and is unshakeable because it is based on correct thinking that leads to true conclusions.

Faith is classified as one of the eleven virtuous mental factors (*dge ba bcu gcig, eka-daśa-kuśala*). According to Jeffrey Hopkins (*ME*, p. 248): “Faith has the aspect of clarity (*prasāda, dang ba*), conviction (*abhisampratyaya, yid ches*), or a wish to attain (*abhilāṣa, 'thob 'dod*) with respect to the existent (such as actions and their effects), the possession of qualities (such as the three jewels), or powers....It has the function of serving as a basis for aspiration.” Thus, faith has an aspirational quality, while belief entails conviction based on reasoning.

According to Geshe Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript), there are three types of faith: (1) faith of conviction (*yid ches pa'i dad pa*), for instance in the effect of meditative stabilizations, the aspiration that is a seeking of those qualities; (2) faith that is a non-captivated clarity (*mi 'phrog pa'i dwang ba*); and (3) aspiration that is a wish to attain (*'thob 'dod kyi 'dun pa*). The second type, non-captivated clarity, keeps the meditator from being captivated by something other than the object of observation. The third type involves exertion on the part of the meditator who is seeking to attain a specific meditative stabilization. See also *Bhāṣya* p. 14.4 and *Compendium* p. 8.

³⁷⁰The word “doctrines” is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 71, D p. 36.4, and P p. 10b.6, which read: *de dag gis chos de thos nas*. *Ād*ok p. 52.2 and K p. 24b.1 read: *de dag gis de thos nas*.

³⁷¹Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.6, and D p. 36.5, make this connection with a genitive particle: *rtan cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i 'du byed rnams*. *Ād*ok p. 52.2 and K p. 24b.1 read: *rtan cing 'brel par 'byung ba 'du byed rnams*.

³⁷²Dok p. 52.3, K p. 24b.2: *yid gzhaḡ tu mi rung ba nyid dang / rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos nyid*; Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.6, D p. 36.5: *yid brtan du mi rung ba nyid dang / 'gyur ba'i chos nyid*.

³⁷³Dok p. 52.4, K p. 24b.3: *de dag sdig pa gang yin pa de mi byed cing / dge ba'ang spyod do*; Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.7, D p. 36.6: *de dag sdig pa gang yin pa de mi byed cing dge ba la bsten [D: sten] par byed do*.

³⁷⁴Dok p. 52.4, K p. 24b.3: *de dag dge ba spyad pa'i rgyus kyang*; Lamotte p. 71, P p. 10b.7, D p. 36.6: *dge ba la bsten pa'i rgyus*.

³⁷⁵Dok p. 52.6, K p. 24b.5: *yang dag par bsgrub [K: bsgrubs] par gyur mod kyi*; Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.1, D p. 36.7, N p. 29a.5, L p. 29e.6: *yang dag par 'grub [P, D: grub] mod kyi*.

³⁷⁶This refers to imputational characters and other-powered natures. With imputational natures, the entityness that is lacking is character itself, and so with these, unlike the case of other-powered natures (see note 367), the genitive particle could be inserted between *mtshan nyid* and *ngo bo nyid med* (i.e., *mtshan nyid kyi ngo bo nyid med pa*), but I have decided to translate both of these in the same way in order to maintain consistency in the translation, and because the meaning remains the same in either reading.

³⁷⁷According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 8.2), this refers to a path of preparation (*sbyor ba'i lam*, *prayoga-mārga*).

³⁷⁸Dok p. 52.7, K p. 24b.6, Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.2, D p. 37.1, L p. 29.7: 'du byed thams cad las yang dag par skyo bar mi 'gyur / yang dag par 'dod chags dang bral bar mi 'gyur; N p. 29a.6: 'du byed thams cas las yang dag par 'dod chags dang bral bar mi 'gyur.

In discussing what it means to be “separated from desire” (*'dod chags dang bral ba*), Geshe Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, p. 104) states that desire is like attachment (*sred pa*), and that being free from desire means giving up attachment to what one previously regarded as important. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 8.2) states that this refers to an uninterrupted path (*bar chad med pa'i lam, ānantarya-mārga*).

³⁷⁹Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.3, and D p. 37.2 connect this with the next phrase with the particle *zhing*; Dok p. 53.1 and K p. 24b.7 have *te*.

³⁸⁰Dok p. 53.2, K p. 24b.8: *tshe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa las yongs su grol bar mi 'gyur te*; Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.3, D p. 37.2: *skye ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa las kyang yongs su grol bar mi 'gyur bas*.

In this chapter, I have decided to include or leave out the adverbs “thoroughly,” “completely,” etc. (which translate intensifying prefixes such as *shin tu* and *rnam par*), on the basis of whether or not they make sense in a particular context. They are Tibetan renderings of Sanskrit prefixes, and could perhaps be omitted in the whole text, but in most cases I think that they enhance understanding of the type of knowledge or attainment that is being discussed. In this paragraph, for instance, Buddha is discussing beings with a high level of attainment, and so the intensifiers apply, whereas in the previous two paragraphs, beings of limited understanding and attainments were being discussed, and so it seemed inappropriate to include the intensifiers.

³⁸¹Dok p. 53.3, K p. 25a.1: *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa la brtsams te*; Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.4, D p. 37.3: *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las brtsams nas*.

³⁸²Ādok p. 53.3, K p. 25a.1, P p. 10c.5, D p. 37.3, N p. 29b.2, L p. 29b.3: *'dod chags dang bral bar bya ba dang / rnam par grol bar bya ba dang*; Lamotte p. 72: *yang dag par 'dod chags dang bral bar bya ba dang / yang dag par rnam par grol bar bya ba dang*. Lamotte notes (p. 72 note a) that his insertion of the intensifier *yang dag par* is done on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's text, and it is not found in his Tibetan texts.

³⁸³Ādok p. 53.5, K p. 25a.3: *mngon par ma zhen pas*; Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.7, D p. 37.5: *mngon par zhen pa med pas*.

³⁸⁴Ādok p. 53.5, K p. 25a.4: *skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa de la mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med par mos shing shes nas ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pas*; Lamotte p. 72, P p. 10c.7, D p. 37.5, N p. 29b.4, L p. 29b.6: *skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de / de la mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du mos par byed / rab tu rnam par 'byed par byed / [yang dag pa: omitted in P, D, N, L] ji lta ba bzhin du rtogs par byed cing*.

³⁸⁵Ādok p. 53.6, K p. 25a.4: *tha snyad kyis yongs su ma bsgos pa'i shes pa dang / tha snyad dang rab tu ma 'brel ba dang / tha snyad bag la nyal ba med pa'i shes pas*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10c.8., D p. 37.6: *tha snyad btags pas yongs su ma bsgos pa'i shes pa tha snyad btags pa dang rjes su 'brel pa med cing tha snyad bag la nyal med pas shes pas*.

³⁸⁶Text corrected per Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.1, and D p. 37.6: substitute *chad* for *chud*. I have, however, retained Ādok and K's reading of *rgyu* (cause), rather than that of Lamotte, P, and D, which have *rgyud* (continuum), because it seems to make more sense in this passage. Ādok p. 53.7 and K p. 25a.5 read: *phyi ma la yang rgyu*

yongs su chud pas gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid de 'gog par byed do. Lamotte, P, and D read: *phyi ma la rgyud yang dag par chad pas 'gog par byed de.*

³⁸⁷Dok p. 54.1, K p. 25a.6: *gzhi de las*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.1, D p. 37.7: *gzhi des*. Lamotte, P, and D place the word “moreover” (*kyang*) near the end of the sentence.

³⁸⁸Dok p. 54.1, K p. 25a.7: *te*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.2, D p. 37.7: *zhing*.

³⁸⁹Dok p. 54.2, K p. 25a.8: *sems can nyan thos kyi theg pa'i rig can rnams kyang lam 'di nyid dang / bgrod pa 'di nyid kyis bla na med pa'i grub pa dang / bde ba'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob bo*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.3, D p. 38.1: *sems can nyan thos kyi theg pa'i rigs can rnams kyis kyang lam 'di nyid dang sgrub pa 'di nyid kyis grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par 'gyur la*.

³⁹⁰Dok p. 54.5, K p. 25b.2: *nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas dang / byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi rnam par dag pa'i lam de ni gcig po 'di yin la / rnam par dag pa yang gcig ste gnyis su gang yang med do*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.5, D p. 38.2: *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi rnam par dag pa'i lam gcig pa yin la / rnam par dag pa gcig ste / gnyis pa gang yang med pas*.

This seems to mean that the purification is the same because different types of beings all achieve it through meditating on the three natures; the path is the same in that it is meditation on the three natures for all of the various lineages. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 227.6) comments that this is “the path of liberation from the obscurations of the afflictions which is common [to all three vehicles].” See Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 13.1-16.7) for a more detailed discussion of this idea.

³⁹¹Dok p. 54.6, K p. 25b.3: *'di la dgongs nas ngas theg pa gcig tu bshad kyi*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.5, D p. 38.3: *ngas de las dgongs nas theg pa gcig pu bstan te*.

The doctrine of one vehicle (*theg pa gcig, ekayāna*) is found in many Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the *Lotus Sūtra (saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra)*, which is quoted by Wonch'uk several times in his discussion of the teaching of one vehicle (see the section beginning on p. 13.1). This doctrine holds that all three vehicles (the Hearer vehicle, the Solitary Realizer vehicle, and the Bodhisattva vehicle) all converge into the one Bodhisattva vehicle. The other two vehicles are said to be merely expedient teachings for those who would initially be afraid of or uninterested in the path of the Bodhisattva. This is not, however, the teaching of this sūtra, and we will see that it finally concludes that there are three final vehicles since there are three different capacities of trainees. See *Somme* notes pp. 62*-63* for references on this topic, and see Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 300-2, where he translates oral commentaries by contemporary Tibetan scholars concerning Mind-Only views on the three vehicles.

³⁹²Dok p. 54.6, K p. 25b.3: *sems can gyi kham na sems can gyi rigs sna tshogs rang bzhin gyis dbang po rtul ba dang / dbang po bar ma dang / dbang po rnon po dag ni med pa ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 73, P p. 10d.6, D p. 38.3: *sems can gyi kham na sems can rang bzhin gyis dbang po rtul po rnams dang / dbang po 'bring rnams dang / dbang po rnon po rnams kyi sems can gyi rigs sna tshogs dag kyang med pa ma yin no*.

This is the first clue given in the sūtra that Buddha is not actually propounding a doctrine of one vehicle (*theg pa gcig, ekayāna*). As this passage indicates, he taught the one vehicle doctrine thinking of something else in order to benefit certain beings who would be helped by such a teaching. As he explains here, however, different beings have different capacities, and Buddhas exert themselves to help them to realize their potentials, but some are able to progress farther than others, and no matter how much those others strive for the highest enlightenment they will inevitably fall short of it.

In many Mahāyāna texts, we find the idea that all beings have the potential for Buddhahood, and that all beings are pervaded by the Buddha-lineage (*gotreṇa vyāptāḥ*; see, for instance, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* II.1). This is not, however, the thought of this sūtra. David Seyfort Ruegg, for instance, notes this in his discussion of *ekayāna* in *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* (École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris, 1969, p. 237). He cites the *Precious Garland of Tenets* (*grub mtha' rin chen phreng ba*) by Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (*dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po*) as teaching that there are certain types of people who are stuck in their own lineage and are unable to progress to the final enlightenment of a Buddha:

Les tenants du Cittamātra traditionaliste (ceux qui suivent l'Écriture [*āgama*], *lung gi rjes 'brang sems tsam pa*) distinguent, à la suite du *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, (7.14-16), entre les Arhat-Śrāvaka tendant uniquement à la tranquillité (*śamaikāyana*) et n'entrant donc pas dans le Chemin du Mahāyāna et les Arhat qui y entrent en se tournant vers la *bodhi* à partir du *sopadhiṣeṣa* (et non pas du *nirupadhiṣeṣa*).

See also p. 123, where Ruegg discusses the idea of fixed lineages, and notes that while some are able to switch from the Hearer or Solitary Realizer path and practice the path to the unsurpassed enlightenment of the Mahāyāna, others are apparently predestined only to reach the limited enlightenments available to Hearers and Solitary Realizers. For a translation of the corresponding section of Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Grub mtha' rin chen phreng ba*, see Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1976), pp. 118-21.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 13.4-15.1) states that this passage indicates that Buddha teaches three different vehicles in accordance with the differing capacities of sentient beings. On p. 14.1 he states that they are called "Hearers" because they completely pass beyond the world after meditating upon the words of the teachings that they receive from masters and spiritual guides, and he adds that "because their practices are small and their results are not great, they are called 'Hearers'" (*spyod pa chung*

zhing 'bras bu mi che ba'i phyir nyan thos zhes bya'o). The sūtra indicates that since Hearers are mainly motivated by fear concerning their own sufferings, and this appears to be the reason that Buddha only teaches them doctrines leading to release from cyclic existence. From other sources it is clear that because their practices and accomplishments are small, it would be inappropriate to teach them about the extensive practices of Mahāyāna and the vast accomplishments of Bodhisattvas, and so Buddha teaches them in accordance with what they can understand and appreciate.

Solitary Realizers (p. 14.2) are so called because they are “always solitary, are interested in peace and do not delight in commotion, they completely achieve their endeavors, and they completely pass beyond the world upon having understood by themselves, without teachings from a master or spiritual guide; because their practices are middling and their accomplishments are middling, they are called ‘solitary realizers’” (*rtag par rab tu dben zhing zhi ba la mos pa dang 'du 'dzi la mi dga' ba sbyor ba sgrub pa yongs su rdzogs pa slob dpon dang dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyi lung med par bdag nyid kyis rtogs nas 'jig rten las gtan du 'das pa ste / spyod pa 'bring dang 'bras bu 'bring yin pa'i phyir ran sangs rgyas zhes bya'o*). Bodhisattvas, however, seek great enlightenment, having great compassion for all sentient beings, and their practices and their accomplishments are vast.

As Wonch'uk (p. 14.5) explains, however, since the three vehicles teach a path of purification that is concordant, Buddha teaches a doctrine of “one vehicle” in some sūtras. Wonch'uk explains that it is called “final purification” because, “because another [final purification] does not occur, the final purification is evident as the one path of thorough purification” (*gzhan mi 'byung bas de'i phyir mthar phyin pa'i rnam par dag pa ni shin tu rnam par dag pa'i lam gcig la bya bar mngon no*). Moreover, they have one path, one result, and one goal (transcendence of the world), and so Buddha teaches that there is “one vehicle”.

Wonch'uk (p. 21.7) concludes, however, that the teaching of one vehicle is Buddha's final teaching on this subject. He establishes this on the basis of quotations

from other sūtras, mainly the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, and *Mahāparinirvāṇa*. As Jam-yang-shay-ba points out (ME p. 604), this passage in the *Samdhinirmocana* teaches three final vehicles and can be used as a scriptural source for this doctrine in the Mind-Only school following Asaṅga. Wonch'uk also expresses the same thought when he concludes (p. 39.1) that this passage in the sūtra “indicates that in reality there are differences between the three vehicles” (*yang dag pa'i don du theg pa gsum po dag la bye brag yod par bstan pa'o*). See also ME pp. 392-97.

³⁹³Dok p. 54.7, K p. 25b.4: *nyan thos kyi rigs kyi gang zag zhi bar bgrod pa gcig pu pa ni / sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur kyang*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10d.7, D p. 38.4: *nyan thos kyi rigs can gang zag zhi ba'i bgrod pa gcig pu pa ni sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur kyang*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 239.1) comments that “peacefulness” (*zhi ba*, *śānti*) refers to “liberation from the afflictive obstructions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*, *kleśāvaraṇa*). ‘Proceeding’ (*bgrod pa*, *yāna*) [refers to] the path and the fruit: the path of the Hearer vehicle and the fruit of liberation. ‘Solely’ (*gcig pu*, *eka*) [refers to] not attaining the lineage of thoroughly achieving the conditions of complete transformation into [the state of] unsurpassable enlightenment at that time and abiding in the partial liberation and nirvāṇa of Hearers.” See also *Bhāṣya* p. 14.5ff.

³⁹⁴The idea of lineage is important in Mahāyāna Buddhism, because it is a basis for achieving Buddhahood. In the Yogācāra system, one's lineage determines how far one may progress spiritually, and there are some people who utterly lack a lineage that provides the basis for achieving any of the Buddhist paths. Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (unpublished transcript, p. 68) defines lineage as: “that reality which when purified is suitable to become enlightenment. This is the reality of the mind that is in the continuum of a person who has not completely abandoned defilements and that is suitable to become a Buddha's nature body. Enlightenment is a state of completion of

abandonment and realization...[lineage] is the basis of Mahāyāna achievement, meaning Mahāyāna practice.”

³⁹⁵ĀDok p. 55.2, K p. 25b.6: *rang bzhin gyis rigs dma' ba yin te*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10d.8, D p. 38.5: *rang bzhin gyis rigs dman pa kho na yin pa'i phyir ro*.

This passage indicates that Buddha's teaching of one vehicle (*theḡ pa gcig*, *ekayāna*) is merely an expedient teaching (*thabs*, *upāya*), but different beings do have different capacities, and so beings of the three lineages (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva) follow different final vehicles. As Jeffrey Hopkins points out (*ME*, p. 603), this passage is interpreted in this way by Asaṅga and his followers, who use it as a scriptural source for their doctrine of three final vehicles.

An important point that is developed in this section is that there are some beings of the Hearer lineage who are only able to realize the limited enlightenment of a Hearer and who do not go on to pursue the Mahāyāna enlightenment. Even though Buddhas attempt to establish them in the Mahāyāna, they only have the capacity of a Hearer, and due to their excessive fear of suffering, etc., they proceed solely to the peacefulness of nirvāṇa.

Nga-wāng-bel-den (*ngag dbang dpal ldan*, b. 1797) — in his *Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnas mdud grol blo gsal gces nor* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964), p. 62.a.8 — states: “Through viewing the suffering of cyclic existence fearfully they forsake the aims of others” (*'khor ba'i sdug bsngal la 'jigs par lta ba'i dbang gis gzhan don gyi yal bar dor na*). This means that they fear suffering, and because of this they are unable to develop interest in helping others and concern themselves primarily with their own liberation, and so they are content with the limited nirvāṇa of a Hinayānist. See *ME*, p. 604.

Wonch'uk adds (40.6): “Excessive adherence to a view of self is an obstruction of Forders. Excessive aversion, fear, and fatigue are obstructions of Hearers. Turning away from the welfare of others is an obstruction of Solitary Realizers.”

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* (119), p. 40.5) comments that limited compassion and love are obstructions of Solitary Realizers ((*rang*; text correction based on line seven) *sangs rgyas kyi sgrib pa*). Excessive fear of suffering is an obstruction of Hearers (*nyan thos kyi sgrib pa*). He cites a number of sources that indicate that the beings referred to in this section of the *Samdhinirmocana* do not have the capacity for compassion and love necessary for entry into Mahāyāna, and so they belong to an inferior lineage. He also adds that in fact both the Hearer and Solitary Realizer vehicles share these two obstructions, but the sūtra indicates their predominant individual obstructions.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 240.1) comments: "In the adventitious developmental lineage of the Hearer vehicle, the cause of unsurpassed enlightenment does not exist; hence, they are only naturally inferior, but there is no certainty that the entity of their transformational basis-consciousness is just naturally inferior, since the seed of unsurpassed enlightenment also exists in that [i.e., the basis-consciousness]." In an earlier section (p. 236.1), in a discussion of beings with the Hearer lineage, he said: "Being naturally initially of dull faculties, little compassion, and very afraid of suffering, they attain the transformational lineage that results in nirvāṇa by way of the Hearer vehicle; but even when they attain the enlightenment of a Hearer by way of the Hearer vehicle they are still of dull faculties, very little compassion, and very afraid of suffering. Being of dull faculties, they do not quickly attain the transformational lineage that causes the manifest purification of unsurpassed enlightenment. Being of little compassion, they turn away from the welfare of sentient beings. Due to fear of suffering, they turn away from all activities involving compoundedness. So at that time those [Hearers] — who do not attain the transformational lineage that causes the manifest purification of unsurpassed enlightenment, who turn away from the welfare of sentient beings, and who turn away from all activities involving compoundedness — 'lack the lineage of unsurpassed enlightenment' because of simply lacking a basis that is endowed with the lot of unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment, of perfect buddhification. At that time, just as, for example, even if a glass gem is polished, it will

not become a great wish-granting jewel, so, even if all Buddhas exert themselves at establishing [those beings of inferior lineage] in the essence of enlightenments, they are unable to attain unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. When they abide in just the fruits of proceeding solely to peacefulness, they just quickly pass away from suffering in the sphere of nirvāṇa in the sphere of nirvāṇa without a remainder of aggregates due to just those conditions of little compassion and fear of suffering and abide in that sphere in the suchness of a transformed basis-consciousness. Not being counted among the types of sentient beings who are included within the [three] realms, the [six types of] transmigrations, and the [four types of] birth, their individual consciousnesses of self-realization abide in the sphere of non-contamination by way of the severance of all conventions. Due to abiding in the suchness of the transformational basis-consciousness and due to having abandoned all the afflictive obstructions, they have attained transformation. However, because they have not abandoned the obstructions to omniscience they [still] are in a condition of having in their continuums the subtle predispositions of non-afflictive ignorance, and when, in the sphere of non-contamination, the power of the good basic constituent — the essence of a Tathāgata that existed previously — increases due to the transformation of the basis-consciousness through the path of realizing the selflessness of phenomena that is an entityness imputed earlier, then there is a time when the consciousness of individual knowledge realizes the non-existence of a selflessness of phenomena that is an entityness imputed earlier, with a complete severance of all conventions. At that time, they are thoroughly aroused by the blessings of all Tathāgatas, whereupon they arise from that uncontaminated sphere”

³⁹⁶ĀDok p. 55.2, K p. 25b.6: *sems can gyi don bya ba las shin tu phyir phyogs par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.1, D p. 38.6: *sems can gyi don bya ba la shin tu mi phyogs par 'gyur ro*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 240.3) comments that “since the causes of unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment are thoroughly ripening sentient beings and ripening the qualities of a Buddha for oneself, those who do not perform those two [activities] lack the causes of that [i.e., Buddhahood] at that time. Moreover, this is merely a difference in practice; it does not come from the nature of the mind. Therefore, [Buddha’s] thought is that they are called ‘those who proceed solely to peacefulness’ for as long as they have not attained the lineage of transformation into unsurpassed enlightenment and do not exert themselves.”

³⁹⁷Ādok p. 55.3, K p. 25b.7: ‘*du byed thams cad mngon par ’du byed pa las kyang phyir phyogs par ’gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.1, D p. 38.6: ‘*du byed mngon par ’du bya ba thams cad la shin tu mi phyogs par ’gyur ro*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 242.3) comments that this means that “they do not thoroughly ripen the qualities of a Buddha for themselves” (*bdag nyid kyi sangs rgyas kyi chos yongs su smin par mi byed pa’o*).

³⁹⁸Lamotte p. 74 adds the phrase “essence of enlightenments and” (*byang chub kyi snying po dang*) before the phrase “unsurpassably, perfectly enlightened” (*bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub*), but this is not found in Ādok p. 55.4, K p. 25b.8, P p. 10e.2, D p. 38.7, N p. 30b.4, or L p. 30b.6. It is also omitted in Jang-chup-dzu-trül’s discussion of this passage (vol. *cho* [205], p. 240.1-3), but is found in Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 41.2), which reads: ‘*du byed mngon par ’du bya ba rnam la shin tu mi phyogs pa dag byang chub kyi snying po la ’dug nas / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub thob par ’gyur ro zhes mi ston pas*. Lamotte bases his insertion of this phrase on Hsüan-tsang’s text (p. 74 note a), but I think that it does not fit into the thought of the passage, and so have not included it in my translation.

This passage is quoted in *Bhāvanākrama* III (see G. Tucci ed., *Minor Buddhist Texts Part III*, Rome, 1971, p. 22): *ekānta-sattvārtha-vimukhasya ekānta-saṃsārābhisamskāra-vimukhasya [nā]nuttara samyaksambodhir uktā mayeti*. As Tucci notes, *saṃsāra* should be emended to *saṃskāra*.

Jang-chub-rdzu-trül (p. 240.3) states that they are not indicated as being unsurpassably, perfectly enlightened because “when they do thoroughly ripen the causes of unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment for sentient beings and thoroughly ripen the qualities of a Buddha for themselves those [beings] who do not complete those two [activities] lack the causes of that [i.e., Buddhahood] at that time. Therefore, although they have merely distinguished practices they do not come from the entityness of mind.”

³⁹⁹Dok p. 55.5, K p. 25b.8 *de bas na zhi bar bgrod pa gcig pu pa zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.3, D p. 38.7: *de'i phyir zhi ba'i bgrod pa gcig pu pa zhes bya'o*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 240.5) comments that this means that “as long as [they continue in this way] they do not attain a lineage that correctly establishes the conditions of unsurpassed enlightenment.”

⁴⁰⁰Dok p. 55.6, K p. 26a.1: *gang yang byang chub tu yongs su 'gyur ba'i nyan thos de ni ngas byang chub sems dpa'i rnam grangs su bshad do*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.3, D p. 38.7: *nyan thos byang chub tu yongs su 'gyur ba gang yin pa de ni ngas rnam grangs kyis byang chub sems dpa' yin par bstan te*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 241.2) comments: “Because immediately thereafter they will abide on the eighth Bodhisattva ground, they are indicated also as being among the enumeration of Bodhisattvas.” In other words, although at the present time they are Hearers rather than Bodhisattvas, when they change over to the Bodhisattva lineage they will begin at the level of the eighth Bodhisattva ground.

⁴⁰¹Text corrected in accordance with K p. 25a.1, Lamotte, p. 74, P p. 10e.4, and D p. 39.1: read *bskul* for *bskur*. *Dok* p. 55.6 begins this phrase with *de nas*, which is omitted in K, Lamotte, P, and D.

⁴⁰²*Dok* p. 55.6, K p. 26a.2: *shes bya'i sgrib pa las sems rnam par grol bar byed do*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.4, D p. 39.1: *shes bya'i sgrib pa las sems rnam par grol bar byed pa'i phyir ro*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 241.3) comments: "When they become non-learners [that is, when they reach the path of no more learning of the Hearer vehicle], they turn away from the aspirations of Hearers and because of being incited by Tathāgatas they apply themselves to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment with a body that has a remainder of aggregates [impelled by former contaminated actions and afflictive emotions]." This means that these Hearers switch over to the Mahāyāna path and so attain the Mahāyāna enlightenment, whereas the Hearers previously described (who seek peace for themselves alone) are only able to attain the Hearer nirvāṇa. Since they overcome the afflictive obstructions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa, kleśa-āvaraṇa*) first, they have reached the path of no more learning (*mi slob lam, aśaikṣa-mārga*) of a Hearer, and at that point enter the Mahāyāna path and overcome the obstructions to omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa, jñeya-āvaraṇa*) and so become Buddhas. Thus they change their enlightenment from that of a Hearer to that of a Buddha.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (line 4) adds: "So why are they called 'Hearers?' Because 'initially, due to having the aspect of application for their own sake, they are released from the afflictive obstructions, whereby the Tathāgatas designate them as being of the Hearer lineage.' But although at first they are of indefinite lineage, in the middle part [of their training] they emerge [from cyclic existence] through the Hearer vehicle. Hence, for as long as this [i.e., their enlightenment] is not transformed into unsurpassed enlightenment they are designated as of the Hearer lineage."

⁴⁰³Dok p. 55.7, K p. 26a.2: *de la thog mar bdag gi don du sbyor ba'i rnam pas*; Lamotte p. 74, P p. 10e.4, D p. 39.1: *de ni dang por bdag gi don la sbyor ba'i rnam pas*.

⁴⁰⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 50.2) comments that the statement that there are various types of faith "indicates that there are different attitudes." He adds that there are four types of orientations: "(1) manifest belief having understood teachings and meanings (*bstan pa dang don shes shing mngon par yid ches pa*); (2) manifest belief in just the teachings without understanding the meanings (*bstan pa kho na la mngon par yid ches shing don med shes pa*); (3) manifest belief in the teachings without manifest faith in the meanings (*bstan pa la mngon par yid ches shing don la mngon par yid mi ches pa*); and (4) no manifest belief in either teachings or meanings (*bstan pa dang don gnyi ga la mngon par yid mi ches pa*)". These are the various types of orientations toward doctrine found among sentient beings. As the sūtra develops this idea, some beings accurately understand Buddha's teachings and believe in them, while others believe in them since they are Buddha's teachings although they do not fully understand them. Still others accept that the teachings come from Buddha but are mistaken about the meaning, and others reject both the teachings and the meanings because they do not understand and mistakenly think that the teachings are demonic in origin because they conflict with their preconceived ideas about the doctrine.

⁴⁰⁵Dok p. 56.1, K p. 26a.3: *de ltar ngas legs par bshad pa / legs par bstan pa'i chos 'dul ba shin tu bsam pa rnam par dag pas bshad pa legs par smras pa'i chos la sems can rnams kyi dad pa sna tshogs kyang snang ngo*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 10e.5, D p. 39.2: *'di ltar nga'i chos 'dul ba legs par gsungs pa shin tu gya nom pa bsam pa shin tu rnam par dag pa ston pa / chos legs par bstan pa la ni sems can rnams kyi mos pa'i rim pa 'ang [P, D: yang] snang ste*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 242.1) comments that the “disciplinary doctrine” (*chos 'dul ba, dharma-vinaya*) is to be taken as “the teaching of the Supramundane Victor Buddha, endowed with the eight limbs of the path of Superiors. Correct views, realization, mindfulness, and meditative stabilization are doctrine. Correct speech, aims of actions, and livelihood are discipline. Correct exertion is omnipresent. It is ‘well propounded...’ in that that very disciplinary doctrine is explained exceptionally well. It is ‘well propounded...’ in that it is virtuous in the beginning, virtuous in the middle, and virtuous in the end.”

With respect to the word “disciplinary”, Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 46.4) states: “Because even all three scriptural collections have the capacity to discipline ill deeds, it is ‘disciplinary.’” He also cites Asvabhāva’s *Commentary on the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*: “Moreover, because it is able to stop ill deeds by way of all virtues, it is ‘disciplinary.’” He adds (line 7) that according to the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* “it is called ‘doctrine’ because one understands correct reasonings by way of the eight limbs of the path of Superiors. It is called ‘disciplinary’ because it stops all afflictions.”

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 242.3) states that it is “very auspicious” (*shin tu gya nom pa, supranṭa*; this phrase is found in Lamotte p. 75, P p. 10e.5, and D p. 39.2, but not in *Ā* p. 56 or K p. 26a) because its meaning is good (*don bzang po*). It is “explained with a very pure thought” (*shin tu bsam pa rnam par dag pas bshad pa*) because it is “thoroughly complete, thoroughly pure, and thoroughly purified”. Wonch'uk (p. 47.2), quoting Nāgārjuna (*klu sgrub*), states that there are two types of teachings: “(1) any doctrinal teachings by persons who are associated with cyclic existence are definitely based on conceptuality and analysis (*'khor ba dang bcas pa'i gang zag gis chos ston par byed pa gang yin pa de ni nges par rtog pa dang dpyod pa la gnas nas so*), and (2) any doctrinal teachings by Bodhisattvas who are truth bodies are taught without abiding in conceptuality and analysis. Moreover, Bodhisattvas always have entered into the concentrations and into the meditative absorptions and, having entered into them, their minds are collected, whereupon, due to being

unfluctuating, conceptuality and analysis do not arise. Even though they teach doctrines through immeasurable verbal expressions for all sentient beings in the ten directions and thoroughly liberate them; that is called the perfection of concentration.”

⁴⁰⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 242.4) comments that the “aspect of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning” (Dok p. 56.2, K p. 26a.5: *drang ba'i don gyi mdo sde brjod pa'i rnam pas*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 10e.7, D p. 39.3, Jang-chup-dzu-trül: *drang ba'i don gyi mdo brjod pa'i rnam pas*) refers to: “statements like ‘All phenomena are without entityness’ and so forth. Furthermore, it is not that [all phenomena] are without entityness in the sense that all are without the entityness of all characters; rather, imputational characters are without entityness due to being without entityness in terms of character. Other-powered characters are without entityness in terms of production, and are without entityness due to being without the entityness of the ultimate; and thoroughly established characters are without entityness due to being distinguished by being the ultimate non-entityness, the selflessness of phenomena. Statements [that all phenomena are without entityness] thinking in this way and statements that all phenomena are not produced and so forth thinking of non-entitynesses in terms of character and thinking of ultimate non-entitynesses which are distinguished by being the selflessness of phenomena are called ‘aspects of setting forth sūtras of interpretable meaning.’”

⁴⁰⁷Dok p. 56.3, K p. 26a.7: *dge ba'i rtsa ba cher bskyed pa*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 10e.8, D p. 39.4: *dge ba'i rtsa ba chen po bskyed pa*.

⁴⁰⁸Dok p. 56.4, K p. 26a.7: *bsod nams dang / ye shes kyi tshogs cher bsags [K: bsags] pa de dag gis*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 10e.8, D p. 39.5: *bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yang dag par grub pa de dag gis ni*.

With respect to the idea of having purified obstructions, Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 244.2) states: “Although Bodhisattvas on the occasion of having accomplished the Bodhisattva lineage abide in the lineage, as long as they are extinguishing the four afflictions that are discordant with pure qualities or do not have some of the secondary afflictions, Bodhisattvas naturally have those virtuous qualities that are marks of the perfections, but even when they have some of the secondary afflictions and some of these virtuous qualities do not appear, they have become thoroughly purified of obstructions due to being free from the four secondary afflictions indicated earlier.” In other words, some Bodhisattvas abide in the Bodhisattva lineage and, when they are in a state in which they are devoid of afflictions, they naturally have these marks, but when they have afflictions they can fall to such a bad state that they can even be reborn in bad transmigrations. The Bodhisattvas the sūtra is discussing at this point are beyond this level, have overcome the four secondary afflictions, and so they will no longer be reborn in bad transmigrations.

With respect to the phrase “having thoroughly ripened their continuums” (*rgyud yongs su smin pa*), Jang-chup-dzu-trül states that this means that “Although Bodhisattvas on the occasion of having accomplished the Bodhisattva lineage abide in the lineage and have thoroughly purified obstructions they, due to four causes, are unable to attain unsurpassed, complete enlightenment. Due to being free from those four causes indicated earlier, [these Bodhisattvas] have ‘thoroughly ripened continuums.’” That they have “perfect belief” (Jang-chup-dzu-trül: *mos pa phun sum tshogs pa*; Dōk, K, Lamotte, P, D: “great belief” — *mos pa mang ba*) means that “the constituent of Bodhisattvas’ belief — that is to say, the constituent that is thoroughly distinguished by being belief in the ability to attain the qualities of a Buddha — flourishes. That is said to be ‘great belief’.” “Perfect wisdom” (Jang-chup-dzu-trül: *shes rab phun sum tshogs pa*; Dōk, K, Lamotte, P, D: “great [collection of] wisdom” — *ye shes kyi tshogs cher* [Lamotte, P, D: *chen po*]) refers to “thoroughly ripened wisdom that thoroughly differentiates doctrines and apprehends the ultimate truth. That

is indicated by [the phrase in the sūtra,] ‘they have thoroughly achieved great collections of merit and wisdom’. Moreover — on the occasion of endeavor at the practices of a Bodhisattva prior to a Bodhisattva’s initially generating a mind [directed toward] enlightenment — one thoroughly ripens wisdom through progressively achieving the collections of merit and wisdom that are subsumed by the six perfections as well as the causes and results of those which were indicated previously. This is considered to be possession of perfect wisdom.”

⁴⁰⁹ĀDok p. 56.5, K p. 26a.8: *chos de thos nas nga'i dgongs te bshad pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes shing chos de la yang mos par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 11a.1, D p. 39.5, N p. 31a.4, L p. 31a.7: *chos de thos na nga'i dgongs te bshad pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes shing / chos de la 'ang [P, D: yang] chos shes par 'gyur la*.

This means that Buddha has a thought behind his literal teaching which is different from what the actual words indicate to those beings who do not understand what he was getting at in his teachings. This point is developed at length by ĀDzong-ka-bā in his *Legs bshad snying po* (especially pp. 3-29) and by his commentator ĀBel-jor-hlün-drup (in his *Commentary*, especially pp. 8-36) in their discussions of interpretable meaning and definitive meaning (*drang don dang nges don, neyārtha-nitārtha*) in this sūtra. See also Gung-tang’s *Commentary* pp. 10-11 and Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 294-7.

The main theme of this chapter is Buddha’s clarification of what he was thinking when he taught the first and second wheels (which he is now reinterpreting, in the sense of saying that they are of interpretable meaning) and his teaching that the third wheel — in which he explains what he was thinking of — is of definitive meaning.

⁴¹⁰ĀDok p. 56.6, K p. 26b.1: *de rtogs pa bsgoms pas kyang smyur te myur bar shin tu mthar thug pa thob par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 11a.2, D p. 39.6: *de rtogs pa*

goms pas kyang myur ba myur ba kho nar shin tu mthar thug pa nyid rjes su 'thob par 'gyur te.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 246.2) explains: “In reliance upon the basis which is a perfect lineage, through the perfect cause of thoroughly knowing, just as they are, the teachings given with a thought [behind them], one becomes endowed with lot of and has the power for unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Thereby, one very quickly subsequently attains the utter finality endowed with fortune.” See also *Bhāṣya* p. 14.

⁴¹¹*Ādok* p. 56.6, *K* p. 26b.1: *nga [K: de] la yang kye ma bcom ldan 'das 'di ni yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas te / 'dis chos thams cad yang dag par mngon du rdzogs par sangs rgyas so zhes dad pa rab tu myong bar byed do*; Lamotte p. 75, *P* p. 11a.2, *D* p. 39.6, *N* p. 31a.6, *L* p. 31b.2: *nga [D, L: de] la 'ang [P, D: yang] a la la bcom ldan 'das de ni yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas yin te / des ni chos thams cad legs par mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so zhes dad pa thob par 'gyur ro.*

⁴¹²Lamotte (p. 75) thinks that they do everything except accumulate the collections of merit and wisdom, but *Ādok* pp. 56.7-57.3 and *K* p. 26b.3-7 have a very different reading, as is indicated in the translation. *D* p. 39.7 and *L* p. 31b.3 mainly agree with *Ādok*, and *K*, while *P* p. 11a.3 and *N* p. 31a.3 mainly agree with Lamotte. Lamotte's translation (p. 199) reads:

D'autres êtres ont planté les racines de bien, purifié les obstacles, mûri la série, multiplié les adhésions, mais n'ont pas accumulé les grands équipements du mérite et du savoir.

Ādok reads: *de la sems can gang dag dge ba'i rtsa ba chen po ma skyed [K: bskyed] pa / sgrib pa yongs su ma dag pa / rgyud yongs su ma smin pa / mos pa chung ba / bsod nams dang / ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yang dag par ma bsags pa.* *K* reads: *de la sems can gang dag dge ba'i rtsa ba chen po ma bskyed pa / sgrib pa yongs su ma*

smin pa [sic; K seems to have omitted a passage] / *mos pa chung ba* / *bsod nams dang* / *ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yang dag par ma bsags pa*. Lamotte p. 75, P p. 11a.3, N p. 31a.7, and Wonch'uk p. 53.3 read: [*de la*: omitted in Wonch'uk] *sems can gang dag dge ba'i rtsa ba bskyed pa dang* / *sgrib pa yongs su dag pa dang* / *rgyud yongs su smin pa dang* / *mos pa mang ba* [P, N: *mos pa chen po ma yin pa*; Wonch'uk: *mos pa mang du bsgom pa ma yin pa*] / *bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yang dag par ma grub pa* [Wonch'uk: *bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs chen po bsags par ma gyur ba*]. D p. 39.7 and L p. 31b.3 read: *de la sems can gang dag dge ba'i rtsa ba ma bskyed pa dang* / *sgrib pa yongs su ma dag pa dang* / *rgyud yongs su ma smin pa dang* / *mos pa chen po ma yin pa* / *bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yang dag par ma grub pa*.

I think that the readings of *Dok*, D, and L are more probable, since the beings discussed in this passage are Hearers on a low level of attainment, whereas in Lamotte's version they accomplish everything short of the complete collections of merit and wisdom, which would qualify them as high level Bodhisattvas. This seems improbable, since Buddha goes on to state that they "are unable to remove conceptuality" and that they "do not understand" Buddha's teachings.

Although Wonch'uk's citation of this passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 53.4) agrees with that of Lamotte, P, and N, his commentary indicates that he concurs with my reading of it. He comments: "[This passage] indicates beings who have not completed those five things, but have manifest faith" (*dngos po lnga phun sum tshogs par ma gyur la mngon par yid ches pa dang ldan pa'i gang zag bstan pa'o*).

⁴¹³*Dok* p. 57.2, K p. 26b.4: *drang po drang po'i rang bzhin can* / *rtog pa dang sel mi nus pa* / *bdag gi lta ba la mchog tu 'dzin par mi gnas pa de dag gis chos de thos nas nga'i dgongs te bshad pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes kyang* / *chos de la mos par byed cing dad pa myong bar byed de*; Lamotte p. 75, P p. 11a.4, D p. 40.1: *drang po dang drang po'i rang bzhin can* / *rtog pa dang sel mi nus pa* / *rang gi lta ba*

mchog tu 'dzin par mi gnas pa de dag gis chos de thos na nga'i dgongs te bshad pa 'ang [P, D: yang] yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu mi shes mod kyi / 'on kyang chos de la mos par byed cing dad pa 'ang [P, D: yang] 'thob ste.

⁴¹⁴Ādok p. 57.3 and K p. 26b.5 read: *mdo 'di rnams ni de bzhin gshegs pas bshad pa yin te / zab pa zab par snang ba / stong pa nyid dang ldan pa / mthong bar dka' ba / shes par dka' ba / brtag tu med pa / rtog ge'i spyod pa ma yin pa / zhib mo brtags pa'i mkhas pa dang mdzangs pas rig pa yin no zhes mos par byed do.* Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11a.5, D p. 40.2, N p. 31b.3, L p. 31b.5, C p. 25b.4, and V p. 91b.5 read: *mdo sde 'di dag ni de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs pa zab pa zab par snang ba / stong pa nyid dang ldan pa / [P, N, L, D, C omit shad] mthong bar dka' ba [C: ga] / rtogs par dka' ba / brtag mi nus pa / rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pa / zhib mo brtags pa [P, N, C: /; D, L: pa'i] mkhas pa 'dzangs [P, D, L, C, V: mdzangs] pas rig pa yin no zhes mos par byed do.*

Wonch'uk (p. 54.7) comments that this passage “thoroughly teaches the characteristics of manifest belief” (*mngon par yid ches pa'i mtshan nyid rab tu bstan pa*). He states that they believe that these sūtras are “profound” (*zab pa, gambhira*) “because they believe them to be spoken by the Tathāgata”. They believe them to be “brilliantly profound” (*zab par snang ba, gambhirāvabhāsa*) “because they clearly differentiate very profound meanings”. They believe them to “possess [the doctrine of] emptiness” (*stong pa nyid dang ldan pa, śūnyatā-saṃprayukta*) in the sense that “because the teachings of Superiors are just of the nature of emptiness, they are connected with emptiness; therefore, they possess [the doctrine of] emptiness”. They are “difficult to perceive and understand” (*mthong bar dka' ba rtogs par dka' ba, durdrśa-durvigāhya*) because ordinary beings are unable to perceive them and because even Hearers and Solitary Realizers are unable to understand them. They are “unanalyzable” (Wonch'uk: *dpyod mi nus pa*; Ādok: *brtag mi nus pa, atarkya*) in the sense that “because the teachings of Superiors completely transcend the sphere of

activity of argumentation they are unanalyzable. With respect to that, 'analysis' [refers to] phenomena that are contaminated minds and mental factors associated with persons of the three realms." The phrase, "[those who] finely [analyze]" refers to "Bodhisattvas abiding on the Bodhisattva grounds who are skilled in fine analysis and who understand due to being wise."

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 249.4) states that these doctrines are "profound" by way of their entityness. They are "brilliantly profound" because "they are realized as being profound by yogis and are suitable to appear brilliantly to the mind." They possess [the doctrine of] emptiness because "they are constituted by the selflessness of phenomena." They are "difficult to understand" because "they are not understood by other means until one has generated a path of seeing and an uninterrupted path". They are "difficult to understand" because "they are not realized by other means until one has generated a path of meditation and a path of release". They are "unanalyzable" because "they are not comprehended by [ordinary] valid cognition". They are "not objects of activity of argumentation" because "they are objects of activity realized by Superiors individually by themselves". "Finely" refers to "wisdom that enters into the meaning of suchness". "Analyze" refers to "wisdom that enters into the final meaning". "Wise" refers to "wisdom arisen from application". "Discerning" refers to "innate wisdom".

⁴¹⁵In other words, these beings recognize their limitations in terms of understanding but, recognizing the Buddha as the supreme authority, they have faith in his teachings, even though they do not fully understand them. The translation of this phrase is aided by Lamotte, p. 76, P p. 11a.7, D p. 40.3, which read: *mdo sde de dag gi don bstan pa dag gi don bstan pa dag [dag omitted in P] la bdag mi shes so snyam nas 'dug ste*. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 55.6) has a similar reading: *mdo sde de dag gi don bstan pa dag bdag mi shes so snyam nas 'dug ste*. Ādok p. 57.5 and K p. 26b.7 read: *mdo de dag gi don dang nges par bstan pa la / bdag mi shes par bzung nas 'dug ste*.

⁴¹⁶ĀDok p. 57.5, K p. 26b.7: 'di skad du sangs rgyas kyi byang chub ni zab pa yin te / chos rnam kyi chos nyid kyang zab pas na / de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyis mkhyen gyis [K: kyi] / bdag cag ni mi shes so; Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11a.7, D p. 40.3: 'di skad ces sangs rgyas kyi byang chub ni zab [P: /] chos rnam kyi chos nyid kyang zab ste / de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyis mkhyen gyi bdag cag gis ni mi shes so.

⁴¹⁷ĀDok p. 57.6, K p. 26b.8: de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyis chos bstan pa ni sems can mos pa sna tshogs can gyi phyir 'jug pa yin te; Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11a.8, D p. 40.4: de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyi chos bstan pa ni sems can rnam la mos pa sna tshogs kyis 'jug pa yin te.

⁴¹⁸The word order and translation in ĀDok and K differs greatly from that of Lamotte, P, and D. ĀDok p. 57.7 and K p. 27a.1 read: bdag cag gis mthong ba dang / shes pa ni ba lang gi rjes tsam la / de bzhin gshegs pas mkhyen pa dang / gzigs pa ni mtha' yas so zhes. Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11a.8, and D p. 40.4 read: de bzhin gshegs pa rnam ni mkhyen pa dang gzigs pa mtha' yas pa yin gyi / bdag cag gi shes pa dang mthong ba ni ba lang gi rjes tsam mo snyam nas.

⁴¹⁹ĀDok p. 58.1, K p. 27a.2: de dag mdo sde rnam ri mor byas te yi ger 'dri'o / bris nas kyang 'dzin pa dang / klog pa dang / yang dag par 'gyed [K: 'ged] pa dang / mchod pa dang / ston pa dang / kha ton bya ba byed kyang; Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11b.1, D p. 40.5, N p. 31b.7, L p. 32a.3, C p. 25b.8, V p. 91b.8: de dag mdo sde de rnam la gus par byas te [P: /] yi ger 'dri bar yang [C: mang] byed / yi ger bris nas 'chang bar yang byed / klog par yang byed / yang dag par 'gyed [P, N: bged; D, L, C: 'ged] par yang byed / mchod par yang byed / lung nod par yang byed / ['don par yang byed: omitted in V] / kha ton du 'ang [P, D, V: yang] byed mod kyi.

My translation follows Lamotte, P, D, L, and N in choosing their reading of 'don instead of that of D̄ok and K, which is *ston*. 'Don is more probable, because the D̄ok's reading of *ston* would indicate that these beings teach these sūtras to others, which is unlikely given their limited understanding.

See Lamotte, p. 200 n. 27, where he cites a Sanskrit fragment of the *Ratnakūṭa-sūtra* that resembles this passage.

⁴²⁰According to Geshe Gendun Lodrö (oral commentary), in Tibetan commentaries the term "understand" (*khong du chud pa*) is equated with *rtogs pa*, "to realize," but in Indian commentaries it has two meanings: (1) if the term is used with respect to enlightenment, it means to attain (*thob*) the enlightenment; and (2) if it is linked with suchness it means to directly realize suchness (*de kho na nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa*). Thus, when Kamalaśīla uses this term in the *Bhāvanākrama*, he is referring to obtaining the first Bodhisattva ground.

Gendun Lodrö says that when this term is used with respect to meditative states, it means "to internalize or realize.... 'Internalizing enlightenment' therefore means to attain enlightenment, or it means the attainment of direct realization (*mngon sum du rtogs pa thob pa*). Thus, it has two meanings: to attain and to realize directly." In this translation, I have rendered it as "understand", which I think most closely accords with the thought of this passage.

⁴²¹This is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 76, P p. 11b.3, and D p. 40.6, which have a clearer reading: *bsgom pa'i rnam par sbyor bar* [D: *pas*] *mi nus so*. D̄ok p. 58.2 and K p. 27a.3 read: *bsgoms* [K: *bsgom*] *pa'i rnam pas sbyor ni mi nus mod kyi*.

The meaning is the same in D̄ok and K, but if literally translated, it says "they are not able to connect with it [i.e., Buddha's teaching] through meditation."

Āzong-ka-ba discusses this passage in *Legs bshad snying po* pp. 15.10ff. He states that the “terms” that these beings adhere to are sūtra statements teaching non-entityness (*ngo bo nyid med pa nyid*), which imply that “all phenomena are ultimately empty of inherent existence, empty of [establishment] by way of their own entityness, and empty of [establishment] by way of their own character.” He adds that in the system of the *Samdhinirmocana* adhering to the mere literal reading of such statements leads to wrong views. If, for instance, one comes to believe that production and cessation by way of their own character do not exist, then one comes to deprecate other-powered phenomena, because this “is a system in which if production and cessation are not established by way of their own character, production and cessation become non-existent [since they would not be established in any other way, in which case the bases of imputation of imputations and the qualificands of the thoroughly established nature would not exist]”. This translation is from Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript, pp. 30-1, and the material in brackets comes from Geshe Rabten’s commentary, p. 29.1.

⁴²⁶Ādok p. 58.7, K p. 27a.8: *de dag gzhi de las chos thams cad la med par lta ba dang / mtshan nyid med par lta bar 'gyur te*; Lamotte p. 77, P p. 11b.7, D p. 41.3: *de dag gzhi des na chos thams cad la med par lta ba dang / mtshan nyid med par lta ba 'thob par 'gyur te*.

The Ge-luk-ba tradition, beginning with Āzong-ka-ba (see, for instance, *Legs bshad snying po* pp. 13-14), takes this to mean that these beings (who are said to be Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamikas, according to Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, p. 208) think that no object exists by way of its own character, which in the system of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is false, since the thoroughly established character does exist by way of its own character, as does the other-powered character. As Āzong-ka-ba interprets the thought of this chapter (see especially p. 14 and Geshe Rabten’s *Commentary*, pp. 15-16), the view that phenomena do not exist and that character does not exist is taken to mean that for the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamikas

establishment of objects by way of their own character does not exist. Because of this mistaken view, these beings fall to an extreme of nihilism, since they are unable to determine which phenomena exist by way of their own character and which phenomena do not exist in this way.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 62.5) comments that this passage indicates the faults of exaggerated adherence to the literal meaning. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 252.4) states that "they manifestly adhere to the meanings of doctrines as only literal" because "with respect to the statement, 'All phenomena lack entityness', it is not that all characters lack entityness due to being without entityness; but when they are taught such by way of the aspect of previously expressed sūtras of interpretable meaning they do not understand in that way, and only exaggeratedly adhere to the meanings of doctrines [such as,] 'All characters lack entityness' as only literal. They do not exaggeratedly adhere to the meanings of doctrines [such as,] 'All of these phenomena are only unproduced' and so forth as only literal. 'They [acquire] the view that all phenomena do not exist' [because] they view all of the phenomena that lack character, the phenomena of thoroughly afflicted character, and the phenomena of purified character as equally non-existent. 'They [acquire] the view that character does not exist': they view all imputational characters, other-powered characters, and thoroughly established characters as equally non-existent. With respect to [the phrase,] 'If other-powered characters and thoroughly established characters exist, then imputational characters are also thoroughly known': this is because just imputation of names and terminology in the manner of entities and attributes is the imputational character. [The phrase,] 'Therefore, those [persons] are said to deprecate even all three aspects of characters' indicates a specific type of belief arisen from little wisdom."

⁴²⁷The words "also" (*kyang*) and "acquired" (*thob*) at the beginning of this sentence are borrowed from Lamotte p. 77, P p. 11b.7, and D p. 41.3, which read: *med par lta ba dang / mtshan nyid med par lta ba thob nas kyang thams cad la mtshan nyid thams*

cad kyis skur pa 'debs te / chos rnams kyi kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid la skur pa 'debs. *Ā*Dok p. 59.1 and K p. 27a.8 read: *med par lta ba dang / mtshan nyid med par lta bar gyur nas thams cad la mtshan nyid thams cad kyis skur te / chos rnams kyi kun btags [K: brtags] pa'i mtshan nyid la 'ang skur to.*

⁴²⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 83.2) comments that having heard the words, "all phenomena lack entityness" and so forth, they become afraid.

The two terms superimposition (*sgro 'dogs*, *samāropa*) and deprecation (*skur 'debs*, *apavāda*) are important to the thought of this chapter. The first refers to imputing too much to something, as when one apprehends phenomena in terms of one's own views and superimposes one's own ideas on them. According to *Ā*Dzong-ka-ba (see *Legs bshad snying po* pp. 5-13 and Geshe Rabten's *Commentary* pp. 19-24), this involves thinking that phenomena exist by way of their own character as bases of conception by thought consciousnesses apprehending them. Deprecation involves negating too much, as when one thinks that all phenomena do not ultimately exist. This is developed at length by *Ā*Bel-jor-hlün-drup (in his *Commentary on the Legs bshad snying po*, ch. 3, "Superimposition", pp. 64-86). See also: *ME* pp. 369-374; Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffery Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 111-115; *Théorie* p. 314 n.2 and 323ff.; and *Somme* p. 181.

⁴²⁹As Gung-tang (p. 80.12-16) and A-ku Lo-drö-gya-tso (pp. 51.3-53.4) interpret this idea, the existence of these two characters comes to mean existence by way of their own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa*).

⁴³⁰In other words, they think that imputations do not exist. This is incorrect, since some imputations do exist. See note 426.

⁴³¹Dok p. 59.4, K p. 27b.4: *de bas na mtshan nyid rnam pa gsum la yang skur ces bya'o*; Lamotte p. 77, P p. 11c.2, D p. 41.5: *de lta bas na de dag ni mtshan nyid rnam pa gsum char la 'ang [P, D: yang] skur pa 'debs pa zhes bya'o*.

In accordance with this passage, *Dzong-ka-ba* (*Legs bshad snying po*, pp. 33.18) interprets the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* as implying that there are two types of imputational characters, the existent and the non-existent. The latter are, for instance, the horns of a rabbit, a sky-flower, etc., which can only be imputed by thought and do not exist at all. The former are such permanent phenomena as space (defined as the absence of obstructive contact), which, although they can only be known by thought and not by direct perception by non-Buddhas, nonetheless exist. These existent imputations cannot be classified within the other-powered nature, since they are permanent, and thus not produced, and also cannot be classified within the thoroughly established nature, since they are not objects of observation for purification, the selflessness of phenomena, etc. See also *Bel-jor-hlün-drup's Commentary*, pp. 43-46.

They do exist, since they can be known as existent by thought (which can, for instance, recognize that there is an absence of obstructive contact between material objects). This division of imputations into existent and non-existent seems to me to be a plausible one based on the words of this passage in the sūtra, because if there were not some existent imputational characters, it would be difficult to imagine how one could deprecate them by thinking that they are non-existent. Following this reasoning, it is plausible to contend that within the set of imputations there are both existent and non-existent imputations, and those beings who consider the imputational character to be completely non-existent are deprecating that character since by implication they deprecate the existent members of that set.

⁴³²Dok p. 59.5, K p. 27b.4: *de dag nga'i chos la chos su 'dus shes shing / don ma yin pa la yang don du 'du shes pas chos la yang chos su 'dzin / don ma yin pa la don du 'dzin te*; Lamotte p. 77, P p. 11c.3, D p. 41.6: *de dag ni nga'i chos la chos su 'du shes*

*pa dang / don ma yin pa la don du 'du shes pa yin te / nga'i chos la chos su 'du shes
pa dang / don ma yin pa la don du 'du shes pa de dag chos la 'ang [P, D: yang] chos
su 'dzin / don ma yin pa la 'ang [P, D: yang] don du 'dzin to.*

⁴³³*Dok p. 59.6, K p. 27b.5: de dag chos la mcs pa'i phyir dge ba'i chos rnam kyis
'gog mod kyī / don ma yin pa la mngon par zhen pa'i phyir / shes rab las yongs su
nyams par 'gyur te; Lamotte p. 77, P p. 11c.4, D p. 41.7: de dag chos la mos pas dge
ba'i chos rnam kyis 'phel mod kyī / 'on kyang don ma yin pa la mngon par zhen pas
shes rab las yongs su nyams par 'gyur te.*

⁴³⁴The translation of this passage is aided by Lamotte p. 78, P p. 11c.5, and D p. 42.1, which read: *de dag las gzhan dag gis chos la chos su dang / don ma yin pa la don du thos nas gang dag lta ba la dga' bar byed pa.* *Dok p. 59.7 and K p. 7 read: gzhan rnam kyang de dag la [K: las] chos su [bya: omitted in K] ba dang / don ma yin pa la don du thos nas / gang dag lta bas rjes su mos par byed pa.* The words “others — who, having heard from them” are translated in accordance with Lamotte, P, and D.

⁴³⁵*Dok p. 60.2, K p. 28a.1: yongs su nyams par rig par bya'o; Lamotte p. 78, P p. 11c.5, D p. 42.2: nyams par rig par bya'o.*

⁴³⁶“Demons” (*bdud, māra*) have the function in Buddhist mythology of tempting people into ignorance, desire, and hatred (see note 14). Ignorance leads to the generation of wrong views, and in Buddhism wrong views are the main cause of suffering, and so it is important for a Buddhist to discern which doctrines are true and which are false. The problem that the beings described in this passage have is that they are unable to understand the profound teachings of Buddha, and so denounce them as demonic teachings out of ignorance.

⁴³⁷Dok p. 60.5, K p 28a.4: *mdo de dag la skur pa 'debs shing spong la / ngan du brjod de mi snyan par smra'o*; Lamotte p. 78, P p. 11d.1, D p. 42.3: *mdo sde de dag la skur pa 'debs par byed / spong par byed / mi bsngags pa brjod par byed / ngan du brjod par byed*.

⁴³⁸Dok p. 60.6, K p 28a.5: *gzhi de las gang dag skye bo phal po che la las kyi sgrib pa chen po thob pas slu bar byed pa / mtshan nyid thams cad med par lta ba can / don ma yin pa la don du ston pa de dag kyang las kyi sgrib pa rgya chen po dang ldan par ngas bshad do*; Lamotte p. 78, P p. 11d.1, D p. 42.4: *gzhi des na phongs pa chen po 'thob par 'gyur zhing las kyi sgrib pa chen pos kyang reg par 'gyur ro // gzhi des kyang gang dag skye bo phal po che la las kyi sgrib pa chen po 'thob pas slu bar byed pa / mtshan nyid thams cad med par lta zhing don ma yin pa don du ston par byed pa de dag ni las kyi sgrib pa chen po dang ldan par nga smra'o*.

Karmic obstructions (*las kyi sgrib pa*, *karma-āvaraṇa*), according to Lamotte (p. 201 n. 21), are the results of rejecting the true doctrine. He also quotes a discussion of this from the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

⁴³⁹Dok p. 60.7, K p 28a.6: *sems can gang dge ba'i rtsa ba ma bskyed pa / sgrib pa yongs su ma dag pa / rgyud yongs su ma smin pa / mos pa mi mnga' [K: mang] ba / bsod nams dang / ye shes kyi tshogs yang dag par ma bsags pa / drang po ma yin te / drang po'i rang bzhin can ma yin kyang rtog pa dang sel nus la / bdag nyid lta ba mchog tu 'dzin par gnas pa de dag gis*; Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11d.3, D p. 42.5, N p. 33b.1, L p. 33b.4, C p. 27a.4: *don dam yang dag 'phags de la sems can gang dag dge ba'i rtsa ba ma bskyed / sgrib pa yongs su ma dag / rgyud yongs su ma smin / mos pa mi mang / bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs yang dag par ma grub cing / drang po dang drang po'i rang bzhin can ma yin la rtog pa dang sel mi nus la / rang gi lta ba mchog tu 'dzin par gnas pa de dag gis*. Lamotte (p. 79 note a) notes that in Hsüan-tsang's text (p. 696a.15) the phrase corresponding to *rtog pa dang sel mi nus* lacks the

negative particle, which is also the case in Wonch'uk's citation of this verse (vol. *thi* [119], p. 85.7), as well as *Ādok* p. 61.2. I have chosen to read this passage in accordance with P, D, N, L, and C, since it seems unlikely that these beings would be able to remove conceptuality if they have not produced roots of virtue and if they conceive their own view to be supreme. Lamotte, however, thinks that they are able to remove conceptuality, and on p. 202 he translates this phrase as follows: "Capables d'argumenter et de réfuter, ils se cantonnent dans une estime injustifiée de leurs propres vues."

⁴⁴⁰*Ādok* p. 61.2 and K p. 28a.8 have a very different reading from that of Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11d.5, and D p. 42.6. *Ādok* and K read: *nga'i dgongs te bshad pa [K: yang /: omitted in Ādok] yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes shing / chos de dag la 'ang mi mos par 'gyur te / de dag chos la yang chos ma yin par 'du shes shing / don la yang don ma yin par 'du shes par 'gyur te / de dag chos la yang chos ma yin par 'du shes shing / don la yang don ma yin par 'du shes pas / chos la yang chos ma yin par mngon par zhen / don la yang don ma yin par mngon par zhen nas*. Lamotte, P, and D read: *nga'i dgongs te bshad pa 'ang [P, D: yang] yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu mi shes shing chos de la mos par yang mi 'gyur la / de dag chos la chos ma yin par 'du shes shing / don la don ma yin par 'du shes la / chos la 'ang [P, D: yang] chos ma yin pa dang / don la 'ang [yang] don ma yin par mngon par zhen nas*.

⁴⁴¹*Ādok* p. 61.6, K p. 28b.4, Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11d.7, and D p. 43.1 read: *lhad kyang 'jug par byed de*, which Lamotte (p. 79 n.23) translates into Sanskrit as *sakapaṭam nivīṣanti*, which could mean either engage in deceit or engage in interpolation. In this case, I think the latter reading is justified, and Lamotte translates it as "interpolent" (p. 202).

⁴⁴²Dok p. 61.6, K p. 28b.4: *rnam grans du mas kyang mdo sde de dag gzhig pa dang / bsal ba dang / ma rung ba bya ba'i phyir zhugs pa yin no / de la mos pa'i gang zag rnams la yang dgrar 'du shes par 'gyur te*; Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11d.7, D p. 43.1: *rnam grangs du mar mdo sde de dag spang ba dang / chud gzan pa dang / rnam par gzhig pa'i phyir zhugs shing de la mos pa'i gang zag rnams la 'ang [P, D: yang] dgrar 'du shes par 'gyur ro.*

⁴⁴³Dok p. 61.7, K p. 28b.5: *de dag snga nas kyang las kyi sgrib pas bsgribs la / yang gzhi de las kyang 'di ltar las kyi sgrib pa de lta bus bsgribs par 'gyur te*; Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11d.8, D p. 43.2: *de dag ni dang po nyid nas kyang las kyi sgrib pas sgribs [P, D: bsgribs] pa yin la / gzhi des kyang las kyi sgrib pa de lta bus sgrib par byed de.*

⁴⁴⁴Dok p. 61.7, K p. 28b.6: *las kyi sgrib pa de'i thog ma nyid ni gdags par sla'i / bskal pa bye ba khrag khriḡ 'di snyed tsam zhig na 'byung bar 'gyur ba ni gdags par sla ba ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11e.1, D p. 43.3: *las kyi sgrib pa de'i dang po ni gdags par sla'i / bskal pa bye ba khrag khriḡ 'bum phrag 'di snyed kyi bar gyis 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes gdags par ni dka'o.*

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 88.2) comments: "Here, with respect to the actions of deprecating doctrines here, because of the limitlessness of suffering one will experience [as a result], their divisions are very difficult [to determine]."

⁴⁴⁵Dok p. 62.1, K p. 28b.7: *de ltar nga'i chos 'dul ba legs par bshad pa / legs par bstan pa / bsam pa shin tu rnam par dag pas nges par bstan pa de lta bu'i legs par bshad pa la sems can rnams kyi mos pa sna tshogs rnam pa de lta bu dag kyang snang ngo*; Lamotte p. 79, P p. 11e.2, D p. 43.3: *de ltar na nga'i chos 'dul ba legs par gsungs pa / shin tu gya r pa / bsam pa shin tu rnam par dag pa ston pa chos legs par bstan pa la sems can rnams kyi mos pa'i rim pa de lta bu dag kyang snang ngo.*

This passage is significant for the translation of the title of D̄zong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po* (*The Essence of the Good Explanations*) which, in the "Mind-Only" section, comments on this sūtra. As Gung-tang (p. 20.14) points out, the "good explanations" do not refer to D̄zong-ka-ba's explanations but to Buddha's. In addition, Gung-tang identifies this "essence" as emptiness (*stong pa nyid, śūnyatā*), which is the essence of all Buddha's teachings. What D̄zong-ka-ba intended in his work was to distill the essence of Buddha's explanations in this and other sūtras. In his translation of the *Legs bshad snying po*, Robert Thurman apparently takes the *legs bshad* (good explanations) as referring to D̄zong-ka-ba's own explanations, and so he translates the title as *Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), which seems to indicate that D̄zong-ka-ba's text itself contains the essence of true eloquence. Since D̄zong-ka-ba comments primarily on the seventh chapter, and since in this chapter Buddha refers to his teachings as "good explanations", this indicates that the title of the *Legs bshad snying po* should probably be taken as referring to *Buddha's* good explanations rather than to D̄zong-ka-ba's. This note is based on Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality* (unpublished manuscript, pp. 67-89).

⁴⁴⁶In this phrase, Buddha seems to be stating that he did not mean what he said on the literal level, that his earlier teachings were given for a particular audience for whom they would be beneficial and that would understand the meaning behind his words. He gave these teachings with a thought behind them, and the Bodhisattvas for whom he intended them understood them as he intended. Now in the third wheel he is clarifying his thoughts and intentions, but is making it very clear that no sage would teach that all phenomena are without entityness, etc., without having a thought behind behind such teachings, since, by implication, some phenomena have entityness and so forth.

⁴⁴⁷Translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 80, P p. 11e.5, and D p. 43.6, which read: *rab tu nyams par 'gyur ba'i lam du de mi 'gro*. D̄ok p. 62.5 and K p. 29a.2 read:

“does not travel on a very unsuitable path” (*rab tu ma rung 'gyur ba'i lam du de mi 'gro*). Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 90.7) explains that those who engage in superimposition and deprecation degenerate from the middle path (*dbu ma'i lam, madhyama-pratipad*).

⁴⁴⁸These verses are translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 80, P p. 11e.5, and D p. 43.6, which read: *kun gyi rnam dag lam ni gcig pu 'di yin te // rnam par dag pa 'ang gcig ste gnyis pa gang yin pa med // de phyir theg pa gcig pa 'di ni 'dogs byed kyang // sems can rig ni rnam pa sna tshogs med ma yin*. Dōk p. 62.6 and K p. 29a.3, which are more ambiguous, read: *shin tu rnam par dag pa'i lam ni thams cad la // rnam par dag pa 'di gcig gnyis su gang yang med // de phyir 'di ni theg pa gcig tu rab 'dogs te // sems can rigs ni rnam pa sna tshogs med ma yin //*

This would be translated as:

The path of thorough purity [includes] all [of these three paths] and

Is this one [path of] purification; there is no second.

Therefore, this is thoroughly designated as being one vehicle.

It is not that there are not various types of sentient beings.

In an earlier passage, Wonch'uk indicated that such statements mean that Buddha's doctrines form a single unit, but can be differentiated into specifics with regard to when and to whom they were taught: “When doctrines enter into the world, differences exist with respect to specifics, but there is no difference with respect to entity. Just as differences with respect to shape exist when specifics [i.e., pieces] are made to be different in breaking a gold vessel, although there is no change with respect to entity, so when doctrines enter into the world, they enter from past time to the present time and they enter from present time to future time. [These doctrines] are separated in terms of the specifics that are apprehended, but there is no separation with respect to the entity that is apprehended.”

⁴⁴⁹Dok p. 62.7, K p 29a.4: *sems can gang rnam s bdag nyid mya ngan 'das byed pa // de ni sems can kham s 'di dag na dpag tu med // gang rnam s mya ngan 'das kyang sems can mi gtong ba'i // brtan zhing snying rje ldan pa de dag shin tu dkon*; Lamotte p. 80, P p. 11e.6, D p. 43.7: *sems can kham s 'di na ni gang bdag gcig pu pa // mya ngan 'das par [P, D: 'da' bar] byed pa'i sems can dpag tu med // gang dag mya ngan 'das kyang sems can mi gtong ba'i // brtan pa snying rje ldan pa de dag shin du dkon*.

⁴⁵⁰Dok p. 63.2, K p 29a.5: *khyad par med*; Lamotte p. 80, P p. 11e.7, D p. 44.1: *bye brag med*.

⁴⁵¹Dok p. 63.2, K p 29a.6: *gnyis su brjod pa ma yin bde zhing brtan pa'o*; Lamotte p. 80, P p. 11e.8, D p. 44.1, L p. 34b.6, N p. 34b.2, C p. 28a.2, V p. 92a.7: *gnyis su brjod pa ma yin bang [P, D, L, N, C, V: bde] zhing brtan pa yin*. I think that Lamotte's substitution of *bang* for *bde* must be an error, since all the other Tibetan texts, as well as Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 93.3), have *bde*.

According to Wonch'uk (p. 92.2), all four lines set forth the character of nirvāṇa. The first line (up to "inconceivable") indicates the entity of nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is "without differentiations" in that "since those who are released in that are equal, they are without differentiation." It is "stable" (p. 93.3) "due to being separated from afflictions" (*nyon mongs pa dang bral ba'i phyir*), and is "peaceful" "due to being separated from suffering" (*sdug bsngal dang bral ba'i phyir*).

⁴⁵²Dok p. 63.6 and K p 29b.2 read: *ming gi brdas*, while Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12a.3, D p. 44.4, N p. 34b.7, L p. 35a.3, C p. 28a.6 (as well as Dzong-ka-ba's *Legs bshad snying po* p. 19) read: *ming dang brdar*, which would be translated as "in terms of names and terminology". V p. 92b.2 reads: "terminological names" (*brdar ming*).

⁴⁵³Dok p. 64.1, K p. 29b.3: *bcom ldan 'das kyis chos rnam kyī mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med par btags so*; Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12a.4, D p. 44.5: *bcom ldan 'das chos rnam kyī mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid 'dogs par mdzad lags so*.

⁴⁵⁴Dzong-ka-ba (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 37) comments that the phrase, “the foundations of imputational characters” (*kun btags pa'i mtshan nyid kyī gnas, parikalpita-lakṣaṇāśraya*) “indicates that they are the bases of imputation of imputations”. The phrase, “those which have the signs of compounded phenomena” (*'du byed kyī mtshan ma de, saṃskāra-nimitta*) “indicates their own entities [as being compositional phenomena]”. Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript; the words in brackets are added on the basis of Geshe Rabten's *Commentary*, p. 42.3.

⁴⁵⁵Dok p. 64.3, K p. 29b.6: *gang rnam par rtog pa'i spyod yul kun btags [K: brtags] pa'i mtshan nyid kyī gnas 'du byed kyī mtshan ma de nyid kun btags [K: brtags] pa'i mtshan nyid der yongs su ma grub cing / ngo bo nyid de nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid*; Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12a.7, D p. 44.7, N p. 35a.3, L p. 36a.5: *rnam par rtog pa'i spyod yul kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid kyī gnas 'du byed kyī mtshan ma de nyid kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid der yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid [P, D, N: med /] de kho nas ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 95.7) explains that “conceptuality” (*rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa*) refers to “minds and mental factors that thoroughly conceptualize” (*rnam par rtog pa nyid kun du gzhal ba'i sems dang sems las byung ba nyid*). With respect to the term, “object of activity” (*spyod yul, gocara*) he adds: “because the imputed entities, real form aggregates and so forth, are objects of activity of that conceptuality, they are ‘objects of activity of conceptuality’” (*des brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa'i gzugs kyī phung po la sogs pa ni rnam par rtog pa de'i spyod yul yin pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa'i spyod yul zhes bya'o*).

⁴⁵⁶*Ḍzong-ka-bā* (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 39.1) comments that Buddha's statement that the thoroughly established nature is "the absence of a self of phenomena" (*Ḍok* p. 64.4, K p. 29b.6: *chos bdag med pa*; Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12a.8, D p. 45.1: *chos bdag ma mchis pa, dharma-nairātmya*) identifies the selflessness of phenomena called "suchness" as the thoroughly established nature. Through observing and meditating on this, obstructions are purified. The qualifier "only" eliminates anything else, and so it means that just the absence of entityness of the imputational nature is the thoroughly established nature.

⁴⁵⁷*Ḍok* p. 64.5, K p. 29b.7: *de la brten nas bcom ldan 'das kyis de dag las gcig don dam pa ngo bo nyid med par btags so // gzugs kyi phung po la ji lta bar phung po lhag ma rnams la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro*; Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12a.7, D p. 45.2: *de la brten nas bcom ldan 'das chos rnams kyi don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa de nyid las gcig 'dogs par mdzad lags so // gzugs kyi phung po la ji lta ba bzhin du phung po lhag ma rnams la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin du sbyar bar bgyi lags so.*

⁴⁵⁸*Ḍok* p. 64.6, K p. 30a.1: *phung po rnams la ji lta bar skye mched bcu gnyis kyi skye mched re re la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro // srid pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis srid pa'i yan lag re re la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro // zas bzhi'i zas re re la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro // khams drug dang / khams bco brgyad kyi khams re re la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro*; Lamotte p. 81, P p. 12b.2, D p. 45.2: *phung po rnams la ji lta ba bzhin du skye mched bcu gnyis po dag gi skye mched re re la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin lags so // srid pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis po de dag gi srid pa'i yan lag re re la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin bgyi lags so / zas bzhi po dag gi zas re re la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin lags so // khams drug dang khams bco brgyad po dag gi khams re re la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin lags so.*

See notes 199 and 200 for Gung-tang's discussion of the six constituents and the eighteen constituents.

⁴⁵⁹This is the ultimate non-entityness that is *designated to other-powered natures*, and is not the thoroughly established nature. They lack the entityness of being the ultimate, and for this reason, in this context, are referred to as non-entitynesses in terms of the ultimate.

⁴⁶⁰ĀDok p. 66.1, K p. 30b.2: *sdug bsngal 'phags pa'i bden pa la ji lta ba de bzhin du lhag ma rnams la yang sbyar ro*; Lamotte p. 82, P p. 12c.2, D p. 46.2: *sdug bsngal 'phags pa'i bden pa la ji lta ba de bzhin du bden pa lhag ma rnams la 'ang [P, D: yang] de bzhin du sbyar bar bgyi lags so*. The word “truths” is added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D.

⁴⁶¹ĀDok p. 66.5, K p. 30b.6: *skyes pa gnas shing mi nyams pa dang / phyir zhing 'byung ba dang / 'phel zhing rgyas pa zhes*; Lamotte p. 83, P p. 12c.6, D p. 46.5: *skyes pa gnas pa dang / mi bskyud pa dang / slar zhing 'byung ba dang / 'phel zhing rgyas pa nyid ces*.

⁴⁶²The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 83, P p. 12c.8, and D p. 46.7, which add *chos rnams kyi*; this is omitted in ĀDok p. 66.7 and K p. 30b.8.

⁴⁶³ĀDok p. 67.4, K p. 31a.4: *'di lta ste dper na / bca' lga [K: sga] ni sman phye ma sbyar ba dang / sman bcud kyis len sbyar ba thams cad la yang stsal bar bgyi ba lags te*; Lamotte p. 83, P p. 12d.3, D p. 47.2: *'di lta ste / dper bgyi na bca' sga ni phye ma' i sman sbyar ba dang / bcud kyis len sbyar ba thams cad du stsal bar bgyi lags so*. Lamotte (p. 205) translates *stsal* as “recommande”, but I think that it is more properly rendered as “placed” or “put”.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 107.5) comments: “This is because when dried ginger is put in medicinal powders, they become potent” (*gal te bca' sga sman phye ma*

rnams kyi nang du bcug na mthu can du 'gyur bas so)...If one puts these words of non-entityness and so forth in all sūtras of interpretable meaning, one will understand the thoughts of those sūtras. This means that if one adds Buddha's teachings of the non-entitynesses of phenomena and so forth to sūtras of interpretable meaning they become more potent.

⁴⁶⁴In other words, the color of the backdrop of a picture (whether this is a canvas, a wall, a pot, etc.) permeates the whole picture. What this example seems to indicate is that Buddha's definitive teachings are the basis of his interpretable teachings and permeate them, even if they are not noticed. Without the definitive teachings, however, the interpretable teachings (which Buddha gives for the benefit of those beings who are not ready for the definitive teachings) would have no basis, just as a painting needs a canvas or ground upon which an artist sketches the details of the painting and then colors them in.

⁴⁶⁵Dok p. 67.7, K p. 31a.7: *ri mo bri ba'i gzhi ni sngon po 'am / ser po 'am / dmar po 'am / dkar po yang rung ste / ri mo'i las thams cad la ro gcig pa lags shing / ri mo bris pa rnams shin tu yang mngon par bgyid pa lags so*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12d.6, D p. 47.4: *ri mo bri ba'i gzhi ni sngon po 'am / ser po 'am / dmar po 'am / dkar po 'am / ri mor bgyi ba thams cad la ro gcig pa lags shing ri mor bris pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] shin tu gsal bar bgyid pa lags so*

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 108.2) comments: "For example, the basis on which the painting — the blue, yellow, etc. — is drawn completely pervades all the work of the various aspects of the picture and is of one taste in terms of the sameness of the blue, yellow, etc." (*dper na ri mo sngon po dang / ser po la sogs pa 'dri ba'i gzhi ni ri mo rnam pa sna tshogs kyi bya ba thams cad kun du khyab cing sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa dang mtshungs pa nyid du ro gcig par byed*). Similarly,

Buddha's definitive teachings pervade all sūtras of interpretable meaning and are of one taste in all such sūtras.

⁴⁶⁶ĀDok p. 68.1, K p. 31a.8: *de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyi chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa la brtsams te / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'i bar du nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di ni drang ba'i don gyi mdo thams cad la ro gcig pa lags te / drang ba'i don de dag mngon par yang bgyid do*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12d.7, D p. 47.5: *de bzhin du chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid dang / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa nyid kyi bar las brtsams nas bcom ldan 'das kyi nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di 'ang [P, D: yang] drang ba'i don gyi mdo sde thams cad la ro gcig pa dang drang ba'i don de dag shin tu gsal bar bgyid pa lags so.*

⁴⁶⁷This passage is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12d.8, D p. 47.6, and N p. 37a.4, which read: *'di lta ste dper bgyi na / chab mar ni snod du bsgral ba dang / sha g.yos dang / bag tshos [P, D, N: chos] kyi rnam pa thams cad du stsal na shin tu dga' [P, N: gda'; D: bda'] bar 'gyur lags so.* Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 108.4) has almost the same reading as Lamotte, P, and D: *dper bgyi na chab mar ni snod du bsgral ba dang g.yos dang / bag chos kyi rnam pa thams cad du stsal na / shin du bda' bar 'gyur lags so.* ĀDok p. 68.2 and K p. 32b.2 say basically the same thing, but are more ambiguous: *'di lta ste dper na / btso [K: brtso] ba'i sha'i rnam pa dang / bag chos kyi rnam pa thams cad la mar gyis btab pa ni shin tu bda' bar 'gyur ro.*

⁴⁶⁸ĀDok p. 68.4: *shin tu dga' zhing mchog tu dga' bar 'gyur ro*; K p. 32b.3: *shin tu dga' bar 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12e.2, D p. 48.1: *dga' ba dang / mchog tu dga' ba chen por 'gyur lags so.*

⁴⁶⁹Dok p. 68.5, K p 32b.4: *nam mkha' ni thams cad du ro gcig pa lags te / rtsom pa thams cad la yang mi sgrib par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12e.3, D p. 48.1, N p. 37a.7: *nam mkha' ni thams cad la ro gcig pa dang / bsal ba [P: brtsal ba; D: brtsam pa] thams cad la sgrib par ma [P, D: mi] 'gyur ba lags so*.

In these examples, Paramārthasamudgata has offered Buddha four different ways of looking at the relation between what Buddha actually said in his interpretable teachings and the definitive teachings that were his actual thought. In the first instance, the definitive teaching is compared to an essential ingredient in a medicinal preparation, without which the whole preparation will lack efficacy. In the second example, the definitive teaching is compared to the basis of a picture, which may not even be noticed by people looking at the picture, but which is essential as the background upon which the lines and colors of the painting are placed. In the third example, the definitive teaching is compared to an important ingredient that is added to a recipe and enhances it. In the final example, the definitive teaching is compared to space, which is all-pervasive and which is subtle, imperceptible, and generally not even noticed, but is essential for the movement of physical bodies. In the same way, the definitive teaching is said to be subtle, difficult to perceive, and so forth, but is the essence of the explanations given by Buddha in the first two wheels, even when this was not noticed by his audience.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 109.2) adds that Buddha's definitive teachings are also found in sūtras of interpretable meaning and are of one taste in them. They pervade all sūtras of interpretable meaning, have the one taste which is non-entityness, and they do not obstruct any seeking in the three vehicles, i.e., the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Great vehicles. These examples are also discussed by Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], pp. 262-4) and in Asaṅga's *Bhāṣya* pp. 14-15.

⁴⁷⁰Dok p. 68.5, K p 32b.4: *rtsom pa*; Lamotte p. 84, N p. 37b.2: *bsal ba*; P p. 12e.5: *stsas ba*; D p. 48.3: *brtsam pa*.

⁴⁷¹Dok p. 69.2, K p 32b.8: *khong du chud do*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12e.6, D p. 48.4: *shes te*.

⁴⁷²Dok p. 69.2, K p 32b.8, D p. 48.4: *mar gyis gdab pa*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12e.6, N p. 37b.4: *rim gyis gdab pa*.

⁴⁷³Dok p. 69.3, K p 33a.1: *de de bzhin te / rnam pa gzhan du ma yin gyis / de bzhin du zung zhig*; Lamotte p. 84, P p. 12e.7, D p. 48.5, N p. 37b.5: *de bzhin te / gzhan du ma yin gyis de ni de bzhin du gzung [P, D: zung] zhig*.

⁴⁷⁴Dok p. 69.4 and K p. 33a.2 have the word *sngon*, which is ambiguous in meaning, but Lamotte p. 85, P p. 12e.8, D 48.5, and N p. 37b.6 have *dang por*, which means initially, i.e., the first period of Buddha's teachings. D̄zong-ka-b̄a also cites this passage (*Legs bshad snying po*, p. 23.5), and his quotation also reads *dang por*. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 110.1) also has *dang por*, which he states refers to the first period of the teaching.

⁴⁷⁵Dok p. 69.4 and K p. 33a.2 read: *yul wā rā nā si drang srong lhung ba ri dags kyi gnas su*. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 110.1) reads: *yul bā rā na si drang srong lhung ba'i nags ri dags rgyu ba'i gnas su*. Lamotte p. 85, P p. 12e.8, D p. 48.6, N p. 37b.6 (and *Legs bshad snying po* p. 23.6 and B̄el-jor-hl̄un-drup's *Commentary* p. 29.3) read: *drang srong smra ba [P: ba'i] ri dags kyi nags su*. This would be translated as "in the Deer Park of Sage's Propounding." Wonch'uk (p. 111-112) gives various explanations for the why this park is so named.

According to Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (oral commentary), the park got the name "Sage's Alighting" because after the time of Kāśyapa, the Buddha prior to Śākyamuni, many Solitary Realizers (*rang sangs rgyas*, *pratyekabuddha*) appeared, some of these levitated into the air and burned themselves, after which their relics fell

from the sky in this place. The people in the area said, “The sages (*drang srong*) have fallen,” which led to it being called the Deer Park of the Alighting (or Falling) Sages.

For an Indian version of this story, see *Mahāvastu* vol. I, tr. J.J. Jones (London: Pāli Text Society, 1973), pp. 301-311.

⁴⁷⁶Dok p. 69.4, K p. 33a.2: *nyan thos kyi theg pa la yang dag par zhugs pa rnam la*; P p. 12e.8, D p. 48.6, N p. 37b.6, V p. 93a.6: *nyan thos kyi theg pa la yang dag par zhugs pa rnam la*. Lamotte p. 85 includes the words *nyan thos kyi* in brackets, noting that they do not occur in his Tibetan text, but do occur in Hsüan-tsang’s text, p. 697a.25. They are also found in Wonch’uk’s citation of this passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 114.2), but are omitted in C p. 31b.1, which reads: *theg pa la yang dag par zhugs pa rnam la*.

⁴⁷⁷Dok p. 69.5, K p. 33a.2: *'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi'i rnam par bstan pas / chos kyi 'khor lo ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba / sngan chad 'jig rten [du: omitted in K] lhar gyur pa 'am / mir gyur pa sus kyang chos dang 'thun pas ma skor [ba rab tu bskor: omitted in K] te*; Lamotte p. 85, P p. 12e.7, D p. 48.6, N p. 37b.6, C p. 31b.1, V p. 93a.6: *'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi'i rnam par [V: pa] bstan pas chos kyi 'khor lo ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba / sngan [P, D, N, C, V: sngon] lhar gyur pa 'am / mir gyur pa sus kyang chos dang 'thun par 'jig rten du ma bskor ba cig [P, D, C: gcig] tu rab tu bskor te*.

The aspects referred to here probably indicate the sixteen aspects of the four truths (see *Meditative States* p. 134). It is worth noting that here in the summary section of the chapter, Buddha speaks of the four truths as the main topic of discussion in the first wheel (the Hinayāna teachings), rather than the seven pronouncements (*bka' stsal bdun*; see note 225) — the aggregates, sources, dependent arising, sustenances, truths, constituents, and mindful establishments — which are mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and the fourth chapter.

Paṇ-chen Šö-nam-drak-ba (in his *Gsung rab kun gyi drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po brgal lan gyis rnam par 'byed pa utpa la'i phreng ba*) says that this indicates that the basis of composition (*brtsams gzhi*) of first wheel teachings is the four truths and that any teachings in the first wheel are necessarily based on the four truths. Gung-tang (p. 79.14 and 80.2-12) discusses this idea and asserts that Paṇ-chen has missed the point of the opening section of this chapter, which emphasizes the seven pronouncements as the main topics taught in the first wheel. According to Gung-tang, the four truths are the most important topics of discussion, but the other six pronouncements are also important, and cannot be reduced to the four truths. These points are drawn from Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*.

⁴⁷⁸In *Ādok* p. 69.6, a scribe has inserted the negative particle *ma* in front of each of these, apparently thinking that the text could not be saying that the Buddha's teaching could be surpassable, interpretable, etc., but this would destroy the whole point of the passage. The idea here is that the first two wheels contain teachings that require interpretation, while in the third wheel Buddha explains the thought behind his earlier teachings, what he was thinking of when he spoke them. As the entire thrust of the chapter indicates, the teachings of the first two wheels were not Buddha's final thought, and are not even correct as they stand, and so in the third wheel Buddha is explaining his final thought. My translation also borrows the word "basis" (*gzhi*) from Lamotte p. 85, P p. 13a.2, and D p. 48.7, which read: *rtsod pa'i gzhi'i gnas su gyur pa*. *Ādok* p. 69.6 and K p. 33a.4 read: *rtsod pa'i tshig gi gnas su gyur pa*, which should be amended in accordance with Lamotte, P, and D.

Bel-jor-hlün-drup (p. 29.4), commenting on this passage, states that terming these teachings "surpassable" (*bla na mchis pa, sa-uttara*) "indicates that there are other sūtras of definitive meaning that are higher than this" (*'di'i gong na nges don gyi mdo gzhan yod pa bstan*). They "provide an opportunity" (*skabs mchis, sa-avakāśa*) for dispute because they "provide an opportunity for finding fault by other disputants

with respect to the literal reading of the explicit teaching" (*'di'i dngos bstan sgra ji bzhin pa la rgol ba gzhan gyi klan ka'i skabs mchis pa bstan*)....[The first wheel] serves as a basis for controversy in that there is a basis for controversy because the Teacher did not differentiate individually in terms of the three characters whether they do or do not exist by way of their own character."

⁴⁷⁹Ādok p. 69.7 and K p. 33a.4 read: *lan gnyis su*, which is not found in Lamotte p. 85, P p. 13a, D pp. 48-9, N p. 38a, L p. 38b, C p. 31b.5, or V p. 93b.2, which refer to this as "the second wheel of doctrine" (*chos kyi 'khor lo gnyis pa*), a phrase that is not found in Ādok. The citation of this passage in *Legs bshad snying po* (p. 23) agrees with Lamotte, P, and D, and Ābel-jor-hlün-drup's commentary (p. 29.6) glosses this as referring to the middle period (*dus bar du*) of Buddha's teaching, exemplified by the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. Also, Wonch'uk's quotation of the sūtra passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 132.3) reads: *sngon dus gnyis pa'i ishe*.

⁴⁸⁰Ādok p. 70.1 and K p. 33a.6 read: *spros pa'i rnam pas*, which differs from Lamotte p. 85, P p. 13a.3, D p. 49.1, N p. 38a.3, C p. 31b.5, V p. 93b.1, Ādzong-ka-ba p. 23.16, and Ābel-jor-hlün-drup p. 29.5, which read: "through the aspect of speaking on emptiness" (*stong pa nyid smos pa'i rnam pas*).

In Wonch'uk's quotation of this passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 133.4), he uses the phrase "through a non-manifest aspect" (*mi mngon pa'i rnam pas*), which Ādzong-ka-ba (*Legs bshad snying po* p. 25.13) states is a good translation, although he disagrees with Wonch'uk's explanation that Buddha is "holding back [or hiding] the existent" (*yod pa nyid mkyud*; Wonch'uk p. 133.4). Ādzong-ka-ba does not explicitly take issue with Wonch'uk's explanation, but he only mentions it and then provides his own. According to Ādzong-ka-ba, in the middle wheel Buddha does not on the literal level differentiate phenomena into the three classes (imputational, other-powered, and thoroughly established natures) and on the literal level is not speaking about the three

types of non-entityness (non-entityness of character, non-entityness of production, and ultimate non-entityness), and hence does not explicitly differentiate between what does exist by way of its own character and what does not. Thus, according to *Āzong-ka-ba*, it is reasonable to assert that this means that Buddha is speaking in a “non-manifest manner”. On p. 25 he writes: “The meaning is that while the latter two wheels are similar in teaching stemming from non-entityness as the subject of expression, the difference in the mode of teaching is that the middle wheel does not differentiate [clearly] what has entityness and what does not as [explained] before, due to which [the sūtra] says ‘in a non-manifest manner’. Since the latter [wheel] differentiates these, [the sūtra] says ‘possessed of good differentiation’.” [translation by Jeffrey Hopkins]

The difference between Wonch’uk’s explanation and *Āzong-ka-ba*’s is that for Wonch’uk what is “non-manifest” in Buddha’s teachings is existence, while *Āzong-ka-ba* thinks that the existence or non-existence by way of their own character of the three natures is what is non-manifest, since Buddha’s views on this subject appear to differ in the three wheels, although those who are able to perceive the basis in Buddha’s thought (*dgongs gzhi*) know that there is no real contradiction.

⁴⁸¹ *Bel-jor-hlün-drup* (p. 30.3) comments: “The Teacher — at the third time, in Vaiśālī, for the sake of taking care of those having all three lineages, the special trainees of [this wheel], stemming from the subject matter of non-entityness and so forth — differentiated well the particulars of true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three, imputations, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures; and thoroughly established natures are the third [wheel of doctrine], the wheel of doctrine of good differentiation.”

Although *Paramārthasamudgata* only explicitly questions Buddha about the middle wheel, *Āzong-ka-ba* thinks that, since *Paramārthasamudgata* describes the third wheel as differentiating between what does and does not exist by way of its own character, it can be presumed that he is also asking about the first wheel because, in that

wheel (at least according to *Āzong-ka-bā*) Buddha taught that all phenomena without differentiation are established by way of their own character. In any case, the fact that *Paramārthasamudgata* here describes the second wheel as requiring interpretation is a clear indication that when he asks Buddha about the thought behind his teaching about the middle wheel he also implicitly asks him about the first wheel. Geshe Belden Drakba (oral commentary) similarly says: “Although *Paramārthasamudgata* asks Buddha explicitly about the thought behind his teaching of the middle wheel, this carries over to the thought behind his teaching of the first wheel. Therefore, *Paramārthasamudgata* is implicitly asking about Buddha’s thought in his teaching of the first wheel.”

⁴⁸²*Dok* p. 70.3 and *K* p. 33a.7 read: *lan gsum du*, which is omitted in *Lamotte* p. 85, *P* p. 13a, *D* p. 49, *N* p. 38a, *C* p. 31b.8, *V* p. 93b.4, *Legs bshad snying po* p. 24.5, and *Āel-jor-hlūn-drup* p. 30. These read: “turned a third wheel of doctrine” (*chos kyi ’khor lo gsum pa bskor te*). *Wonch’uk* (vol. *thi* [119], p. 135.7) quotes this as: *deng dus gsum pa ’dir*.

⁴⁸³According to *Āel-jor-hlūn-drup* (p. 30.3), this means that this wheel is taught “for the sake of taking care of trainees of the three lineages” (i.e., Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas: *gdul bya rigs can gsum ka rjes su bzung ba’i ched du*), but Geshe Belden Drakba (oral commentary) thinks that since it is a Mahāyāna sūtra it must be taught for Mahāyānists, or at least trainees who switch to Mahāyāna from either the Hearer vehicle or the Solitary Realizer vehicle. He thinks that it makes no sense to say that this sūtra could be aimed at Hinayanists, since all their paths aim at is liberation from cyclic existence through realizing the selflessness of persons. Since this sūtra also teaches the more subtle selflessness of phenomena and is a Mahāyāna sūtra that deals with the Bodhisattva path, it would be inappropriate for Hinayanists.

⁴⁸⁴In the various recensions of the sūtra there is a gradation of the three wheels that is implicit in how they are described. The first wheel is called “fantastic and marvellous” (*ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*; *Ādok* p. 69.5, *K* p. 33a.3, *Lamotte* p. 85, *P* p. 13a.1, *D* p. 48.6, *N* p. 37b.7, *L* p. 38b.1, *C* p. 31b.2, *V* p. 93b.7, *Legs bshad snying po* p. 23.8, *Ābel-jor-hlün-drup* p. 29.3, *Wonch’uk* (vol. *thi* [119], p. 131.5). The second wheel is called “very fantastic and marvellous” (*Ādok* p. 70.1, *K* p. 33a.6: *shin tu ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*; *Lamotte* p. 85, *P* p. 13a.4, *D* p. 49.1, *N* p. 38a.3, *L* p. 38b.4, *C* p. 31b.5, *V* p. 93b.2, *Legs bshad snying po* p. 23.17, *Ābel-jor-hlün-drup* p. 30.1, *Wonch’uk* p. 134.6: *ches ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*). The third wheel is called “extremely fantastic and extremely marvellous” (*ha cang yang ngo mtshar la / ha cang yang rmad du byung ba*) in *Ādok* p. 70.4 and *K* p. 33b.1. It is called “thoroughly fantastic and marvellous” (*shin tu ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*) in *Lamotte* p. 85, *P* p. 13a.6, *D* p. 49.4, *N* p. 38a.6, *L* p. 38b.7, and *C* p. 31b.8. *Wonch’uk* p. 137.6 quotes the description of the third wheel as “supremely fantastic and marvellous” (*mchog tu rmad du byung ba*). In the *Legs bshad snying po* p. 24.5 and *V* p. 93b.6 it is just called “fantastic and marvellous” (*ngo mtshar rmad du byung ba*).

According to *Ādzong-ka-ba* (p. 24.11), although the third wheel is of definitive meaning and the other two wheels are of interpretable meaning, the second wheel is the supreme of all wheels, because its special trainees are the sharpest of all Bodhisattvas, who understand the basis in Buddha’s thought (*dgongs gzhi*) without needing the explanations of the third wheel. The third wheel is taught for those Bodhisattvas who are less sharp and need the good differentiations of the *Samdhinirmocana-sutra* in order to correctly understand Buddha’s thought. This may account for the discrepancy between his citations of the intensifying particles and those of the other versions: *Ādzong-ka-ba* only calls the third wheel “fantastic and marvellous”, while the second wheel is called “very fantastic and marvellous”. All the other citations of the passage (*Ādok*, *K*, *Lamotte*, *P*, *D*, *L*, *N*, and *Wonch’uk*) indicate that the third wheel is superior to the second.

⁴⁸⁵Ādok p. 70.4 and K p. 33b.1 read: *shin tu rnam par phye ba'i bye brag*. In *Legs bshad snying po* p. 24.5 (as well as Lamotte p. 85, P p. 13a.6, D p. 49.3, N p. 38a.6, L p. 38b.7, C p. 31b.7, and V p. 93b.4), this phrase reads “possessed of good differentiations” (*legs par rnam par phye ba dang ldan pa*), and Wonch'uk quotes this phrase as “by way of the aspect of thorough differentiation” (*rab tu phye ba'i rnam pas*). Ādzong-ka-bā's reading is crucial for his interpretation of the third wheel, which he calls “the wheel of good differentiations” (*legs par rnam par phye ba'i 'khor lo*; p. 26.11). Ādzong-ka-bā contrasts his interpretation with that of Wonch'uk, and Ādzong-ka-bā reports that Wonch'uk thinks that this wheel should be known as “the wheel that thoroughly determines the ultimate” (*don dam rnam par nges pa'i 'khor lo*), and not “the wheel of good differentiations”. I have not been able to locate this phrase in Wonch'uk's commentary, but in Wonch'uk's discussion of this wheel (vol. *thi* [119], p. 137.1) he writes: “...because of thoroughly indicating entityness and non-entityness, this is a turning of the wheel of correct doctrine that thoroughly differentiates” (*ngo bo nyid yod pa dang ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rab tu ston pas na de'i phyir 'di ltar rab tu phye ba'i rnam pas yang dag pa'i chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba*).

⁴⁸⁶According to Ābel-jor-hlün-drup (p. 31.5), third wheel teachings are “unsurpassable” (*bla na ma mchis pa, anuttara*) because there are no other sūtras of definitive meaning that are superior to them. They “do not provide an opportunity [for refutation]” (*skabs ma mchis pa, anavakāśa*) because there is no opportunity for opponents to validly dispute them in terms of the literal readings of the actual teachings. They are of “definitive meaning” (*nges pa'i don, nitārtha*) because they “need not be interpreted as something else and are definitive as that meaning” (*'di'i don gzhan du drang mi dgos shing don der nges pa'o*). Ādzong-ka-bā comments that the statement that the third wheel does not involve controversy “should be taken as [meaning] that since the [sūtra] indicates the existence or non-existence of entityness, there is no place for controversy

when scholars analyze whether the meaning of the sūtra is or is not delineated in that way. However, this does not indicate that there are not other controversies" [p. 27.2; tr. Jeffrey Hopkins]. *Ābel-jor-hlün-drup* (p. 31.7) adds that: "Since these [sūtras] differentiate individually whether the three characters do or do not exist by way of their own character, there is no basis for controversy, that is, they do not serve as a basis for controversy."

This passage from the sūtra (beginning with "during the third period...") is quoted in full by Bu-dōn (*bu ston*) in his *Chos 'byung* (tr. Eugene Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1931), part II pp. 51-54. According to Bu-dōn, the aim of this teaching was to remove the misconceptions of those who had heard teachings of the first two wheels and had fallen to one of the two extremes.

⁴⁸⁷This refers to the Buddhist tradition that there is a special benefit in receiving teachings from one's guru. In Tibetan traditions, the reception of an oral transmission is referred to as a *lung*.

⁴⁸⁸*Dok* p. 70.5 and *K* p. 33b.2 have a very different word order from that of Lamotte p. 86, *P* 13a.7, *D* p. 49.4, *N* p. 38b.1, *L* p. 39a.2, *C* p. 32a.1, and *V* p. 93b.5: *bcom ldan 'das kyis chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa la brtsams pa nas / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'i bar la brtsams te / nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di thos nas / mos sam / yi ger 'dri 'am / yi ger 'drir stsol tam / 'dzin tam / klog gam / mchod dam / yang dag par 'gyed dam / lung nod dam / kha ton du bgyid dam / sems sam / sgom pa'i rnam pas sbyor na / bcom ldan 'das rigs kyi bu 'am / rigs kyi bu mo de bsod nams ji tsam skyed par 'gyur*. Lamotte, *P*, *D*, *N*, *L*, *C*, and *V* read: *bcom ldan 'das [L: /] chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid las brtsams / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa nyid kyi bar las brtsams nas / bcom ldan 'das kyis nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di [C: ni] rigs kyi bu 'am / rigs kyi bu mo gang [P: dag] gis thos nas mos par bgyid pa dang / yi ger 'drir rtsol [P, D, N, L, C, V: stsol] ba dang /*

yi ger bris nas kyang 'chang ba dang / klog pa dang / mchod pa dang / yang dag par 'gyed [V: 'ged] pa dang / lung nod pa dang / kha ton bgyid pa dang / sems pa [P: dpa'] dang / bsgom [V: sgom] pa'i rnam pas [V: par] sbyor bar bgyid pa de bsod nams ji tsam zhig skyed par 'gyur ba lags.

⁴⁸⁹Ādok p. 71.2, K p. 33b.6: *bsod nams tshad med grangs med par bskyed do*; Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13b.3, D p. 49.7: *bsod nams dpag tu med grangs med pa bskyed de*. Lamotte, P, and D also differ from Ādok in that they begin this sentence with *don dam yang dag 'phags*, which is omitted in Ādok.

⁴⁹⁰Ādok p. 71.3, K p. 33b.6: *de la dpe bya bar yang sla ba ma yin mod kyi / khyod la mdo tsam du bshad do*; Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13b.3, D p. 50.1: *de'i dpe bya bar sla ba ma yin mod kyi / 'on kyang mdor bsodus te khyod la bshad par bya'o*.

⁴⁹¹Ādok p. 71.3, K p. 33b.7: *sen mo'i rtse mo la gnas pa'i rdul dang / sa la gnas pa'i rdul du bsgrun na / brgya'i char yang nye bar mi 'gro'o / stong gi char yang / brgya stong gi char yang / grangs su yang / char yang / dper yang / rgyur yang nye bar mi 'gro'o*; Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13b.4, D p. 50.1: *sen mo'i rtse mo la gnas pa'i sa'i rdul gang dag yin pa de ni / sa la gnas pa'i rdul rnams dang bsgrun na / brgya'i char yang nye bar mi 'gro zhing stong gi cha dang / 'bum gyi cha dang / grangs dang / cha dang bgrang ba dang / dpe dang / rgyur yang nye bar mi 'gro'o*. Lamotte p. 87 n. 17 equates *rgyur yang* with Sanskrit *upamām api*, which I translate as “even a comparison”. See also his note on this in his translation (pp. 207-8 n. 37).

⁴⁹²Ādok p. 71.5, K p. 33b.8: *ba glang gi rmig rjes dang / rgya mtsho chen po bzhi'i chur bsgrun na*; Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13b.5, D p. 50.2, N p. 38b.7: *ba lang gi rjes kyi chu ni [rgya: omitted in P, D] mtsho chen po bzhi'i chu dang bsgrun na*.

This refers to the idea in Buddhist cosmology that the continent of Jambudvīpa is surrounded by four great oceans.

⁴⁹³Ādok p. 71.5, K p. 33b.8, Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13b.5, and D p. 50.3 use the particle *nas* to indicate that this sentence uses the same comparisons as the previous one, and so I have inserted these in brackets.

⁴⁹⁴Lamotte p. 86, P p. 13.6, and D p. 50.3 insert *don dam yang dag 'phags*, which is omitted in Ādok p. 71.5 and K p. 33b.8.

⁴⁹⁵Ādok p. 72.1, K p. 34a.1: *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs 'di la nges par bstan pa 'di'i ming ci lags*; Lamotte p. 87, P p. 13b.8, D p. 50.5: *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs 'dir bstan pa 'di'i ming ci lags*.

⁴⁹⁶According to Gung-tang (pp. 8-9; from Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, p. 11), the main concern of this chapter is the differentiation of the interpretable and definitive with respect to Buddha's teachings concerning non-entityness and so forth. This entire chapter is quoted by Asaṅga in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* (Peking p. 89.2.2-93.4.2). He indicates (p. 89.2.2) that the chapter explains the meaning of "non-entitynesses of character of phenomena" (*chos rnams kyi ngo bo med pa'i mtshan nyid, dharma-niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇa*).

"Forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production" (*mi skye ba'i chos la bzod pa, anutpatti-dharmakṣānti*) is discussed by Lamotte, p. 208 n. 39. In an oral commentary on this term, Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen stated: "When you meditate on emptiness and see the non-affirming negation that is the mere negative of the object of negation, true establishment, which you have not seen before, you could feel a little afraid. Forbearance means either being able to bear that fear or not being

afraid, being able to bear meditation on emptiness" [tr. Jules Levinson]. He added that there are three types of forbearance, the first of which is attained on the path of preparation, the second of which is attained on the path of seeing, and the third of which is attained on the eighth Bodhisattva ground. See also Étienne Lamotte, the *Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (tr. Sara Boin, London: Pāli Text Society, 1976), Appendix note III, pp. 286-291.

⁴⁹⁷Maitreya (*byams pa*), in Buddhist mythology, is the future Buddha, who presently resides in Tuṣita in preparation for his last rebirth, in which he will be a fully actualized Buddha. At present he is a tenth ground Bodhisattva, and according to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 174.2) he is called "Love" (*maitreya*) "because his nature is endowed with love and compassion". Regarding this Bodhisattva, see: Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., *Maitreya*, Princeton, 1986; Lewis Lancaster, "Maitreya", in *Encyclopedia of Religions*, ed. Mircea Eliade, pp. 136-141; Shinjou Suguro, "On Maitreya", in *Bukkyō Gaku*, vol. 21, 1987, pp. 1-28; and Hisao Inagaki, "Haribhadra's Quotations from Jñānagarbha's *Anantamukhanirhāra-dhāraṇīṭika*", in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, pp. 139-40, which discusses Haribhadra's etymology of Maitreya's name in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*.

⁴⁹⁸This chapter is one of the great scriptural locus classici for calm abiding (*zhi gnas*, *śamatha*) and special insight (*lhag mthong*, *vipaśyanā*) in the Mahāyāna tradition. According to Asaṅga (*Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* p. 93.4.2), the main topic of this whole chapter is "the thorough differentiation of the path of calm abiding and special insight that is subsumed by yoga" (*rnal 'byor gyis yongs su bsdud pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi lam gyi rab tu dbye ba*).

Geshe Gendun Lodrö (from an unpublished transcript of his lectures translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 17) defines calm abiding as "a technique for setting the mind

without fluctuation on one object of observation.” Geshe Lhundup Sopa (“Śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist Meditation”, in Minoru Kiyota, ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, p. 48) states that it is “just a one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā*) on a meditative object (*ālambana*). Whatever the object may be...if the mind can remain upon its object one-pointedly, spontaneously and without effort (*nābhisaṃskāra*), and for as long a period of time as the meditator likes, it is approaching the attainment of meditative stabilization (*samatha*)”.

Ge-luk-ba scholars in general hold that there are six prerequisites for achieving calm abiding: (1) staying in an agreeable place; (2) having few desires; (3) knowing satisfaction; (4) not having many activities; (5) pure ethics; (6) thoroughly abandoning thoughts.

According to Geshe Gendun Lodrö (transcript, p. 71), “special insight is a mind that does not merely remain on its object of observation but analyzes it within clarity and intensity.” In terms of the path, it is generally held that one must first achieve calm abiding, the ability to remain mentally concentrated on an object, before one can attain special insight, in which one analyzes the object in terms of its ultimate mode of subsistence.

According to Gendun Lodrö, when calm abiding is manifest, special insight is only present in a subliminal manner, and vice-versa. Prior to the attainment of special insight, one can maintain stabilizing and analytical meditation in equal portions at the same time after having attained calm abiding and prior to attaining special insight. This is why it is necessary to alternate the two types of meditation. When special insight is manifest, calm abiding is said to be present “in a subliminal way,” which means that: “it has become weaker due to the fact that you have to generate this other consciousness. If calm abiding were manifest, then even though calm abiding and special insight are not in general contradictory, it is the nature of the person at that level that the one cannot operate manifestly while the other is manifest.”

Gendun Lodrö adds (p. 73) that at the time of attaining special insight, calm abiding and special insight are said to be of one entity because: “the calm abiding and special insight that a person has in equal force upon attainment of special insight — which is at the point of the mental contemplation arisen from belief — are one entity; they have one object of observation.”

Gendun Lodrö also states that in the system of the *Samdhinirmocana* all good qualities of the three vehicles are the fruits of calm abiding and special insight: “This is said from the viewpoint of the types of meditation — there is no meditative practice that is not included within analytical or stabilizing meditation.” In describing their results, he states: “If a person who has attained calm abiding keeps his mind in calm abiding, not only does the force of his meditative stabilization remain but his other good qualities increase and do not degenerate. Similarly, a person who has achieved special insight has clear perception with respect to any other object to which he turns his mind. A person who cultivates calm abiding but not special insight will gain the factor of stability but not that of intense clarity; he will not be able to manifest any actual antidote to the afflictions. One must achieve an intensity of clarity in order for anything to serve as an antidote to ignorance and to achieve that clarity one must have special insight.”

For more on these topics, see: Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* (chapter six); Asaṅga’s *Five Treatises on the Levels*, especially the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, as well as his *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (and see *Somme* notes p. 33*, where Lamotte provides a bibliography on these topics), and *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi*; Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba’s (*paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa*, 1478-1554) *General Meaning of (Maitreya’s) Ornament for Clear Realizations* (*phar phyin spyi don / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa dang bcas pa’i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba’i sgron me*); Wonch’uk’s commentary on this sūtra, especially pp. 198-220; Jam-yang-shay-ba’s (*’jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, 1648-1721) *Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions / Treatise on the Presentations of the*

Concentrations and Formless Absorptions, Adornment Beautifying the Subduer's Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate (*bsam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug rnam kyi rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed*); *Meditative States*; ME, pp. 67-114; and “Śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist Meditation”, by Geshe Sopa, in Minoru Kiyota, ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, pp. 46-65.

⁴⁹⁹Dok p. 72.7, K p. 34b.1: *rnam par dgod pa*; Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13c.5, D p. 51.3: *rnam par bzhag pa*.

⁵⁰⁰According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 275.6), they “abide in” this resolution because they have heard those doctrines well, apprehended them well, trained in reciting them, analyzed them well with their minds, and they thoroughly realize them through perceiving them. He adds (p. 275.7): “Abiding in [realization of] them, they are not committed to cyclic existence, resources, etc., and they make connection to a supramundane path; therefore, that is indicated as being a cause of making connection to the path of calm abiding and special insight that is an abode risen above worldlings.” In discussing the statement that they are “unsurpassably, perfectly enlightened” (p. 276.1) he states that this enlightenment is “unsurpassable” in terms of six unsurpassabilities: “(1) unsurpassable perception; (2) unsurpassable hearing; (3) unsurpassable attainments; (4) unsurpassable training; (5) unsurpassable religious service; and (6) unsurpassable mindfulness”. It is “completely perfect” because it is “non-erroneous with respect to the nature of all phenomena”. He adds that “‘Enlightenment’ has the meaning of realization. ‘Unwavering aspiration’ [refers to] generating, uninterruptedly and continually, from the depth of one’s thought, the mind of enlightenment that is endowed with enhancement through the unsurpassed apex of correct aspirations from among the virtues that are the five characteristics of generating

the initial mind [directed toward] unsurpassed enlightenment: (1) the entity that is the initial correct aspiration; (2) the aspect of achieving one's own enlightenment and the welfare of sentient beings; (3) the objects of observation, which are to observe one's own unsurpassed enlightenment and all sentient beings; (4) the precursors that are the composite of all the roots of virtue concordant with enlightenment; and (5) correct aspiration for qualities that are discordant with faulty deeds of body, speech, and mind that are related to all sentient beings, as well as for mundane and supramundane qualities other than those."

On p. 275.4 he divides these designations of doctrines into four types: "(1) presentations of designations of doctrines; (2) presentations of designations of truths; (3) presentations of designations of reasonings; and (4) presentations of designations of vehicles".

⁵⁰¹The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13c.6, and D p. 51.3, which add: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi*; this is omitted in *Ā* Dok p. 73.1 and K p. 34b.1.

In the context of meditation, an "object of observation" (*dmigs pa*, *ālambana*) is any object that a meditator takes to mind. For instance, in generating calm abiding, one takes to mind an object in order to develop the ability to remain calmly contemplating it without being disturbed by laxity or excitement. See also *Meditative States* pp. 80-91 and 73-74; and *Compendium* p. 47, where objects of observation are divided into twelve types.

⁵⁰²Geshe Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, p. 163) explains these four types of objects in accordance with Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama*. See *Bhāvanākrama III*, ed. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts Part III*, Rome, 1971, pp. 1-3 and Tohoku #3917 (Tokyo: Otani University Press, 1979, *dbu ma* vol. 15, p. 28.b.5-29b). Gendun Lodrö says that the names of the first two, non-analytical images and analytical images, are

posited from the point of view of the subject, while the names of the latter two are given from the side of the object. Non-analytical meditation is so called because it does not analyze the mode of subsistence of phenomena (their nature of emptiness), but rather is a type of meditation that takes conventional phenomena as its objects of observation. Its objects are always the varieties (*ji snyed pa*) of phenomena (which correspond to conventional truths), and not the mode (*ji lta ba*), which corresponds to ultimate truths. See Tucci pp. 1-2, which reads: “With respect to that, having devoted oneself to whatever images of all phenomena, images of Buddhas, and so forth by way of calm abiding, one observes [them]; these are called ‘non-analytical images’. With respect to that, due to an absence of conceptuality with respect to real objects that are understood, they are called ‘non-analytical’. Insofar as one observes them after having devoted oneself to images of phenomena as they are heard and as they are apprehended, they are called ‘images’. When yogis analyze those very images by way of special insight, those same objects that they are involved with are called ‘analytical images’. This is due to the arising of conceptual analytical thought of the character of special insight with respect to those very [objects].”

Analytical images, in Kamalaśīla’s text, are treated as a case of special insight. Gendun Lodrö states: “They receive the name of ‘analytical image’ because they involve special insight taking to mind (or analyzing) the nature of phenomena. Because the nature of phenomena is being analyzed this is said to be an analytical image.” Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 186.1) states that analytical images are “whatever are objects of activity imagined by meditative stabilization that is partially similar to things that are objects of knowledge” (*shes bya’i dngos po dang cha mtshungs pa’i ting nge ’dzin gyis btags pa’i spyod yul gang yin pa’o*), and non-analytical images are “whatever are real objects that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations that are partially similar to things that are objects of knowledge” (*shes bya’i dngos po dang cha mtshungs pa’i ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul yang dag pa’i yul gang yin pa’o*).

The third type, the limits of phenomena, is referred to by Kamalaśīla and Tibetan commentators as “observing the limits of phenomena” (*dn̄gos po'i mtha' la dmigs pa*), and can be posited either from the viewpoint of the object or the subject. From the viewpoint of the subject, the limits of phenomena would be limits that apply to all phenomena, for instance the fact that phenomena do not exist from their own side. This is the mode of subsistence (*gnas lugs*) of all phenomena without exception. The impermanence of sound would not fit into this category of the limits of phenomena, because it is only being applied to one phenomenon, sound. It does not apply to all phenomena because there are permanent phenomena, such as non-compounded space.

If the limit of phenomena is posited from the point of view of the subject, one is only observing the limit of phenomena when one is directly perceiving emptiness. Until that time, even if one is meditating on emptiness, one is not observing the limits of phenomena. Thus, from the point of view of the subject, observing the limits of phenomena means directly perceiving their ultimate mode of subsistence, and according to Gendun Lodrö (p. 174) the attainment of observing the limits of phenomena is simultaneous with the attainment of the first Bodhisattva ground: “This is the point where there is no generic image intervening between the consciousness and its object of observation, emptiness, and thus the nature of phenomena is observed nakedly.” Kamalaśīla states: “When a yogi, understanding the nature of all phenomena according to the mode by way of analyzing the natures of those very images, analyzes the arising of an image of his own face in a mirror he/she similarly understands ugliness and so forth with respect to his/her own face. When he/she analyzes the suchness of the character of the limits of phenomena, because on the first ground he/she understands the limits of phenomena, this is called ‘observing the limits of phenomena’.” The first sentence is translated in accordance with the Tibetan (Ötani University text, p. 28c.6-7), which gives a clearer reading than Tucci’s Sanskrit text, and the second sentence is translated in accordance with both Tucci’s text (p. 2) and the Tibetan.

According to Wonch'uk (p. 180.4), "observing the limits of phenomena" refers to observing "the varieties of existence and the mode of existence of all phenomena" (*gang chos thams cad kyi ji snyed yod pa nyid dang ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid do*). "The varieties of existence" refers to the aggregates, constituents, and sources. "The mode of existence" refers to "the four noble truths, suchness, the impermanence of all compounded phenomena, the suffering [associated with] all compounded phenomena, the selflessness of all phenomena, [the fact that] nirvāṇa is peace, to emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness".

According to Gendun Lodrö, "thorough accomplishment of the purpose", is a Buddha's nature body, and so when you actualize this in your continuum you have become a Buddha. Before this point, however, it is possible to take this as one's object of observation in order to cultivate and attain calm abiding. This term does not refer to an actual object of observation, but rather refers to the purpose for which one is meditating. In general, this includes all the fruits of meditative stabilization from liberation up to the omniscience of a Buddha, but in the context of this chapter mainly refers to attainment of a Buddha's truth body (*chos kyi sku, dharma-kāya*). Kamalaśīla (Tucci, p. 2) states: "Therefore — due to actualizing transformation of the basis by way of the gradual arising of moments of very great purity on the following grounds through employing the essence of the medicine of a path of seeing — when one thoroughly completes the purpose of the character of abandonment of obstructions then the purpose of exalted knowledge on the Buddha ground is called 'the object of observation that is a thorough accomplishment of the purpose'."

Wonch'uk (II.180.6) states that thorough accomplishment of the purpose refers to transformations of bases (*gnas gyur pa, āśraya-parāvṛtti*) in general, which includes the actualization of the truth body.

Gendun Lodrö associates non-analytical images with the path of accumulation, analytical images with the path of preparation, the limits of phenomena with the paths of seeing and meditation, and the thorough accomplishment of the purpose with the fifth

Mahāyāna path, the path of no more learning, in which one thoroughly achieves ones purpose and becomes a Buddha.

These are called “pervasive objects of observation” (*khyab pa'i dmigs pa*, *vyāpyālamana*) because all objects are included among them. The first type includes all types of conventional phenomena, and some appropriate objects are love, the unpleasant, the seven-fold reasoning, etc. The last three types of pervasive objects involve emptiness, which is classified as an object of observation for purifying afflictions. See *Meditative States*, pp. 81-82 and *ME* pp. 70-71.

As explained in the Ge-luk-ba tradition, there are four types of objects of observation: (1) pervasive objects of observation (*khyab pa'i dmigs pa*); (2) objects for purifying behavior (*spyad pa rnam sbyong gi dmigs pa*); (3) skillful objects (*mkhas pa'i dmigs pa* or *mkhas par byed pa'i dmigs pa*); and (4) objects for purifying afflictions (*nyon mongs rnam sbyong gi dmigs pa*). See *Meditative States* pp. 80-91 and *ME* pp. 69-71.

In explaining these, Gendun Lodrö states that: “Pervasive refers to the fact that this type pervades all objects of observation....Objects of observation that purify behavior are used by persons in whom one of the afflictions predominates and these objects are so named for their ability to temporarily pacify afflictions. Objects that make one skilled have the feature that, by training in them, one becomes skilled. This third category includes objects such as the four noble truths and the twelve limbs of dependent arising; if one studies the texts on these subjects one becomes skilled in them. The word ‘skillful’ is an abbreviated expression meaning ‘to make or bring about skill’. The fifth type of object is for purifying afflictions.” (pp. 88-9) Objects used for purifying behavior are intended to alleviate whatever affliction predominates in a particular individual, e.g., desire, hatred, delusion, and the objects that purify afflictions purify all afflictions equally.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 180.6) divides objects used for purifying behavior into five types: “(1) those who engage in desire frequently should observe unclean

objects; (2) those who often engage in hatred should meditate on objects of love; (3) those who engage in obscuration frequently should observe those objects that are dependent arisings; (4) those who engage in pride should observe the divisions of constituents; and (5) those who engage in conceptuality should observe the objects of mindfulness of the inhalation and exhalation of breath." These are also listed by Jang-chup-dzu-trül, (vol. *cho* [205], p. 277). See also *ME* pp. 70-80.

For more on the various types of objects of observation, see Wonch'uk pp. 183-4; Jang-chup-dzu-trül pp. 278-81; *Meditative States* pp. 80-91; and *Compendium* pp. 134-36.

⁵⁰³Ādok p. 73.3, K p. 34b.3: *zhi gnas kyi dmigs pa du lags*; Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13c.7, D p. 51.4: *du zhig zhi gnas kyi dmigs pa lags*.

⁵⁰⁴Ādok p. 73.3, K p. 34b.3: *gcig ste 'di ltar rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan no*; Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13c.7, D p. 51.4: *gcig ste 'di lta ste / rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan no*.

⁵⁰⁵The word "only" is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13c.8, and D p. 51.4, which read: *gcig kho na ste*. Ādok p. 73.4 and K p. 34b.5 read: *gcig ste*.

⁵⁰⁶Ādok p. 73.5, K p. 34b.5: *ji ltar na / byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi dmigs pa'i dngos po bzhi po 'di dag la gnas shing / zhi gnas tshol ba dang / lhag mthong la mkhas pa lags*; Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13d.1, P p. 51.5: *byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi dmigs pa'i dngos po bzhi po de dag la brten cing gnas nas ji ltar zhi gnas yongs su tshol bar bgyid pa dang / lhag mthong la mkhas pa lags*.

⁵⁰⁷Dok p. 73.6, K p. 34b.6: *chos gdags pa rnam par bkod pa*; Lamotte p. 88, P p. 13d.2, D p. 51.6: *chos gdags pa rnam par bzhas pa*.

⁵⁰⁸Sūtra collections (*mdo'i sde, sūtrānta*), according to Asaṅga (*Abhidharma-samuccaya* II.1), are teachings given by Buddha which explicate a particular idea or point of view. In his *History of Buddhism* (*chos 'byung*, tr. Eugene Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1931, pp. 31-33), Bu-dōn (*bu ston*) states that sūtras are brief expressions of a particular subject-matter, and he quotes the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* to the effect that in sūtras Buddha gives teachings that establish a particular thesis, are particularly beneficial, easy to remember, meritorious, and lead to wisdom.

Discourses in prose and verse (*dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa'i sde, geya*), according to the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (II.1), are discourses in which Buddha summarizes his teachings in verse at the middle or end, which mix prose sections with verse summaries. Asaṅga also states that the material in the verses is only material covered in the prose section. Bu-dōn follows Asaṅga's explication, and adds that *geyas* communicate the essential teachings of sūtras of interpretable meaning in verses.

Prophetical discourses (*lung du bstan pa'i sde, vyākaraṇa*), according to Asaṅga, are discourses in which Buddha speaks of the various past lives of his disciples in relation to their present lives, including the reasons why they are in their particular situations, and he predicts what their future existences will be like. According to Bu-dōn, these prophecies are given in relation to Hearers (*nyan thos, śrāvaka*), and he cites in particular the prophecies given in the *Lotus Sūtra*, in which Buddha describes the future existences of his disciples as Buddhas and the kinds of Buddha-lands they will have.

Verses (*tshigs su bcad pa'i sde, gāthā*), according to Asaṅga, are *pādas* (metrical stanzas) consisting of two, three, four, five, or six couplets. Bu-dōn repeats Asaṅga's explanation and provides examples of the various types of *gāthās*.

Purposeful statements (*ched du brjod pa'i sde, udāna*), according to Asaṅga, are joyous responses to utterances by Tathāgatas. Bu-dōn, commenting on this idea, quotes the *Vyākhyāyukti*: “That which is spoken, not with regard to (separate) individuals, but only in the interest of maintaining the Doctrine; such are the utterances of joy and praise” (Obermiller, op. cit., p. 32). For instance, if a Buddha teaches about moral purity, other Buddhas will utter their approval of his teaching.

Specific teachings (*gleng gzhi'i sde, nidāna*), according to Asaṅga, are the answers Buddha gave to questions by specific persons in response to specific questions. Bu-dōn indicates that these teachings are conjoined with stories having a moral. He cites as an example Buddha's teaching to Dhanika, forbidding him from stealing.

Narratives (*rtogs pa brjod pa'i sde, avadāna*), according to Asaṅga, are teachings that are connected with parables.

Discourses [that report] what occurred (*de lta bu byung ba'i sde, itivṛttaka*), according to Asaṅga, consist of the reports by Buddha's disciples of previous occurrences, and Bu-dōn adds that these stories are about Gautama Buddha.

Discourses on [Buddha's previous] births (*skyes pa rabs kyi sde, jātaka*) are identified by Asaṅga as stories of the past lives of Buddha and relate the practice and career of a Bodhisattva, and Bu-dōn cites the story of Buddha's previous birth as Viśvaṃtara as an example of this type of discourse.

Extensive discourses (*shin tu rgyas pa'i sde, vaipulya-sūtra*) are, according to Asaṅga, teachings in the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka* (the Mahāyāna canon). He states that these are also termed *vaidalya* or *vaitulya* and that they are called “extensive” because they are based on compassion for all beings, and thus are supremely profound. They are called *vaidalya* because they overcome (*vidalana*) all the obstructions. They are called *vaitulya* because there is no comparison (*tulanābhāva*) with them by way of analogies (*upamāna*). Bu-dōn adds that they also expound doctrine in a great, extensive, and profound manner.

Discourses on miraculous phenomena (*rmad du byung ba'i chos kyi sde*, *adbhuta-dharma-sūtra*), according to Asaṅga, are discourses that report the miraculous deeds of Hearers, Bodhisattvas, and Tathāgatas. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 299.7) states that they “set forth the common and uncommon qualities, as well as other special qualities of Buddhas, Hearers who are monks and nuns, male and female novices, and male and female lay practitioners, which are renowned to be amazing and marvelous”.

The discourses that delineate (*gtan la bab par bstan pa'i sde*, *upadeśa*), according to Asaṅga, are explanations concerning the characteristics of all phenomena (*sarvadharmā-lakṣaṇa*). These explanations are precise, profound, and subtle. Bu-ḍōn states that these discourses explain the nature of all *dharma*s as they truly are.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 300.2) states that the first five constitute the Hearer canon, while the tenth and eleventh constitute the Bodhisattva canon. The sixth, eighth, and ninth are the scriptural collection of the discipline for both, and discourses that delineate are the scriptural collection of *abhidharma* for both.

Discussions of the historical development of the twelvefold division of Buddhist scriptures can be found in “Avadāna and Apadāna” by Edward J. Thomas, in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. IX, 1933, pp. 32-36 and in *Four Avadānas from the Gilgit Manuscripts* by Hisashi Matsumura (Ph.D. Diss., Australian National University, 1980, pp. xivff., which contains a good discussion of scholarly opinions on the development of this classification. See also: Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 191-96); Lamotte, *Samādhinirmocana*, p. 210 n. 10; Kamalaśīla's second *Bhāvanākrama* (ed. Ācārya Gyaltsen Namdol, Sarnath, 1985, p. 209), which quotes this verse; and Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 75-78.

⁵⁰⁹Dok p. 74.1, K p. 34b.8: *legs par thos / legs par bzung / kha ton tu yang legs par byas / yid kyis kyang shin tu brtags / mthong bas kyang legs par rtogs par gyur la*;

Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.4, D p. 52.1: *legs par thos / legs par bzung / kha ton byang bar byas / yid kyis legs par brtags / mihong bas shin tu rtogs par byas nas.*

⁵¹⁰Dok p. 74.2, K p. 35a.1, Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.5, and D p. 52.1 read: *de gcig pu dben par 'dug ste* (Skt.: *ekākinō rahogatāḥ*). Solitude is said to be important in the beginning stages of meditation, since in an isolated place there are fewer distractions than in crowded areas.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 302.1) states that “alone” refers to physical isolation (*lus dben pa, kāya-viveka*), and “an isolated situation” refers to mental isolation (*sems dben pa, citta-viveka*). He adds that there are three aspects of thorough isolation: “(1) an excellent abode; (2) excellent behavior; and (3) excellent isolation”. Excellent abodes are of three types: (1) hermitages; (2) places without householders; and (3) roofless dwellings. The third type consists of such places as burial grounds, hermitages, mountain caves, and fields.

On p. 304.5 he states that physical isolation involves householders and those who have left the household life not abiding together. Mental isolation involves “practicing cultivation of mental contemplation having virtuous objects that is arisen from application to the levels of meditative equipoise or at the preparatory states for meditative stabilizations”. Regarding the topic of isolation, see: Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, London, 1975, p. 140; *Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary*, London, 1972, p. 638; *Somme* notes p. 53*; and *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās*, ed. L. de la Vallée-Poussin, Osnabrück, 1970, ch. 18.12.

⁵¹¹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 304.6) states that “setting the mind thoroughly within” (*nang du yang dag 'jog*) refers to meditative stabilization (*ting nge 'dzin*). See also Wonch'uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 195.2-4.

⁵¹²Dok p. 74.3, K p. 35a.1: *nang du yang dag bzhag nas ji ltar bsams pa'i chos de dag nyid yid la byed cing / sems gang gis yid la byed pa'i sems de / nang du rgyun du 'byung ba'i yid la byed pas yid la byed do*; Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.5, D p. 52.1: *nang du yang dag bzhag [P: gzhag] nas ji ltar legs par bsams pa'i chos de dag yid la byed cing / sems gang gis yid la byed pa'i sems de nang du rgyun chags su yid la byed pas yid la byed do*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 305.1) comments: “Having actualized the signs of one on the level of meditative equipoise — from the point of view of whatever doctrines of sūtras and so forth they have heard and apprehended and whatever advice and teachings by gurus they have obtained — they engage the object of observation and set [the mind] closely [on it] through continual mindfulness.”

This passage plays on the uses of the term *yid la byed* (Skt. *manaskāra*) as noun and as verb, alternating these two uses. Mental contemplation is included among the five omnipresent mental factors (*kun 'gro lnga, pañca-sarvatraga*), so called because they accompany all main minds. Mental contemplation directs the mind accompanying it to a specific object of observation. The Sanskrit term literally means “mind-making” or “mental activity,” and in many of its uses it simply refers to mental functioning in general. In the context of this chapter, however, I think “mental contemplation” is the best English translation, since the chapter is mainly concerned with meditation and discusses mental contemplation in connection with cultivation of meditative states.

⁵¹³Dok p. 74.4, K p. 35a.3: *de de ltar zhugs shing / de la lan mang du gnas pas / lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa skye ba 'di ni zhi gnas zhes bya ste*; Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.6, D p. 52.2: *de ltar zhugs shing de la lan mang du gnas pa de la lus shin tu spyangs [P, D: sbyangs] pa dang sems shin tu spyangs [P, D: sbyangs] pa 'byung ba gang yin pa de ni zhi gnas zhes bya ste*.

Pliancy (*shin tu sbyangs pa, praśrabdhi*) is one of the eleven virtuous mental factors (*dge ba bcu gcig, eka-daśa-kuśala*). It is defined as: “a serviceability of mind and body such that the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as one likes; it has the function of removing all obstructions” [ME, p. 252]. In the *Śrāvakabhūmi* Asaṅga states: “Pliancy is supreme happiness and joy that is preceded by faith and clarity. Gradually making the mind joyful, pliancy [eliminates] the non-virtuous class of assumptions of bad states” (Ötani Sde dge, *sems tsam* vol. 6, p. 117a.4-5; Shukla, *Śrāvakabhūmi*, p. 320.3-5). See also Sde dge p. 147b.6-148a.4 (the corresponding passage in Shukla p. 402.7-20 is so corrupt as to be virtually unreadable), which outlines the means of achieving pliancy, which is connected with gaining mental one-pointedness (*rtse gcig pa*).

The four types of pliancy are: (1) mental pliancy; (1) physical pliancy; (3) bliss of physical pliancy; and (4) bliss of mental pliancy.

The definition of mental pliancy that Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 174) gives is: (1) A special compositional factor that removes the functioning of assumptions of bad mental states; (2) is in the class of very pure phenomena; (3) takes to mind a true object; (4) joyfully and happily engages its object of observation unimpededly; (5) is a factor of lightness; (6) is a taking to mind of something true or a pure taking to mind [from Sthiramati; the difference between these two comes in whether or not *yang dag pa* has a *ra* ending, making it an adverbial accusative]; (7) is a special sort of compositional factor, not an ordinary one, because it has arisen by the power of meditative stabilization [the source for 6-7 is Sthiramati]. It is other than the ordinary virtues because unlike ordinary virtues pliancy arises due to having cultivated meditative stabilization. All these factors must be complete for mental pliancy to be actualized.

Gendun Lodrö states that the parts of this definition are not found together in any one text, and are brought together from various sources: (1) that it removes the functioning of bad mental states is taken from the *Abhidharmakośa*; (2) that it is in-

cluded in the class of very pure phenomena is from Asaṅga's *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*); (3) that it is a taking to mind of something true or a pure taking to mind is from Sthiramati; (4) and (5) that it is a mind happily and unimpededly engaging in its object of observation is from Bhavya's *Tarka-jvālā*; (6) that it is a mental factor which is a factor of lightness is from Sthiramati; (7) that it is a special sort of compositional factor is also from Sthiramati.

The definition of physical pliancy given by Gendun Lodrö is: A special light object of touch that removes physical tiredness and other unfavorable physical functionings. It is a wind (*rlung*, *prāṇa*) that moves in the body through the force of meditative stabilization (*ting nge 'dzin*, *samādhi*) when one engages in cultivating meditative stabilization, and is included within the class of very pure phenomena (*ting nge 'dzin sgom pa la 'jug pa na ting nge 'dzin gyi mthus lus la rlung rgyu ba na lus ngal ba dang 'dis mtshon pa'i byed lus gzhan sel bar byed pa rnam par byang ba'i phyogs su gyur yang ba'i reg bya khyad par ba*).

Gendun Lodrö states: "The reason why this is a special object of touch is that it is not an ordinary form but a form of meditative stabilization; it is a special touch generated by meditative stabilization. The opposite of a physical pliancy is an assumption of a bad physical state. This is a factor of heaviness that brings about bodily fatigue when the winds circulate in the body while one is engaged in cultivating meditative stabilization [see note 141]."

A physical pliancy is classified as a tangible object (*reg bya*, *spraṣṭavya*), while a mental pliancy is classified as a mental factor (*sems 'byung*, *caitta*). See *Meditative States*, p. 174. Summing up his discussion of physical and mental pliancies in relation to assumptions of bad mental states, Geshe Gendun Lodrö says: "The general meaning of an assumption of a bad state is a factor that cannot bear the mind's being aimed at its object of observation, whereas the general meaning of a pliancy is a factor of being able to take to mind a factor of facility within aiming the mind at an object of observation.

That which causes the yogi to dislike aiming the mind at an object is called the assumption of a bad state [unpublished transcript, p. 255].”

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 308.5) comments that physical pliancy is an antidote to assumptions of bad physical states that arises from physical isolation, and mental pliancy is an antidote to assumptions of bad mental states that arises from mental isolation. He adds: “Due to diminishing the afflictions that are objects of abandonment through [a path of] meditation by by one who has heard about aspects of mental contemplation of antidotal doctrines, there is physical pliancy; and due to diminishing the afflictions that are objects of abandonment by way of [a path of] seeing, there is mental pliancy. Because there is no physical fatigue and because there is no mental turmoil, these are called ‘physical and mental pliancy’.”

According to *Meditative States* pp. 73-4, the order in which pliancies are generated is as follows: (1) foresigns; (2) mental pliancy; (3) physical pliancy; (4) bliss of physical pliancy; (5) bliss of mental pliancy; (6) stages of cessation of the blisses of physical and mental pliancy; (7) generation of calm abiding.

The attainment of pliancies helps in cultivating calm abiding and special insight. Gendun Lodrö says: “One sign of having achieved calm abiding is the increase of meditative stabilization which is due to the fact that pliancy and meditative stabilization assist each other. At this point, one has attained mental pliancy and has brought its capacity to fulfillment. One has also attained physical pliancy and brought its capacities to fulfillment.” Prior to achieving calm abiding one must achieve physical and mental pliancy. In order to do that, one must cease all physical and mental unfavorable states that prevent this pliancy. The person engaging in analysis has already achieved calm abiding observing the varieties [of phenomena] and, therefore, the situations unfavorable to mind and body have already been eliminated. One is merely switching the object of observation, and thus it is not necessary to eliminate states or conditions that prevent calm abiding. Pliancy is also posited as an antidote to laziness. It is the fourth of the four antidotes for laziness, but it is important at the beginning, middle, and

end of meditative practice. “Pliancy is called a branch which is a benefit because it is a benefit or effect of having cultivated the nine abidings” [transcript, p. 254]. See also *Meditative States* pp. 73-4; *ME* pp. 86-7; and *Compendium* p. 8.

⁵¹⁴Dok p. 74.5, K p. 35a.4: *tshol ba yin no*; Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.7, D p. 52.3: *yongs su tshol bar byed pa yin no*.

⁵¹⁵Dok p. 74.5, K p. 35a.4: *de lus shin du sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thos nas de nyid la gnas te / ji ltar bsams pa'i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas / so sor rtog cing mos par byed do*; Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.7, D p. 52.3, N p. 40a.7, L p. 41a.3, C p. 33b.4, V p. 93e.6: *de lus shin du spyangs [P, D, N, L, C, V: sbyangs] pa dang / sems shin tu spyangs [P, D, N, L, C, V: sbyangs] pa de thos nas de nyid la gnas te / sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas ji ltar [legs par: not in P, D, N, L, C, V] bsams pa'i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du so sor rtog par byed [P, L: /] mos par byed do*.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 310.4), the aspects of mind that are abandoned are “non-analytical images — the objects of observation of the path of calm abiding”.

⁵¹⁶Dok p. 74.6, K p. 35a.5: *gang 'di ltar ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de rnams la shes par bya ba'i don de 'byed pa dang / rab tu rnam par 'byed pa dang / kun tu brtag pa dang / kun tu dpyad pa dang / bzod pa dang / mos pa dang / blo gros dang / lta ba dang / rtog pa 'di ni lhag mthong zhes bya ste*; Lamotte p. 89, P p. 13d.8, D p. 52.4: *de ltar ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de dag la shes bya'i don de rnam par 'byed pa dang / rab tu rnam par 'byed pa dang / yongs su rtog pa dang / yongs su dpyod pa dang / bzod pa dang / 'dod pa dang / bye brag 'byed pa dang / lta ba dang / rtog pa gang yin pa de ni lhag mthong zhes bya ste*.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 200.2), “differentiation” (*rnam par 'byed pa, vicaya*) involves “differentiation by way of the varieties of existence (*ji snyed yod pa nyid*) with respect to objects of observation for purifying behavior, skillful objects of observation, and objects of observation for purifying afflictions”. “Thorough differentiation” (*rab tu rnam par 'byed pa, pravicya*) involves “thorough differentiation by way of how things actually exist (*ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid*) with respect to those very objects of activity that serve as objects of observation”. “Thorough investigation” (*yongs su rtog pa, paritarka*) involves “thoroughly investigating those objects of observation — by way of conceptual mental activity that is endowed with wisdom — after having thoroughly apprehended their signs”. “Thorough analysis” (*yongs su dpyod pa, paricāra*) involves “thoroughly analyzing those objects of activity that serve as objects of observation at the time of correctly investigating them”. He cites the *Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa* to the effect that these are four aspects of special insight. The next five — forbearance, etc. — are synonyms of special insight (*lhag mthong gi ming gi rnam grangs*). “Forbearance” (*bzod pa, kṣānti*) is “forbearance in terms of understanding”. “Desire” (*'dod pa, kāma; mos pa* in *Ḍok* and *K*) refers to “interest” (*mos pa, adhimukti*). “Wisdom” (*shes rab, prajñā; blo gros, buddhi* in *Ḍok* and *K*) refers to “differentiation” (*rnam par 'byed pa, vicaya*). “View” (*lta ba, darśana*) refers to “thorough searching” (*yongs su tshol ba, paryeṣaṇā*). “Investigation” (*rtog pa, avabodha*) refers to “individual investigation” (*so sor rtog pa, pratyavekṣaṇa*).

The sūtra passage is cited by Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Bsam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug rnam kyis rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed* (Indian blockprint, n.d., p. 162.7). He states (p. 163.2) that one has forbearance “because of lack of fear or lack of disturbance due to analysis” (*dpyad pas mi skrag pa 'am 'khrug pas na*). One has desire “due to seeking analysis” (*dpyad pa don du gnyer pas na*). One has differentiation “due to the intelligence, distinguishing analysis, or thorough differentiation” (*blo gros kyis sam*

khyad par du dpyad pas sam rab tu 'byed pas na). One views “by way of observation or looking” (*dmigs pas sam rjes su lta bas na*). One investigates “by way of conceptualization” (*mngon par zhen pas na*).

⁵¹⁷Dok p. 75.1, K p. 35a.7: *sems la dmigs pa'i sems nang du yid la bgyid pa / lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin du sbyangs pa nas ma thob pa de' i bar du yid la bgyid pa de ci zhes bgyi*; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.2, D p. 52.6: *de la sems la dmigs pa'i sems nang du yid la bgyid pa na / ji srid du lus shin tu spyangs [P, D: sbyangs] pa dang [P, D: /] sems shin du spyangs [P, D: sbyangs] pa ma thob pa de' i bar du yid la bgyid pa de la ci zhes bgyi*.

In mental contemplation in which the mind observes the mind, it is said that “one corner of the mind observes the rest of the mind.” Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 264) states: “It is necessary to have inspection while you are abiding on the object and this is like one mind looking at another mind. Prior to attaining dexterity, this type of inspection must be done continually throughout the session. How does one do this? The main mind is manifest; the observing mind is a bit non-manifest. It is as if looking from one side, like someone spying. Once dexterity has been attained, it is no longer necessary to inspect all the time.”

As an illustration of this type of activity, Gendun Lodrö gives the example of a person walking along a path with someone and engaging in intense or important conversation with that person. In this instance, the person is simultaneously engaged in two activities: one is mainly concentrating on what the other person is saying, but a small portion of the mind is keeping one on the path. In the same way, in this type of mental contemplation one portion of the mind observes the rest of the mind, which is involved in intense mental contemplation.

⁵¹⁸Dok p. 75.2, K p. 35a.8: *byams pa zhi gnas dang 'thun pa'i mos pa dang ldan pa yin te / zhi gnas ni ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.3, D p. 52.6: *byams pa zhi gnas*

ni ma yin te / zhi gnas kyi rjes su 'thun pa'i mos pa dang mthsungs par ldan pa yin par brjod par bya'o.

According to Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, p. 134), in order to generate a mind that one has not previously generated, it is first necessary to cultivate a similitude of that mind. In terms of actual practice leading to special insight, one first cultivates the nine states prior to calm abiding. These are prerequisites for the attainment of calm abiding. See *Meditative States* pp. 58-72. According to Gendun Lodrö: "One first achieves a calm abiding that observes the varieties of phenomena — not emptiness. Having done this, one works at the first of the seven mental contemplations, which is called 'thorough knowledge of the character' (*mtshan nyid so sor rig pa*). This is an analytical meditation on emptiness. In dependence upon such analysis one achieves special insight." One thus uses the mind of calm abiding as a basis for meditating on emptiness, which is analytical meditation. After engaging in this type of analysis, one again practices stabilizing meditation. The alternation of these two types of meditation results in the mental and physical pliancy that this type of meditation aims at (see note 513). Prior to actually achieving calm abiding, for instance, one cultivates a mind that approximates it in order to train the mind in it and prepare it for actual calm abiding.

According to Gendun Lodrö, one of the signs of having attained actual calm abiding is that "when the yogi sets in meditative equipoise, all coarse appearances vanish." This mainly refers to coarse appearances that appear to sense consciousnesses or to the stopping of manifest gross afflictions.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 202.5-7) states that this passage implies that this is a mental contemplation that is similar to calm abiding,, but it is not actual calm abiding because it does not have pliancy.

⁵¹⁹Ādok p. 75.3, K p. 35b.1: *byang chub sems dpa' lus dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa ma thob kyi* [Ādok: *rab du* (sic); K: *bar du*] *ji ltar bsams pa'i chos rnams kyi gzugs*

brnyan ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul nang du yid la bgyid na / yid la bgyid pa de ci zhes bgyi; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.4, D p. 52.7: *byang chub sems dpa' de ji srid du lus dang sems shin tu spyangs [P, D: sbyangs] pa ma thob pa de'i bar du ji ltar legs par bsams pa'i chos de dag nang du ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du yid la bgyid pa'i yid la bgyid pa de la ci zhes bgyi*.

⁵²⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 203.1-2) explains that this is a mental contemplation that thoroughly abandons mental signs due to involvement with individual investigation of the images that are objects of activity of internal meditative stabilizations that consider well the phenomena that were the objects of observation of calm abiding. However, since this mental contemplation lacks pliancy, it is not special insight.

⁵²¹Dok p. 75.5, K p. 35b.2: *zhi gnas kyi lam dang / lhag mthong gi lam tha dad ces bgyi 'am / gcig ces bgyi*; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.5, D p. 53.1: *zhi gnas kyi lam dang / lhag mthong gi lam tha dad ces bgyi 'am / tha dad pa ma lags ces [P: shes; D: zhes] bgyi*.

⁵²²Dok p. 75.5, K p. 35b.3: *tha dad pa yang ma yin / gcig pa yang ma yin te / ci'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin zhe na / lhag mthong gis dmigs pa'i sems la dmigs pa'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir gcig pa ma yin zhe na / rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan la dmigs pa'i phyir ro*; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.6, D p. 53.2, N p. 41a.1, L p. 41b.5: *tha dad pa 'ang [P, D: yang] ma yin / tha dad pa ma yin pa 'ang [P, D: yang] ma yin zhes bya'o // ci'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin zhe na / lhag mthong gi dmigs pa'i sems la dmigs pa'i phyir ro // ci'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin [pa ma yin: omitted in P, D, N; present in L, Wonch'uk p. 204.1] zhe na / rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan la [mi: omitted in P, D, N, L; present in Wonch'uk line 2] dmigs pa'i phyir ro*. Lamotte (p. 90, notes a and b) notes that the negative particles at the end of this passage in his version of the text (in brackets) are found in Hsüan-tsang's text (p. 698a.26), but

not in the Tibetan texts. They are also found in Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 204.1-2), and the first one (i.e., *ma yin*) is found in L p. 41b.5, but Jang-chup-dzu-trül's citation of this passage (vol. *cho* [205], p. 322.1-3) omits both and agrees with P, D, and N. I think that Lamotte's insertion of these particles is unjustified and would distort the meaning of the passage, since Buddha is explaining that calm abiding and special insight are neither the same nor different because calm abiding and special insight are both involved with the same object of observation in the sense that calm abiding observes an object and special insight observes the mind observing that object. In Lamotte's reading they would be different (as opposed to being neither the same nor different), and special insight (absurdly) would not observe analytical images. This runs counter to the previous discussion of special insight (p. 73), in which it is said that special insight is involved with analytical images.

⁵²³Dok p. 75.7, K p. 35b.4: *rnam par lta ba'i ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnyan gang lags pa de sems de las tha dad pa zhes bgyi 'am / tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi*; Lamotte p. 90, P p. 13e.7, D p. 53.3: *rnam par lta bar bgyid pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan gang lags pa de ci lags / sems de dang tha dad pa zhes bgyi 'am / tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 323.6) explains that the “viewing consciousness” is “a non-conceptual realizational consciousness of a yogi who has special insight” (*lhag mthong dang ldan pa'i rnal 'byor pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa*). The “image that is an object of activity of meditative stabilization” (*ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnyan*, *samādhi-gocara-bimba*) refers to “analytical and non-analytical images that are objects of activity of mental meditative stabilizations of calm abiding and special insight” (*zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi sems kyi ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa dang / rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan*).

⁵²⁴Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 324.2) comments: “Because that image is of the entityness of the mind, it is not different from mind” (*gzugs brnyan de sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir sems dang tha dad pa ma yin te*). Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 207.5) explains: “They are said to be ‘not different’ because the object is not separate from the mind but, that in reality they are neither one nor different destroys the apprehension of them as being different, whereby they are said to be ‘non-different’” (*yul sems las gud na med pa'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin zhes gsungs kyi / yang dag par ni gcig pa yang ma yin tha dad pa yang ma yin pa yang tha dad pa nyid du 'dzin pa rnam par gzhig pa'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin pa zhes bya ba gsungs so*). This is because what serves as an object of observation does not exist when separated from mind (p. 208.1): “Whatever is an object of observation by consciousness is explained as appearing from cognition-only” (*rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa ni rnam par rig pa tsam las snang bar shes*). He goes on to cite other sources, mostly from Yogācāra writers, that repeat the same idea.

In the Ge-luk-ba tradition, the system based on the *Samdhinirmocana* is called “mind-only” (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*). According to Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 67), “they get this name because they settle the mind-only view in which all phenomena are asserted to be of the entity of the mind.” The proponents of this school are divided by Ge-luk-ba scholars into two branches, those following scripture (primarily the *Samdhinirmocana*) and those following reasoning. The former are represented by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and their followers, and the latter group is represented by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers. See Sopa and Hopkins, *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, New York, 1976, pp. 107-21, especially pp. 110-11 and ME pp. 365-397. For more on the idea of cognition-only, see Lamotte, *Somme*, notes p. 18*; Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana*, p. 211 n. 6; *Siddhi* pp. 416-432; *Théorie* pp. 428-9 and 58-66; and Joe B. Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 146-7, which discusses the idea that mind and its objects are of one entity.

⁵²⁵Ādok p. 76.2, K p. 35b.6, P p. 14a.1, D p. 53.4, N p. 41a.5, L p. 42a.2, C p. 34a.7, V p. 94a.8: *rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no zhes ngas bshad do*; Lamotte p. 91: *rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no zhes ngas bshad do*. As Lambert Schmithausen ("On the Vijñaptimātra Passage in *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* VIII.7", *Acta Indologica* vol. VI, 1984, p. 435) notes, Lamotte's reading follows Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text. However, it disagrees with all the Tibetan texts I have consulted (i.e., Ādok, K, P, D, N, L, C, V) as well as the citations of this passage in the commentaries of Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 324) and Jñānagarbha (Karmapa Sde dge p. 321b), but accords with Wonch'uk's citation of the passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 208.1).

Schmithausen (p. 436) proposes the following translation of the passage as found in Ādok, K, P, D, N, and L: "Mind (*vijñāna*) is constituted by (*prabhāvita*)...mere cognition (*vijñaptimātra*) of an object (*ālambana*)." I disagree with his translation in that I see no justification in the text or in the commentaries to treat *dmigs pa* and *rnam par rig pa tsam* as if there were a genitive particle connecting them. The passage, in my opinion, is a fairly straightforward statement that the objects perceived by consciousness are cognition-only, and I see no way to justify Schmithausen's reading based on either the grammar of the passage or the commentaries of Jang-chup-dzu-trül and Jñānagarbha.

⁵²⁶Ādok p. 76.2, K p. 25b.7: *ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de gal te sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags na / sems de nyid kyis sems de nyid la ji ltar brtag par bgyi*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.1, D p. 53.4: *ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul [P: gi] gzugs brnyan de gal te gzugs sems de las tha dad pa ma lags na / sems de nyid kyis sems de nyid la ji ltar rtog par bgyid lags*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 208.7) states that this question is similar to the qualm (often raised against the doctrine of cognition-only) that an eye cannot see itself,

a finger cannot touch itself, and swords cannot cut themselves, but he states that the case of the mind is different from that of the others. On p. 210.3, he states: "It is as follows: when an other-powered phenomenon such as mind is produced, because such images appear, the mind apprehends them as objects." Even when one apprehends another person's consciousness, the object of observation is not external.

He adds that the mind's perception of objects is not like the rays of the sun illuminating external objects; rather, like an object in a mirror, something appears to be an external object but is only of the entity of mind: "Objects of direct perception arise from the entity of [the consciousness itself], and so the sūtras say that although it is not the case that any phenomenon apprehends another phenomenon, at the time when a consciousness is produced it appears as similar in character to those [things], due to which it is said that those things are apprehended."

⁵²⁷Dok p. 76.3, K p. 35b.8: *de la chos gang yang chos gang la yang so sor rtog pa med mod kyi / de ltar skyes pa'i sems de ni de ltar snang ngo*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.2, D p. 53.5: *de la chos gang yang chos gang la 'ang [P, D: yang] rtog par mi byed mod kyi / 'on kyang de ltar skyes pa'i sems gang yin pa de ni de ltar snang ngo*.

⁵²⁸Dok p. 76.4, K p. 35b.8: *'di lta ste dper na / me long gi dkyil 'khor shin tu dag pa la gzugs kyis rkyen byas te / gzugs nyid mthong yang gzugs brnyan mthong ngo snyam sems te / de la ni gzugs de dang gzugs brnyan snang ba de / don tha dad par snang ngo / de bzhin du de ltar skyes pa'i sems de yang ting nge 'dzin gyi gzugs brnyan zhes bya ba dang / don de tha dad par snang ngo*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.3, D p. 53.6: *'di lta ste dper na / gzugs la brten nas me long gi dkyil 'khor shin tu yongs su dag pa la gzugs nyid mthong yang gzugs brnyan mthong ngo snyam du sems te / de la gzugs de dang / gzugs brnyan snang ba de don tha dad par snang ngo // de bzhin du de ltar skyes pa'i sems de dang / ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan zhes bya ba gang yin pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] de las don gzhan yin pa lta bur snang ngo*.

This passage is quoted by Asaṅga in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, ch. II.7. See Lamotte's translation (*Somme* pp. 93-96) for Asaṅga's discussion of this.

⁵²⁹ĀDok p. 76.6, K p. 36a.2: *sems can rnam kyis sems kyis gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa / gzugs la sogs pa gang lags pa de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi 'am*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14e.5, D p. 53.7: *sems can rnam kyis gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyis gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa gang lags pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi 'am*.

⁵³⁰ĀDok p. 76.7, K p. 36a.3: *tha dad pa ni ma yin te / byis pa phyin ci log gi blo can rnam kyis gzugs brnyan de dag la rnam par rig pa tsam de yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes pas phyin [ĀDok: cing (sic); K: ci] log tu sems so*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.6, D p. 54.1: *tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya ste / byis pa phyin ci log gi blo can rnam ni gzugs brnyan de dag la rnam par rig pa tsam de nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin mi shes pas phyin ci log tu sems so*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 217.5) comments that Buddha's answer means that "those objects that are images are also not different from this mind" (*gzugs brnyan rnam kyis yul gang lags pa de yang sems 'di dang tha dad pa ma lags*). He adds that even objects of observation of distracted minds are not separate from mind, but the minds of childish beings are mistaken, and so these beings think of them as being external objects. On p. 218.1 he cites the *Shin tu rgyas pa brgya pa*, which states that the Supramundane Victor's teaching of cognition-only is "for the sake of abandoning external objects through meditating on [objects] as cognition-only" He adds: "When they abandon external objects, then they pacify incorrect minds; when they pacify incorrect minds, then they realize the middle way." Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 326.5) comments: "childish beings — who do not perceive suchness, whose vision has degenerated due to faults of vision — perceive external objects as existing although they do not exist."

This passage is important in that it extends the doctrine of cognition-only from the meditative situation to include all phenomena and all ordinary perception. This point has been missed by some Western scholars, who try to argue that the doctrine of cognition-only only applies to the meditative situation, but that the idealism implied by this doctrine does not apply to ordinary perception. Alex Wayman, for instance (in his article “Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians”, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 2.1, 1979, p. 67), actually uses the preceding passage (see *Dōk* p. 72.2 and note 525) as a basis for his argument that the Yogācāra school does not really propound a doctrine of idealism. His argument is that that passage only speaks of images in the state of meditative stabilization, but he thinks that this does not apply to all phenomena. Wayman apparently chose to ignore the present passage, in which Buddha *explicitly* extends the doctrine of cognition-only to all phenomena, and says that everything should be viewed in this way.

This passage is also quoted by Asaṅga in the *Mahāyanasamgraha* (ch. II.2; see note 528) in support of his contention that the doctrine of cognition-only is proven by both scripture and reasoning. The scriptural passage he cites is this one from the *Samdhinirmocana*. He then states:

The reasoning is also indicated by this scripture. When the mind is in meditative equipoise, in terms of whatever images that are objects of knowledge — blue and so forth — that are seen, the mind is seen. Blue and so forth are not objects that are different from mind. By this reasoning, Bodhisattvas should infer that all cognitions are cognition-only [translated in accordance with *Somme*, Tome II, p. 27].

See also chapter III.8 (*Somme* Tome II, p. 162) for Asaṅga’s explanation of how Bodhisattvas enter into cognition of cognition-only.

This is an important passage that is quoted by D̄zong-ka-ba (in *Legs bshad snying po*, Varanasi ed., 1973, pp. 70.17-71.10). D̄zong-ka-ba discusses cognition-only in terms of letters and meanings and states that Bodhisattvas who understand

cognition-only know that letters and meanings are only mental verbalization and are not established as they appear. According to Jeffrey Hopkins, (unpublished manuscript, p. 48), Āzong-ka-bā's position is that the Maitreya chapter has a clear and explicit refutation of external objects, and Asaṅga's discussion of this in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* also refutes external objects. Hopkins quotes the Second Dalai Lama's condensation of Āzong-ka-bā's thought on this topic:

Therefore, the meaning of cognition-only which is a negation of an otherness in substantial entity between apprehended object and apprehending subject also is complete in a very good manner in the emptiness — of the imputation as entity and attribute — of [being] established by way of its own character [Hopkins, p. 48].

Lamotte also translates relevant portions of Vasubandhu's commentary on this passage from the sūtra:

L'expression cittamātra...ne s'agit pas seulement de l'inexistence de la matière (*rūpa*), mais encore de l'inexistence de la pensée et des mentaux (*rāga*, etc.) en tant qu'ils prennent un objet, de l'inexistence des objets pris par la pensée...[*Somme*, Tome II, p. 94].

As these passages indicate, both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were well aware of the doctrine of cognition-only, and they also espoused it and based their expositions of it on this sūtra. I can find no indication in the *Samdhinirmocana*, the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, or in any Indian, Tibetan, or Chinese commentaries that this is not a denial of the external reality of external objects, or that this only applies to the meditative situation. Moreover, this idea is not unique to this chapter, and is also found in chapter five (p. 33), where it is stated that an eye consciousness arises “engaged with, in one instant with, and in the same range as” a mental impression of it. If there were external objects and cognition of them, then perceptions of those objects must precede mental cognition of them. This section of chapter eight develops the thought of this passage in chapter five by stating that the mind and its objects are not different and

it extends this thought by making explicit the fact that Buddha is espousing a doctrine of cognition-only and that this should be extended to all objects of knowledge. It should also be noted that this is the conclusion of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and its commentary, along with the commentaries of Wonch'uk and Jang-chup-dzu-trül on the sūtra.

⁵³¹Dok p. 77.1, K p. 36a.4: *ji tsam gyis na / byang chub sems dpa' lhag mthong la gcig tu sgom pa lags / bka' stsal pa / nam rgyun du yid la byed pas / sems kyi mtshan ma nyid yid la byed pa na'o*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.7, D p. 54.2, N p. 41b.5, L p. 42b.2, C p. 34b.5, V p. 94b.5: *byang chub sems dpa' ji tsam gyis na / gcig tu lhag mthong sgom pa lags / bka' stsal pa / gang gi tshe rgyun chags su yid la byed pas sems kyi mtshan ma yid la byed pa'o* [P, D, N, L, C: *mtshan nyid la byed pa'o*]. Lamotte notes (p. 92 n. a) that his Tibetan texts use *mtshan nyid* instead of *mtshan ma*, but gives no justification for his altering the reading. V has *mtshan ma*, but P, D, N, L, and C all have *mtshan nyid*.

⁵³²Dok p. 77.2, K p. 36a.5: *ji tsam gyis na zhi gnas la gcig tu sgom pa lags / bka' stsal pa / nam rgyun du yid la byed pas / de ma thag pa'i sems yid la byed pa na'o*; Lamotte p. 91, P p. 14a.8, D p. 54.3: *ji tsam gyis na gcig tu zhi gnas bsgom* [D: *sgom*] *pa lags / bka' stsal pa / gang gi tshe rgyun chags su yid la byed pas bar chad med pa'i sems yid la byed pa'o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 220.1) states that it is called an “uninterrupted mind” (*bar char ma mchis pa'i sems, ānantarya-citta*) “because it is something that has an uninterrupted continuum at all times” (*dus thams cad du bar chad med par rgyun du 'jug pa gang yin pa'o*). He adds: “Because in that way the mind does not fluctuate, calm abiding only observes mind” (*zhi gnas kyi sems rnam par mi g.yeng bar byed pa'i phyir sems la dmigs pa kho na'o*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 328.7) states that this uninterrupted mind indicates the two causal factors of calm

abiding, “the causal factor that is the object of observation is the cause of attaining the mental contemplation of calm abiding.” He adds: “The object of activity of meditative stabilization that is the object of observation of calm abiding is any non-analytical image. The pacifying image is the causal factor that thoroughly purifies the path of calm abiding.”

Dok p. 77.3 and K p. 36a.5 read: *nam rgyun du yid la byed*, which would translate as “continuous mental contemplation”; Lamotte, Wonch’uk, Jang-chup-dzu-trül, and Jñānagarbha (p. 11) all read: “*bar chad med pa’i sems*” or “*bar chad ma mchis pa’i sems*” (the Sanskrit equivalent of which is probably *ānantarya-citta*). I have followed the latter translation and render this as “uninterrupted mind”.

⁵³³Dok p. 77.3, K p. 36a.6: *ji tsam gyis na zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gnyis ’dres par gyur te / mnyam pa zung du ’byung ba lags / bka’ stsal pa / nam sems rtse gcig pa nyid yid la byed pa na’o*; Lamotte p. 92, P p. 14a.8, D p. 54.3: *ji tsam gyis na zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gnyis ’dres par ’gyur te [P: /] mnyam par zung du ’jug pa lags / bka’ stsal pa / gang gi tshe sems rtse gcig pa nyid yid la byed pa’o*.

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 220.4) states that this occurs when “calm abiding and special insight simultaneously engage and observe an object” (*zhi gnas dang lhag mthong cig car ’jug cing yul la dmigs pa’o*).

⁵³⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 221.4) states that this is a mind that observes the images referred to earlier and that has causal aspects that are similar to wisdom arisen from hearing and thinking.

⁵³⁵Dok p. 77.7, K p. 36b.1: *de rtogs nas kyang de bzhin du yid la byed pa’o*; Lamotte p. 92, P p. 14b.3, P p. 54.5: *de rtogs nas de bzhin nyid du yid la byed pa gang yid pa’o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 221.6) comments: "At that time, one understands that 'phenomena do not exist separately from cognition' and, having understood in that way, one also takes thusness to mind."

⁵³⁶Dok p. 77.7, K p. 36b.2: *lhag mthong la rnam pa du mchis / bka' stsal pa / byams pa rnam pa gsum ste / mtshan ma can dang / kun tu tshol ba dang / so sor rtog pa'o*; Lamotte p. 92, P p. 14b.4, D p. 54.6: *lhag mthong la rnam pa du mchis / byams pa rnam pa gsum ste / mtshan ma las byung ba dang / yongs su tshol ba las byung ba dang / so sor rtog pa las byung ba'o*.

The translation borrows the words "arisen from" (*las byung ba*) from Lamotte, P, and D. I prefer this reading because it indicates the source of this type of special insight. According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 222.6), it is said to "have signs" (*mtshan ma can*) because it "takes to mind only a conceptual image that accords in meaning with the phenomenon" (*rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan chos dang don 'dra ba 'ba' zhig yid la byed pas na*). Citing the *Yogācārabhūmi* as his source, he also states (p. 223.4) that since one is only dealing with these in terms of their signs (i.e., the words one has heard and one's own understanding of those words), one has not yet fully grasped their meanings, and so (p. 223.5) "this is a special insight that is an engagement of mere signs" (*de ni mtshan ma tsam gyi rjes su zhugs pa'i lhag mthong*).

The second type (p. 223.1) is "arisen from thorough searching" (*yongs su tshol ba las byung ba, paryeṣaṇā-mayī*) because "due to the power of wisdom, one works well with those objects that are images having signs that were not [previously] understood well" (*shes rab kyi dbang gi phyir gzugs brnyan mtshan ma dang bcas pa'i yul legs par ma rtogs pa dag legs par bya ba'i phyir*). This occurs at the time when one "thinks about, understands, comprehends, and closely understands" (*sems par byed rtog par byed 'jal bar byed nye bar rtog par byed*) what one had considered previously.

The third type includes “whatever takes [its object] to mind due to attaining thorough liberation, having already understood objects well in that way.” One engages in this when one individually investigates doctrines and meanings in accordance with how one is set in meditative equipoise on them after one has thought on them, analyzed them, and comprehended them. See also Wonch’uk pp. 223.6-225.6 for other divisions of calm abiding and special insight.

The passage from the sūtra is quoted by Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Bsam gzugs kyi snyoms ’jug rnam kyi rnam par bzhag pa’i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga’ byed* (Indian blockprint, n.d., p. 163.5)). He comments:

There are individual meanings of these three because, if one defines the single view of selflessness, (1) from the point of view of arising from signs, [special insight] is posited as mental contemplation of a sign of [selflessness] within observing selflessness which has already been ascertained, with delineating it in many ways; (2) from the point of view of thorough investigation, [special insight] is posited as the delineation [of selflessness] in order to ascertain what has not been previously ascertained; (3) special insight from the point of view of individual investigation is posited as analysis on such occasions from the point of view of investigating the meaning of what has already been ascertained [tr. Leah Zahler].

⁵³⁷Dok p. 78.2, K p. 36b.3: *kun tu tshol ba gang zhe na / gang de dang des shes rab kyis legs par ma rtogs pa’i chos de dag nyid legs par rtogs par bya ba’i phyir yid la byed pa’i lhag mthong ngo*; Lamotte p. 92, P p. 14b.5, D p. 54.7: *yongs su tshol ba las byung ba gang zhe na / de dang der shes rab kyis shin tu legs par ma rtogs pa’i chos de dag nyid shin tu legs par rtogs par bya ba’i phyir yid la byed pa’i lhag mthong gang yin pa’o*.

⁵³⁸This sentence has been translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 92, P p. 14b.6, and D p. 55.1, because this reading is more consistent with the previous passage than is that of *Ā*ok p. 78.3 and K p. 36b.4, and is also more straightforward: *so sor rtog pa las byung ba gang zhe na / de dang der shes rab kyis shin tu legs par rtogs pa'i chos rnams la [P: ni] rnam par grol bas shin tu legs par bde ba la reg par bya ba'i phyir yid la byed pa'i lhag mthong gang yin pa'o*. *Ā*ok and K read: "What is individual investigation? That special insight which thoroughly contacts liberation in terms of phenomena that are realized well through wisdom with respect to this and that [image]" (*so sor rtog pa gang zhe na / gang de dang der shes rab kyis legs par rtogs pa'i chos rnams rnam par grol ba la shin tu reg par bya ba'i lhag mthong ngo*).

⁵³⁹*Ā*ok p. 78.4, K p. 36b.5: *de ma thag pa'i sems de'i rjes su 'jug pas de yang rnam pa gsum du rig par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 93, P p. 14b.7, D p. 55.2: *bar chad med pa'i sems de'i rjes su 'brang bas de 'ang [P, D: yang] rnam pa gsum du brjod par bya'o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 226.1) states that the three kinds of calm abiding refer to a threefold division corresponding to the threefold division of special insight, which consists of: (1) calm abiding having signs; (2) calm abiding of thorough searching; and (3) calm abiding of individual investigation. He states that since there are three kinds of special insight that observe mental signs, there are three corresponding types of calm abiding that observe an uninterrupted mind.

⁵⁴⁰The four concentrations (*bsam gtan*, *dhyāna*) are advanced meditative states that are shared by both Buddhist and Hindu schools. They also correspond to levels within the Form Realm (*gzugs kham*s, *rūpa-dhātu*), the second of the three levels of cyclic existence. According to *Meditative States*, pp. 115-116, one reaches the first concentration by overcoming the subtlest levels of afflictions of the Desire Realm ('*dod kham*s, *kāma-dhātu*), the lowest level of cyclic existence and the one in which we exist. In order to do this, the meditator views the Desire Realm as gross and the first

concentration as subtle and seeks to attain it. By successfully attaining it, the meditator can achieve rebirth in this state, which is said to be endowed with joy and bliss. To reach the other three concentrations, the procedure is similar: The meditator views the lower concentration as gross and the higher one as subtle and seeks to attain it. For further details, see *Meditative States*, pp. 115ff., *Visuddhimagga*, X.376ff., and *Compendium*, p. 112.

The next four terms refer to the four formless absorptions, (*gzugs med kyi snyoms 'jug, ārūpya-samāpatti*), which are meditative states that correspond to levels within the Formless Realm (*gzugs med khams, ārūpya-dhātu*), the highest levels within cyclic existence. One is reborn in one of these levels in dependence upon successfully cultivating the corresponding absorption. They are called absorptions (*snyoms 'jug, samāpatti*) because in them the mind and mental factors are all equally focused on the object.

In the absorption of limitless space, the appearance of forms to the mind completely disappears, and the meditator perceives everything as limitless space, without any obstruction or variety.

In the absorption of limitless consciousness, the meditator first views the preceding absorption as gross and then views the discrimination that consciousness is limitless as peaceful. This mainly involves stabilizing meditation, and in the absorption the meditator views everything as just limitless, undifferentiated consciousness.

In the absorption of nothingness, even viewing everything as limitless consciousness appears as gross, and the meditator cultivates a mental state in which only nothingness appears to the mind. This is discussed in Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (see *Somme* p. 62), which states that this is a sphere of lucid consciousness in which beings are still caught up in cyclic existence. This is more subtle than the preceding absorption, since there is no content at all, only undifferentiated nothingness. In the succeeding absorption, even this is left behind, and there is no coarse discrimination at all, only subtle discrimination. This is generally

referred to as the “Peak of Cyclic Existence” (*srid rtse, bhavāgra*), because it leads to rebirth at the highest level of the Formless Realm, a state in which beings have enormously long lifespans characterized by no hint of unpleasantness and only the subtlest of discriminations.

In a Buddhist context, however, this is still unsatisfactory, since one’s lifespan eventually ends and one is again reborn in the lower realms of cyclic existence, and will again suffer, grow old and die. Thus for Buddhists the final goal should be a supramundane path, one that leads out of cyclic existence altogether and which leads to either the state of Buddhahood or at least the more limited nirvāṇa of a Foe Destroyer or Solitary Realizer. See also Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 226-239) and *Meditative States* pp. 129-33.

⁵⁴¹According to the *Visuddhimagga* (IX.320ff.), these are called “immeasurables” (*ishad med pa, apramāṇa*) because they arise with respect to an immeasurable field. This field encompasses all sentient beings, whose numbers are limitless. They are also said to be divine in that they are the “best” and have a faultless nature. They are also said to be the proper way that one should conduct oneself toward others.

Immeasurable love involves cultivating the attitude of love that one has for someone dear to one and extending it to all beings. It involves the wish to establish other beings in happiness.

Immeasurable compassion entails not being able to bear the suffering of others, and is caused by observing their pain. This entails cultivating an attitude of non-harming toward others. Immeasurable compassion has the characteristic of joy and involves absence of envy toward others’ good fortune. It also involves affection for other beings and at its highest state involves overcoming all dislike for others.

According to Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 112), “immeasurable compassion exists for one who has attained an actual concentration and observes an immeasurable number of beings within the wish that

they be free from suffering. Such mercy is called an immeasurable compassion. Because here one is observing a limitless number of sentient beings an immeasurable amount of merit is accumulated.” He notes, however, that this is inferior to the great compassion extolled in Mahāyāna treatises due to the inferiority of its object of observation. Great compassion takes all sentient beings as its object and involves an aspiration to establish all sentient beings in Buddhahood. Immeasurable compassion takes an immeasurable number of beings as its object, but does not include *all* beings and excludes extremely nasty ones, for example. The reason why some beings are excluded is that one has not completely overcome desire and hatred, and so one makes distinctions between different beings.

Immeasurable joy involves feeling joy for others’ happiness and wishing that they be free from unhappiness. Immeasurable equanimity involves viewing all beings equally, not favoring some and holding others in disfavor. It involves the ability to abide without bias, without becoming desirous toward those who have helped one or having hatred toward those who have harmed one. It is perfected when one overcomes all aversion and favoritism toward beings.

In the *Visuddhimagga*, the immeasurables are not directly linked to calm abiding, but in the *Samādhinirmocana* they are listed as four kinds of calm abiding. For more on these, see: *Kośa* 8.195; Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 240-46); *Somme* p. 285 and notes p. 52*; and *Compendium*, p. 163.

⁵⁴²Dok p. 78.7, K p. 36b.8: *chos la gnas pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong zhes kyang bgyi*; Lamotte p. 93, P p. 14c.2, D p. 55.4: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong ni chos la gnas pa zhes kyang bgyi*.

⁵⁴³Dok p. 79.1, K p. 37a.1: *ji ltar bzung ba dang / bsams pa'i chos kyi mtshan ma'i rjes su 'jug pas / don gyi zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong de ni chos la gnas pa'o*; Lamotte p. 93, P p. 14c.2, D p. 55.4: *ji ltar bzung ba dang / bsams pa'i chos kyi mtshan ma'i rjes su 'brang bas don la zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni chos la gnas pa yin no*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 336.4) identifies these “signs of [doctrines]” (*[chos] kyi mtshan ma, dharma-nimitta*) as “signs that are the words, letters, and so forth [of doctrines]” (*tshig dang yi ge la sogs pa'i mtshan ma'i'o*). Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 247.7) makes it clear that in this passage the term *chos* (Skt. *dharma*) is referring to doctrines, rather than to phenomena or qualities. He states that this passage means that these Bodhisattvas obtain calm abiding and special insight in terms of the meanings of the twelve types of teachings listed at the beginning of this chapter by way of wisdom with respect to the doctrines that they had heard and thought about previously.

⁵⁴⁴Dok p. 79.2, K p. 37a.2: *gang bzung ba dang / bsams pa'i chos la mi ltos par gzhan las gdams pa dang rjes su bstan pa thob nas / don gyi zhi gnas dang lhag mthong 'di lta ste / rnam par bsngos pa 'am / rnam par brnags pa 'am / de lta bu'i cha dang mthun pa rnams sam / 'du byed thams cad mi riag pa 'am / sdug bsngal ba 'am / chos thams cad bdag med pa 'am / mya ngan las 'das pa zhi ba'o zhes bya ba de lta bu'i cha dang mthun pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong de ni chos la mi gnas pa yin par shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 93, P p. 14c.3, D p. 55.5: *bzung ba dang bsams pa'i chos la mi ltos par gzhan gyi gdams ngag dang / rjes su bstan pa la brten nas don la zhi gnas dang / lhag*

mthong 'di lta ste / rnam par rngos [P, D: sngos] pa 'am / rnam par rnags pa 'am / de lta bu dang 'thun pa rnams sam / 'du byed thams cad mi rtag pa zhes bya ba 'am / sdug bsngal ba zhes bya ba 'am / chos thams cad bdag med pa zhes bya ba 'am / mya ngan las 'das pa zhi ba zhes bya ba dang / de lta bu dang 'thun pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong de ni chos la mi gnas pa yin par rig par bya'o.

⁵⁴⁵ĀDok p. 79.4, K p. 37a.4: *de la chos la gnas pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong bzung ste / ngas chos kyi rjes su 'gro ba'i byang chub sems dpa' dbang po rnon por btags so*; Lamotte p. 93, P p. 14c.6, D p. 55.7: *de la nga ni chos la gnas pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong la bsten nas byang chub sems dpa' chos kyi rjes su 'brang ba dbang po rnon por 'dogs so*. In this passage, *chos* (Skt. *dharma*) appears to refer to the twelve types of doctrinal teachings listed at the beginning of this chapter (as in did in the passage discussed in note 543). The phrase “in dependence upon” is borrowed from Lamotte, P, and D, which use *la bsten nas*. ĀDok uses *bzung ste*, which is more ambiguous.

⁵⁴⁶Citing *Abhidharmakośa* VI, p. 194, Lamotte (p. 215 n. 16) states that Bodhisattvas who follow faith are so named because they pursue the meaning under the influence of others and due to confidence in them. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 250.3) states that they obtain calm abiding and special insight after having relied on the teachings of others. They follow Buddha's teachings due to faith rather than understanding, and so are said to be of dull faculties (*dbang po rtul po, mṛdāvindriya*). On pp. 250-252 he elaborates on how Bodhisattvas of dull faculties and sharp faculties are distinguished.

⁵⁴⁷ĀDok p. 79.6, K p. 37a.5: *ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong zhes kyang bgyi / 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang*

lhag mthong zhes kyang bgyi na / ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags
/ 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 14c.7, D p. 56.1:
zhi gnas dang lhag mthong ni ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi /
'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi na / ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs
pa ni gang lags / 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags.

The commentaries of Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], pp. 338-339), Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 252.6-253.4), and Jñānagarbha (pp. 325a-b) discuss the meaning of the phrase “doctrines that are mixed” (*'dres pa'i chos, miśra-dharma*), which refers to a Bodhisattva's ability to find coherence and meaning in all the various doctrines taught by Buddha, without having to organize or rank them according to whether they are interpretable or definitive. Such a Bodhisattva is able to understand Buddha's intention in all of his teachings without having to interpret them or arrange them. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 339.1) explains that a Bodhisattva who observes doctrines that are mixed can bring together all the enumerations, characteristics, and contextual etymologies found in various sūtras and understand that they are everywhere of one taste.

In this section, there is a hierarchy of understanding implied by the three phrases, “doctrines that are a little mixed” (*'dres pa chung ngu'i chos la dmigs pa, paritta-miśra-dharma*), “doctrines that are very mixed” (*'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos, mahāmiśra-dharma*), and “doctrines that are immeasurably mixed” (*'dres pa tshad ma mchis pa'i chos la dmigs pa, apramāṇa-miśra-dharma*). Bodhisattvas who can understand “doctrines that are immeasurably mixed” are those who can comprehend all of Buddha's teachings without needing to organize them at all, who can directly understand Buddha's thought. Below such Bodhisattvas are those who only need to arrange doctrines a little in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of Buddha's teachings. Below these Bodhisattvas are those who must extensively organize and interpret

Buddha's teachings in order to make sense of them and put the often contradictory statements Buddha made in the three wheels into perspective. Among these latter Bodhisattvas are probably those in the audience to whom this sūtra is addressed, since the text engages in extensive interpretation and explanation of doctrines and is directed towards those who need to have the thought behind Buddha's words explained to them.

Jeffrey Hopkins (*Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, pp. 209-11), basing himself on Gung-tang's commentary on the *Legs bshad snying po*, thinks that the trainees of the second wheel for whom the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras were intended are sharp Bodhisattvas (*byang chub sems dpa' dbang po rnon po*) who are able to understand Buddha's teachings without needing any other explanations, while the special trainees of the third wheel are of duller faculties because they need to have the thought behind Buddha's words spelled out for them. This accords with the *Samdhinirmocana-sutra*, which states that some Bodhisattvas understand Buddha's second wheel teachings as they are spoken have the ability to comprehend the thought behind all of Buddha's teachings without needing the differentiations of the third wheel.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 129.6) discusses these terms in a later section: "The first, doctrines that are a little mixed, [are so named] because one observes the twelve limbs of teachings in terms of individual differences. The second, doctrines that are very mixed, [are so named] because one observes the twelve limbs of teachings collectively. The third, doctrines that are immeasurably mixed, [are so named] because one observes the twelve limbs of immeasurable teachings of Tathāgatas as a single collection." For a bibliography of the term "doctrines that are mixed" (*'dres pa'i chos, miśra-dharma*), see *Somme* p. 167 and notes p. 33*. See also Asvabhāva's commentary on the passage from the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* translated on *Somme* p. 167 (Peking vol. 106, pp. 300b.5-300b.6) and Jinaputra's commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*

(ed. Tatia, p. 62.22), where he states that one who understands doctrines in this way is able to understand the general character of all doctrines by way of taking to mind an undifferentiated object of observation. This seems to mean either that one take suchness as one's object of observation or that one views all of Buddha's teachings as an undifferentiated whole.

⁵⁴⁸Dok p. 79.7, K p. 37a.7: *gal te byang chub sems dpa' ji ltar bzung ba dang / bsam pa'i chos rnams la mdo la sogs pa'i chos la so so re rer dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong la sgom pa 'di ni ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong ngo*; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 14c.8, D p. 56.2: *gal te byang chub sems dpa' ji ltar bzung ba dang [P: /] bsam [P, D: bsams] pa'i chos rnams las mdo'i sde la sogs pa'i chos so so la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong sgom par byed pa de ni ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong yin no*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 255.5), quoting Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, adds that this means that when these Bodhisattvas take the suchness of doctrines as their object of observation, then they observe doctrines that are unmixed. At this point, "because they understand the nature of all doctrines, those very [Bodhisattvas] observing all doctrines 'observe suchness'."

⁵⁴⁹Dok p. 80.2, K p. 37a.8: *gal te yang mdo la sogs pa'i chos de dag nyid gcig tu bsdu ba dang / gcig tu spung ba dang / gcig tu brtul ba dang / phung po gcig tu byas te / chos de dag thams cad de bzhin nyid la gzhol ba / de bzhin nyid la 'bab pa / de bzhin nyid la bab pa*; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 14d.1, D p. 56.3: *gal te mdo sde la sogs pa'i chos de gcig tu bzlum ba dang / gcig tu bsdu ba dang / gcig tu brtul ba dang / phung po gcig tu byas te / chos 'di dag thams cad ni de bzhin nyid la gzhol ba / de bzhin nyid la 'bab pa / de bzhin nyid la bab pa*. The

tense of the verbs *gzhol ba*, *'bab pa*, and *bab pa* is ambiguous, and so I have translated them in accordance with my understanding of the common usage of this phrase. Wonch'uk discusses this passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 256) confirms this reading.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 339.5) comments that in this passage "suchness" refers to "the pure element of qualities" (*chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa*). The phrases "flow into" and "descend" are explained as meaning that they are of "concordant class and nature; they are of one taste" (*phyogs dang mthun par gyur pa dang / ngo bo nyid du gyur pa ste / ro gcig pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*).

⁵⁵⁰"Transformation of the basis" (*gnas gyur pa*, *āśraya-parāvṛtti*) refers to the Buddhist concept of fundamental changes that are brought about through the cultivation of method and wisdom. This is discussed in chapters nine and ten of this sūtra. For a more detailed discussion, see *Buddhist Systems of Transformation* by Ronald Davidson (Ph.D. dissertation, University Microfilms, 1986). For a bibliography on this topic, see *Somme* notes pp.16*-17* and 48*.

551Dok p. 80.5, K p. 37b.3: *chos 'di dag thams cad ni dge ba'i chos grangs med pa / dpag tu med pa mngon par brjod par / mngon par brjod do zhes yid la byed pa ni*; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 14d.4, D p. 56.5: *chos 'di dag thams cad ni dge ba'i chos dpag tu med pa / grangs med pa dag mngon par rjod [P: brjod] pas rjod pa yin no snyam du yid la byed pa de ni*.

⁵⁵²Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 339.6) comments that nirvāṇa refers to "the element of the uncompounded" (*'dus ma byas pa'i dbyings*). "Transformation of the basis" refers to the truth body (*chos kyi sku*).

The phrase, “all these doctrines...” refers to “all of those doctrines that are of one taste, those countless scriptural doctrine and realizational doctrines — which, by way of their manifest expression and their teaching, clarify [meanings] — serve to increase virtue”.

⁵⁵³Dok p. 80.6, K p. 37b.4: *chung ngu 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong zhes kyang bgyi / cher 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi / tshad med par 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi na / chung ngu 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags / cher 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags / tshad med par 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags*; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 14d.5, D p. 56.5: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong ni 'dres pa chung ngu'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi / 'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi / 'dres pa tshad ma mchis pa'i chos la dmigs pa zhes kyang bgyi na / 'dres pa chung ngu'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags / 'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags / 'dres pa tshad ma mchis pa'i chos la dmigs pa ni gang lags*.

⁵⁵⁴Dok p. 81.1, K p. 37b.6: *mdo'i sde nas / shin tu rgyas pa'i sde dang / rmad du byung ba'i chos kyi sde dang / gtan la bab par bstan pa'i sde so sor gcig tu bsdu bar byas te / yid la byed pa ni chung ngu 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa yin par shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 95, P p. 14d.7, D p. 56.7: *mdo'i sde nas shin tu rgyas pa'i sde dang / rmad du byung ba'i chos kyi sde dang / gtan la dbab [P, D: bab] par bstan pa'i sde'i bar dag so sor gcig tu bzlums [P: zlums] te / yid la byed pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong ni 'dres pa chung ngu'i chos la dmigs pa yin par rig par bya'o*. See note 508.

⁵⁵⁵Dok p. 81.3, K p. 37b.8: *mdo sde la sogs pa ji snyed bzung ba dang / bsams pa de dag nyid gcig tu bsdu ba byas te / yid la byed pa ni cher 'dres pa'i chos*

la dmigs pa yin par shes par bya'o; Lamotte p. 95, P p. 14d.8, D p. 57.1: *mdo'i sde la sogs pa de dag nyid ji snyed bzung ba dang / bsams pa so sor gcig tu bzlums [P: zlums] te yid la byed pa ni 'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos la dmigs pa yin par rig par bya'o*.

⁵⁵⁶Dok p. 81.4, K p. 38a.1: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi chos bstan pa ni tshad med do // chos kyi tshig dang / yi ge yang tshad med do // gong nas gong du shes rab dang / spobs pa yang tshad med do zhes gcig tu bsdu ba byas te*; Lamotte p. 95, P p. 14e.1, D p. 57.2: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi chos bstan pa tshad med pa rnams dang / chos kyi tshig dang / yi ge tshad med pa rnams dang / gong nas gong du shes rab dang / spobs pa tshad med pa rnams gcig tu bzlums te*.

⁵⁵⁷Dok p. 81.6, K p. 38a.3: *rgyu lngas de thob par 'gyur bar rig par bya ste / yid la byed pa'i tshe / skad cig re re la gnas ngan len gyi rten thams cad 'jig par byed pa dang*; Lamotte p. 95, P p. 14e.1, D p. 57.2: *de ni rgyu lngas thob par 'gyur bar rig par bya ste / 'di lta ste / yid la byed pa'i tshe skad cig skad cig la gnas ngan len gyi rten thams cad 'jig par byed pa dang*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 266.2) comments that Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Samādhinirmocana-sūtra* uses the term "afflictions" (*nyon mongs pa*) rather than "assumptions of bad states" (*gnas ngan len*). He cites a commentary by Vasubandhu that states that this is accomplished through the power of calm abiding and special insight observing doctrines that are mixed.

⁵⁵⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 267.5) cites a commentary by Vasubandhu which explains that this means that they become devoid of discriminations concerning the varieties of doctrinal teachings.

⁵⁵⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 269.7) cites Asvabhāva, who states that the "appearances of doctrines" are limitless because they "pervade limitlessly and without any delimitation".

⁵⁶⁰This phrase is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 95, P p. 14e.4, and D p. 57.5, which read: *dgos pa yongs su grub pa dang ldan pa rnam par dag pa'i cha dang 'thun pa'i mtshan ma rnam par ma brtags pa rnams de la kun tu 'byung ba dang*. The meaning of *Ḍok* p. 82.1 and K p. 38a.5 seems to be the same, but the arrangement of the words makes it unclear: *rnam par ma brtags par dgos pa yongs su grub pa dang ldan pa rnam par dag pa'i cha dang 'thun pa'i mtshan ma rnams de la kun tu 'byung ba dang*.

⁵⁶¹*Ḍok* p. 82.2, K p. 38a.6: *chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs par bya ba dang / yongs su grub par bya ba'i phyir / gong ma bas ches gong ma / bzang po bas bzang po'i rgyu yongs su 'dzin par byed pa'o*; Lamotte p. 96, P p. 14e.5, D p. 57.5: *chos kyi sku 'thob pa dang / yongs su rdzogs pa dang [P: /] yongs su 'grub par bya ba'i phyir / rgyu gong ma bas ches gong ma / bzang po bas ches bzang po yang dag par yongs su 'dzin par byed pa'o*.

Noriaki Hakamaya ("On a Paragraph in the *Dharmavinīścaya* Chapter of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*", in *Indobukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, 21.1, 1972, pp. 468-78) has identified a passage in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* that is almost identical to this passage in the *Samdhinirmocana* in the Tibetan translations, but which is not cited as a quote by Asaṅga. It is not surprising that Asaṅga would quote a passage from the *Samdhinirmocana*, since it is one of his main scriptural sources, but it is strange that he would do so without attribution. Hakamaya speculates that Asaṅga may have remembered the passage subconsciously when writing the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and not realized that he was actually quoting almost verbatim from the *Samdhinirmocana*. The

passage in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* reads:

*shin tu rgyas pa la byang chub sems dpa' chos la ting nge 'dzin du mkhas
par ji ltar khong du chud par bya zhe na / rnam par lnga ste / skad cig re
re la gnas ngan len gyi gnas thams cad 'jig par byed pa dang / sna
tshogs kyi 'du shes pa dang bral te / chos kyi dga' ba la dga' ba 'thob pa
dang / chos kyi snang ba rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa thams cad du
tshad med pa yang dag par shes pa dang / de la rnam pa dag pa'i cha
dang mthun pa rnam par mi rtogs pa'i mtshan ma rnams kun tu
'byung ba dang / chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs par bya ba dang yongs
su bsgrub pa'i phyir gong ma bas kyang ches gong ma'i rgyu yongs su
'dzin par byed pa'o.*

The Sanskrit passage from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* reads:

*vaipulye dharma-samādhi kuśalo bodhisattvaḥ katham pratyavagantavyaḥ
/ pañcabhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ pratikṣaṇam sarva-dauṣṭulyāśrayam drāvayati,
nānātva-samjñā-vigatām ca dharma-ārāma-ratiṃ pratilabhate,
aparicchinna-akārāṇi ca sarvato 'pramāṇam dharmāvabhāsam
samjānāti, viśuddha-bhāgiyāni cāsyāvikalpitāni nimittāni
samudācaranti, dharma-kāya-paripūri-pariṇiṣpattaye cottarād
uttarataram hetu-samparigrahaṃ karoti //*

The portions in boldface italic script indicate the similar passages.

⁵⁶²Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 344.2) explains that “they are realized on the first ground, the Joyous” because “on that [ground] they understand the meaning of the omnipresent element of qualities. ‘They are attained on the third ground, the Luminous,’ because one attains all of the concentrations and

formless absorptions that are divisions of calm abiding and special insight.”

⁵⁶³This translation borrows the words “not neglect” (*mi gtang ba*) from Lamotte p. 96, P p. 14e.8, and D p. 57.7. *Dok* p. 82.5 and K p. 38b.1 have *mi gzhig pa*, “not destroy”, which seems a bit too strong in this context. Except for this, the two texts say the same thing.

⁵⁶⁴*Dok* p. 82.5, K p. 38b.1: *de ji ltar na / zhi gnas dang lhag mthong rtog pa dang bcas dpyod pa dang bcas pa'i ting nge 'dzin du 'gyur / ji ltar na mi rtog cing dpyod pa tsam du 'gyur / ji ltar na mi rtog mi dpyod par 'gyur*; Lamotte p. 96, P p. 14e.8, D p. 57.7: *ji ltar na zhi gnas dang [P: /] lhag mthong rtog pa dang [P: /] bcas shing dpyod pa dang bcas pa'i ting nge 'dzin du 'gyur ba lags / ji ltar rtog pa ma mchis shing dpyod pa tsam du 'gyur ba lags / ji ltar na rtog pa ma mchis pa dang dpyod ma mchis par 'gyur ba lags*.

“Conceptual” translates *rtog pa dang bcas pa* (Skt.: *savitarka*; Pāli: *savitakka*). “Non-conceptual” translates *rtog pa dang mi bcas pa* (Skt.: *nirvitarka*; Pāli: *nirvitakka*). “Analytical” translates *dpyod pa dang bcas pa* (Skt., Pāli: *savicāra*). Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 278.7) states that the term “conceptual meditative stabilizations” refers to thorough searching, and the term “analytical meditative stabilizations” refers to individual analysis.

In the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (ch. I.3), Asaṅga equates *nirvitarka-samādhi* with higher wisdom (*adhiprajñā*); in his commentary on this (*Somme*, Tome 2, p. 8), Vasubandhu (as excerpted by Lamotte) states:

Le *svoir intuitif* (littéralement, exempt de concepts) est la haute sagesse: chez les Śrāvaka, l'absence de concepts (*nirvikalpa*) consiste à ne concevoir aucune des quatre méprises (*viparyāsa*); chez les Bodhisattva, l'absence de concepts consiste à ne concevoir aucun Dharma: telle est la différence entre les deux absences de concepts.

⁵⁶⁵Dok p. 82.6, K p. 38b.2: *ji ltar bzung ba dang / brtags pa dang / dpyad pa'i chos rnams la / de'i mtshan ma gsal zhing che ba myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa 'di ni*; Lamotte p. 96, P p. 15a.1, D p. 58.1, N p. 44b.2, L p. 45b.3, C p. 37a.5, V p. 95a.8: *ji ltar bzung zhing brtags pa dang / dpyad [P, D, C: dpyod] pa'i chos rnams la de dag gi mtshan ma gsal zhing rags [P: rigs] pa myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni*.

The term “coarse” (*rags pa*) is borrowed from Lamotte, P, D, and V. According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 346.1), “clear and coarse signs” (*mtshan ma gsal zhing rags pa, vyakta-sthūla-nimitta*) are “images on the level of association with conceptuality of the first concentration” (*bsam gtan dang po'i rtog pa dang bcas pa'i sa'i gzugs brnyan yin pa*).

⁵⁶⁶Dok p. 83.1, K p. 38b.3: *de'i mtshan ma rnams nyid la gsal zhing che ba myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa ma yin gyi / de snang ba dran pa tsam phra ba myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa 'di ni / mi rtog cing dpyod pa tsam gyi ting nge 'dzin to*; Lamotte p. 96, P p. 15a.2, D p. 58.2, N p. 44b.3, L p. 45b.4, V p. 95b.1: *de dag nyid kyi mtshan ma gsal zhing rags [P: rigs] pa myong ba'i rjes su dpyod [V: spyod] pa ma yin mod kyi / 'on kyang de snang ba 'od kyi [P, D, N, L: snang ba 'ol byi; V: snang ba 'ol byi'i] dran pa tsam phra mo myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni rtog pa med cing dpyod pa tsam gyi ting nge 'dzin yin no*; Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 279.5): *gang la de dag nyid kyi mtshan ma rags shing gsal bar myong ba dang / so sor rtog pa med mod kyi / 'on kyang de'i snang pa'i dran pa phra ma tsam gyi myong ba dang so sor rtog pa dang bcas pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni rtog pa med cing dpyod pa tsam gyi ting nge 'dzin*.

Lamotte gives no justification for his reading of *snang ba 'od kyi*, which is not found in any of the Tibetan texts I am consulting, nor does it occur in the commentaries of Wonch'uk, Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 346.6-7), or Jñānagarbha (p. 326b.6).

⁵⁶⁷The translation of this passage is aided by Lamotte p. 97, P p. 15a.4, and D p. 58.3, which indicate that the passage refers back to what has gone on before: *de dag gi mtshan ma la thams cad kyi thams cad du lhun gyis grub par chos myong ba yid la byed pas rnam par dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni rtog pa med pa dang dpyod pa med pa'i ting nge 'dzin yin no*. *Dok* p. 83.2 and K p. 38b.5 read: *de'i mtshan ma [la: omitted in K] thams cad kyi thams cad du lhun gyis 'grub pas / chos myong ba yid la byed pa / rnam par dpyod pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gang yin pa 'di ni mi rtog mi dpyod pa'i ting nge 'dzin [yin: omitted in K] to*.

⁵⁶⁸*Dok* p. 83.5, K p. 38b.8: *rgyu*; Lamotte p. 94, P p. 15a.6, D p. 58.5: *rgyu mtshan*.

⁵⁶⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 282.7) comments: "Because, having guarded the mind, one dwells on an object and is free from distraction, this is [called] 'calm abiding'. With respect to special insight: Because one thoroughly searches and thoroughly differentiates phenomena, this is called 'special insight'." "Thorough stabilization" (*rab tu 'dzin pa*, *pragraha*) is so named because "it is free from laxity" (*bying ba*, *nimagna*). "Equanimity" (*btang snyoms*, *upekṣā*), according to Wonch'uk, is so named for the same reason.

⁵⁷⁰*Dok* p. 83.5, K p. 38b.8: *sems rgod pa 'am / rgod du dogs pa zhig tu gyur na / skyo bar gyur pa'i chos rnam dang / de'i sems kyi de ma thag pa yid la*

byed pa 'di ni zhi gnas kyi rgyu zhes bya'o; Lamotte p. 97, P p. 15a.7, D p. 58.6: *sems rgod pa 'am / rgod du dogs pa na / kun tu skyo bar 'gyur pa dang 'thun pa'i chos rnamdang / bar chad med pa'i sems de yid la byed pa gang yin pa de ni zhi gnas kyi rgyu mtshan zhes bya'o*.

“Sobering phenomena” (*skyo bar gyur pa'i chos*, *udvegam āpadyata dharma*) are things that reduce excitement or help one to realize the sufferings of cyclic existence. Examples are: corpses, specific sufferings, impermanence, etc. An example of such sobering phenomena can be found on page 79 of this translation.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 283.5) comments: “Whatever serves to pacify and isolate the mind through the power of those two types of mental contemplation in that way is a ‘cause of calm abiding’....When the mind is lax or one has qualms that it will become lax, whatever is a mental contemplation of phenomena that serve to manifestly revivify [the mind] or the signs of the mind is a ‘cause of thorough stabilization’.” The “cause of equanimity” is “a mental contemplation that is free from exertion” (*rtisol ba med pa'i yid la byed*) and “a mental contemplation of natural engagement” (*rang gi ngang gis 'jug pa'i yid la byed*) when one is afflicted by the two secondary afflictions of laxity and excitement. When one is definite in calm abiding and special insight and is free from laxity and excitement and what is concordant with those, this also is called “equanimity”.

⁵⁷¹*ĀDok* p. 84.1, *K* p. 39a.2: *zhi gnas la gcig tu nges pa'i lam mam [K: 'am] / lhag mthong la gcig tu nges pa 'am / zung du 'brel ba 'ang rung ste / de gnyis kyi nye ba'i nyon mongs [ĀDok: pas; K: pa la] nyon mongs pa [la: omitted in K] gang lhun gyis 'grub pa yid la byed pa rang gi ngang gis 'jug pa'i sems 'di ni btang snyoms kyi rgyu zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 97, P p. 15b.1, D p. 58.7: *zhi gnas la gcig tu nges pa 'am / lhag mthong la gcig tu nges pa 'am / zung du*

'brel ba'i lam yang rung ste / de gnyis ka'i [P, D: gnyi ga'i] nye ba'i nyon mongs pas nye bar nyon mongs pa med pa la sems rang gi ngang gis 'jug pa na yid la byed pa lhun gyis grub pa gang yin pa de ni btang snyoms kyi rgyu mtshan zhes bya'o.

The union of calm abiding and special insight (*zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi zung 'brel, śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha*) is characterized by physical and mental pliancy, as discussed in note 513. See also Geshe Sopa, "Śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha", in Minoru Kiyota ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation* (Honolulu, 1978), pp. 46-65 and ME pp. 91-109.

⁵⁷²Dok 84.2, K p. 39a.4: *byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang lhag mthong sgom pa / chos rab tu rig pa dang / don rab tu rig par gyur na / ji ltar na chos rab tu rig pa lags / ji ltar na don rab tu rig pa lags*; Lamotte p. 98, P p. 15b.2, D p. 59.2: *byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang lhag mthong bsgom pa / chos so sor yang dag par rig pa dang / don so sor yang dag par rig pa lags na / ji ltar chos so sor yang dag par rig pa lags / ji ltar don so sor yang dag par rig pa lags*.

⁵⁷³Dok p. 84.4, K p. 39a.5: *rnam pa lngas chos rab tu rig par 'gyur te / ming gi rnam pa dang / tshig gi rnam pa dang / yi ge'i rnam pa dang / so so'i rnam pa dang / bsdus pa'i rnam pa'o // ming gang zhe na / gang kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams la ngo bo nyid kyi ming du bya bar btags pa'o // tshig gang zhe na / gang ming de dag nyid kyi tshogs la kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i don du tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir gnas dang / rien du 'dug pa'o // yi ge gang zhe na / gang de gnyis ka'i gnas kyi yi ge'o*; Lamotte p. 98, P p. 15b.4, D p. 59.2, N p. 45a.6, L p. 46b.2, C p. 37b.8, V p. 95c.2: *rnam pa lngas [chos: omitted in P, D, N, L, C; present in Lamotte, V] so sor [V: so so] yang dag par rig pa yin te / ming dang tshig*

*dang yi ge dang so so ba dang bsdus pas so // ming gang zhe na / kun nas
nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i chos rnam la ngo bo nyid dang /
bye brag gi ming du bya bar btags gang yin pa'o // tshig gang zhe na / kun nas
nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i don rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i
phyir gnas dang rten ming de dag nyid kyi tshogs la brtan [P, D, N, L, C, V:
brten] pa gang yin pa'o // yi ge gang zhe na / de gnyis ka'i gnas kyi yig 'bru
gang yin pa'o.*

The terms “names” (*ming*, *nāma*), “words” (*tshig*, *pada*), and “letters” (*yi ge*, *vyañjana*) are discussed by Asaṅga in *Abhidharmasamuccaya* I.1 (see *Compendium* p. 16). He states that groups of names express the entityness of phenomena, groups of words express the differences between phenomena, and groups of letters are the units from which the previous two are formed.

⁵⁷⁴Dok p. 84.6, K p. 39a.8: *de dag so so'i rnam pa rab tu rig pa gang zhe na /
gang ma 'dres pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed pas rab tu shes pa'o // [bsdus pa'i
rnam par rab tu rig pa gang zhe na / gang 'dres pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed
pas rab tu shes pa'o: omitted in K] // 'di dag thams cad gcig tu bsdus nas chos
rab tu rig pa zhes bya ste / de ltar na chos rab tu rig pa yin no; Lamotte p. 98,
P p. 15b.6, D p. 59.4: de dag so so las so so yang dag par rig pa gang zhe na /
ma 'dres pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed pas so so yang dag par rig pa gang yin
pa'o // bsdus pa las so so yang dag par rig pa gang zhe na / 'dres pa la dmigs
pa'i yid la byed pas so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig pa gang yin pa'o // de
dag thams cad gcig tu bsdu na chos so so yang dag par rig pa zhes bya ste / de
ltar na chos so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig pa yin [no: omitted in P].*

⁵⁷⁵Dok p. 85.2, K p. 39b.2: *byang chub sems dpa' rnam pa bcus ni / don rab tu
rig par 'gyur te / ji snyed yod pa dang / ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa dang / 'dzin
pa'i don dang / gzung ba'i don dang / gnas kyi don dang / longs par spyod*

pa'i don dang / phyin ci log gi don dang / phyin ci log med pa'i don dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i don dang / rnam par byang ba'i don to; Lamotte p. 98, P p. 15b.8, D p. 59.6: byang chub sems dpa' rnam pa bcus don so so yang dag par rig pa yin te / ji snyed yod pa nyid dang / ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid dang / 'dzin pa'i don dang / gzung ba'i don dang / gnas pa'i don dang / longs spyod kyi don dang / phyin ci log gi don dang / phyin ci ma log pa'i don dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i don dang / rnam par byang ba'i don gyis so.

⁵⁷⁶Dok p. 85.4, K p. 39b.3: *de la kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams kyi rnam pa thams cad du / rnam par phye ba'i mthar thug pa gang yin pa 'di ni ji snyed yod pa ste / de yang 'di lta phung po rnams kyi grangs lnga dang / nang gi skye mched rnams kyi grangs drug dang / phyi rol gyi skye mched rnams kyi grangs kyang drug go zhes bya ba de dag la sogs pa'o; Lamotte p. 99, P p. 15c.1, P p. 59.7, N p. 45b.6, L p. 47a.2, C p. 38a.7, V p. 95c.8: de la kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams la rnam pa rab tu dbye ba thams cad kyi mthar thug pa gang yin pa de ni ji snyed yod pa nyid yin te / 'di lta ste / phung po rnams kyi ni grangs lngas so // nang gi skye mched rnams kyi ni grangs drug gis so // phyi rol gyi skye mched rnams kyi 'ang [P, D, C, V: yang] grangs drug kho nas so [P: //] zhes bya ba lags pa'o [P, D, N, L, C, V: zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o]. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 294.4) also quotes this passage as ending with *la sogs pa*, and Lamotte gives no reason why his text differs from the other Tibetan texts.*

⁵⁷⁷Dok p. 85.7, K p. 39b.7: *rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid ni gang 'du byed rnams rnam par rig pa tsam mo; Lamotte p. 99, P p. 15c.5, D p. 60.3: rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid ni 'du byed rnams rnam par rig pa nyid gang yin pa'o.*

⁵⁷⁸ĀDok p. 86.1, K p. 39b.8: *gnas pa'i de bzhin nyid ni gang ngas sdug bsngal gyi bden pa bshad pa'o*; Lamotte p. 99, P p. 15c.5, D p. 60.3: *gnas pa'i de bzhin nyid ni gang ngas sdug bsngal gyi bden pa bstan pa gang yin pa'o*.

⁵⁷⁹This passage is cited in *Madhyāntavibhāṣikā* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi, Tokyo, 1934) p. 133. See this text for Sthiramati's comments on the passage. See also Sthiramati's *Mahāyānasūtralamkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya* (Otani Sde dge, *sems tsam* vols. 3-4, pp. 204a.1-205a.5) for another description of these seven aspects of suchness.

⁵⁸⁰Text (ĀDok p. 86.4 and K p. 40a.3) corrected per Lamotte, p. 100, P p. 15c.8, and D p. 60.5: read *de la* for *de'i*.

⁵⁸¹ĀDok p. 86.5, K p. 40a.4: *nyan thos kyi byang chub gang yin pa dang / rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub gang yin pa dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub gang yin pa dang / byang chub de dag thams cad mtshungs shing mnyam mo*; Lamotte p. 100, P p. 15d.1, D p. 60.6: *nyan thos kyi byang chub gang yin pa dang / rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub gang yin pa dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub gang yin pa'i byang chub de dag thams cad mtshungs shing mnyam mo*. The translation borrows the phrase *gang yin pa'i byang chub* from Lamotte, P, and D.

⁵⁸²ĀDok p. 86.6, K p. 40a.5: *yang dag par sgrub pa'i de bzhin nyid gang yin pa des ni / thos pa'i chos thams cad 'dres pa la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gis yongs su zin pa'i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo*; Lamotte p. 100, P p. 15d.2, D p. 60.7: *de la yang dag par sgrub pa'i de bzhin nyid des ni thos pa thams cad 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi [P: gis] bsdus pa'i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo*.

⁵⁸³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 303.5), this refers to the five sense powers (*dbang po*, *indriya*), which are characterized as types of subtle matter that allow their corresponding sense consciousnesses to perceive their respective objects. The eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po*, *cakṣur-indriya*), for instance, gives rise to an eye consciousness in dependence upon contact with an external form.

⁵⁸⁴These latter four terms are difficult to differentiate in translation because the English words used to translate them here share some similarities in meaning and connotation. In Buddhist epistemology, “mind” (*sems*, *citta*) refers to a main mind (*gtso sems*), one which knows the mere entity of the apprehended object. Minds are accompanied by mental factors (*sems 'byung*, *caitta*), which apprehend various aspects of objects and influence how the mind apprehends them. For the standard list of fifty-one mental factors, see *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, by Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper (New York: Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 35ff.

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (I.1.23), “mind” refers to the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*, *ālaya-vijñāna*) which contains all seeds (*sarvaḥśakam ālayavijñānam*). Mentality (*yid*, *manas*) has the basis-consciousness as its object and it always participates in prideful nature (*manyānātmaka*) associated with the view of “I” (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) and “mine” and ignorance. It is present everywhere, in all virtuous (*kuśala*), non-virtuous (*akuśala*), and neutral (*avyākṛta*) states, except in: actualization of the path (*lam mngon sum du bya ba*, *mārga-saṃmukhi-bhāva*); the absorption of cessation (*'gog pa'i snyoms 'jug*, *nirodha-samāpatti*); and the level of no more learning (*mi slob pa'i sa*, *aśaikṣa-bhūmi*).

Consciousness (*rnam par shes pa*, *vijñāna*) is a difficult term to translate,

because *vijñāna* includes mental phenomena that are considered to be part of the subconscious in Western psychology, such as unconscious motivations. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, it includes the six types of consciousness: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, bodily consciousness, and mental consciousness. See also note 247, which cites Wonch'uk's and Jang-chup-dzu-trül's comments concerning these.

⁵⁸⁵Dok p. 87.2, K p. 40a.8: *de la gnas kyi don ni jig rten gyi khams gan gyin pa ste / sems can gyi khams gang la gnas par snang ba'o*; Lamotte p. 100, P p. 15d.4, D p. 61.2: *de la gnas kyi don ni 'jig rten gyi khams gang yin pa ste / gang la gnas na sems can gyi khams snang ba'o*.

⁵⁸⁶Jambudvīpa (Tib.: *dzam bu'i gling*) refers to the southern of the four great land masses (*gling bzhi*, *catur-dvīpa*) of traditional Buddhist cosmology and is said to be named after the Jambu tree that grows there. It measures 2,000 *yojanas* on three sides, and its fourth side is only three and one half *yojanas* long.

⁵⁸⁷This term is not particularly revealing. It was invented by Rémusat to translate this distinctively Buddhist vision of the structure of the universe. The term *stong spyi phud kyi 'jig rten gyi khams* (Skt. *sāhasracūḍiko lokadhātu*) literally means a “one thousand apex worldly realm”, which, according the *Anguttara-nikāya*, is composed of 1,000 universes. A middling chiliocosm is 1,000 of these, and a trichiliocosm is 1,000 middling chiliocosms. Thus, a trichiliocosm is composed of 1,000,000,000 universes like the one in which we live, each of which is composed of four great continents surrounding a Mt. Meru (the *axis mundi* of traditional Buddhist cosmology). If this is further

extended, the *Mahāvastu* states that one Buddha-land (*buddha-kṣetra*) is composed of sixty one of these, and a great trichiliocosm constitutes one worldly realm ('*jig rten gyi kham*s, *loka-dhātu*). There are an infinite number of these, existing in the ten directions, and each Buddha-land is presided over by a Buddha. I am not sure whether or not the *Samdhinirmocana* is in accord with this system or not, but it seems that the numbers in this passage of the sūtra are quite a bit higher than in the schema of the *Mahāvastu* or the *Abhidharmakośa*. For more on this, see Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 305-308, and *Compendium* p. 60, which discusses the various types of chiliocosm.

⁵⁸⁸According to Yaśomitra, an “incalculable number” (*grangs med pa, asaṃkhyā*) is actually a definite number, represented as a one followed by sixty zeroes. See *Kośa* III, p. 190 n. 1, and see also Randy Kloetzli, *Buddhist Cosmology* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), pp. 91-131.

⁵⁸⁹This paragraph is translated in accordance with Lamotte pp. 100-101, P pp. 15d.5-15e.1, and D p. 61.2-6, which better outline the parallelism between the passages and show their progression in terms of numbers than do *Ḍok* pp. 87.3-88.1 and K p. 40b. For a similar presentation, see *Kośa* ch. 5 p. 21; for an extensive discussion of this passage, see Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 305-314.

⁵⁹⁰*Ḍok* p. 88.1, K p. 40b.5: *de la yongs su longs spyod pa'i don ni gang ngas sems can rnams kyi [K: kyis] yongs su spyad par bya ba'i phyir yongs su bzung ba'i yo byad bshad pa'o*; Lamotte p. 101, P p. 15e.1, D p. 61.6: *de la longs spyod kyi don ni yongs su spyad par bya ba'i phyir ngas sems can rnams kyi yongs su bzung ba dang / yo byad bstan pa gang dag yin pa rnams so*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 314.4), citing the *Yogācārabhūmi* as his

source, lists fourteen types of resources: (1) food (*zas*); (2) drink (*skom*); (3) vehicles (*bzhon*); (4) clothing (*gos*); (5) ornaments (*rgyan*); (6) laughter (*bzhad gad*); (7) singing (*glu bro*); (8) the sound of instrumental music (*rol mo'i sgra*); (9) perfume (*spos*); (10) flower garlands (*me tog phreng*); (11) ointments (*byug pa*); (12) vessels (*snod*); (13) shows (*snang ba*); and (14) men and women (*skyes pa dang bud med*).

⁵⁹¹These are discussed by Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 315.7). He equates mistakenness with ignorance (*ma rig pa*, *avidyā*), and states that "the nature of mistakenness consists of: one class of extreme views, holding [one's own] view to be supreme, holding ethics and conduct to be supreme, and desire" ('*jig tshogs la lta ba dang / mthar 'dzin par lta ba'i phyogs gcig dang / lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa dang / tshul khrims dang / brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa dang / 'dod chags so*).

⁵⁹²Dok p. 88.4, K p. 40b.8: *de la phyin ci log med pa'i don ni 'di las bzlog pa dang / 'di ni gnyen por shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 101, P p. 15e.3, D p. 62.1: *de la phyin ci ma log pa'i don ni de las bzlog [P: zlog] pa ste / de'i gnyen po yin par rig par bya'o*.

⁵⁹³Dok p. 88.5, K p. 41a.1: *de la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i don ni rnam pa gsum ste / khams gsum gyi nyon mongs pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / tshe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa'o*; Lamotte p. 102, P p. 15e.4, D p. 62.2: *de la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i don ni rnam pa gsum ste / khams gsum pa'i nyon mongs pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / tshe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa'o*. See note 364 and Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 316-18.

⁵⁹⁴Dok p. 88.6, K p. 41a.2: *de la rnam par byang ba'i don ni / gang kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa gsum po de nyid dang bral bar bya ba'i phyir / byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos rnams so / byams pa rnam pa bcu po 'di dag gis don thams cad bsdus par shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 102, P p. 15e.5, D p. 62.2: *de la rnam par byang ba'i don ni kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa gsum po de dag nyid dang bral bar bya ba'i phyir byang chub kyi phyogs dang 'thun pa'i chos gang dag yin pa rnams te / byams pa rnam pa bcu po de dag gis don thams cad bsdus par rig par bya'o*.

⁵⁹⁵Dok p. 89.1, K p. 41a.3: *chos rnam pa lngas ni byang chub sems dpa' don rab tu rig pa yin te*; Lamotte p. 102, P p. 15e.6, D p. 62.3: *byang chub sems dpa' [P: sa; D: dpas] rnam pa lngas don so so yang dag par rig pa yin te*.

⁵⁹⁶Dok p. 89.2, K p. 41a.5: *de la yongs su shes par bya ba'i dngos po gang zhe na / shes par bya ba thams cad yin par blta ste / 'di lta ste / phung po rnams zhes [K: shes] bya ba 'am / nang gi skye mched rnams sam / phyi rol gyi skye mched rnams zhes [K: shes] bya ba la sogs pa'o*; Lamotte p. 102, P p. 15e.8, P p. 62.4: *de la yongs su shes par bya ba'i dngos po ni shes bya thams cad yin par blta bar bya ste / 'di lta ste / phung po rnams zhes [shes] bya ba 'am / nang gi skye mched rnams zhes [P: shes] bya 'am / phyi rol gyi skye mched rnams zhes [P: shes] bya ba 'am / de lta bu la sogs pa dag go*.

The term “object of knowledge” (*shes bya, jñeya*) refers to all phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, that can be known. In *Compendium* p. 174 they are divided into six types. See also *ME* pp. 213-274.

⁵⁹⁷According to Maitreya (*Madhyānta-vibhāga* I.14), reality-limit is a synonym of emptiness and the ultimate. It is called reality-limit because in it there is no mistakenness (*viparyāsa, phyin ci log*), and because it is the furthest point of

awareness. See also *Compendium* p. 18.

⁵⁹⁸See note 29.

⁵⁹⁹See note 508.

⁶⁰⁰Dok p. 89.4, K p. 41a.6: *de la yongs su shes par bya ba'i don ni rnam pa ji snyed kyis shes par bya ba ji lta shes par bya'o // de yang 'di lta ste / kun rdzob dang / don dam pa dang / nyes pa dang / yon tan dang / rkyen dang / dus dang / skye ba dang / gnas pa dang / 'jig pa'i mtshan nyid dang / nad la sogs pa dang / sdug bsngal dang / kun 'byung ba la sogs [K: stsogs] pa dang / de bzhin nyid dang / yang dag pa'i mtha' dang / chos kyi dbyings dang / bsdu pa dang / rgyas pa dang / mgo gcig tu lung bstan pa dang / rnam par dbye ba dang / dri ba'i lung bstan pa dang / gzhaq pa dang / gsang ba dang / rab tu bstan pa yang rung ste / de lta bu'i cha dang 'thun pa dag ni / yongs su shes par bya ba'i don du rig par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 102, P p. 16a.1, D p. 62.5: *de la yongs su shes par bya ba'i don ni rnam pa ji snyed kyis shes bya de ji lta ba bzhin shes par bya ste / 'di lta ste / kun rdzob dang / don dam pa dang / skyon dang [P: /] yon tan dang / rkyen dang / dus dang / skye ba dang / gnas pa dang / 'jig pa'i mtshan nyid dang / nad la sogs pa dang / sdug bsngal dang / kun 'byung ba la sogs pa dang / de bzhin nyid dang / yang dag pa'i mtha' dang / chos kyi dbyings dang / bsdu ba dang / dbye ba dang / mgo gcig tu lan gdab pa dang / rnam par dbye ba dang / dris te lan gdab pa dang / gzhaq pa dang / gsang ba dang / bsgrags pa dang / de lta bu dang 'thun pa ni yongs su shes par bya ba'i don yin par rig par bya'o*. See Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 319-21 for a selective commentary on this passage.

⁶⁰¹Dok p. 90.1, K p. 41b.2: *de la yongs su shes pa ni gang de gnyis ka 'dzin*

pa'i byang chub kyi phyogs te / de'ang 'di lta dran pa nye bar gzhas pa rnam dang / yang dag par spong ba rnam dang / de dag la sogs pa'o; Lamotte p. 103, P p. 16a.4, D p. 62.7: *de la yongs su shes pa ni de gnyis ka [P, D: gnyi ga] 'dzin par byed pa / byang chub kyi phyogs dang 'thun pa'i chos gang yin pa dag ste / 'di lta ste / dran pa nye bar bzhag [P, D: gzhas] pa rnam dang / yang dag par spong ba rnam dang / de la sogs pa'o*. This refers to the seven pronouncements (*bka' stsal bdun*) outlined in chapter seven. See note 225 and Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 327-328.

⁶⁰²Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 328.5) comments that “disciplining” (*'dul ba, damana*) refers to eliminating (*'gog pa, nirodha*). “Completely abandoning” (*gtan tu spangs*; *ĀDok: gtan nas blangs te spangs, nikhila-hāni*) refers to “the ability to completely abandon” (*yang dag par 'gog pa nyid kyi nus pa*) desire, anger, and bewilderment. This complete elimination is “the fruit of virtuous endeavor” (*dge sbyong gi 'bras bu, śrāmaṇya-phala*).

⁶⁰³This passage is a composite translation, based on Lamotte p. 103, P p. 16a.5, D p. 63.1, and *ĀDok* p. 90.2 and K p. 41b.3. *ĀDok* and K read: *de la yongs su shes pa'i 'bras bu thob pa ni 'di lta ste / 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug rnam par 'dul ba ste / 'dod chags [dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug: omitted in K] gtan nas blangs te spangs pa dang / dge sbyong gi 'bras bu rnam dang / gang ngas nyan thos dang / de bzhin gshegs pa'i thun mong [K: mongs] dang / thun mong [K: mongs] ma yin pa dang / 'jig rten dang / 'jig rten las 'das pa dang / yon tan dang / gang de dag mngon du bya ba bstan pa'o*. Lamotte, P, and D read: *de la yongs su shes pa'i 'bras bu 'thob pa ni 'di lta ste / 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug 'dul ba dang / 'dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug ma lus par spong ba dang / dge sbyong nyid kyi 'bras bu rnam dang / ngas nyan thos dang / de bzhin*

gshegs pa'i yon tan 'jig rten pa dang / 'jig rten pa las 'das pa thun mong dang thun mong ma yin pa gang dag bstan pa de dag mngon du bya ba gan yin pa'o.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 329.1) states that these refer to the eight deliverances (*rnam par thar pa*, *vimokṣa*) that are qualities common to Hearers and Tathāgatas and to the fourteen unshared qualities of Tathāgatas (discussed in chapters nine and ten), such as the powers (*stobs*, *bala*), fearlessnesses (*mi 'jigs pa*, *vaiśāradya*), and so forth.

⁶⁰⁴Dok p. 90.4, K p. 41b.5: *de rab tu shes par byed pa ni / mngon du byas pa'i chos de dag nyid la rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / rgya cher yang gzhan la snyod cing 'chad pa dang / yang dag par ston pa ste*; Lamotte p. 103, P p. 16a.7, D p. 63.3: *de la rab tu rig par byed pa ni mngon sum [P: gsum] du byas pa'i chos de dag nyid las rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / gzhan dag la 'ang [P, D: yang] rgya cher ston pa dang / yang dag par ston pa gang yin pa ste.*

⁶⁰⁵Dok p. 91.4, K p. 42a.3: *gnas dang rten cing 'brel pa'i mtshan nyid dang*; Lamotte p. 104, P p. 16b.5, D p. 63.7: *gnas dang gnas par 'brel pa'i [P, D: ba'i] mtshan nyid dang.*

⁶⁰⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 372.1) comments: “‘Worldly realms’ (*'jig rten gyi khams*, *loka-dhātu*) are limitless worldly realms. These are the environments — limitless in the ten directions and also having limitless names — that are objects of thorough purification by Bodhisattvas. ‘Realms of sentient beings’ (*sems can gyi khams*, *saṁsāra-dhātu*) are limitless realms of sentient beings. These are the sixty-four lineages of sentient beings — of activated lineage and non-activated lineage — who are objects of thorough

ripening by Bodhisattvas. 'Realms of qualities' (*chos kyi kham*s, *dharmadhātu*) are the limitless realms of qualities. These are the realms of sentient beings in the worldly realms that have become afflicted or purified due to virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral practices and are to be realized by Bodhisattvas. 'Realms of discipline' (*'dul ba'i kham*s, *vinaya-dhātu*) are the limitless realms of discipline. These are sentient beings among those sentient beings whose lineage has been activated, are endowed with fortune, are suitable to be liberated from suffering forever, and are to be liberated by Bodhisattvas. 'Realms of methods of discipline' (*'dul ba'i thabs kyi kham*s, *vinayopāyadhamu*) are the limitless methods of discipline. These are the methods of freeing those sentient beings who Bodhisattvas teach well."

⁶⁰⁷Dok p. 91.7, K p. 42a.6: *gang thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don rab tu rig pa dang / gang yang bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don rab tu rig pa dang / bcom ldan 'das gang yang zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don rab tu rig pa dang / 'di rnams la tha dad du dbye ba ci mchis*; Lamotte p. 105, P p. 16b.8, D p. 64.3: *thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig pa gang lags pa dang / bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig pa gang lags pa dang / bcom ldan 'das zhi gnas dang lhag mthong bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig pa gang lags pa de dag la tha dad du bgyi ba ci mchis lags*.

This refers to an important idea in Buddhist meditation theory, that there are three stages involved in understanding doctrinal teachings. The first, wisdom arisen from hearing (*thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, *śrutamayī-prajñā*), occurs when someone hears and studies doctrines. The second, wisdom arisen from thinking (*bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, *cintāmayī-prajñā*), occurs when one understands those doctrines through further

contemplation. The third, wisdom arisen from meditation (*bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, *bhāvanāmayi-prajñā*), occurs when analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation are in harmony, that is to say, when there is a union of calm abiding and special insight. These are discussed at length by Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 339-347). See also *ME* pp. 92-94 and *Kośa* ch. 6, pp. 143 and 159 and *Compendium* p. 134. Lamotte provides a bibliography of these terms in *Somme* notes p. 7*.

⁶⁰⁴Dok p. 92.2, K p. 42a.8: *thos ba las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni byang chub sems dpa' yi ge la gnas pa / sgra ji bzhin pa / dgongs pa med pa / mngon du ma byas pa / rnam par thar pa'i rjes su mthun [K: 'thun] pa / rnam par thar par byed pa'i don rab tu shes pa ma yin pa'o*; Lamotte p. 105, P p. 16c.2, D p. 64.4: *byang chub sems dpa' [P, D: dpas] thos ba las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa / sgra ji bzhin pa / dgongs pa med pa / mngon du ma gyur pa / rnam par thar pa'i rjes su 'thun pa / rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa'i don so so yang dag par rig par byed do*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 339.2) explains that they “abide in the letters” (*tshig 'bru la gnas pa*, *vyañjanāśrita*) because “such wisdom [arisen from] hearing arises due to the power of words.” They “are literal” (*sgra ji bzhin pa*, *yathāruta*) because they apprehend these letters according to the literal meanings of the words they comprise, but these beings “do not apprehend the words by way of the meaning, as is done by the two wisdoms [i.e., wisdom arisen from hearing and wisdom arisen from thinking]”. They “do not have the thought” (*dgongs pa med pa*, *anabhisam̐dhi*) because they do not understand well the thought of Buddha's scriptures. They “do not actualize them” (*mngon du ma byas pa*, *anabhimukha*) because “when they observe such objects, they still do not actualize partially concordant images and do not attain meditative stabilizations.” They are “concordant with liberation” (*rnam par thar pa'i rjes*

su mthun pa, vimokṣānulomika) “because they are concordant with the liberation of nirvāṇa after a long time and because [nirvāṇa] contains both aspects of liberation from compounded and uncompounded phenomena”, but they “do not thoroughly know liberative meanings” (*rnam par thar par byed pa'i don rab tu shes pa ma yin pa, vimokṣārtha-aprajñāna*) because they “abide in a fluctuating mind and have not abandoned entanglements due to not having attained cessations”.

⁶⁰⁹ĀDok p. 92.3, K p. 42b.1: *bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis yi ge la gnas la / sgra ji bzhin du ma yin gyi / dgongs pa can mngon du ma byas pa / rnam par thar par byed pa'i don ma yin kyang / rnam par thar pa'i rjes su mthun la / rnam par thar par byed pa'i don rab tu mi shes pa'o*; Lamotte p. 105, P p. 16c.3, D p. 64.5, N p. 49a.2, L p. 50b.4, C p. 41a.6, V p. 96d.1: *bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa kho na [ma: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] yin la / sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa / dgongs pa can / mngon du [V: ma] gyur pa / rnam par thar pa'i rjes su ches [P, C, V: chos] 'thun [L, V: mthun] pa / rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa'i don so so yang dag par rig par byed do*.

Lamotte's insertion of the negative particle *ma* (in brackets) is based on Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text (p. 700c.5), but is not found in ĀDok, K, P, D, L, N, C, V, Wonch'uk's quotation of this passage (vol. *thi* [119], p. 339.6), Jangchup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 374.5), or Jñānagarbha's commentary (p. 333b).

⁶¹⁰ĀDok p. 92.5, K p. 42b.3: *bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni / byang chub sems dpa' yi ge la gnas pa dang / yi ge la mi gnas pa dang / sgra ji bzhin pa dang / dgongs pa can yang shes par bya ba'i dngos po dang / mthun [K: 'thun] pa gzugs brnyan ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul du mngon du gyur pa /*

rnam par thar pa'i rjes su mthun [K: 'thun] *ches pa / rnam par thar par byed pa'i don rab tu shes so // byams pa 'di ni 'di rnams kyi bye brag tu bya'o zhes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to*; Lamotte p. 105, P p. 16c.4, D p. 64.6, N p. 49a.4, L p. 50b.6, C p. 41a.7, V p. 96d.3: *byang chub sems dpa' [P, D, N, L, C, V: dpas] bsgoms [P: bsgom] pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyi ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa dang / tshig 'bru la gnas pa ma yin pa dang / sgra ji bzhin pa dang / [sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa dang /: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V; present in Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), p. 340.4 and Hsüan-tsang p. 700c.8: per Lamotte p. 105 n. b] dgongs pa can dang / shes bya'i dngos po dang cha 'thun* [L, V: *mthun*] *pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnyan gyis mngon du gyur pa / rnam par thar pa'i rjes su ches shin tu 'thun* [L, V: *mthun*] *pa / rnam par thar par byed pa'i don kyang so sor yang dag par rig par byed do // byams pa de dag gi tha dad du bya ba ni de yin no zhes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to.*

⁶¹¹ *Dok* p. 92.7, K p. 42b.5: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong bsgom pa'i byang chub sems dpa' chos rab tu rig cing / don rab tu rig pa'i ye shes ni gang lags / mthong ba ni gang lags / byams pa ngas ye shes dang / mthong ba rnam grangs du mar bstan mod kyi / yang mdor bstan to // gang 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gi shes rab 'di ni ye shes so // gang ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa 'di ni mthong ba'o*; Lamotte p. 106, P p. 16c.7, D p. 65.1: *byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong sgom pa chos so sor yang dag par rig pa dang / don so sor yang dag par rig pa'i shes pa ni gang lags / mthong ba ni gang lags / byams pa nga ni shes pa dang / mthong ba rnam grangs du mas ston par byed mod kyi / 'on kyang mdor bsdu te bshad par bya'o // 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gi shes rab gang yin pa de ni shes pa yin no // ma 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gi shes rab gang yin pa de ni mthong ba yin no.*

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 347-351) cites various discussions of these

terms. On p. 350.1, he states that they are not mutually exclusive and that there are four permutations (*mu bzhi, catuṣ-koṭi*) of possible relationships between them.

⁶¹²This refers to the list on page 90. It includes the objects that are letters and the objects that are meanings. See Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), p. 354.

⁶¹³Dok p. 93.6, K p. 43a.3: *de bzhin nyid kyi don rab tu rig pa'i mtshan ma de'ang rnam par sel lam [K: tam] / byams pa de bzhin nyid kyi don rab tu rig pa la mtshan ma med par mi dmigs pa yin na / de la ci zhig rnam par sel bar 'gyur / byams pa de bzhin nyid kyi don rab tu rig pa ni chos dang / don gyi mtshan ma thams cad zil gyis gnong pa ste / de la gang gis gang zil gyis gnong par bya bar mi bshad do*; Lamotte p. 106, P p. 16d.4, D p. 65.5: *ci lags [P: /] de bzhin nyid kyi don so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig pa'i mtshan ma gang lags pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] rnam par sel bar bgyid lags sam / byams pa de bzhin nyid kyi don so so yang dag par rig pa la ni mtshan ma med de mi dmigs na / de la ci zhig rnam par sel bar 'gyur te / byams pa de bzhin nyid kyi don so so yang dag par rig pas ni / chos dang don gyi mtshan ma thams cad zil gyis gnong gyi de ni gang gis kyang zil gyis mnan [P: gnong] par bya ba yin par nga ma [P, D: mi] smra'o.*

⁶¹⁴Dok p. 94.2, K p. 43a.5: *snod chu rnyog pa can gyis gang ba'i dpe dang / me long yongs su ma dag pa'i dpe dang / mtshe'u 'khrugs pa'i dpes rang gi gdong gi mtshan ma blta bar mi rung ba dang / de las slar bzlog na rung ba de bzhin du ma bsgoms pa'i sems kyis yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du shes par mi nus kyi / bsgoms pas nus so zhes bka' stsal pa de / sems kyis brtag pa gang dang / de bzhin nyid gang las dgongs te gsungs*; Lamotte p. 107, P p. 16d.7, D p. 65.7: *chab rnyog pa can mchis pa'i snod kyi dpe dang / me long yongs su*

*ma dag pa'i dpe dang / mtshe'u 'khrugs pa'i dpes ji ltar rang [P: gi] bzhin gyi
mtshan ma bntag par mi nus pa de las bzlog pa [D: par] ni nus pa de bzhin du
ma bsgoms pa'i sems kyis yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin shes par mi nus kyis /
bsgoms pas ni nus so zhes bka' stsal pa gang lags pa de la sems kyis so sor
bntag pa ni gang lags / de bzhin nyid ni gang las dgongs te bka' stsal pa ni
gang lags.*

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 359.7) states that these three examples respectively relate to wisdom arisen from hearing, wisdom arisen from thinking, and wisdom arisen from meditating. He also links these examples to the following paragraph. See also note 607.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 381.3), these examples relate to mentally contemplating suchness, which can only be done successfully by a mind that is not clouded by signs and conceptuality. The suchness referred to is “the suchness of cognition” (*rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid*, *vijñapti-tathatā*).

⁶¹⁵Dok p. 94.6, K p. 43b.1: *de ltar chos dang don rab tu rig pa'i byang chub sems dpa' mtshan ma sel ba la zhugs pa'i mtshan ma du zhig ni bka' stsal lags / de dag gang gis rnam par sel bar bgyi*; Lamotte p. 107, P p. 16e.3, D p. 66.3: *byang chub sems dpa' de ltar chos dang don so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig pa dang / mtshan ma rnam par sel ba la zhugs pa'i mtshan ma du zhig ni rnam par bsal dka' [D: bka' stsal] ba [dag: omitted in D] lags la / gang gis ni de dag rnam par sel lags.*

⁶¹⁶Dok p. 94.7, K p. 43b.2: *byams pa bcu ste / stong pa nyid kyis rnam par sel bar byed do // bcu gang zhe na / chos kyis don rab tu shes par byed pa na / tshig 'bru' i mtshan ma sna tshogs gang yin pa de ni chos thams cad stong pa nyid kyis rnam par sel to*; Lamotte p. 107, P p. 16e.4, D p. 66.4: *byams pa bcu ste /*

de dag ni stong pa nyid kyis rnam par sel lo // bcu gang zhe na / chos kyis don so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig par byed pa'i tshig dang / yi ge'i mtshan ma sna tshogs gang yin pa de ni chos thams cad stong pa nyid kyis rnam par sel lo.

⁶¹⁷This phrase is translated in accordance with Lamotte pp. 107-108, P p. 16e.5, and D p. 66.4, which read: *gnas pa'i de bzhin nyid kyis don so so [D: sor] yang dag par rig par byed pa'i skye ba dang / 'jig pa dang / gnas pa dang / gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid kyis rgyun gyi rjes su 'jug pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*. *Ādok* p. 95.1 and K p. 43b.3 read: *gnas pa'i de bzhin nyid kyis don rab tu shes par byed pa na skye ba dang / 'jig pa dang / gnas pa dang / gzhan du 'gyur ba'i rgyu 'byung ba'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de [ni: omitted in K]*.

⁶¹⁸*Ādok* p. 95.2, K p. 43b.4: *'dzin pa'i don rab tu shes par byed pa na / lus la chags pa'i mtshan ma dang / nga zhes bya ba'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; Lamotte p. 108, P p. 16e.6, D p. 66.5: *'dzin pa'i don so so [P: sor] yang dag par rig par byed pa'i 'jig tshogs la lta ba'i mtshan ma dang / nga'o snyam pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*.

The words “the view of the transitory collection” (*'jig tshogs la lta ba*, *satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) are borrowed from Lamotte, P, and D. *Ādok* and K read: *lus la chags pa*, which literally means “attachment to the body”. Since *lus* is a common translation of the Sanskrit *kāya*, and since Lamotte has *'jig tshogs* and renders the Sanskrit as *satkāya*, I think that the *Ādok* and K reading is probably an alternative rendering of *satkāya*.

That this should be read as a translation of *satkāya* is also borne out by an article by Noriaki Hakamaya (“The Old and New Tibetan Translations of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*”, in *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu Ronshu*, 1963, pp. 1-17), in which he compares a manuscript of the *Samdhinirmocana*

found in Tun-huang to the version in the Peking *Tripitaka*. He notes that in this early translation *lus* is rendered by *tshogs*.

⁶¹⁹Dok p. 95.4, K p. 43b.6: *yongs su longs spyod pa'i don bud med dang / skyes pa dga' dgur spyod pa dang / yo byad dang ldan pa rab tu shes par byed pa na / nang gi bde ba'i mtshan ma dang / phyi rol gyi gzung [K: bzung] ba'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; Lamotte p. 108, P p. 16e.8, D p. 66.7: *yongs su longs spyod pa'i don du skyes pa dang / bud med kyi bsnyen bkur dang yo byad dang ldan pa so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig par byed pa'i nang gi bde ba'i mtshan ma dang / phyi rol gyi sdug pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*.

⁶²⁰Dok p. 95.7, K p. 43b.8: *gzugs med pa la yang brten nas / nang gi zhi ba rnam par thar pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; Lamotte p. 108: *gzugs med pa ['i don so so yang dag par rig par byed pa'i: omitted in P, D] nang gi zhi ba'i rnam par thar pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; P p. 17a.2, D p. 67.1, N p. 50b.6, L p. 52b.4, C p. 42b.8, V p. 97b.1: *gzugs med pa la brten te / nang gi zhi ba'i rnam par thar pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), p. 376.2: *gzugs med pa so sor yang dag par rig pa'i phyir nang gi zhi ba rnam par thar pa'i mtshan ma yod pa gang yin pa*. Lamotte's reading is based on Hsüan-tsang's text (p. 701a.21), but is very different from all the other Tibetan texts and from Wonch'uk.

⁶²¹Dok p. 95.7, K p. 44a.1: *mtshan nyid kyi de bzhin nyid kyi don rab tu shes par byed pa na / gang zag la bdag med pa'i mtshan ma dang / chos la bdag med pa'i mtshan ma dang / rnam par rig pa tsam gyi mtshan ma dang / don dam pa'i rnam pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni*; Lamotte p. 108, P p. 17a.3, D p. 67.2: *mtshan nyid kyi de bzhin nyid kyi don so so [P, D: sor] yang dag par rig par byed pa'i gang zag bdag med pa'i mtshan ma dang / chos bdag*

*med pa'i mtshan ma dang / rnam par rig pa tsam gyi mtshan ma dang / don
dam pa'i mtshan ma gang yin pa de ni.*

⁶²²Dok p. 96.4, K p. 44a.4: *rnam par 'gyur ba med pa stong pa nyid*; Lamotte
p. 108, P p. 17a.5, D p. 67.4: *dor ba med pa'i stong pa nyid*.

⁶²³There is a list of eighteen emptinesses, called “emptinesses that are the paths
of the view”, which is found in Mahāyāna literature, and this passage lists most
of them. The complete list can be found in *ME*, pp. 204-5. I will discuss them
in the order that they appear in the *sūtra* in accordance with the presentation in
ME.

The emptiness of all phenomena (*chos thams cad stong pa nyid*,
sarvadharma-śūnyatā; number thirteen in the list) is the emptiness of the
eighteen constituents and so forth (see *ME*, p. 274). This includes all
phenomena.

The emptiness of character (*mtshan nyid stong pa nyid*, *lakṣaṇa-śūnyatā*;
number fourteen on the list) is the emptiness of the characteristics of all
phenomena, including everything from forms through to omniscient conscious-
nesses (i.e., all the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa). The emptiness
of what is beginningless and endless (*thog ma dang tha ma med pa stong pa
nyid*, *anavarāgra-śūnyatā*; number ten on the list) is the emptiness of cyclic
existence, which has no beginning or end.

The emptiness of the internal (*nang stong pa nyid*, *adhyātma-śūnyatā*;
number one on the list) is the emptiness of the five senses. The emptiness of
the unapprehendable (*mi dmigs pa stong pa nyid*, *anupalambha-śūnyatā*;
number fifteen) is the emptiness of the past, present, and future, which are
unapprehendable as the cessation of phenomena, their presence, and their non-
production.

The emptiness of the external (*phyi stong pa nyid, bahirdhā śūnyatā*; number two on the list) is the emptiness of the six types of objects that are the objects of the six senses (this includes: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousness).

The emptiness of the external and internal (*phyi nang stong pa nyid, adhyātma-bahirdhā-śūnyatā*; number three on the list) is the emptiness of the loci of the senses, i.e., the gross orbs of the eyes, etc. The emptiness of nature (*rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid, prakṛti-śūnyatā*; number twelve) refers to the emptinesses that are the nature of phenomena.

The emptiness of the great (*chen po stong pa nyid, mahāśūnyatā*; number five on the list) refers to the emptiness of the ten directions (the eight cardinal directions, plus the apex and the nadir).

The emptiness of compounded phenomena (*'dus byas stong pa nyid, saṃskṛta-śūnyatā*; number seven on the list) is the emptiness of all phenomena that arise in dependence upon causes and conditions.

The emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes (*mtha' las 'das pa stong pa nyid, atyanta-śūnyatā*; number nine on the list) refers to what has passed beyond the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. The emptiness of non-things (*dngos po med pa stong pa nyid, abhāva-śūnyatā*; number eighteen) refers to the emptiness of uncompounded phenomena. The emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things (*dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid, abhāva-svabhāva-śūnyatā*; number sixteen) refers to the emptiness of inherently existent uncompounded phenomena. The emptiness of the ultimate (*don dam pa stong pa nyid, paramārtha-śūnyatā*; number six) refers to the emptiness of nirvāṇa.

The emptiness of uncompounded phenomena (*'dus ma byas stong pa nyid, asaṃskṛta-śūnyatā*; number eight) refers to the emptiness of phenomena that are not produced in dependence upon causes and conditions (e.g. uncaused

space). The emptiness of the indestructible (*rnam par 'gyur pa med pa stong pa nyid*, *avipariṇāma-sūnyatā*; Lamotte, P, D: *dor ba med pa stong pa nyid*, *anavakāra-sūnyatā*; number eleven) refers to the emptiness of the indestructible Mahāyāna.

The emptiness of emptiness (*stong pa nyid stong pa nyid*, *sūnyatā sūnyatā*; number four) refers to the emptiness that is the nature of phenomena.

This passage has seventeen of the eighteen emptinesses on the *ME* list. The missing member is the emptiness of things (*dnegos po stong pa nyid*, *bhāva-sūnyatā*; number twenty-three), which refers to the emptiness of the five aggregates. This list is also found in *Mahāvvyutpatti* XXXVII.1-18. See also Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), pp. 361-76 and Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], pp. 384-88). Sixteen emptinesses are listed in the *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭīkā* (see Susumu Yamaguchi ed., *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭīkā*, Nagoya, 1934, pp. 51-59 and Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, p. 219). Sthiramati omits numbers nine, fifteen, and seventeen, and has *anavakāra-sūnyatā* instead of *avipariṇāma-sūnyatā*.

⁶²⁴Dok p. 96.5, K p. 44a.5: *mtshan ma rnam pa bcu rnam par sel ba na / gang rnam par sel / mtshan ma gang las rnam par 'grol*; Lamotte p. 109, P p. 17a.6, D p. 67.5: *mtshan ma rnam [P, D: pa] bcu rnam par sel bar bgyid na / mtshan ma gang rnam par sel bar bgyid cing 'ching ba'i mtshan ma gang las yongs su grol bar 'gyur lags*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 388.6) states: “[This question] indicates that, having thoroughly abandoned the phenomena of thoroughly afflicted character of the other-powered [nature], one obtains the phenomena of pure character of the thoroughly established [nature]” (*gzhan gyi dbang gi kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos rab tu spangs nas yongs su grub pa'i rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid kyi chos thob par 'gyur ba ston do*).

⁶²⁵Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 388.7) states that this answer indicates that “having eliminated the two [types of] images that are objects of observation of calm abiding and special insight, through that there is no manifest grasping of the other-powered character as the imputational character.” See also Wonch’uk vol. *thi* (119), p. 383.2.

⁶²⁶Dok p. 96.7, K p. 44a.7 *stong pa nyid 'di rnams ni gtsor mtshan ma 'di dag gi gnyen por gyur par shes par bya ste / re res kyang mtshan ma thams cad kyi gnyen por mi 'gyur ba ni ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 109, P p. 17a.8, D p. 67.6: *stong pa nyid de dag ni dngos su na mtshan ma de dag gi gnyen por gyur pa yin par rig par bya'o / re re 'ang [P, D: yang] mtshan ma thams cad kyi gnyen por mi 'gyur ba ni ma yin no*.

This means that any one of these emptinesses can serve to weaken any of the signs.

⁶²⁷This refers to the twelve links of dependent arising. For the complete list, see *ME*, pp. 275ff.

⁶²⁸Dok p. 97.1, K p. 44a.8: *ma rig pa nas [K: ni] rga shi'i bar gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa mi skyed pa ma yin mod kyi / rkyen du nye ba dang / shin tu nye ba'i phyir gtsor na 'du byed skyed par bshad do / tshul de bzhin du 'di la yang blta bar bya'o*; Lamotte p. 109, P p. 17b.1, D p. 67.7, N p. 51a.7, L p. 53a.6, C p. 43b.1, V p. 97b.8: *ma rig pa [Lamotte, N, L: nas; P, D, C, V: ni] rga shi'i bar gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa grub [V: 'grub] par mi byed pa [ma: omitted in P, D, N, L, C; present in V] yin mod kyi / nye ba dang shin tu nye ba'i rkyen nyid yin pa'i phyir / dngos su na 'du byed 'grub par byed pa yin par bstan pa bzhin du 'di la 'ang [P, D, C, V: yang] tshul de bzhin du blta bar bya'o*;

Wonch'uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 385.3: *ma rig pa nas rga zhi'i bar gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams mi skyed pa ma yin mod kyi / gtso bo'i dbang du byas nas 'du byed skyed pa*. Lamotte's insertion of the negative particle *ma* (in brackets) is based on Hsüan-tsang's text, p. 701b.4, but is not found in P, D, N, L, or C, although Wonch'uk and V do have it.

⁶²⁹Dok p. 97.2, K p. 44b.1: *byang chub sems dpas stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid gang 'tshal bas / stong pa nyid kyi don la mngon pa'i nga rgyal ma mchis shing / ma rung bar mi 'gyur ba'i stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid rdzogs pa gang lags*; Lamotte p. 110, P p. 17b.2, D p. 67.7: *theg pa chen po la byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyis gang rtogs na stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid la mngon pa'i nga rgyal ma mchis pas rab tu nyams par mi 'gyur ba'i stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid bsdus pa gang lags*.

⁶³⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 386.6) comments that "the Great Vehicle" in this context refers to Great Vehicle teachings, such as teachings concerning the eighteen emptinesses.

⁶³¹Dok p. 97.7 and K p. 44b.6 read: *de la de yang mi dmigs pa*. P p. 17b.7, D p. 68.4, N p. 51b.6, L p. 53b.6, C p. 43b.7, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), p. 391.5 all omit the negative particle *mi*; these texts read: *de la de dmigs pa*. Lamotte p. 110 adds the negative particle in brackets on the basis of Hsüan-tsang p. 701b.17: *de la de [mi] dmigs pa*, which is identical to V p. 97c.6. Wonch'uk vol. *thi* (119), p. 387.7 reads: *de la ci yang dmigs su med pa*.

⁶³²Dok p. 98.1, K p. 44b.7: *zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gnyis kyi ting nge 'dzin du zhig yongs su bzung*; Lamotte p. 110, P p. 17b.7, D p. 68.4: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong dag gi [P: gis] ting nge 'dzin du zhig bsdus lags*.

Presumably this question refers back to the main topic of this chapter, i.e., calm abiding and special insight. After a long digression, the sūtra now appears to be returning to this topic.

⁶³³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 393.7), this means that all meditative stabilizations of practitioners of the three vehicles are included within calm abiding and special insight.

⁶³⁴ĀDok p. 98.4, K p. 45a.1: *de dag gi 'bras bu gang lags zhes [K: shes] bgyi*; Lamotte p. 110, P p. 17c.2, D p. 68.6: *de dag gi 'bras bu gang lags par brjod par bgyi*.

⁶³⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 394.5) states that pure mind is the result of calm abiding and pure wisdom is the result of special insight.

⁶³⁶ĀDok p. 98.5, K p. 45a.2: *gzhan yang nyan thos gang gi 'am / de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi yang rung ste / 'jig rten pa dang / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i dge ba'i chos thams cad kyang / zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi 'bras bur shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 111, P p. 17c.3, D p. 68.7: *yang nyan thos rnams kyi 'am / byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi 'am / de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi dge ba'i chos 'jig rten pa dang / 'jig rten las 'das pa thams cad kyang zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi 'bras bu yin par rig par bya'o*. The words “of Bodhisattvas” are borrowed from Lamotte, P, and D, and are not found in ĀDok.

⁶³⁷ĀDok p. 98.7, K p. 45a.4: *mtshan ma'i bcings pa dang / gnas ngan len gyi bcings pa ste / bcings pa rnam gnyis las rnam par 'grel pa'o*; Lamotte p. 111, P p. 17c.4, D p. 69.1: *'ching ba rnam pa gnyis po mtshan ma'i 'ching ba dang / gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba las rnam par thar par byed pa yin no*.

Asaṅga (*Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* p. 287.d.5-6) quotes this passage and states: “Through cultivating calm abiding and through cultivating special insight one abandons the afflictions. Due to liberation from the bonds of signs and due to liberation from the bonds of bad states [the afflictions] are declared to be abandoned.”

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 395.4) states: “The signs are bonds because they are the minds and mental factors of the other-powered natures of the three realms. ‘Assumptions of bad states’ are bonds because they are the predispositions for manifestly apprehending conventions, that is to say, imputational natures.”

⁶³⁸Dok p. 99.1, K p. 45a.4: *gang bcom ldan 'das kyis bgegs su 'gyur ba rnam pa lnga gsungs pa 'di dag las / zhi gnas kyis bgegs su 'gyur ba ni du / lhag mthong gi bgegs su 'gyur ba ni du / de gnyis ka'i bgegs su 'gyur ba ni du lags*; Lamotte p. 111, P p. 17c.5, D p. 69.2: *bcom ldan 'das kyis gegs [P: gags] rnam pa lnga gsungs pa gang dag lags pa [P: /] de dag las du ni zhi gnas kyis gegs [P: gags] dag lags / du ni lhag mthong gi gegs [P: gags] dag lags / du ni gnyis ka'i [P, D: gnyi ga'i] gegs [P: gags] dag lags*.

⁶³⁹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 396.3) states that the “views [which overvalue] bodies” (*lus la lta ba, kāya-dṛṣṭi*) are “attachments to the internal sense spheres” (*nang gi skye mched la chags pa, ādhyātmika-āyatana-sakta*), and the “views [which overvalue] resources” (*long spyod la lta ba, bhoga-dṛṣṭi*) are “attachments to the external sense spheres” (*phyi rol gyi skye mched la chags pa, bahirdhā-āyatana-sakta*). Because these two are of a class that is discordant with purifying ethics due to being of the nature of aspiration for afflicted desires and lustful desires, they are obstacles to calm abiding.”

⁶⁴⁰Dok p. 99.2, K p. 45a.6: 'phags pa'i gtam [K: gtan] gyis tshim pa ma thob pa ni / lhag mthong gi bgegs so; Lamotte p. 111, P p. 17c.6, D p. 69.3: 'phags pa'i gtam 'dod pa bzhin ma thob pa ni lhag mthong gi gegs [P: gags] yin no.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 396.5) comments: "Because this is a class that is discordant with the pure view that arises from hearing and thinking, it is an obstacle to special insight."

⁶⁴¹Dok p. 99.3, K p. 45a.6: 'du 'dzir gnas pa dang / cung zad tsam gyis chog par 'dzin pa ni / de gnyis ka'i bgegs su 'gyur bar shes par bya ste; Lamotte p. 111, P p. 17c.7, D p. 69.3: 'dres par gnas pa dang / cung zad tsam gyis chog par 'dzin pa ni de gnyis ka'i [P, D: gnyi ga'i] gegs [P: gags] yin te.

See Lati Rinbochay's discussion of the prerequisites for calm abiding (*Meditative States* pp. 75-76), which is similar to this passage in its thought. See also *Kośa* 5.99 and 6.167.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 396.6) comments: "'Abiding in commotion' ('du 'dzir gnas pa, saṃgaṇikā-vihāra; Lamotte, P, D: 'dres par gnas pa, saṃkirṇa-vihāra) [refers to] physical non-isolation (*lus kyi mi dben pa, kāya-aviveka*). 'Being satisfied with mere inferior [attainments] (*cung zad tsam gyis chog par 'dzin pa, kiṃcinmātreṇa saṃtuṣṭi*) refers to] mental non-isolation (*sems kyi mi dben pa, citta-aviveka*.'" Because of these, one is not able to attain calm abiding or special insight: "On the one hand, through abiding in commotion one does not apply oneself to calm abiding and special insight. On the other hand, due to being satisfied with inferior [attainments,] one does not complete the endeavor. Therefore, these two are obstacles to both calm abiding and special insight."

⁶⁴²Dok p. 99.4, K p. 45a.7: de la yang gcig gis mi [K: ni] sbyor bar mi byed do // gnyis pas ni sbyor ba'i mthar phyin par mi 'gyur ro; Lamotte p. 111, P p.

17c.7, D p. 69.3: *de la 'ang [P, D: yang] gcig gis kyang sbyor bar mi byed do*
// gcig shos kyis ni sbyor ba mthar thug par mi 'gyur ro.

⁶⁴³Excitement (*rgod pa, auddhatya*) is listed among the twenty secondary afflictions (*nye nyon nyi shu, upakleśa*; see *ME* pp. 262-266). These are related to the six root afflictions (see *ME* pp. 256-262) and, like the root afflictions, disrupt the mental continuum. Excitement is “a scattering of the mind to attributes of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding. Thus, all scatterings of mind are not instances of excitement, since excitement is a portion of desire whereas the mind is frequently distracted to objects by way of afflictions other than desire and even scatters to virtuous objects of observation. Scattering involving desire is both scattering and excitement whereas other instances are just scattering” [*ME* p. 265].

Contrition (*'gyod pa, kaukrtya*) is listed among the four changeable mental factors (*gzhan 'gyur bzhi, catur-anyathābhāva*), so called because they become virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral in accordance with the motivations of the minds that accompany them. Contrition is “remorse or regret for a deed done by oneself in accordance with one’s own thought or upon pressure by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike. It involves ignorance and has the function of interrupting the stability of the mind” [*ME* p. 267].

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 399.3) states that they are obstructions to calm abiding because they lead to mental fluctuation, which involves the mind’s wandering from its objects. See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), pp. 396-7.

⁶⁴⁴Lethargy (*rmugs pa, sryāna*) is one of the twenty secondary afflictions, and is

defined as: “a heaviness and unservicability of body and mind. It involves ignorance and has the function of assisting all root and secondary afflictions, for in dependence on lethargy these increase” [ME p. 265].

Sleep (*gnyid, middha*) is one of the changeable mental factors, and is defined as: “a powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. It depends on causes such as heaviness of body, weakness, fatigue, taking the figure of darkness to mind, and so forth. Sleep involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities...there are two types of sleep, virtuous and non-virtuous, the latter having the function of degenerating virtuous activities” [ME p. 266].

Doubt (*the tshom, vicikitsā*) is one of the six root afflictions (*rtsa nyon drug, ṣaḍ-mūlakleṣa*; these are called “root afflictions” because they are the sources of all other afflictions). It is defined as: “a two-pointedness of mind with respect to the four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues. Doubt obstructs all virtuous activities and especially interferes with seeing the truth” [ME p. 258].

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 399.4) states that they are obstructions to special insight because they lead to lack of mental clarity and lack of ascertainment (*mi gsal zhing nges pa med pa*). See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), pp. 396-7.

⁶⁴According to *Meditative States* pp. 93-96, when one attains calm abiding, one overcomes the manifest arising of the gross afflictions to the point where they become weaker and eventually disappear of their own accord. One also overcomes five obstructions (*'grib pa, āvaraṇa*) that ordinarily are found in the mental continuum. These are: (1) aspiration to the attributes of the Desire Realm (*'dod pa la 'dun pa, kāma-cchanda*); (2) harmful intent (*gnod sems*,

vyāpāda); (3) lethargy and sleep (*rmugs pa dang gnyid, styāna-middha*); (4) excitement and contrition (*rgod pa dang 'gyod pa, auddhatya-kaukrtya*); and (5) doubt (*the tshom, vicikitsā*).

According to *Meditative States* (in the context of discussing attainment of the first concentration), the main attachment to attributes of the Desire Realm is the desire for copulation. This is the strongest object of desire in this realm. In order to overcome attachment to its attributes, one should consider its faults (this is necessary in attaining the first concentration). These faults are: (1) Desire Realm beings are of little consequence; that is, even if they achieve virtue it brings little profit since their minds are Desire Realm minds, whose chief characteristic is desire; (2) there are many sufferings in the Desire Realm; (3) the Desire Realm has many objects of observation that generate bad states, which means that many things in this realm lead to afflictive emotions in the perceiver, such as coarse desire; (4) when one depends upon the things of the Desire Realm, one does not attain auspiciousness; and (5) when one depends upon the phenomena of the Desire Realm, one does not know satisfaction, and there is no end which completely satisfies one.

Harmfulness is one of the features of the Desire Realm, in which beings desire to hurt and kill each other. It is an unmerciful wish to harm other sentient beings. It is not just a lack of mercy, but also involves an actual wish to harm another being. See *Meditative States* pp. 107-108 and Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvali*, verse 16, where he states that it leads to fright.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 399.4), these are obstructions to both calm abiding and special insight because they increase obstructions since they are root afflictions. See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), p. 398.

⁶⁴⁶This list is also found in *Compendium*, pp. 13-14.

⁶⁴⁷Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 399.3) explains that a “mahāyānistic mental contemplation” (*theg pa chen po dang ldan pa'i yid la byed, mahāyāna-samprayukta-manasikāra*) is one that meditates on the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med, dharma-nairātmya*) and that is endowed with the paths and fruits of Bodhisattvas (*byang chub sems dpa'i lam 'bras bu dang bcas pa dang ldan pa chos bdag med pa yid la byed pa*). By contrast, a Hinayānistic mental contemplation is one that meditates on the selflessness of persons (*gang zag gi bdag med, pudgala-nairātmya*) and is endowed with abiding in a path of asceticism (*dge sbyong gi lam la gnas pa*) and attains the fruits of asceticism.

⁶⁴⁸Lamotte p. 112, P p. 17d.7, N p. 53a.2, Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* (205), p. 399.5, and Wonch'uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 407.1 omit the term “afflictions” (*nyon mongs, kleśa*) in their lists, but it is found in Ādok p. 100.5, K p. 45b.6, D p. 70.2 and L p. 55.4.

According to Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary), “commotion” (*'du dzi, saṃgaṇa*) refers to “many people gathering together and talking a lot. If you do that, you do not achieve meditative equipoise. To achieve [meditative equipoise], you need to remain alone” [tr. Jules Levinson]. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 399.4) explains that: “‘Signs’ (*mtshan ma, nimitta*) are the shapes of the forms of men, women, and so forth (*skyes pa dang bud med la sogs pa'i dbyibs*). ‘Conceptuality’ (*rnam par rtog pa, vikalpa*) [refers to] the five, conceptuality of desire, harmful intent, and so forth (*'dod pa dang gnod sems kyi rnam par rtog pa la sogs lnga*; see note 645). The ‘secondary afflictions’ (*nye ba'i nyon mongs pa, upakleśa*) are all the bases that are concordant with making the mind afflicted (*sems nye bar nyon mongs par byed pa dang mthun pa'i gzhi thams cad*).” “External objects of observation” (*phyi rol gyi dmigs pa, bāhya-ālam-bana*) include “all aspects of objects” (*yul gyi*

rnam pa thams cad). Due to these, the mind becomes scattered.

⁶⁴⁹Dok p. 100.6, K p. 45b.7: *gal te snyoms par 'jug pa'i nye ba'i nyon mongs pa rmugs pa dang / gnyid dam / bying ba 'am / snyoms par 'jug pa'i myang ba 'am / gang yang rung bas nye ba'i nyon mongs pa dang ldan par 'gyur ba / 'di ni nang gi sems rnam par g.yeng ba'o*; Lamotte p. 112, P p. 17d.7, D p. 70.2: *gal te rmugs pa dang gnyid kyis bying ba 'am / snyoms par 'jug pa'i ro myang ba 'am / snyoms par 'jug pa'i nye ba'i nyon mongs pa gang yang rung bas nyon mongs par gyur na / de ni nang du sems rnam par g.yeng ba yin no*.

This means that they become attached to the bliss of meditative absorptions and fail to progress because of this. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 399.6) states that this means that sentient beings who experience the bliss of the four concentrations and the four formless absorptions become established in the long lives of gods. By so doing, they lose the ability to practice the concentrations and absorptions, and so degenerate from bringing about the aims of sentient beings.

Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Bsam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug rnams kyi rnam par bzahag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed* (Indian blockprint, n.d., p. 143.2)) cites this passage and comments:

The entities of those two [laxity and excitement] are unlike because (1) lethargy is a factor of obscuration and accompanies all root and secondary afflictions; (2) laxity is divided into virtuous and neutral types but does not accompany desire, hatred, and so forth at all [translation by Leah Zahler].

⁶⁵⁰Dok p. 100.7, K p. 46a.1: *gal te phyi rol gyi mtshan ma la gnas pa*; Lamotte p. 112, P p. 17d.8, D p. 70.3: *gal te phyi rol gyi mtshan ma la brten nas*.

⁶⁵¹Ādok p. 101.1, K p. 46a.1: *gal te nang gi yid la byed pa la brten nas byung ba'i tshor ba la gnas ngan len gyi tshogs kyis nga'o zhes snyems* [sic; in both Ādok and K] *pa de ni*; Lamotte p. 112, P p. 17e.1, D p. 70.4: *gal te nang gi yid la byed pa la brten nas byung ba'i tshor ba la gnas ngan len gyi lus kyis nga'o snyam du rlom sems su byed na de ni*.

⁶⁵²For a list and description of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (*sa, bhūmi*), see Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* (*ratnāvalī*, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, London: Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 84-87 and chapter nine of this sūtra.

⁶⁵³Ādok p. 101.5, K p. 46a.5: *'khor ba dang / mya ngan las 'das pa la shin tu phyir phyogs pa dang / mngon du phyogs pa'i 'o*; Lamotte p. 113, P p. 17e.4, D p. 70.6: *'khor ba dang / mya ngan las 'das pa dag la gcig tu mi phyogs pa nyid dang / mngon du phyogs pa nyid kyi'o*.

⁶⁵⁴Ādok p. 101.6, K p. 46a.6: *mtshan ma med pa la sgrib pa 'am / mtshan ma la mi dbang ba'i 'o*; Lamotte p. 113, P p. 17e.6, D p. 70.7: *mtshan ma med pa la rtsol ba dang / mtshan ma la dbang du ma gyur pa'i 'o*.

⁶⁵⁵Ādok p. 101.7, K p. 46a.7: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sa la ni / zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong nyon mongs pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra ba bas kyang ches phra ba'i gnyen po ste*; Lamotte p. 113, P p. 17e.7, D p. 71.1: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong de bzhin gshegs pa'i sa la ni nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra ba mchog tu ches shin tu phra ba'i gnyen po yin te*.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 435.3), The "very subtle" (*shin tu phra ba, sūkṣmatama*) obstructions are the afflictive obstructions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa, kleśa-āvaraṇa*), and the "extremely very subtle" (*mchog tu ches shin tu phra ba, atisūkṣmatama*) obstructions are the obstructions to

omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa, jñeya-āvaraṇa*).

⁶⁵⁶Dok p. 102.1, K p. 46a.8: *de legs par bcom pa'i phyir / chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas / dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye shes mthong ba rab tu 'thob bo*; Lamotte p. 113, P p. 17e.7, D p. 71.2: *de legs par bcom pas thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs [ma; P, D: pa] med pa'i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob cing dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la [chos kyi sku; P: cha shas kyi sku] shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa yin no*. See note 502.

⁶⁵⁷Dok p. 102.2, K p. 46b.1: *zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong la nan tan bgyid pa'i byang chub sems dpa' ji ltar bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.1, D p. 71.2: *byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang lhag mthong la ji ltar sgrub na bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar 'gyur lags*.

⁶⁵⁸Dok p. 102.4, K p. 46b.2: *'di la byang chub sems dpa' zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong rab tu thob nas / de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun la brtsams te / ji ltar thos pa dang bsams pa'i chos rnams la mnyam par gzhas pa'i sems kyis de dag nyid legs par rtogs pa [K: rtog pas] dang / shin tu bsam pa [K: shin tu bas] dang / shin tu bkod pa'i de bzhin nyid nang du yid la byed do*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.2, D p. 71.3: *'di la byang chub sems dpa' [P: de nyid] zhi gnas dang lhag mthong thob nas / de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun las brtsams te / ji ltar thos pa dang [P: /] bsams pa'i chos rnams mnyam par bzhas [P: gzhas] pa'i sems kyis bzung ba dang / legs par bsams pa dang / legs par mnyam par bzhas [P: gzhas] pa'i de bzhin nyid nang du yid la byed de*.

⁶⁵⁹Dok p. 102.5, K p. 46b.4: *de de ltar yid la byed pas mtshan ma shin tu phra ba 'byung ba rnams las kyang / sems shin tu btang snyoms su 'gyur na / chen po lta la ci smos*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.3, D p. 71.4: *de ltar de bzhin nyid yid la byed pa na mtshan ma phra mo kun tu 'byung ba thams cad la 'ang [P, D: yang] re zhig [P: shig] sems lhag par btang snyoms su 'jog na rags pa dag la lta smos kyang ci dgos*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 406.1) states that when the mind “becomes very withdrawn from” (*shin tu btang snyoms su 'gyur*) signs one is no longer attached to imputational natures.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 441.7) states that “coarse signs” (*mtshan ma rags pa, sthūla-nimitta*) include “all the signs that are sources of thorough affliction” (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i kun tu 'byung ba'i mtshan ma thams cad*).

⁶⁶⁰Dok p. 102.6, K p. 46b.5: *mtshan ma shin tu phra ba*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.4, D p. 5: *mtshan ma phra mo*.

⁶⁶¹Dok p. 103.2, K p. 46b.8: *mi rtag pa'i mtshan ma 'am / rtag pa'i mtshan ma 'am*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.7, D p. 71.7: *rtag pa'i mtshan ma 'am / mi rtag pa'i mtshan ma 'am*.

⁶⁶²Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 406.3) comments: “With respect to the ‘signs of mental appropriation’ (*sems kyi len pa'i mtshan ma, cittādāna-nimitta*): there are two causes of connecting lives (*nying mtshams sbyor ba, samdhi*) of just the basis-consciousness: (1) predispositions for manifestly apprehending the imputational nature (*kun briags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags len pa*) and (2) appropriating physical sense powers that serve as bases [of consciousnesses] (*rtan dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs*)

can len pa). When [engaging in] viewing the body and establishing mindfulness of the body — regarding the internal body, the external body, and bodies that are both external and internal which are appropriated through those [two causes] — whatever appearing images — the signs of filthiness and the signs of suchness that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations — [appear] with respect to the body are the ‘signs of mental appropriation’ in this [case].”

On p. 406.5 he comments: “With respect to ‘signs of experience’ (*myong ba’i mtshan ma, anubhava-nimitta*): there is obscuration concerning the self, the view of self, pride of self, and attachment to self of just that mind; when engaging in viewing feelings and establishing mindfulness of feelings [produced] by these — regarding experiencing internal feelings, external feelings, and feelings that are both internal and external — whatever appearing images — the signs of suffering and the signs of suchness that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations with respect to feelings — are called ‘signs of mental experience’ in this [case].”

“Signs of cognition” (*rnam par rig pa’i mtshan ma, vijñapti-nimitta*) are “just that mind’s cognitions of objects of observation”. He adds: “Due to these, when engaging in viewing the mind and establishing mindfulness of the mind with respect to internal minds, external minds, and minds that are both internal and external, which are understood as cognition-only — whatever appearing images — the signs of impermanence and the signs of suchness that are objects of activity of meditative stabilizations with respect to that mind — are ‘signs of mental cognition’ in this [case].”

“Signs of thorough affliction and purification” (*kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba’i mtshan ma, saṃkleśa-vyavadāna-nimitta*) are “the mind’s own minds and mental factors” (*sems dang sems ’byung, citta-caitta*). He adds that the signs of thorough affliction and thorough purification are

considered in the context of establishing mindfulness of phenomena and refer to the meditative images of thorough affliction, images of purification, and the suchness of those.

“Signs of the internal” (*nang gi mtshan ma, ādhyātmika-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the internal”. “Signs of the external” (*phyi rol gyi mtshan ma, bāhya-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the external”. “Signs of both” (*de gnyis ka’i mtshan ma, ubhaya-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the internal and external”.

“Signs involved in thinking, ‘[I] am working for the sake of all sentient beings’” (Dok p. 103.1, K p. 46b.6: *sems can thams cad kyi don la sbyor ro snyam pa’i mtshan ma*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.5, D p. 71.6: *sems can thams cad kyi don la sbyar bar bya’ o snyam pa’i mtshan ma, sarvasattvārthe prayoga iti nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of emptiness”. He adds that one might think that since the internal and external are empty there is no need to work for the benefit of sentient beings, but as an antidote to such thoughts one should think that this thought itself is also empty: “One realizes the emptiness of emptiness as an antidote to neglecting the welfare of sentient beings upon having the thought, ‘If the internal and the external are both emptiness, then what is to be achieved in emptiness?’ One realizes the emptiness of emptiness, thinking, ‘[I] will apply myself to the welfare of all sentient beings since that emptiness is itself also empty’.”

“Signs of consciousness” (Dok p. 103.1, K p. 46b.7: “signs of wisdom”, *ye shes kyi mtshan ma, prajñā-nimitta*; Lamotte p. 114, P p. 18a.5, D p. 71.6: *shes pa’i mtshan ma, jñāna-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the great”. He adds: “This is the realization that all worldly realms in the ten directions are not external or internal things, but are of the nature of consciousness.”

“Signs of suchness, [true] sufferings, [true] sources, [true] cessations, and [true] paths” (*de bzhin nyid dang sdug bsngal dang kun ’byung ba dang ’gog pa dang lam gyi mtshan ma, tathatā-duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the ultimate”.

“Signs of compounded phenomena” (*'du byas kyi mtshan ma, saṃskṛta-nimitta*) are “aspects that are involved in realizing the emptiness of compounded phenomena”. “Signs of uncompounded phenomena” (*'dus ma byas kyi mtshan ma, asaṃskṛta-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of uncompounded phenomena”. “Signs of impermanent phenomena” (*mi rtag pa'i mtshan ma, anitya-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of what is beginningless and endless”. He adds: “One realizes the emptiness of impermanent phenomena, [the fact that] compounded phenomena lack a former or later limit.”

“Signs of permanent phenomena” (*rtag pa'i mtshan ma, nitya-nimitta*) are “aspects for realizing the emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes”. He adds: “One realizes that persons are utterly non-existent in permanent, permanent time and everlasting, everlasting time.”

“Signs of what has a nature that is associated with suffering as well as with change” (*sdug bsngal 'gyur ba dang bcas pa'i rang bzhin can gyi mtshan ma, duḥkha-pariṇāma-samyukta-svabhāvasya nimitta*) and “signs having a nature of unchangeableness” (*mi 'gyur ba'i rang bzhin can gyi mtshan ma, aparīṇāma-svabhāvasya nimitta*) are “aspects for realizing the emptiness of the indestructible [i.e., nirvāṇa]”....That which has a nature of suffering is the aggregates, and that which has a nature of change is also the aggregates because since they are just true sufferings they have a nature of impermanence. The aggregates having a nature of suffering and the aggregates having a nature of change are what are to be discarded, which is a synonym of the aggregates. The indestructible [literally, ‘that which is not to be discarded’] is nirvāṇa because it is the utter cessation of suffering and has a nature of changelessness.”

“Signs of the characteristics of compounded phenomena” (*Ḍok p. 103.3, K p. 47a.1: 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid kyi mtshan ma, saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-nimitta*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18a.8, D p. 72.1: *'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba'i mtshan ma, saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-pratikūla-nimitta*) or “signs of the specific characteristics of those” (*de'i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi mtshan ma*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of character”. He

adds: “The different character of compounded phenomena is the uncompounded, the ultimate truth. Their specific characters are compounded phenomena, conventional truths. One realizes that those two characters are empty of their own inherent nature.”

“Signs of everything, as in the context of knowing everything as ‘everything’” (Dok p. 103.4, K p. 47a.1: *thams cad la thams cad ces bya bar shes nas thams cad kyi mtshan ma*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18a.8, D p. 72.1: *thams cad thams cad ces bya bar rig nas thams cad kyi mtshan ma*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of everything”. He adds: “One realizes that all the phenomena that are included within [the categories] compounded and uncompounded are empty.”

“Signs of the selflessness of persons” (*gang zag [la; Lamotte, P, D: gi] bdag med pa'i mtshan ma, pudgala-nairātmya-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of the unobservable”. He adds: “One understands persons as being empty of the emptiness of the unobservable.”

“Signs of the selflessness of phenomena” (*chos [la: omitted in Lamotte, P, D] bdag med pa'i mtshan ma, dharma-nairātmya-nimitta*) are “aspects involved in realizing the emptiness of non-things”. He adds: “One realizes that phenomena are empty of being non-things.” Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 409.7) concludes: “In this way...one enters into suchness, the antidote to all the signs of the other-powered [nature].” See also Wonch'uk's discussion of this, beginning on vol. *thi* (119), p. 442.

⁶⁶³Dok p. 103.5, K p. 47a.2: *de dag 'byung ba las / sems btang snyoms su byed do*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.1, D p. 72.2: *de dag kun tu 'byung ba la sems lhag par btang snyoms su 'jug go*.

⁶⁶⁴Dok p. 103.5, K p. 47a.2: *de de ltar zhugs shing de lan mang du gnas pas / dus dus su bgegs dang / sgrib pa dang / rnam par g.yeng ba las sems yongs su sbyong ba na / de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun la nang gi so so rang gis shes par bya bar rab tu rtogs pa'i ye shes rnam pa bdun skye bar 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.1, D p. 72.2: *de ltar zhugs*

shing de la mang du gnas pa dus dus su gegs [P: gags] dang / sgrib pa dang / rnam par g.yeng ba dag las sems rnam par spyod [D: sbyong] par byed pa de la nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la so sor rang rig pa de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun so sor rtogs [P, D: rtog] pa'i shes pa rnam pa bdun skye bar 'gyur te.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 410.1) states that these “occasions” (*dus dus su*) are “the occasion of calm abiding, the occasion of special insight, and the occasion of both”.

For a list of the seven aspects of suchness, along with descriptions of each, see chapter eight, p. 86 and *Compendium* pp. 18-19.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 410.2) states that “individually” (*nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la*, *pratyātma*) means “within the nature of the mind” (*sems kyi ngo bo nyid la*). “Known by oneself” (*so sor rang rig pa*, *pratyeka-svasaṃveda*) means that one knows “non-dualistically” (*gnyis med pa*, *advaya*).

⁶⁶⁵Dok p. 103.7, K p. 47a.4: *yang dag pa nyid du nges par gyur pa la zhugs pa yin te*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.3, D p. 72.3: *yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs pa yin*.

⁶⁶⁶Dok p. 103.7, K p. 47a.5: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i rigs su skyes pa'i sa dang po yang thob pa yin no // sa de'i phan yon yang myong ba yin no*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.3, D p. 72.3: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i rigs su skyes pa yin / sa dang po thob pa dang / sa de'i phan yon yang nyams su myong ba yin no*.

This paragraph is quoted by Jam-yang-shay-ba (*Bsam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug rnam kyi rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed* (Indian blockprint, n.d., p. 170.4)). He comments:

Moreover, this is the case because (1) with regard to attaining the objects of observation that are the two images by having previously attained the two, calm abiding and special insight, by means of [stabilizing and analytical meditation], one attains the object of observation that is the limit of phenomena which [thinks,]

“Suchness,” with respect to the mode by the power of experience through directly seeing emptiness in that way; (2) it is explained that even someone on the path of seeing, in dependence upon the three — the two images and the limits of phenomena — also on the occasions of the higher [Bodhisattva] grounds — that is, the path of meditation — abandons by the power of analytical meditation assumptions of bad states and all bonds of signs and attains the object of observation which is thorough achievement of the purpose at Buddhahood [tr. Leah Zahler].

⁶⁶⁷Dok p. 104.1, K p. 47a.5: *de sngar zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong thob pa'i phyir / rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa dang / rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan la dmigs pa rnam pa gnyis thob pa yin no*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.4, D p. 72.4: *des sngar zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong thob pas ni rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan dang / rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan gyi dmigs pa rnam pa gnyis thob pa yin no*.

⁶⁶⁸Dok p. 104.2, K p. 47a.6: *da gdod*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.5, D p. 72.4: *de ltar na*.

⁶⁶⁹See note 502. According to Geshe Jambel Tandu (oral commentary), in this instance it involves seeing the true nature of an object, i.e., its emptiness, without the mediation of a meaning-generality (*don spyi*, *artha-sāmānya*). A meaning-generality accompanies all perceptions by the mental consciousnesses of ordinary beings up until the path of seeing and is the means by which we get at our objects of observation. The path of seeing is attained when one is able to directly perceive the final nature of things, i.e., their emptiness.

⁶⁷⁰Dok p. 104.2, K p. 47a.6: *de sa rnam la gong nas gong du bsgom pa'i lam la rab tu zhugs shing / dmigs pa gsum po de dag yid la byed pas / 'di lta ste dper na / la la zhig gis shin tu phra ba'i khye 'us de bas sbom pa'i khye'u dbyung ba de bzhin du / de'ang khye 'us khye'u dbyung ba'i tshul du nang gi mtshan ma rnam par sel bas / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i phyogs kyi mtshan ma thams cad rnam par sel to*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.5,

D p. 72.5: *da* [P, D: *de*] *sa gong ma gong ma rnam su bsgom pa'i lam la zhugs shing / dmigs pa rnam pa gsum po de dag nyid yid la byed pa na / 'di lta ste dper na / la la zhig khye'u ches phra mos khye'u ches sbom po 'byin par byed pa de bzhin du de 'ang* [P, D: *yang*] *khye 'us khye'u dbyung ba'i tshul du nang gi mtshan ma rnam par sel ba nyid kyis kun nas nyon mongs pa'i cha dang mthun* [P, D: *'thun*] *pa'i mtshan ma thams cad rnam par sel bar byed de.*

As Lamotte points out (p. 231 n. 49, citing Candra Das' *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 160), The term *khye'u* would usually mean "puppy" or "child". He correctly states, however, that in this context *khye'u* means "nail" or "peg". In his *Dag yig thon mi'i dgongs rgyan* (New Delhi, 1969, p. 38), Tsay-dēn-shap-drung (*tshe brtan zhabs drung*) states that this term refers to "a small piece of wood that is used to set up and make firm" (*gzthag pa dang dam por byed pa'i thabs kyi shing bu*). This term refers to pegs of wood used to hold furniture and so forth together. The upshot of the example is that, just as a small wooden peg could be used to expel a much larger one, so this mental contemplation (which at first is weak compared to the afflictions) can be used to eliminate the grossest afflictions at first and then gradually to eliminate more subtle ones.

Lamotte's translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (*Somme* pp. 219-220) contains the same analogy. The commentary states:

Le savoir à objet synthétique (*samsr̥ṣṭadharma-lambana jñāna*) se présente comme le contrecarrant de tous les obstacles (*sarvāvaraṇa-pratipakṣa*). C'est comme un clou mince (*sūkṣmāṇi*) expulsant un gros clou (*sthūlāṇi*). En effet, les imprégnations-germes (*vāsanābija*) des Dharma souillés (*saṃkleśika-dharma*), qui résident dans la connaissance-racine (*mūla-vijñāna*), sont grossières (*sthūla*), et le chemin contrecarrant (*pratipakṣa-mārga*) qui peut les expulser est subtil (*sūkṣma*).

The same idea is found in *Tshig mdzod* pp. 264 and 267. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], pp. 452.3) discusses different ways of applying this metaphor.

⁶⁷¹ Dōk p. 104.4, K p. 47b.1: *mtshan ma* [K: *rnam*] *rnam par sel bas* [K: *pas*] *gnas ngan*

len rnam kyang rnam par sel to; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.7, D p. 72.6: *mtshan ma rnam rnam par sel ba na gnas ngan len rnam kyang rnam par sel bar byed do*. The word “when” is added on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which have a *na* particle. This is omitted in *Dok*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 411.3) states that this passage indicates that those who eliminate the assumptions of bad states eliminate the predispositions for imputations.

⁶⁷²*Dok* p. 104.5, K p. 47b.2: *gser lta bur sems rnam par sbyong shing*; Lamotte p. 115, P p. 18b.8, D p. 72.7, N p. 54b.7, L p. 57a.6: *gser lta bur sems rnam par spyod [D, L: sbyong] la*. I have chosen *sbyong* instead of *spyod* as a more probable reading, since *spyod* seems out of place in this sentence, while *sbyong* fits the analogy. Also, Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 454.6) uses *sbyang* in his quotation of this passage, and glosses it with the term “purify” (*rnam par dag pa*).

According to Wonch’uk (p. 454.7, citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*), “purifying the mind like gold” involves eliminating faults such as anger and so forth and making the mind serviceable.

⁶⁷³My insertion follows the discussion of thorough accomplishment of the purpose at the beginning of this chapter, which equates attaining the truth body with “thorough accomplishment of the purpose”. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 411.4) states that in this passage the term refers to “perfect exalted wisdom” (*ye shes phun sum tshogs pa, sampanna-jñāna*).

⁶⁷⁴*Dok* p. 104.7, K p. 47b.3: *de ltar na zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong la nan tan byed pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par ’tshang rgya’o*; Lamotte p. 116, P p. 18c.1, D p. 72.7: *byang chub sems dpa’ zhi gnas dang lhag mthong la de ltar sgrub na bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i*

byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar 'gyur ro.

⁶⁷⁵Dok p. 104.7, K p. 47b.3: *byang chub sems dpa' ji ltar na nan tan bgyid na / byang chub sems dpa'i mthu chen po mngon par sgrub pa lags*; Lamotte p. 116, P p. 18c.1, D p. 72.7: *byang chub sems dpa' ji ltar sgrub par bgyid na / byang chub sems dpa'i mthu chen po mngon par sgrub pa lags*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 411.7) identifies these “great powers” (*mthu chen po, mahāprabhāva*) as: (1) the power of clairvoyance (*mngon par shes pa'i mthu, abhijñā-prabhāva*); (2) the power of doctrine (*chos kyi mthu, dharma-prabhāva*); (3) innate powers (*lhan cig skyes pa'i mthu, sahaja-prabhāva*); (3) common powers (*thun mong gi mthu, sādharma-prabhāva*); and (4) uncommon powers (*thun mong ma yin pa'i mthu, asādhāraṇa-prabhāva*). See also pp. 412-425, where he goes into great detail concerning divisions and sub-divisions of each of these, and see *Compendium* p. 98.

⁶⁷⁶According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 457.5), in this passage “skill” (*mkhas pa, kuśala*) refers to “a mind that thoroughly knows” (*yongs su shes par byed pa'i sems*).

⁶⁷⁷The *Compendium* (pp. 134-135) has a different list of skillful objects. I have not been able to find the list of skillful objects presented in this sūtra in any other source.

In discussing skillful objects of observation, Gendun Lodrö (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 273) explains that these are specific objects that Bodhisattvas take to mind in order to become skilled with respect to realizations leading up to calm abiding and special insight: “For example, a yogi who desires to become skilled with respect to the nature of composed phenomena must know the entity, divisions, definition, enumeration, and mode of production of the aggregates. For example, to know the mode of production of the form aggregate, which is an instance of coarse form, is to know that it arises from or is composed of an aggregation of minute particles and to know that when it disintegrates there is disintegration of these particles”. This outline accords with that of the

Compendium, but differs from that of the *Samdhinirmocana*, although the procedure of taking the objects to mind appears to be the same.

⁶⁷⁸Dok p. 105.3, K p. 47b.6: *rnam pa bcu drug tu sems skye ba shes na / sems skye ba yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mkhas pa yin no // de la sems skye ba rnam pa bcu drug po la*; Lamotte p. 116, P p. 18c.4, D p. 73.3: *sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug shes na sems kyi skye ba la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mkhas pa yin te / de la sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug ni*.

⁶⁷⁹Dok p. 105.4, K p. 47b.1: *rab tu mi rtogs shing brtan pa snod kyi rnam par rig pa ni*; Lamotte p. 116, P p. 18c.5, D p. 73.3: *brtan pa dang snod rnam par rig pa'i ni*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 425.6) explains that it is “stable” (*brtan pa, dṛdha*) “because it is the appropriating consciousness, which is the abode of the predispositions of thoroughly afflicted and purified phenomena. It is a ‘vessel’ (*snod, bhājana*) because it is a world that is an environment.”

⁶⁸⁰These terms have technical meanings in Buddhist philosophy, but here probably only indicate short periods of time. In general, a “moment” (*skad cig, kṣaṇa*) is simply the shortest period of time required to accomplish an action (*bya rdzogs*). This is also Jam-*yang-shay-ḥa*’s position in his *Dbu ma chen mo* (*dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs*, Buxador: Gomanag, 1967, p. 99a.5). According to the Ge-luk-*ḥa* system (which is based on the *Abhidharmakośa*) a moment is defined as an amount of time equivalent to the duration of 1/60th of a finger-snap (*se gol, acchaṭā*), or 1/60th of an “instant” (*thang cig, lava*). This accords with Wonch'uk's explanation in vol. *di* (120), p. 171.6. According to the *Tshig mdzod* (p. 106), in general this refers to “an exceedingly small period of time” (*dus yun ha cang chung ngu*). This dictionary adds that in the Svātantrika system this equals “1/65th of the portion of the time of a human's finger-snap” (*skyes bu'i se gol gcig gi yun tshad cha drug rtsa re lnga*). In

the Prāsaṅgika system it is said to equal 1/365th of a finger-snap. The *Kośa*, however (Tome II p. 179), has a different position: it states that one instant equals 7,200 moments. According to the *Tshig mdzod* (p. 1141), an “instant” equals sixty moments, or the duration of one finger-snap.

The *Tshig mdzod* (p. 2584) defines a “short time” (*yud tsam*, *muhūrta*) as “a 1/30th portion of a day” (*nyin zhag gcig gi cha sum rtsa'i zur gcig*), which is a period of about 48 minutes. This is also the position of Jam-yang-shay-ba in his *Dbu ma chen mo* p. 94a. Lamotte (p. 232) thinks that this is a much shorter period, and he translates *yud tsam* as “*unclin-d'œil*”, which accords with Wonch'uk's explanation in vol. *di* (120), p. 173.7. The *Kośa* (Tome II p. 179) states that it equals thirty instants. According to Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary), in a non-technical sense it just means “a little bit” (*tog tsam*).

The three terms are translated in accordance with the order in Lamotte's text. *Dōk* lists them in the following order: *skad cig*, *yud tsam*, and *thang cig*. I decided to follow Lamotte's order because he lists them in increasing duration. See also Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 171.6), where he provides explanations of these and other chronological measurements. My thanks to Ann Klein of Stanford University for providing me with a transcript of notes on Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Dbu ma chen mo*.

⁶⁸¹*Dōk* p. 105.4, K p. 47b.7: *rnam pa sna tshogs la dmigs pa'i rnam par rig pa de 'di lta ste / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa thang cig tu / gzugs la sogs pa'i yul 'dzin pa thang cig tu / phyi nang gi yul tshor ba 'dzin pa thang cig tu / skad cig yud tsam thang cig gcig la ting nge 'dzin mang po la yang snyoms par 'jug pa / sangs rgyas kyi zhing mang po yang mthong ba / de bzhin gshegs pa mang po yang mthong ba / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa'o*; Lamotte p. 116, P p. 18c.4, D p. 73.4: *dmigs pa'i rnam pa sna tshogs rnam par rig pa'i ni 'di lta ste / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa gzugs la sogs pa'i yul cig car 'dzin pa phyi rol dang / nang gi yul cig car 'dzin pa / skad cig dang thang cig dang yud tsam cig la cig car ting nge 'dzin mang [D: yang] po*

la snyoms par 'jug pa / sangs rgyas kyi zhing mang po mthong ba [P, D: /] de bzhin gshegs pa mang po mthong ba / rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa kho na'i 'o.

According to Śer-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay (pp. 36a-b), in the Mind-Only system the term “conceptual consciousness” (*rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa*, *vikalpa-vijñāna*) includes all dualistic consciousnesses, which seems to apply in this context. He states (36a.4): “Conceptual [consciousnesses include] all minds and mental factors of the three realms that have dualistic appearance” (*rnam rtog ni gnyis snang can gyi kham gsum pa'i sems sems byung thams cad de*).

The term “simultaneously” translates *thang gcig tu* in Ḍok and K, which is ambiguous; but the fact that Lamotte, P, and D use the term *cig car* indicates that this should be taken as meaning that this consciousness apprehends its objects in the same moment, or “simultaneously”.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 426.4) identifies the “external objects” that are apprehended as form and so forth. The “internal objects” that are apprehended are sense powers, minds, and mental factors.

The translation follows Lamotte, P, and D in omitting *tshor ba*. The phrase in Ḍok and K: *phyi nang gi yul tshor ba 'dzin pa* would be translated as: “apprehends feelings that are external and internal objects” or “apprehends feelings as external and internal objects”. I have chosen the reading of Lamotte, P, and D as more probable, since the idea of “feelings that are external objects” makes no sense.

⁶⁸²Ḍok p. 105.7, K p. 48a.2: *mtshan ma chung ngu'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa ni / 'di lta ste / 'dod pa dang ldan pa'o*; Lamotte p. 117, P p. 18c.7, D p. 73.5: *dmigs pa'i mtshan ma chung ngu rnam par rig pa'i ni 'di lta ste / 'dod pa dang ldan pa'i 'o.*

The words in brackets in this section have been added on the basis of the correspondence of some of the first six members of this list to a standard Mahāyāna list of six discriminations (*'du shes*, *saṃjñā*). The first of these is “discrimination having signs” (*mtshan ma bcas gyi 'du shes*, *saṃjñā*), which *ME* (p. 242) defines as: “(a)

discrimination skilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as impermanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination having a clear subjective aspect and object of observation". This corresponds to the second member of the list of cognitions in the sūtra passage. The second discrimination is "discrimination lacking signs" (*mtshan med kyi 'du shes, animitta-saṃjñā*), which is the opposite of the first discrimination, and may correspond to the first cognition in the sūtra passage.

The third discrimination is "discrimination of the small" (*rgya chung ba'i 'du shes, parṭṭa-saṃjñā*), which *ME* (p. 243) defines as: "(a) discrimination in the continuum of an ordinary being in the Desire Realm who has not attained an actual concentration and (b) discriminations observing attributes of the Desire Realm". This corresponds to the third cognition.

⁶³This corresponds to the fourth type of discrimination (see previous note), "discrimination of the vast" (*rgya che ba'i 'du shes, mahadgatā-saṃjñā*), which *ME* (p. 243) defines as: "(a) discriminations observing the Form Realm and (b) discriminations in the continuums of beings in the Form Realm".

⁶⁴This corresponds to the fifth type of discrimination, "discrimination of the limitless" (*tshad med pa'i 'du shes, apramāṇa-saṃjñā*), which *ME* (p. 243) defines as: "discriminations observing limitless space or limitless consciousness". The next cognition (number six) corresponds to the sixth discrimination, "discrimination of nothingness" (*ci yang med pa'i 'du shes, akiñcin-saṃjñā*), which *ME* (p. 243) defines as: "discriminations observing nothingness (a state beyond coarse feeling and discrimination)".

⁶⁵*Dok* p. 106.2, *K* p. 48a.4: *mtha' ma'i mtshan ma dmigs pa rnam par rig pa ni / 'di lta ste / 'du shes med 'du shes med min gyi skye mched dang ldan pa'o*; *Lamotte* p. 117, *P* p. 18d.1, *D* p. 73.7: *dmigs pa'i mtshan ma mthar thug pa rnam par rig pa'i ni 'di lta ste / 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched dang ldan pa'i 'o*.

These are discussed at length in *Meditative States*, pp. 92-133.

⁶⁸⁶According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 463.3), "the supramundane" ('*jig rten las 'das pa, lokottara*) refers to uncontaminated true paths as well as consciousnesses that are concordant with such. "Cessation" ('*gog pa, nirodha*) probably refers to true cessations ('*gog pa'i bden pa, nirodha-satya*).

⁶⁸⁷*Dōk* p. 106.4 reads: '*dres pa'i tshor ba dang ldan pa ni / 'di lta ste / 'dod pa spyod pa*. Lamotte p. 117, P p. 18d.3, D p. 74.1 and K p. 48a.6 make it clear that this refers to involvement in the Desire Realm by inserting a *na* particle. These texts read: '*tshor ba 'dren ma dang ldan pa'i ni 'di lta ste / 'dod pa na spyod pa'i 'o*.

⁶⁸⁸The discussion of this and the previous cognition presupposes the idea (common to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna systems of meditation) that in the first two concentrations joy (*dga' ba, prīti*) and bliss (*bde ba, sukha*) are present, but in the third concentration joy is absent but bliss is present. One also develops meditative equanimity (*btang snyoms, upekṣā*) in the third concentration, which is strengthened in the fourth concentration to the point where bliss also disappears and is replaced with a pervasive equanimity. The reason why joy and bliss are progressively eliminated is that they interfere with mental stability. See *Meditative States* pp. 92-128.

⁶⁸⁹*Dōk* p. 106.5, K p. 48a.7: '*sdug bsngal yang ma yin / bde ba yang ma yin pa dang ldan pa ni / 'di lta ste / bsam gtan bzhi pa nas 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched pa'i bar du'o*; Lamotte p. 117, P p. 18d.4, D p. 74.2: '*sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba 'ang [P, D: yang] ma yin pa dang ldan pa'i ni 'di lta ste / bsam gtan bzhi pa pa dang / 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched pa'i bar gyi'o*.

This appears to be referring to the mode of attaining the four concentrations and the four formless absorptions (see note 540). In cultivating the first concentration, one views

the Desire Realm as gross and the first concentration as subtle, and seeks to actualize the first concentration, which is characterized by joy and bliss. In the second concentration, one views the first as coarse and the second as subtle, and this concentration also has joy and bliss. In the third concentration, joy is absent, and is replaced by meditative equanimity. In the fourth concentration, bliss is absent, and one instead cultivates neutral feeling (*btang snyoms*, *upekṣā*), since bliss interferes with mental stability. The next few members of this list refer to the four formless absorptions, which are also discussed in note 540.

⁶⁹⁰For a list of these, see *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* by Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper (New York: Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 35-6.

⁶⁹¹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 464.2), "faith and so forth" (*dad pa la sogs pa*, *śraddhādi*) includes the eleven virtuous mental factors (*dge ba*, *kṛśala*), the six contaminated consciousnesses, and the eight uncontaminated consciousnesses that are associated with those. See *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* p. 37.

⁶⁹²Dok p. 106.7, K p. 48b.1: *lung du mi ston pa dang ldan pa ni 'di lta ste / de gnyis ka dang mi ldan pa'o*; Lamotte p. 117, P p. 18d.6, D p. 74.3: *lung du ma bstan pa dang ldan pa'i ni 'di lta ste / de gnyis ka'i [P, D: gnyi ga'i] dang mi ldan pa'i'o*.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 464.3), "the neutral" (*lung du ma bstan pa*, *avyākṛta*) refers to "the six contaminated consciousnesses that do not possess those virtues or afflictions and to the basis-consciousness".

⁶⁹³Dok p. 107.2, K p. 48b.2: *gal te mtshan ma dang / gnas ngan len gyi bcings pa dang / bcings pa rnam pa gnyis yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes te / de rab tu shes nas / sems 'di ni 'di las bslang ngo zhes mkhas pa yin no*; Lamotte p. 118, P p. 18d.7, D p. 74.4: *gal te 'ching ba rnam pa gnyis po mtshan ma'i 'ching ba dang / gnas ngan len gyi 'ching*

ba yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin rab tu shes te / de rab tu shes nas de las sems 'di bslang bar bya'o zhes bya ba la mkhas pa yin no.

With respect to this passage, Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 428.7) comments: “Because emergence of mind is liberation from the bonds of the other-powered [nature] and the imputational [nature] and abiding in the suchness of the thoroughly established [nature], in that way consciousness is indicated as being wise with respect to that.” The “bonds of signs” are “signs of the other-powered nature”, and the “bonds of assumptions of bad states” are “predispositions of imputations”.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 465.3) comments: “Having thoroughly realized, just as it is, the mind that is concordant with non-conceptual exalted wisdom one definitely emerges from these two bonds.”

⁶⁹⁴ĀDok p. 107.3, K p. 48b.3: *gal te gang mtshan ma dang / gnas ngan len de'i gnyen po'i sems de skye zhing / 'phel ba'i tshe skye'o / 'phel lo zhes 'phel ba la mkhas pa yin no*; Lamotte p. 118, P p. 18d.8, D p. 74.5: *gal te mtshan ma dang gnas ngan len gyi gnyen po'i sems gang yin pa de skye ba dang phel ba'i tshe skye ba dang 'phel lo zhes 'phel ba la mkhas pa yin no.*

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 465.5) comments that this refers to the increasing and augmentation of a mind that is an antidote to the two types of bonds, the bonds of signs and the bonds of assumptions of bad states.

⁶⁹⁵ĀDok p. 107.4, K p. 48b.5: *gal te de de dang mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur pa / mtshan ma dang / gnas ngan len gyis kun nas nyon mongs pa'i sems 'grib cing 'bri bar gyur pa na / 'grib bo zhes 'grib pa la mkhas pa yin no*; Lamotte p. 118, P p. 18e.1, D p. 74.5: *gal te de dang mi mthun [D: 'thun] pa'i phyogs su gyur pa mtshan ma gnas ngan len gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa can du gyur pa'i sems de 'grib cing 'bri bar gyur pa na 'grib cing 'bri'o zhes 'grib pa la mkhas pa yin no.* The words “and decreases” are added on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which add *cing 'bri'o*, which is omitted in ĀDok.

⁶⁹⁶This refers to skill in terms of method with respect to mind rather than the Mahāyāna idea of skill in means (*thabs la mkhas pa, upāya-kausalya*), which is a Bodhisattva's ability to adapt his or her actions and teachings to any being or group of beings. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 467.1) comments that it is called "method" (*thabs, upāya*) because it induces various qualities, such as clairvoyances (*mngon par shes pa, abhijñā*) and absence of affliction (*nyon mongs med pa, niḥsaṃkleśa*). See also *Compendium* p. 175.

⁶⁹⁷According to *ME* (p. 207), these do not liberate beings from cyclic existence but rather from specific afflictions. These are outlined in *ME* p. 207, *Compendium* p. 164, *Kośa* ch. 8, and *Somme*, p. 285 and listed in *Mahāvvyutpatti* LXX. See also Lamotte's notes to *Somme*, p. 52* and Leon Hurvitz, "The Eight Deliverances", in *Studies in Pāli and Buddhism*, ed. A.K. Narain (Delhi: B.R. Publishing House, 1979), pp. 121-169.

⁶⁹⁸See *Compendium* p. 165, *Kośa* ch. 8, *Mahāvvyutpatti* LXXI, and *Somme* p. 285 and notes p. 52*.

⁶⁹⁹See *Compendium* p. 165, *Kośa* ch. 8, *Mahāvvyutpatti* LXXII, and *Somme* p. 285 and notes p. 52*.

With respect to these three terms, Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 468.4) comments: "Small virtuous roots are 'spheres of liberation' (*rnam par thar pa'i skye mched, vimokṣa-āyatana*); great virtuous roots are 'spheres of overwhelming' (*zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched, abhibhāvāyatana*); and immeasurable virtuous roots are 'spheres of totality' (*zad par gyi skye mched, kṛtsna-āyatana*).” He adds that whatever is a cause is called “liberating”, whatever is a result is called “sphere of totality”, and whatever is included among both causes and results is called “sphere of overwhelming”.

⁷⁰⁰*Dok* p. 107.6, *K* p. 48b.6: *gal te rnam par thar pa dang / zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched*

dang / zad par gyi skye mched sgom pa'o / byams pa de ltar na byang chub sems dpa' rnam / byang chub sems dpa'i mthu chen po mngon par bsgrubs pa dang / mngon par bsgrubs par 'gyur zhing mngon par bsgrub bo; Lamotte p. 118, P p. 18e.2, D p. 74.6: gal te rnam par thar pa dang zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched dag dang / zad par gyi skye mched dag sgom [P: bsgom] par byed pa ste / byams pa de ltar na byang chub sems dpa' rnam byang chub sems dpa'i mthu chen po mngon par bsgrubs pa dang / mngon par sgrub par 'gyur ba dang / mngon par sgrub par byed pa yin no. I have read the last occurrence of "achieve" (sgrub) in accordance with Lamotte, P, and D, which treat this as a present tense verb. This seems more probable than Dōk and K's reading of bsgrub.

⁷⁰¹See *Compendium* p. 101 for a discussion of this, and *Somme* notes pp. 47-8* for a bibliography on this topic.

⁷⁰²Dōk p. 108.2, K p. 49a.1: *gnas kyi gnas ngan len myong ba*; Lamotte p. 119: *gnas kyi gnas ngan len rig pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 469.7) comments: "Because they follow from bad states that are seeds of the two obstructions, they are 'bad states that are states' (*gnas kyi gnas ngan len pa, āśraya-dauṣṭhulya*)." See also pp. 470-71, where he provides alternate explanations.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 430.2) comments: "With respect to experiences of assumptions of bad states that are states: 'State' refers to just the basis-consciousness when it has not been transformed, because it is the abode of all the phenomena of minds and mental factors and all the predispositions. On this occasion, because one is [at] the level of transformation of the basis into nirvāṇa with a remainder of aggregates, the transformed basis-consciousness abides in just non-conceptual exalted wisdom."

⁷⁰³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 470.1), the "results" (*'bras bu, phala*) of these are the six kinds of external objects (corresponding to the six senses), which arise through

the power of the six internal sense powers (*nang gi dbang po*) and thus are their results. He adds: “Because knowers of objects also arise upon observing those, they are ‘results’.”

⁷⁰⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 471.5) explains that “experiences of physical states” (*gzugs can gyi gnas rig pa*; *Ḍok*: “experiences of form states”, *gzugs kyi gnas myong ba, rūpyāśraya-anubhava*) include “whatever are seeds of Desire Realm feelings” (*’dod pa’i kham s kyi tshor ba’i sa bon gang yin pa*). “Experiences of formless states” (*gzugs med pa’i gnas myong ba, ārūpyāśraya-anubhava*) are “whatever are seeds of Formless Realm feelings” (*gzugs med pa’i kham s kyi tshor ba’i sa bon gang yin pa*). “Experiences of bad states that are established results” (*’bras bu grub pa’i gnas ngan len myong ba, phala-siddha-dauṣṭhulya-anubhava*) are “whatever are seeds that bring forth present results” (*da ltar ’bras bu ’byin pa’i sa bon gang yin pa*). “Experiences of bad states that are not established results” (*’bras bu ma grub pa’i gnas ngan len myong ba, phala-asiddha-anubhava*) are “whatever are seeds that still have not brought forth results” (*da dung ’bras bu ma byin pa’i gang yin pa*). Wonch’uk describes three assertions concerning these experiences. He states that he prefers the third explanation, which holds that experiences of form states are “whatever are feelings accompanying the five collections of consciousness”. Experiences of formless states are “whatever are feelings accompanying the mental consciousness”. He states that these are physical and mental feelings which are experiences of present effects that are produced by past ignorance, compositional actions, and so forth.

⁷⁰⁵Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 434.5) explains that “experiencers of bases” (Jang-chup-dzu-trül, Lamotte, P, D: *gnas rig pa, adhara-vedita*; *Ḍok*, K: *rten myong ba, āśraya-anubhava*;) are “cognitions of worldly environments; also, at the level of transformation of the basis, these are cognitions of appearances of bases, i.e., impure worldly environments” (*snod kyi ’jig rten rig pa ste / de yang gnas gyur pa’i gnas skabs na ni gnas kyi rnam par snang ba snod kyi ’jig rten ma dag pa rnam par rig pa yin no*). He adds (line 6): “At this level — because transformation of the basis is at the level of a nirvāṇa with a remainder of

aggregates — this is to be known as cognition of the abode of a Tathāgata that is a thoroughly purified Buddha land — an inestimable great palace that is perfect in color, perfect in shape, and so forth — as explained previously in the introduction” (*skabs 'dir ni gnas gyur pa phung po'i lhag ma dang bcas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i gnas skabs yin pas sangs rgyas kyi zhing yongs su dag pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i gnas gzhal med khang chen po kha dog phun sum tshogs pa dang / dbyibs phun sum tshogs pa la sogs par sngar kyi gleng gzhi'i skabs su bstan pa lta bu rnam par rig par bya'o*). “Experiencers of property” (*yo byad rig pa, pariṣkāra-vedita*; *Ādok, K: yo byad myong ba, pariṣkāra-anubhava*) are “experiences the arising of material property from that abode” (*gnas de nyid las lus kyi yo byad 'byung ba*).

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 472.6), one scholar's opinion is that “experiencers of resources” (*longs spyod pa'i rig pa, bhoga-vedita*; *Ādok, K: longs spyod myong ba, bhoga-anubhava*) are “feelings that observe the necessities of life” (*'tsho ba'i yo byad la dmigs pa'i tshor ba'o*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 435.1) explains that these are “cognitions of various enjoyments that [arise] from those abodes and properties; moreover, at the level when the basis has not been transformed, they are cognitions of physical resources” (*gnas dang yo byad de dag las longs spyod pa sna tshogs kyi rnam par rig pa / de yang gnas ma gyur pa'i gnas skabs na ni lus kyi yo byad la longs spyod pa rig pa yin no*).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 435.3) explains that “experiencers of reliances” (*ltos pa'i rig pa, apeṣā-vedita*; *Ādok, K: ltos pa myong ba, apeṣā-anubhava*) “cognize those cognitions of abodes, property, and resources as existing as causes on which they depend” (*gnas dang yo byad dang longs spyod rig pa de dag rgyu gang la ltos pa'i rgyu mtshan yongs su ma rdugs par yod par rig pa*). See also Wonch'uk pp. 472-3 for alternate explanations.

⁷⁰⁶For a discussion of this see *Compendium* p. 173 and *Somme* notes pp. 47-8*.

⁷⁰⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 473.7) comments: “One experiences uncontaminated

feelings that are associated with the wisdom of extinction and non-production, this wisdom being the discordant classelimination of those actions and afflictions.”

⁷⁰⁸ĀDok p. 108.5, K p. 49a.4: *de la phung po'i lhag ma dang bcas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings su ni 'bras bu ma grub / rig pa dang ldan pa'i reg pa las byung ba'i tshor ba myong ba na / de'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs thams cad kyi thams cad du 'gags pa ma yin te / thun mong ba myong ba'o*; Lamotte p. 119, P p. 18e.8, D p. 75.4: *de 'ang [P, D: yang] phung po lhag ma dang bcas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings na'o / 'bras bu ma grub pa rig pa'i 'dus te reg pa las byung ba'i tshor ba myong ba de'i mi mthun [D: 'thun] pa'i phyogs thams cad kyi thams cad du 'gag pa ma yin te / 'dren mar myong ngo*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 473.7) comments that the phrase “experience common [results]” (*thun mong du yod pa yang myong ba*; ĀDok, K: *thun mong ba myong ba*) means that “one also experiences cognitions of worldly environments that exist in common” (*thun mong du yod pa snod kyi 'jig rten rig pa yang myong ba*).

⁷⁰⁹ĀDok p. 108.6, K p. 49a.6: *'bras bu grub pa myong ba'i tshe ni / tshor ba rnam pa gnyis po de dag thams cad kyi thams cad du 'gags pa yin te / rig pa dang ldan pa'i reg pa las byung ba'i tshor ba 'ba' zhig myong ba*; Lamotte p. 119, P p. 19a.1, D p. 75.5: *'bras bu grub pa myong ba'i ni tshor ba rnam pa de gnyis ka [P: gnyi ga] thams cad kyi thams cad du 'gags te / rig pa'i 'dus te reg pa las byung ba'i tshor ba 'ba' zhig myong ngo*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 473.6) comments that according to one scholar the phrase “[when] one experiences non-established results...has not ceased in all ways” means that “At the time of the vajra-like mind (*rdo rje lta bu'i sems*, *vajropama-citta*), one abandons and eliminates future results and feelings that are associated with actions and afflictions.”

⁷¹⁰Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 437.7) asks, “If Tathāgatas pass beyond sorrow in the element of a nirvāṇa without a remainder of aggregates, how then can they work to

establish the welfare of others until the limit of cyclic existence?" In answer, the text says, "Due to the power of former aspirations, Tathāgatas continually work for the benefit of sentient beings, although they make a display of thoroughly passing beyond sorrow." This means that although they overcome all desires, still the power of their past vows motivates them to continue to work for the benefit of sentient beings for as long as cyclic existence lasts.

⁷¹¹Dok p. 109.2, K p. 49b.1: *byams pa khyod kyis rnal 'byor gyi lam yongs su dag pa [K: dang] / shin tu yongs su rdzogs pa la brtsams te / de bzhin gshegs pa la dri ba dris pa legs so legs so*; Lamotte p. 120, P p. 19a.4, D p. 75.6: *byams pa khyod kyis rnal 'byor gyi lam yongs su rdzogs pa dang / shin tu yongs su dag pa las brtsams nas / 'di lta ste / rnal 'byor la shin tu rnam par nges shing mkhas pas de bzhin gshegs pa la dri ba dris pa legs so legs so*.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 438.5), "the 'path of yoga' [refers to] the nature of the paths of calm abiding and special insight that are subsumed by the yogas of ethics and cognition" (*rnal 'byor gyi lam zhes bya ba ni tshul khrims dang / rig pa'i rnal 'byor gyis yongs su bsdu pa'i zhi gnas dang / lhag mthong gi lam gyi ngo bo nyid gang yin pa'o*).

⁷¹²This means that he teaches the path of yoga on the basis of his own direct experience, not from merely hearing about it.

⁷¹³Dok p. 109.3, K p. 49b.2: *de ltar ngas kyang shin tu rtogs shing / shin tu mkhas pa'i tshul gyis / rnal 'byor gi lam 'di yongs su dag cing / yongs su rdzogs par bstan to // gang 'das pa dang / ma 'ongs pa'i yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas de dag thams cad kyis kyang 'di nyid bstan te / ston par 'gyur ro // de ltar na 'di la rigs kyi bu 'am / rigs kyi bu mo rnams kyis rab tu brtson par bya ba'i rigs so*; Lamotte p. 120, P p. 19a.5, D p. 75.7: *ngas kyang rnal 'byor gi lam de yongs su rdzogs pa dang / yongs su dag par bstan*

*te / 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas gang dag yin pa de
dag thams cad kyis kyang de ltar bstan cing ston par 'gyur ro // rigs kyi bu rnam dang /
rigs kyi bu mo dag gis 'di la shin tu brtson par bya ba'i rigs so.*

⁷¹⁴Dok p. 109.7, K p. 49b.5: *glags tshol 'di skad rgol bar glags lta ba // gang dag thar
pa'i chos ni 'dzin byed pa // de dag byams pa rnal 'byor 'di las ring // shin tu ring ba
gnam sa ni [K: ji] bzhin no*; Lamotte p. 120, P p. 19a.8, D p. 76.3: *gang dag glags lta de
skad rgol ba las // thar par lta ba chos kun chub byed pa // byams pa de dag rnal 'byor 'di
las ni // thag ring gnam sa ring ba ji bzhin no.*

⁷¹⁵Materialism (*zang zing*, *āmiṣa*) refers to a desire for valuable things, according to *Tshig mdzod* (p. 2447). *The Pāli Text Society Dictionary* (p. 104) states that it originally referred to raw meat, but was later extended to include gross material objects in general. *The Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Ceylon, 1964, vol. I.3, p. 433) states that it is derived from the Vedic term *āma*, meaning raw or uncooked. The *Encyclopedia* indicates that it originally referred to raw meat, but has come to mean material things in general. This is the usage in *Aṅguttara* I.91, which says that giving this is one of the two kinds of giving, the other being giving of *dhamma* (*dhamma-dāna*). In *Majjhima* I.12 Buddha exhorts monks not to become attached to *āmiṣa*, and in *Majjhima* I.480 he states that Buddhas are dissociated from *āmiṣa*. See also *Majjhima* I.319, the *Āmiṣa-kiṇcikkha-sutta* (*Saṃyutta* II.234), and *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, ed. V. Trenckner (Copenhagen, 1965), vol. 2, Fasc. 3, pp. 122-3, which provides a number of citations of usages of this term.

⁷¹⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 440.6) comments: “It is not that, thinking that reciprocal benefits are to be expected from those sentient beings, they make effort for the welfare of sentient beings.”

Lamotte p. 121, P p. 19b.1, and D p. 76.3 have a reading that makes the same point as

Ādok, but in a negative way: *blo ldan sems can don zhes de dag las // lan byed rig nas sems can don brtson min // lan de rtog na kun gyi dam pa dang // zang zing med pa'i dga' ba 'thob mi 'gyur*. This would be translated as:

Those wise beings do not make effort at the welfare of sentient beings

Having thought of reward from them.

If they thought of reward, they would not attain the joy that is the supreme of all

[joys]

And is free from materialistic concern.

Interestingly, although Lamotte, P, and D have negative particles that are not present in Ādok and K, the overall meaning is the same in both texts. Both state that if beings work at the welfare of sentient beings thinking to benefit from this then they will be materialistically oriented and will not attain the final joy that is attained by those who practice religion unselfishly.

Ādok p. 110.1 and K p. 49b.6 read: *sems can don la brtan zhing lan mi re // shes nas sems can don brtson shes rab can // de yi [K: de'i] bya byed [K: pa] zang zing med pa dang // kun gyis dam pa'i dga' ba thob par 'gyur*.

⁷¹⁷This passage has been corrected on the basis of Lamotte, p. 121, P p. 19b.1, and D p. 76.4. Ādok p. 110.2 and K p. 49b.7 read: *'dod phyir su dag dam chos ston byed pa // de dag 'dod pa btang ba'i [K: ba] phyir len te // myos pa de dag thang med rin chen chos // thob par gyur kyang sprang por rgyu ba byed*. Lamotte, P, and D are quite different: *gang dag 'dod phyir chos kyi lung 'bog pa // de dag 'dod pa spangs pa phyir len te // rmongs pa de dag chos kyi rin po che // rin thang med pa rnyed kyang spong zhing rgyu*.

The translation borrows the reading of Lamotte, P, and D in the second line on the advice of Geshe Sangyay Samdrup (oral commentary), who states that this should not be read as a reason clause. Rather, *phyir len* should be taken as a single term, meaning “revert”, “reappropriate”, etc. In addition, there is an important difference in the fourth line, which in Lamotte, P, and D has *spong*, but reads *sprang* in Ādok and K. The different

readings lead to different meanings for the passage: Lamotte, P, and D simply state that they abandon the doctrine, while \bar{D} ok and K add that as a result they become destitute.

The upshot of the passage, as explained by Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 480.6), is that these beings teach for the sake of fame, goods, and so forth and they state with their mouths that they have abandoned desire although they have not. They are said to be obscured persons who obtain the priceless jewel of dharma but do not seek complete, perfect, unsurpassed enlightenment, and so those who seek worldly fame and goods become destitute like a foolish worldly being who finds a priceless jewel but later becomes a beggar. In other words, they obtain the doctrine, a jewel beyond price, but do not realize its value and so they squander it like a person who finds a precious jewel but squanders it because he does not know its worth.

⁷¹⁸ \bar{D} ok p. 110.3, K p. 49b.8: *de phyir rtsod dang 'du 'dzi spros dang chags // rnam par spongs la brtson 'grus mchog byos te // lhar bcas jig rten bsgral bar bya ba'i phyir // rnal 'byor 'di la rab tu brtson par gyis*; Lamotte p. 121, P p. 19b.2, D p. 76.5: *de phyir rtsod dang 'du 'dzi spros ldan pa // rnam par spongs te brtson 'grus mchog byos te // lhar bcas 'jig rten bsgral bar bya ba'i phyir // rnal 'byor 'di la rab tu brtson par gyis*.

⁷¹⁹Lamotte p. 121, P p. 19b.6, D p. 76.7, as well as both Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 482.4) and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 443.2 state that the number is 300,000, but \bar{D} ok p. 110.7 and K p. 50a.4 say that the number is 3,000. The number 300,000 is more probable, since there is a progression of: 600,000, 300,000, 150,000, 75,000.

⁷²⁰According to Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 119), this means that they directly realize the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.

⁷²¹Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 483.1) comments: "because those Bodhisattvas attain calm

abiding and special insight that observe the two aspects of emptiness, this is called ‘mental contemplation of the extensive, vast yoga’”.

⁷²Avalokiteshvara (Tib. *spyan ras gzigs dbang phyugs*) is one of the most important personages in Mahāyāna Buddhism. He is the embodiment of compassion (*snying rje, karuṇā*), which, along with wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*) is one of the two main principles of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His name literally means “The Lord Who Looks Down”, implying that he views the sufferings of sentient beings with compassion. According to Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 488.5), he is named “Avalokiteshvara” “because this Bodhisattva internally is endowed with wisdom and compassion and externally has effortless natural dominion over the three actions of body and so forth”. He then goes on to give other etymologies (on pp. 488-489) from several sūtras, including one from the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* that states: “Due to the power of his auspicious exalted wisdom, Avalokiteshvara thoroughly protects [sentient beings] from worldly sufferings.”

He figures prominently in many Mahāyāna sūtras, e.g., several Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* (in which he is said to be one of the Bodhisattvas in the Pure Land of Amitābha), and the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (which has an entire chapter [number 24; number 25 in Kumārajīva’s Chinese version] in which he is the main figure). In this sūtra, he is said to be the savior of beings in trouble. It is said that by merely remembering his name with devotion one can be saved in times of trouble.

For more on this Bodhisattva, see: (1) *Introduction à l’étude d’Avalokiteśvara* by Marie-Thérèse de Mallmann (Paris, 1948), which deals with his representations in Buddhist art; (2) “À propos Avalokiteśvara” by Guiseppe Tucci, in *MCB* 9 (1948-51), pp. 173-220, which disagrees with key theses of de Mallmann’s work; (3) *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* by Har Dayal (Delhi, 1970), pp. 46-49; and (4) “Kuan-yin: The Cult of Half Asia”, by C.N. Tay, in *History of Religions* 16 (Nov. 1976), pp. 147-77.

Joe B. Wilson (*The Meaning of Mind in Mind-Only*, pp. 8-9) reports that according to

Gung-tang this chapter mainly sets forth a presentation of the ten Bodhisattva grounds and the stages of the Bodhisattva's path of seeing and of meditation.

⁷²³The term "ground" (*sa, bhūmi*) refers to a level of development. Each succeeding ground represents a further level of spiritual accomplishment and is accompanied by progressively greater power and wisdom. According to Ālo-sang-dā-ñang (p. 77), the definition of a Bodhisattva's ground is: "a Bodhisattva superior's exalted knower that is affected by both wisdom realizing emptiness directly and great compassion". He cites Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* as follows: "When just the non-contaminated wisdoms of Bodhisattvas who are affected by compassion and so forth are divided into parts they attain the name 'grounds' because of serving as bases for good qualities" [tr. Jules Levinson]. See also pp. 73-4 of the sūtra and *ME* pp. 98-109. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 484-5) gives several etymologies for this term. See also *Siddhi* p. 731 and *Somme* notes pp. 38-39* for a bibliography on this subject and *Compendium* pp. 159-160.

⁷²⁴For an exposition of the ten grounds, along with explanations for why they are named as they are, see Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvali*, verses 440-461 and *ME* pp. 98-109. See also: *Compassion* pp. 131-230; *Compendium*, p. 159, including notes 2-12; and *Somme* pp. 196-217 and notes pp. 38*-41*.

⁷²⁵Dok p. 111.6, K p. 50b.1: *shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 122, P p. 19c.2, D p. 77.4: *rig par bya'o*.

⁷²⁶Dok p. 111.6, K p. 50b.2: *de la bsam pa rnam par dag pas ni sa dang po bsdus so // lhag pa'i tshul khriṃs rnam par dag pas ni sa gnyis pa'o // lhag pa'i sems rnam par dag pas ni sa gsum pa'o // lhag pa'i shes rab rnam par dag pas ni / gong nas gong du 'bogs par sa bzhi nas sangs rgyas kyi sa'i bar du bsdus par shes par bya ste / rnam par dag pa bzhi po 'di rnam kyi sa 'di rnam bsdus pa yin no*; Lamotte p. 122, P p. 19c.3, D p. 77.5:

de la sa dang po ni bsam pa rnam par dag pas bsdus so // sa gnyis pa ni lhag pa'i tshul khrims rnam par dag pas so // sa gsum pa ni lhag pa'i sems rnam par dag pas so // sa bzhi pa nas bzung ste sangs rgyas kyi sa'i bar ni lhag pa'i shes rab rnam par dag pa gong nas gong du gya nom pa bas kyang ches gya nom pa bas bsdus par rig par bya ste / sa de dag ni rnam par dag pa bzhi po dag gis bsdus pa yin no.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 489.7), "pure thought" (*bsam pa rnam par dag pa*, *āśaya-viśuddhi*) refers to the "pure unusual attitude" (*lhag pa'i bsam pa rnam par dag pa*, *viśuddhy adhyāśaya*). He adds (p. 490.4) that according to a commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* it refers to "the nature of non-conceptual exalted wisdom" (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyi ngo no nyid*), but according to the *Yogācārabhūmi* it refers to "the nature of belief" (*mos pa'i ngo bo nyid*). He adds (line 6) that according to Asvabhāva it refers to "the nature of faith and aspiration" (*dad pa dang 'dun pa'i ngo bo nyid*) and that Vasubandhu gives a similar explanation. On p. 491.5 he adds that through this attitude one overcomes the afflictions, secondary afflictions, and all activities of Demons (*bdud, māra*), one thinks to control one's own mind, one thinks of the faults of compounded phenomena, thinks of the benefits of nirvāṇa, thinks to constantly engage in meditative cultivation of the virtuous phenomena that are harmonies with enlightenment, thinks of the thorough isolation [of body and mind] that is concordant with cultivating those harmonies with enlightenment, thinks without regard to worldly things, worldly renown, goods, and services, and one thinks to realize the great vehicle upon having abandoned the Small Vehicle and having the thought to bring about the welfare of all sentient beings. Citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* as his source, Wonch'uk then goes on to describe fifteen aspects of the unusual attitude. He then lists eight aspects of the unusual attitude that are discussed in Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. See also Lamotte's *L'Enseignement de Vimalakirti* (Louvain, 1962), p. 406.

Somme (p. 6), defines "surpassing ethics" (*lhag pa'i tshul khrims, adhiśīla*) as: "l'observance (*śikṣā*) en matière de moralité (*śīla*)...c'est la discipline (*saṃvara*) des Bodhisattva qui ne songent pas à pécher". Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 492.7) states:

“Through this ground, having thoroughly abandoned the subtle faults of faulty ethics, one abides on this ground and is endowed with natural ethics; when one does not involve oneself in even small faulty actions, what need is there to mention middling and great [faulty actions]?” See also Lamotte’s notes (*Somme*, pp. 41-2*) for additional references.

Surpassing intention (*lhag pa'i sems pa, adhicitta*) is: “le recueillement de la pensée ou l’observance en matière de pensée...c’est sont les concentrations (*samādhi*)”. Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 493.1), citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, states that one first abides often in the four mundane concentrations, the four formless absorptions, the four immeasurables, the five clairvoyances, and then one turns away from concentrations, liberations, meditative stabilizations, absorptions, and one works at the welfare of sentient beings in the Desire Realm due to the power of one’s aspirations, and one perfects the harmonies with enlightenment. See also *Somme* notes p. 43* for additional references.

Surpassing wisdom (*lhag pa'i shes rab, adhiprajñā*) is: “l’exercice de la compréhension (*abhisamaya*) ou l’observance en matière de sagesse... c’est la savoir intuitif (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*)”. See also Lamotte’s notes (*Somme*, p. 43*) and *Compendium* pp. 125 and 133-4.

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 493.6) comments: “[On] the fourth ground one abides in surpassing wisdom that is involved with the harmonies with enlightenment. [On] the fifth, one abides in surpassing wisdom that is involved with truths. [On] the sixth, one abides in surpassing wisdom that is involved with dependent arising. [On] the seventh, one abides in signlessness with exertion. [On] the eighth, one abides in signlessness without exertion. [On] the ninth, one abides in correct individual knowledge. [On] the tenth, one abides in the excellences and thorough completions of Bodhisattvas. The eleventh is the state of a Tathāgata.” He adds that an extensive explanation can be found in the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*.

⁷²⁷Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 494.6) states that the meaning of “limb” (*yan lag, aṅga*) in this passage is “state” (*gnas*). According to another explanation (on p. 496.4), the limbs are “the different individual factors of the ten grounds”.

With respect to the limb that completes the training of the first ground (but which is not able to complete the training of the second ground), he states: “Because one is not able to thoroughly eliminate faults that are errors due to association with faults of errors that are subtle infractions, at the time of the first limb [which corresponds to the time of the first ground] one will not thoroughly complete [the second ground] due to those causes and conditions.” These eleven limbs, along with the obstacles that they overcome, are discussed at length in *Siddhi* pp. 639-657.

⁷²⁴According to Lamotte (p. 237 n. 4), these are the practices described in chapter seven (*Dōk* p. 70; p. 69 of this translation). Wonch’uk, however (vol. *thi* [119], p. 497.2), gives a somewhat different list, which is taken from the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*. According to him, they include: (1) causing beings to copy sūtras that are included in the Bodhisattva canon and that contain Mahāyāna doctrines; (2) memorizing them; (3) likewise worshipping them (*de bzhin nyid du mchod pa*; translation doubtful); (4) giving them to others; (5) honoring them when they are taught and listening to them; (6) reading them oneself; (7) likewise receiving an oral transmission for realizing them entirely; (8) extensively reciting those for which oral transmission has been received; (9) extensively teaching them to others; (10) having gone into solitary isolation, engaging in thinking about them, comprehending them, realizing them, and meditating on them.

He adds (p. 498.5): “When one thoroughly passes beyond preparation due to the power of the causes and conditions of the ten doctrinal practices and so forth one enters into the faultless reality of the first ground. Due to those causes and conditions, one thoroughly completes those limbs.” He adds that “reality” (*yang dag pa nyid*) refers to “the uncontaminated path of Superiors” (*zag pa med pa’i ’phags pa’i lam*), which is called “reality” because due to it one “turns away from error” (*log pa las bzlog pa*). This reality is said to be “faultless” (*skyon med pa*) “due to abandoning the afflictions that are objects of abandonment through [a path of] seeing by an uncontaminated path of Superiors.” He also cites other explanations from Perfection of Wisdom sūtras (pp. 499-500). See also *Somme*

notes p. 40* for a bibliography on this subject.

⁷²⁹See note 114.

⁷³⁰Dok p. 112.2, K p. 50b.4: *mos pas spyod pa'i sa la chos spyod pa bcu shin tu bsgoms pas mos pas spyod pa'i byang chub sems dpa' sa de las 'das nas / byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la 'jug go*; Lamotte p. 122, P p. 19c.5, D p. 77.6: *mos pas spyod pa'i sa la byang chub sems dpa' chos spyod pa rnam pa bcu po dag la mos pa shin tu bsgoms pa'i phyir bzod pas sa de las yang dag par 'das nas byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la 'jug go*.

The term “faultless reality” (*yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa, samyaktva-niyama*) in this passage probably indicates that these Bodhisattvas have attained the path of seeing (*mithong lam, darśana-mārga*), and so have entered the first Bodhisattva ground.

According to la Vallée Poussin (*Kośa* Tome 4, p. 180), *samyaktva* equals *nirvāṇa*. This does not fit the thought of this passage in the sūtra, however, since these Bodhisattvas are only at the level of the path of seeing. In his translation of the *Siddhi* (p 722), however, la Vallée Poussin states that *samyaktva-niyama* refers to a Bodhisattva's entry into the grounds and rapidly progressing toward *nirvāṇa*, which does accord with this passage. As Ruegg (*Théorie* pp. 196-7) notes, when the compound *samyaktva-niyama* is used, this refers to Bodhisattvas who have entered into a path destined for *nirvāṇa*. Regarding the term *niyama*, he states:

Le *niyāma* (*nges par 'gyur ba*) «détermination, fixation» — dit aussi *niyati* et *niyama* (*mi 'gyur ba*) et correspondant au *nyāma* (*skyon med pa*) — est la condition spirituelle où l'aspirant se «fixe» dans la correction (*samyaktva*) et devient alors absolument assuré à la fois de ne plus tomber dans l'incorrection ou l'erreur (*mithyārtva*) et d'obtenir le Fruit résultant de la pratique de son Chemin; en d'autres termes, c'est la certitude d'arriver au Terme suprême de la voie spirituelle.

He adds that this occurs when a Bodhisattva passes into the path of seeing and attains the

“forbearance of exalted wisdom of doctrine” (*dharmajñānakṣānti*) specific to his ground. See also: *Compendium* (p 152), which also equates *samyaktva-niyama* with entry into the path of seeing and states that such a person is a Stream Enterer (*śrota-āpanna*); and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. Unrai Wogihara, Leipzig, 1908) pp. 28-31, where Wogihara collects a variety of Pāli and Sanskrit sources concerning the differences between *niyama*, *niyāma*, *nyāma*, etc.

⁷³¹According to Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 500-508), what this means is that one completes a particular ground by way of working at the limb(s) specific to that ground. When one completes training in the limb of one ground, one then advances to the level of the next ground, but the limb(s) through which one completed the preceding ground will not also complete the next one, and one must work at the limbs specific to the next ground in order to complete it. When one completes the limbs of a particular practice, one cultivates striving, and then one attains the next level that one subsequently seeks to reach.

With regard to the first ground, this means that first ground Bodhisattvas are primarily motivated by faith, rather than understanding, and so they make effort at ethics and the ten doctrinal practices, but are not yet able to attain the worldly meditative absorptions that they will practice on the second ground.

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 501.6) states that on the first ground one practices surpassing ethics, and by doing so one overcomes subtle faults that are infractions. On p. 502.2 he states that one has natural ethics, due to which one does not engage in small ethical faults that are included within wrong paths, and so it goes without saying that one does not engage in middling or great [ethical faults]. Citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* (line 3), he adds that on the first Bodhisattva ground Bodhisattvas are not endowed with advanced abilities, due to which they do not understand habituation to subtle faults of faulty ethics. He adds that their lack of [advanced] abilities is due to three obscurations: “(1) ignorance of faults that are subtle infractions and (2) ignorance of various types of actions; (3) whatever is associated with something manifested due to connection with those very ignorances is

'fruition of an assumption of a bad state'. Due to abandoning those three obscurations, one engages in correct effort. Having abandoned those three obscurations, one enters the second ground and one attains eight pure qualities: (1) pure thought; (2) pure love; (3) pure compassion; (4) pure perfections; (5) pure perception with respect to performing the activities of a Buddha; (6) pure thorough ripening of sentient beings; (7) pure power; and (8) pure qualities". He adds that from the first ground up to the Buddha ground these eight qualities become progressively greater and more superior, and through these limbs the second ground will be completed.

⁷³²The "worldly meditative stabilizations" (*'jig rten pa'i ting nge 'dzin, laukika-samādhi*) are probably the four concentrations and the four formless absorptions (see note 540). Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 503.2) comments that "meditative stabilizations" (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*) are so called "because they are free from laxity and excitement" (*bying dang rgod pa dang bral ba*). He adds that they are one-pointed meditative stabilizations (*rtse gcig pa nyid du gyur ba'i ting nge 'dzin*). On p. 503.3 he comments that they are called "absorptions" (*snyoms par 'jug pa, samāpatti*) "because they are final states that are devoid of laxity and excitement; this is because they are final states of pacification and isolation". He also states that the meditative stabilizations and absorptions in this passage are "worldly" (*'jig rten pa, laukika*) "because they are associated with contamination and because they are engagers (*zag pa dang bcas pa'i phyir dang 'jug par 'gyur ba'i phyir*; translation doubtful)".

⁷³³According to Lamotte (p. 237), in the term "retention of what is heard" (*thos pa'i gzungs, śruta-dhāraṇī*), *dhāraṇī* does not refer to the *mantras* found in some Mahāyāna sūtras which are supposed to have magical powers when recited. He says that it refers to memory (*smṛti*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). Similarly, Ven. Denma Lochö Rinbochay (unpublished transcript, tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, p. 203) states: "A *dhāraṇī* is a mindfulness or a wisdom that is able to hold scriptural words and meanings without forgetting them for an aeon. This is

different from the *mantras* that are called *dhāraṇī* (although such *mantras* are often done for this purpose). Here a *dhāraṇī* is a consciousness, either a mindfulness or a wisdom.” Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary) states: “Retention means not forgetting the meaning of the scriptures. Remembering the meaning again and again is called retention” [tr. Jules Levinson]. He also glosses its meaning as “retention of not forgetting” (*mi brjed pa’i gzungs*). This term is also discussed in *Siddhi* p 613 note 1.

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 507.3) states that “retention” (*gzungs*) “is of the nature of mindfulness and wisdom” (*dran pa dang shes rab gyi bdag nyid*). Citing the *Yogācārabhūmi*, he states that there are four types of retentions: “(1) retention of doctrines; (2) retention of meanings; (3) retentions that are secret *mantras*; and (4) retentions that are means of attaining the forbearances of Bodhisattvas”. On p. 508.4 he adds that meditative stabilizations and absorptions are the causes of wisdom [arisen from] meditation, and retention is the cause of wisdom [arisen from] hearing and thinking. He also states that one thoroughly completes the limbs of the unusual attitude due to attaining the causes and conditions that give rise to the meditative stabilizations, absorptions and so forth of Bodhisattvas.

⁷³⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 508.7), quoting the *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya*, comments that this means that second ground Bodhisattvas do not have the power of the four concentrations, four formless absorptions, and retention of what is heard. Their not having attained these things is due to three obstructions: ignorance that is craving for desires, and ignorance in terms of association with hearing and retention. He states: “The cyclic existence that is established through the workings of these ignorances ripens assumptions of bad states”. He adds: “Having abandoned those three obstructions through effort, one enters into the third ground, and one also attains the eight elevated types of purities, as well as the four absorptions and so forth; one also realizes the element of qualities as a concordant cause [meaning doubtful]. Through these limbs, one thoroughly completes the third ground.”

⁷³⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 509.6) explains that in order to enter into the fourth ground, one must make effort at cultivating dispassion toward meditative states. On p. 510.3 he quotes the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which states that this means that the causes of not completing the limbs of the fourth ground are: (1) not abiding according to one's wish in [contemplation of] the harmonies with enlightenment which one has attained and (2) not being able to abide in thoroughly pure mind after having abandoned craving for absorptions and for doctrine. Due to these two causes, one does not complete the limb of the harmonies with enlightenment, which is the precondition for entry into the fourth ground. One enters into the fourth ground through making effort at this limb and completing it.

⁷³⁶Dok p. 113.2, K p. 51a.3: 'khor ba dang / mya ngan las 'das pa la shin tu phyir phyogs pa dang / mngon du phyogs pa yid la byed pa btang snyoms su bzhag nas; Lamotte p. 123, P p. 19d.3, D p. 78 4 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa dag la gcig tu mi phyogs pa nyid dang / mngon du phyogs pa'i yid la byed pa lhag par btang snyoms su bzhag ste.

⁷³⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 511.2) states: "Moreover, although a fourth grounder has attained the harmonies with enlightenment, due to three causes the fifth ground cannot be attained. Although on the first ground one has obtained the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, one is not able to analyze the reasoning of the truths as it is in reality." He states that the "truths" (*bden pa*, *satya*) are the four noble truths and the two truths. Bodhisattvas on the second ground have not completed training in dispassion toward cyclic existence and nirvāṇa in that they tend to see the first as to be completely avoided and the second as to be dilligently sought. He quotes the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* as stating: "this is because they have not attained the path of non-difference of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa" (p. 511.5).

He adds that on the third ground a Bodhisattva is not able to cultivate the harmonies with enlightenment that are conjoined with method. A hypothetical opponent asks why

Bodhisattvas on the fifth ground cannot cultivate the harmonies with enlightenment if they have already attained them. Wonch'uk answers by making a distinction between the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment (which they have attained) and "the three types of phenomena that are harmonies with enlightenment that are conjoined with method". He quotes the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, which states that on the level of the fifth ground "one does not know satisfaction due to working at merit. The continuum of effort is uninterrupted due to seeking exalted wisdom. One is endowed with thought that is completely untiring with respect to the collections of great love and compassion. Due to these three causes one does not thoroughly complete this limb." He concludes that there is no contradiction between the statement that Bodhisattvas on the first four grounds attain the harmonies with enlightenment and the statement that on the fifth ground they are not able to cultivate the harmonies with enlightenment.

⁷³⁸Ādok p. 113.4, K p. 51a.5: 'dus shes [K: 'du byed] 'byung ba ji lta ba bzhin du mngon sum du byas te / de la skyo ba mang ba dang / mtshan ma med pa yid la byed pas / mang du spyod par mi nus pas; Lamotte, p. 124, P p. 19d.5, D p. 78.6, N p. 59a.2, L p. 62a.1, C p. 50b.2, V p. 100a.2, Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *cho* [205], p. 478.3: 'du byed kyi 'jug pa [yang dag pa: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V, Jang-chup-dzu-trül] ji lta ba bzhin mngon sum [P: gsum] du [ma: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V, Jang-chup-dzu-trül] byas nas de la skyo ba mang ba dang / mtshan ma med pa yid la byed pas mang du gnas par mi nus pas. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 513.1): 'khor bar 'jug pa la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du so sor rtogs par mi nus pa dang / gzhan yang de la skyo ba mang ba'i phyir / mtshan ma med pa yid la byed pas mang du gnas par mi nus pas. I have chosen the readings of Lamotte, P, D, L, N, C, and V in translating the phrase "the workings of the compounded" ('du byed kyi 'jug pa, *saṃskāra-pravṛtti*) over Ādok's reading of "the arising of conceptions" ('dus shes 'byung ba, *saṃjñāsamhava*). I chose this reading over Ādok's because it accords with Wonch'uk's commentary, which links the training of this ground with understanding the nature of cyclic existence and dependent arising. Note also that K

uses 'du byed instead of 'du shes. I have rejected Lamotte's insertion of the intensifier *yang dag pa* and the negative particle *ma*, since these are not found in any Tibetan texts or in Jang-chup-dzu-trül. Both of these insertions in Lamotte's text are based on Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text, p. 703c.16 (see Lamotte p. 124, notes a and b).

⁷³⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 513.3) comments that the sixth ground is not attained due to two causes and conditions: "because they are unable to individually realize, just as it is, the reasoning of dependent arising with respect to entry into cyclic existence, and because they generate much discouragement with respect to suffering and the afflictions that are the sources [of suffering]." Until they overcome these obstructions, they cannot complete the training of the fifth ground. Without overcoming these obstacles, they cannot enter the sixth ground, because Bodhisattvas on that ground perceive dependent arising.

⁷⁴⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 514.5) comments that the statement that they "are not able to abide for a long time uninterruptedly and continuously in signlessness" (*Ḍok* p. 113.6, K p. 51a.6: *mtshan ma med pa la bar chad med cing rgyun ma chad par mang du gnas mi nus pas*; Lamotte p. 124, P p. 19d.6, D p. 78 7 *bar chad med pa dang / rgyun mi 'chad par mtshan ma med pa' i yid la byed pas mang du gnas par mi nus pas*) means that "although they have attained meditation on dependent arising they are not able to meditate solely on signlessness as one is able to do on the seventh ground." He cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* to the effect that on the previous five grounds one mostly practices meditation associated with signs, and only practices a little signless meditation. On the sixth ground, however, the situation is reversed, and one mainly meditates on signlessness. Until Bodhisattvas are able to perform this meditation continuously and uninterruptedly they cannot progress to the seventh ground: "Because seventh ground Bodhisattvas meditate solely on signlessness, due to these causes and conditions, that limb is not thoroughly completed. Through meditation for the sake of thoroughly completing that limb, it also is attained (p. 515.2)."

He cites the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya* to the effect that sixth ground Bodhisattvas have three obstructions that prevent them from completing their training: (1) ignorance in terms of the arising of subtle signs; (2) ignorance in terms of single-pointed method with respect to signlessness (*mtshan ma med pa gcig tu thabs kyis ma rig pa'o*; translation doubtful); these lead to (3) the fruition of assumptions of bad states. Through abandoning these three by way of effort, one removes the obstacles to attaining the seventh ground. One then enters into it and attains eight types of superior purities and “thoroughly abandons subtle arisings of signs of compounded phenomena; because one will also thoroughly realize the meaning of the non-difference between various phenomena in terms of the element of qualities, due to this limb one will thoroughly complete the seventh ground.”

⁷⁴¹ĀDok p. 113.7 and K p. 51a.8 read: *bsgrim pa btang snyoms su bzhas pa*; Lamotte p. 124, P p. 19d.8, and D p. 79.1 read: *rtsol ba lhag par btang snyoms su bzhas pa*. Both *bsgrim pa* and *rtsol ba* indicate exertion or endeavor. The meaning of the passage seems to be that from this point one no longer has to make any exertion.

⁷⁴²Wongch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 516.2) comments: “Due to inability to abandon exertion with respect to abiding in signlessness and inability to also attain mastery with respect to signs, because of these causes and conditions those seventh ground Bodhisattvas do not complete the eighth ground.” This means that they must achieve mastery with respect to “abiding in signlessness and signs that benefit oneself and others”.

When one abandons these, the three obstructions that prevent progress to the next ground are: (1) ignorance in terms of signlessness and so forth; (2) ignorance in terms of not attaining mastery with respect to signs; and (3) assumptions of bad states that result from those. When one abandons these one attains the eighth ground, attains eight types of superior purities, “attains [the state of] abiding in signlessness and so forth by way of a mind that is free from exertion, and also thoroughly realizes the meaning that the element of qualities does not increase or decrease; by way of these limbs, one will thoroughly

complete the eighth ground (vol. *thi* [119], p. 516.7)."

⁷⁴³Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 517.3) comments that "enumerations" (*rnam grangs*, *paryāya*; see note 89) are "objects of correct individual knowledge of doctrine" (*chos so so yang dag par rig pa'i yul*). He states that characteristics are "objects of correct individual knowledge of meanings". Etymologies (*nges pa'i tshig*) are objects of correct individual knowledge of etymologies.

According to Kensur Yeshe Thubden (oral commentary), correct individual knowledge of *nges tshig* is an ability specific to ninth ground Bodhisattvas that allows them to know the various names of things in any language. In addition, he states that these Bodhisattvas are never mistaken about the meanings (*don dag*) of the things for which they know the names.

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 517.4), knowledges that depend upon thoroughly dividing the aspects of all doctrines (*chos thams cad kyi rnam pa rab tu dbye ba la brten pa'i shes pa*) are "objects of individual correct knowledge of inspired courage". Mastery with respect to these is the precondition for entering the ninth ground.

Citing a commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, Wonch'uk states that eighth ground Bodhisattvas have the following obstructions preventing them from attaining the ninth ground: (1) ignorance with respect to attaining mastery in terms of limitless doctrinal teachings, limitless doctrinal words and letters, increasing wisdom, inspired courage, and retention; (2) ignorance with respect to the generation of wisdom upon having eliminated doubt by way of the four correct individual analyses (*so so yang dag par rig pa*, discussed in chapter ten, p. 146 of this sūtra); and (3) assumptions of bad states that result from those. When they overcome those, they "enter into the ninth ground and also achieve eight types of superior purities. They will also attain perfect mastery with respect to teaching doctrine correctly and, also thoroughly realizing the meaning of the state of mastery with respect to exalted wisdom regarding the element of qualities, through that limb they will thoroughly complete the ninth ground (vol. *thi* [119], p. 518.5-518.7)."

⁷⁴⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 518.1), discussing the statement that these Bodhisattvas "are not able to attain and thoroughly experience the completion of a truth body" (*Ādōk* p. 114.4, K p. 51b.3: *chos kyi sku'i yongs su rdzogs pa 'thob pa dang / rab tu myong bar mi nus pas*; Lamotte p. 124, P p. 19e.3, D p. 79.3: "are not able to attain correct individual knowledge of the completed truth body", *chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa so sor yang dag par rig pa 'thob par mi nus pas*), comments that ninth ground Bodhisattvas gain mastery over the four correct individual analyses (*so so yang dar par rig pa bzhi, catur-pratisamvid*). On p. 519.7, citing a commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, he states that a ninth ground Bodhisattva does not have the capacity to complete a truth body that teaches doctrine thoroughly and cannot attain the unhindered and unobstructed wisdom of the six clairvoyances. They have three obstacles to attaining the next ground: (1) ignorance in terms of wisdoms that are the six clairvoyances; (2) ignorance in terms of entering into very secret Buddha-qualities; and (3) assumptions of bad states that arise from those. When one overcomes these, "one enters into the tenth ground and will also attain eight types of superior purities, and one will attain completion of the truth body that teaches doctrine correctly and so forth. One will also thoroughly realize the meaning of the state of mastery with respect to the element of qualities. Due to this limb, one will thoroughly complete the tenth ground." See *Somme* notes pp. 49-50* for a bibliography on the bodies of a Buddha.

⁷⁴⁵Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.4, and D p. 79.4 treat this as a *dvandva* compound, and insert a connecting particle (*dang*) between the two terms knowledge (*shes pa, jñāna*) and insight (*mtshong ba, darśana*), which would be translated as "knowledge and insight". *Ādōk* p. 114.5 and K p. 51b.5, however, treat the compound as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*. The meaning is probably much the same in either case, since both readings imply that these Bodhisattvas achieve insightful understanding of all objects of knowledge. Lamotte, P, and D read: *shes bya thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa'i shes pa dang / mtshong ba thob par mi nus pas*. *Ādōk* and K read: *shes bya thams cad la mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye*

shes mthong ba thob par mi nus pas.

⁷⁴⁶According to Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 521.5), citing a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, on the tenth ground there are three obstructions to entering the Tathāgata ground: (1) ignorance in terms of very subtle attachments to all objects of knowledge; (2) ignorance in terms of very subtle obstructions from all objects of knowledge; and (3) assumptions of bad states that arise from those. When one overcomes these three, "one enters the Tathāgata ground, attains seven superior purities and purity that is free from birth, one thoroughly completes a truth body, and also attains unattached and unobstructed insight and wisdom."

⁷⁴⁷Compare the following exposition with that of *Siddhi* p. 613, and Appendice I, "La carrière du Bodhisattva", pp. 721-742, which includes a bibliography. See also *Somme* pp. 199-204 and notes p. 39*.

⁷⁴⁸Dok p. 115.2, K p. 51b.8: *don chen po 'jig rten las 'das pa 'dris pa ma yin pa'i sems rnyed pas / rgya cher dga' zhing mthog tu dga' ba'i phyir / sa dang po ni rab tu dga' ba zhes bya'o*; Lamote p. 125, P p. 19e.6, D p. 79.6: *sa dang po ni don che ba 'dris pa ma yin pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems thob pas dga' ba dang mchog tu dga' ba rgya che ba'i phyir rab tu dga' ba zhes bya'o*.

The term '*dris pa ma yin pa* indicates that this mind is new to this level and that one is unfamiliar with the practices of the Bodhisattva grounds.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 507.6), it is "very important" (*don chen po, mahārtha*) because one attains a supramundane mind and accomplishes the welfare of others.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 523.3), quoting a commentary on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, writes: "Because one thoroughly establishes unsurpassed benefits for oneself and others and because for the first time one achieves the state of a Superior, it is called the 'Very

Joyous’.” “The state of a Superior” (*’phags pa’i gnas*) is explained as referring to “uncontaminated exalted wisdom” (*zag pa med pa’i ye shes*). He then goes on to provide other explanations for why this ground is named the “Very Joyous” (pp. 523-524). Kensur Yeshe Thupden (oral commentary) comments: “Just as we are glad when we get what we want, so a Bodhisattva is ‘very joyful’ when he or she achieves the first ground because what he or she wants is to go higher and higher from one ground to the next” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁷⁴⁹Dok p. 115.2, K p. 52a.1 *ltung ba phra mo’i tshul khrims ’chal ba’i dri ma thams cad dang bral ba’i phyir sa gnyis pa ni / dri ma med pa zhes bya’o*; Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.7, D p. 79.7: *sa gnyis pa ni ltung ba phra mo dang / ’chal ba’i tshul khrims kyi dri ma thams cad dang bral ba nyid kyi phyir dri ma med pa zhes bya’o*.

Wonch’uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 524.7), citing the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, states that this ground is “stainless” “because one thoroughly abandons minds that are stained by miserliness, jealousy, and faulty ethics”. He adds that Superiors on this ground overcome faulty ethics by separating themselves from afflictions that give rise to faulty ethics, and so their ethics become fully “stainless”. He also cites other explanations (p. 525).

⁷⁵⁰Dok p. 115.3, K p. 52a.1: *ting nge ’dzin de dang / thos pa’i gzungs de’i ye shes snang ba tshad med pa la gnas pa’i phyir sa gsum pa ni ’od byed pa zhes bya’o*; Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.8, D p. 80.1: *sa gsum pa ni ting nge ’dzin de dang thos pa’i gzungs de shes pa’i snang ba tshad med pa’i gnas nyid yin pa’i phyir ’od byed pa zhes bya’o*.

Wonch’uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 525.7) comments: “One generates the illumination of meditative wisdom by way of attaining meditative stabilizations and attains retention of what is heard; and one generates the illumination of wisdom of hearing and thinking; therefore, the third [ground] is called the ‘Luminous’.” He also quotes numerous sources that discuss the meanings of the name of this ground (p. 526). The main thrust of these citations is that on this ground one becomes skilled in entering into meditative states.

Kensur Yeshe Thupden (oral commentary) comments: “The third ground is the ‘Luminous’ because of the fire [of wisdom] that will result in the afflictive obstructions having been abandoned at the beginning of the eighth ground. It is like sunlight arriving in a dark place and dispelling the darkness. At the eighth ground the sun — the wisdom realizing emptiness — will have risen. Here at the third ground one glimpses the rays before it rises. One has a surpassing practice of the perfection of patience. Now anger cannot arise” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁷⁵¹Dok p. 115.4, K p. 52a.2: *nyon mongs pa'i shing sreg pa'i phyir byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos bsgom pa'i ye shes kyi 'od 'phro bar gyur pas sa bzhi pa ni 'od 'phro ba can zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 125, P p. 19e.8, D p. 80.1: *sa bzhi pa ni nyon mongs pa'i shing bsreg pa'i phyir byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun [P, D: 'thun] pa'i chos sgom pa de ye shes kyi me'i 'od 'phro bar gyur pa'i phyir 'od 'phro can zhes bya'o*.

Wonch'uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 527.5), citing the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* as his source, states that those on this ground “constantly emit the radiance of exalted wisdom”. He cites a commentary on the *Ārya-daśabhūmika[-sūtra]*, which terms the afflictions that are burned up “non-forgotten afflictions” (*mi brjed pa'i nyon mongs pa*) “because these are innate afflictions that continually arise naturally”. He cites the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra*, which explains that the afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience are like sticks, and that when Bodhisattvas on this ground generate the radiance of wisdom the two types of obstructions are incinerated. He also cites other sources that link the function of this ground to burning up obstructions (p. 528).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 512.1) also states that the obstructions that are burned are the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience. The exalted wisdom that serves as the fire is the “vajra-like meditative stabilization” (*rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin, vajropama-samādhi*). The process of burning the obstructions is completed on the Buddha ground.

Kensur Yeshe Thubden (oral commentary, tr. Jules Levinson), citing Candrakīrti's

Madhyamakāvatāra as his source, states that the “sticks of the obstructions” burned up on this ground are primarily the obstructions to omniscience. The passage he refers to from Candrakīrti (as cited in Ālo-sang-dā-ñang, *Brief Expression* p. 101) reads:

Through having burned completely the dry firewood of objects of
knowledge

This peace is the truth body of Conquerors [tr. Jules Levinson].

Kensur Yeshe Thubden comments: “The ‘dry fuel of objects of knowledge’ (*shes bya’i bud shing*) means the obstructions to omniscience (*shes bya’i sgrib pa*). A Bodhisattva’s wisdom realizing emptiness destroys the obstructions to omniscience in just the way that fire destroys dry wood” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁷⁵²The term “*sudurjayā*” (Tib. *shin tu sbyang dka’ ba*) is taken to mean either “difficult to train in” or “difficult to overcome”. The discussion in this and later sections indicates that the former reading is to be preferred in this sūtra. It is called “difficult to train in” because the practices associated with this ground are very advanced and difficult to perfect. It is difficult to overcome because a Bodhisattva who has completed the training of this ground has profound wisdom and insight that are difficult to surpass or overpower.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 512.4) comments: “It is called “difficult to train in” because it is difficult to train in a consciousness that does not abide in cyclic existence of nirvāṇa from the viewpoint of the attribute of achieving a non-abiding path and establishing the fruits of that.”

Wonch’uk vol. *thi* [119], p. 528.7) adds that it is called “Difficult to Overcome” because one attains mastery over difficult meditations. He cites the *Suvarṇa-prabhāsa* as stating that a Bodhisattva on this ground is “difficult to overcome” “because he/she cannot be overwhelmed by obstructions that are objects of abandonment by seeing and meditation”. Quoting the *Daśabhūmika*, he adds: “Because on this ground one has all virtuous roots that depend on this ground and one has thoroughly analyzed by means of wisdom, exalted wisdom, and mind, one is very clear and thoroughly pure, and one is not deprived of the

virtuous roots of the lower grounds or by the virtuous roots of the two vehicles [of Hearers and Solitary Realizers]; therefore, it is ‘a ground that is very difficult to conquer’.”

⁷⁵³Dok p. 115.6, K p. 52a.4: ‘*du byed rjes su ’byung ba la mngon sum du gyur pa dang / mtshan ma med pa’i yid la bya pa mtho bar mngon sum du gyur pa’i phyir sa drug pa ni mngon du gyur ces bya’o*; Lamotte p. 126, P p. 20a.2, D p. 80.2: “Because of just manifestly realizing the workings of compounded phenomena and manifest realization that takes signlessness to mind often, the sixth ground is called the ‘Manifest’” (*sa drug pa ni ’du byed kyi ’jug pa mngon sum du gyur nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa mang du yid la byed pa mngon sum du gyur pa’i phyir mngon du gyur ces bya’o*). According to Lamotte (p. 239 n. 6), “realizing the workings of compounded phenomena” refers to understanding of dependent arising, which is borne out by the text and Wonch’uk’s commentary (vol. *thi* [119], p. 531.3), as well as by the *Siddhi* (p. 615), as Lamotte notes.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 513.5) comments that this means that they realize the subtleties of the workings of dependent-arising and approach unattached exalted wisdom.

Wonch’uk (p. 531.1) cites the *Daśabhūmika*, which states: “Because one manifestly attains the door of unobstructed exalted wisdom, one manifests the light of wisdom.” He also quotes the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* to the effect that on this ground one “manifests meditative wisdom that neither abides in cyclic existence nor in nirvāṇa”.

⁷⁵⁴According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 512.2), the term “pure ground” (*rnam par dag pa’i sa, viśuddha-bhūmi*) refers to the eighth ground and above, and this is also the opinion of Ālo-sang-dā-nyang, p. 84). See also *Siddhi* p. 616.

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 532.3), quoting the *Suvarṇa-prabhāsa*, comments that on this ground “one is liberated by way of uncontaminated and uninterrupted mental contemplation of signlessness, and one cultivates meditative stabilizations for a long time; therefore, this ground is pure, without obstacles, and unobstructed.” He quotes a

commentary on the *Daśabhūmika* (532.6) as saying: “Due to finalizing exertion with respect to meditation up to [the level of realizing] signlessness one completely passes beyond mundane and supramundane paths of the two vehicles [of Hearers and Solitary Realizers]; therefore, this is ‘the ground that is gone afar’.” He also cites other sources (pp. 532-3) that explain that this ground is so named because Bodhisattvas on this level make great advances in their practice.

Kensur Yeshe Thupden (oral commentary) comments: “The seventh is called ‘Gone Afar’ because the Bodhisattva is able to outshine Hīnayāna Foe Destroyers by way of wisdom. The wisdom of a seventh ground Bodhisattva is not able to outshine Hīnayāna Superiors by way of wisdom.”

⁷⁵⁵ĀDok p. 115.7, K p. 52a.5: *mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa dang / mtshan ma la yang nyon mongs pa 'byung bas mi sgul ba'i phyir / sa brgyad pa ni mi g.yo ba zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 126, P p. 20a.3, D p. 80.3: *sa brgyad pa ni mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub pa nyid dang / mtshan ma'i nyon mongs pa kun tu byung [P: 'byung] bas mi spyod [P, D: skyod] pa nyid kyi phyir mi g.yo ba zhes bya'o*. Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 533.4), like Lamotte, P, and D, also has a genitive reading in the passage: *mtshan ma'i nyon mongs pa* (as opposed to ĀDok's reading of *mtshan ma la yang nyon mongs pa*).

Wonch'uk (p. 533.5) explains that it is called “immovable” “because one is not shaken by afflictions related to effort”. He goes on to cite several sources that indicate that Bodhisattvas on this ground are “immovable” because their minds are not moved by signs, compounded phenomena, and so forth.

Kensur Yeshe Thupden (oral commentary) comments: “On the eighth ground the Bodhisattva has achieved the sign of irreversibility. Thus there is no wavering. One has abandoned manifest awarenesses that are mental applications for one's own purposes. Thoughts of descending to the Hīnayāna do not occur at all. One achieves a surpassing practice of the perfection of aspirational prayers.”

⁷⁵⁶Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 517.2) comments: “Due to attaining extensive intelligence of correct individual knowledge — that manifestly accomplishes the teaching of doctrine by way of perfected speech with respect to the objects of perfected exalted wisdom, this is called the ‘Good Intelligence’.”

Wonch’uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 535.3) adds that when they are said to be “faultless” (*kha ma tho ba med pa, anavadya*), the term “fault” refers to offences (*nyes pa, doṣa*), obstacles (*thogs pa, pratigha*), and obscurations (*rmongs pa, moha*). He adds: “The attainment on this ground of unhindered, extensive, and vast intelligence through attaining mastery with respect to teaching various doctrines in all aspects is very virtuous, and hence [this ground] is called ‘Good Intelligence’.” He also quotes a commentary on the *Daśabhūmika* which states that this ground is so named “because one benefits others upon having thoroughly achieved the teaching of doctrine through the power of correct individual knowledge”. He then cites other sources that state that Bodhisattvas on this ground have “good intelligence” because their intelligence surpasses the intelligence of gods, humans, and so forth of the three realms (the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm) and because they attain enhancements of the four correct individual knowledges. Through developing these, they understand all names, words, meanings, and languages, and they teach in all the ten directions through the courage of having attained mastery.

⁷⁵⁷Dok p. 116.2, K p. 52a.7: *gnas ngan len gyi tshogs nam mkha’ dang ’dra ba la chos kyi sku sprin chen po lta bus khyab pa dang / yog pa’i phyir sa bcu pa ni chos kyi sprin zhes bya’o*; Lamotte p. 126, P p. 20a.5, D p. 80.4: *sa bcu pa ni gnas ngan len gyi lus nam mkha’ lta bu la chos kyi tshogs sprin chen lta bus khyab cing khebs pa’i phyir chos kyi sprin zhes bya’o*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 518.3) comments: “It is pervasive because doctrines that are heard pervade the body of a tenth grounder, which is like space. It is very pacifying because those doctrines pacify the dust and tongues of fire of the afflictions of sentient beings. Because it draws out sentient beings through the stages of the Joyous

Land (*dga' ldan, tuṣita*) and so forth it brings out, in the way that the rain of clouds brings out flowers.”

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 537.2) notes that the assumptions of bad states associated with this ground are so named “because the seeds that are thoroughly deposited [into the mind] through [mis-]apprehensions of persons and phenomena are unserviceable”. They are “like space” (*nam mkha' lta bu*) “because they obscure the meaning of the two types of emptiness and of selflessness”. He then explains that the truth body of the tenth ground that arises from such meditation covers the assumptions of bad states that are like space, and so the tenth ground is called “Cloud of Doctrine”

Wonch'uk then goes on to cite numerous other sources comparing tenth ground Bodhisattvas to clouds of doctrine. From among the analogies cited, they are said to be “cloudlike” because they rain down the teaching of doctrine on sentient beings due to their great compassion. See Wonch'uk pp. 539-41.

⁷⁵⁸ĀDok p. 116.3, K p. 52a.8: *shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra ba rab tu spangs pa mi chags mi thogs par shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i phyir / sa bcu gcig pa ni sangs rgyas kyi sa zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 127, P p. 20a.5, D p. 80.5: *sa bcu gcig pa ni nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa shin tu phra mo spangs pas chags pa med cing thogs pa med par shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa nyid kyi phyir sangs rgyas kyi sa zhes bya'o*. The translation borrows the words in brackets from Lamotte, P, and D, which add the phrase “*nyon mongs pa dang*”; this is omitted in ĀDok.

Wonch'uk (vol. *thi* [119], p. 542.1) comments: “In the first moment, due to actualizing a path of an uninterrupted vajra-like meditative stabilization one abandons the very subtle seeds of the two obstructions simultaneously. Because one abandons the afflictive obstructions, one is ‘without attachment’. Because one abandons the obstructions to omniscience, one is ‘unimpeded’. In the second moment, one actualizes a path of liberation, and one becomes completely enlightened with respect to all objects of knowledge in all

aspects.” Compare *Somme* V.20 on the meanings of the names of these grounds.

⁷⁵⁹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 520.3) states: “Because [the obscurations] are ignorances, they are a class that is discordant with the liberative wisdom. With respect to ‘the eleven discordant classes of the assumptions of bad states’: They are connected with each of the eleven grounds; due to being predispositions, they are a class that is discordant with liberation of mind.” See also *Siddhi* p. 642 and note 1 and Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 3.2.

⁷⁶⁰Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 520.5) comments that as long as these exist in one’s continuum, they prevent the arising of “the liberative wisdom of the path of seeing”.

First ground Bodhisattvas have attained the path of seeing, which is a result of directly realizing emptiness. A Bodhisattva on the path of seeing is a Superior (*‘phags pa, ārya*), and has transcended the state of an ordinary being. The passage appears to be implying that the discordant class must be overcome before one attains the first ground and must be referring to beings who have not yet reached the first ground, because for Bodhisattvas on the path of seeing exaggerated adherence to persons and phenomena and so forth should not be operating.

On p. 5.5, Wonch’uk states that from among the two types of obstructions (the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience), they abandon those which arise from imputation (that is to say, the afflictive obstructions), due to which they “attain the nature of a Superior”. When one actualizes a Bodhisattva’s path of seeing, one abandons both and becomes a Superior, which indicates that the state of having overcome these and the first Bodhisattva ground are simultaneous. At the time of an uninterrupted path (*bar chad med pa’i lam, ānantarya-mārga*) of a path of seeing the seeds of these obstructions no longer exist.

⁷⁶¹Ādok p. 116.7, K p. 52b.4: *ltung ba phra mo’i ‘khrul pa’i shin tu rmongs pa dang / las*

kyi 'gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs la shin tu rmongs pa; Lamotte p. 127, P p. 20b.1, D p. 80.7: *ltung ba phra mo'i 'khrul pa kun tu rmongs pa dang / las kyi rnam par smin pa rnam pa sna tshogs la kun tu rmongs pa*; Wonch'uk vol. di, [120], p. 7.1: *ltung ba phra mo'i 'khrul pa la kun tu rmongs pa dang / las kyi 'gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs la kun tu rmongs pa*. I have chosen the reading of Lamotte, P, and D of the second part of this passage (*las kyi 'gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs la kun tu rmongs pa*, *nānāvidha-karma-vipāka-saṃmoha*) over that of Dōk, K, and Wonch'uk because it is less ambiguous.

Wonch'uk (p. 7.2) comments that according to the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* “great obscurations of errors that are subtle infractions” (*ltung ba phra mo'i 'khrul pa'i shin tu rmongs pa*, *sūkṣmāpatti-skhalita-saṃmoha*) are one type of innate obscuration and “great obscurations of the various aspects of the fruitions of actions” are faults that arise from these. See also *Siddhi* p. 645 n. 1.

⁷⁶²Wonch'uk (vol. di, [120], p. 7.6) cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, which states that the first type includes “whatever serves to obstruct exalted meditative stabilizations and meditative wisdom”. One abandons these by way of attaining exalted meditative stabilizations and [wisdom] arisen from meditation. When one becomes unobstructed with respect to such meditative states, those obstructions that have operated beginninglessly are suppressed.

The second type of obscuration includes “whatever serves to obscure wisdom of retention, hearing, and thinking on this [ground]”.

⁷⁶³Wonch'uk (vol. di, [120], p. 8.3) cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, which states that the first type includes “whatever is associated with craving for meditative stabilizations on this [ground]”, and the second type includes “whatever is associated with craving for doctrine on this [ground]”. These are included among the obstructions to omniscience. They serve to obstruct qualities that are concordant with the harmonies with enlightenment of the fourth ground, and so are to be completely abandoned by fourth ground Bodhisattvas. When one

eliminates these, one no longer gives rise to the view of “I” and so forth. On p. 9.1 he adds: “Those who cultivate giving, ethics, and patience on the first, second, and third grounds are similar to worldly [beings], but, because those on the fourth ground who attain qualities that are harmonies with enlightenment pass beyond the mundane they completely conquer those two views of the transitory collection [as constituting a real ‘I’ and ‘mine’].”

⁷⁶⁴Dok p. 117.3, K p. 52b.7: *'khor ba las shin tu phyir phyogs pa dang / mngon du phyogs pa'i yid la byed pa'i shin tu rmongs pa dang / mya ngan las 'das pa las shin tu phyir phyogs pa dang / mngon du phyogs pa yid la byed pa'i shin tu rmongs pa*; Lamotte p. 128, P p. 20b.3, D p. 81.2: *'khor ba la gcig tu mi phyogs pa nyid dang / mngon du phyogs pa nyid yid la byed pa kun tu rmongs pa dang / mya ngan las 'das pa la gcig tu mi phyogs pa nyid dang / mngon du phyogs pa nyid yid la byed pa kun tu rmongs pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. di, [120], p. 9.6) cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, which states that these are “strong aversion toward cyclic existence and zeal for nirvāṇa”. They cause one to take interest in a Hīnayānistic nirvāṇa and lose sight of Mahāyāna practice. Thus, on this ground one works to overcome such tendencies: “On the fifth ground, by way of meditating on the four truths one enters into the path of non-difference of the causes and effects of thorough affliction and purification with respect to these four truths; therefore, one abandons great obscurations of turning away [from cyclic existence] and turning toward [nirvāṇa].”

⁷⁶⁵Dok p. 117.4, K p. 52b.8: *'du byed 'byung ba mngon sum du gyur pa'i shin tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma mang du 'byung ba'i shin tu rmongs pa*; Lamotte p. 128, P p. 20b.4, D p. 81.3: *'du byed kyi 'jug pa mngon sum du bya ba nyid la kun tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma mang po kun tu 'byung ba kun tu rmongs pa*; Wonch'uk vol. di, [120], p. 10.3: *'du byed rnams kyi 'jug pa mngon du bya la so sor rtog pa'i kun tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma mang po kun tu 'byung ba kun tu rmongs pa*. The translation of the phrase “great obscurations of the arising of many signs” is based on Lamotte, P, D, and

Wonch'uk. The *Ḍok* and K passage, which is more ambiguous, would be translated as "great obscurations of manifold arising of signs".

Wonch'uk (p. 10.4) cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, which comments that the term "great obscurations to manifestly realizing the arising of the compounded" refers to "conceiving thorough afflictions as existent; this is because the workings of compounded phenomena are subsumed by the class of thoroughly afflicted [phenomena]". The second type of obscuration involves "conceiving purification as existent; this is because one grasps at the signs of purified [phenomena]". Because of the first, "one conceives [true] sufferings and [true] sources as just the approach to entering cyclic existence." Because of the second, "one conceives [true] cessations and [true] paths as just the approach to the characteristics of purification." Since these obstruct the training of the sixth ground, when one enters this ground one abandons them. See also *Siddhi* pp. 648-9 for a discussion of these.

⁷⁶⁶*Ḍok* p. 117.5, K p. 53a.1: *mtshan ma phra mo 'byung ba'i shin tu rmongs pa dang / rab tu mtshan ma med pa yid la bya ba'i thabs la shin tu rmongs pa*; Lamotte p. 128, P p. 20b.5, D p. 81.4, Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 11.1: *mtshan ma phra mo kun tu 'byung ba kun tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma med pa gcig tu yid la byed pas [Wonch'uk: pa'i] thabs la kun tu rmongs pa*. *Ḍok* and K's use of *rab tu* (which is usually an intensifying particle prefixed to verbs) is questionable, and so I have replaced it with the adverbial *gcig tu* from Lamotte, P, D, and Wonch'uk.

Wonch'uk (p. 11.2) cites the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, which comments that the first type of obscuration involves "conceiving beings as existent". The second type involves "conceiving negators as existent". The *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* expands on this idea by adding that this involves conceiving as existent the arising of subtle signs of production and cessation due to one type of innate karma of the obstructions to omniscience. These serve to obstruct the actualization of the particular superiorities of [realization of] signlessness of the seventh ground, and when one enters the eighth ground one completely abandons them.

These are also discussed in *Siddhi* pp. 649-50. See also *Kośa* ch. 8, p. 185.

⁷⁶⁷Dok p. 117.6, K p. 53a.2: *mtshan ma med pa la bsgrim [K: sgrim] pa'i shin tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma dag la dbang ba'i shin tu rmongs pa*; Lamotte p. 128, P p. 20b.6, D p. 81.5: *mtshan ma med pa la rtsol ba kun tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma rnams la mi dbang ba kun tu rmongs pa*; Wonch'uk vol. di, [120], p. 11.6: *mtshan ma med pa la rtsol ba kun tu rmongs pa dang / mtshan ma la dbang ba kun tu rmongs pa*.

Wonch'uk (p. 12.4) comments that on the first five grounds one engages in much meditation associated with signs but only engages in a little signless meditation. On the sixth ground the situation is reversed, and one concentrates on signless meditation. On the seventh ground one continually, uninterruptedly engages only in signlessness, but this requires exertion. Because one must exert oneself one is not able to engage in this meditation naturally. On the eighth ground, however, one overcomes the need for exertion and engages in this meditation effortlessly, and one attains mastery with respect to signless meditation and mastery with respect to signs. See also *Siddhi* p. 659.

⁷⁶⁸Wonch'uk (vol. di, [120], p. 13.1) comments that "mastery of retention with respect to immeasurable teaching of doctrine" (*chos bstan pa dpag tu med pa la gzungs kyi dbang, aprameya-deśanā-dharma-vaśitā*) involves "correct individual analysis (*so so yang dag par rig pa, pratisaṃvedanā*) because one teaches all meanings within one meaning through attaining mastery with respect to retention of objects of expression".

"Mastery with respect to retention of immeasurable doctrinal words and letters" (*chos kyi tshig dang yi ge dpag tu med pa'i gzungs la dbang, aprameya-dharma-pada-vyañjaneṣu dhāraṇī-vaśitā*) involves "correct individual analysis of doctrines" (*chos so so yang dag par rig pa, dharma-pratisaṃvedanā*) because one teaches all names, words, and letters within the name, word, and letter of one letter.

"Mastery of retention in terms of increase of wisdom and inspired courage" (*gong nas gong du shes rab dang spobs pa'i gzungs kyi dbangs, uttarottara-prajñā-pratibhāne*

dhāraṇī-vaśitā) is “correct individual knowledge of etymology; one attains mastery with respect to explication of mutual etymologies through one language, whereby one teaches all languages within one language”. He adds that whatever serves to obscure those four masteries is included within ninth ground obscurations. These are obscurations that cause one to lose interest in benefitting others while one still makes effort at one’s own welfare. When one enters the ninth ground one abandons them. See also *Siddhi* p. 652.

Mastery of “inspired courage” (*spobs, pratibhāna*) is “correct individual knowledge of inspired courage, because one understands the faculties [of other sentient beings] well and is skilled with respect to teaching doctrine”. Inspired courage is a quality that enables Hearers and Bodhisattvas to correctly and fearlessly preach doctrine correctly. In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I.420), it is the knowledge that arose in Kauṇḍinya when Buddha taught the four truths and he understood them in a flash of inspiration. This involves actualizing the four correct individual analyses: (1) correct individual analysis of doctrines; (2) correct individual analysis of meanings; (3) correct individual analysis of etymologies; and (4) correct individual analysis of inspired courage. In many Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, this is a result of a Buddha inspiring a Bodhisattva or a Hearer to preach, and the resulting teachings have the same validity as those of a Buddha, since they are inspired by a Buddha. See: “Inspired Speech in Early Mahāyāna Buddhism” by Graeme MacQueen, *Religion* 11, 1981, pp. 303-319 and 12, 1982, pp. 49-65; Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 266-7; *Théorie* pp. 289 n. 2; the definition in *Compendium* p. 166; and *Siddhi* p. 652.

In a discussion of these four individual correct individual analyses, Kensur Yeshe Thubden (oral commentary) stated: “First one knows all forms of names (*ming gi rnam grangs*). However many names something has, one knows them all. One is not obscured in any way with regard to forms of names. Second, one knows all the meanings (*don*) to which those names refer. Third, one knows their true nature (*gnas lugs*). Fourth, one has great confidence/courage (*spobs pa*) in explaining something to others. One is not afraid. One can say whatever needs to be said and one is fearless” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁷⁶⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 14.1), citing the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, comments that the obstructions of the first type “serve to obstruct activities of functioning things” and those of the second type “serve to obstruct the cloud of exalted wisdom of the great doctrine and what is very hidden”. When one enters the tenth ground one abandons these.

⁷⁷⁰Dok p. 118.2, K p. 53a.6: *shes bya thams cad la rab tu phra ba'i chags pa'i shin tu rmongs pa dang / thogs pa'i shin tu rmongs pa*; Lamotte p. 129, P p. 20c.1, D p. 81.7, N p. 61a.5, L p. 64b.5, C p. 52b.4, V p. 100e.1, Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 14.4: *shes bya['i don: omitted in P, D, N, L, V, C, Wonch'uk] thams cad la chags pa shin tu phra mo kun tu rmongs pa dang / thogs pa [shin tu phra mo; omitted in P, D, N, L, C; present in V; Wonch'uk: phra mo] kun tu rmongs pa*. Lamotte inserts both *don* and *shin tu phra mo* on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's text, p. 704c1. *Don* is not found in any of the Tibetan texts I have consulted, and *shin tu* is only found in V.

Wonch'uk (p. 14.5), citing the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, states that “great obscurations of very subtle attachment to all objects of knowledge” are “subtle obstructions to omniscience”, and “great obscurations of [very subtle] obstacles” are “all the seeds of naturally operating afflictive obstructions” (*rang gi ngang gis 'jug pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa sa bon gang yin pa thams cad de*). He cites the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* to the effect that when one becomes enlightened one simultaneously abandons the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience and so becomes a Foe Destroyer and a Tathāgata because one attains great nirvāṇa and great enlightenment. Citing the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, he adds (14.7): “On this ground one attains mastery with respect to doctrine, but because one has a remainder of obstructions one has not completely finalized [training]. Because on this [ground] one has the seeds of subtle innate obstructions to omniscience and the seeds of naturally operating afflictive obstructions, when one actualizes the vajra-like meditative stabilization (*rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin, vajropama-samādhi*) these are simultaneously abandoned, whereupon one enters the Tathāgata

ground.” See also *Siddhi* p. 653.

According to Kensur Yeshe Thubden (oral commentary), the “vajra-like meditative stabilization” is the second of two uninterrupted paths (*bar chad med lam*, *ānantarya-mārga*) of the tenth ground that abandons without remainder the predispositions for mistaken dualistic appearance. It is the actual antidote to the small of the small obstructions to omniscience, and is followed by a path of release (*thar pa'i lam*, *vimokṣa-mārga*) that is the Buddha ground. He adds: “Just as a diamond (*rdo rje pha lam*) can destroy any stone and anything else and cannot be destroyed by anything, so the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum is able to abandon the very subtle obstructions to omniscience that are extremely difficult to abandon” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁷⁷¹This paragraph is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 129, P p. 20c.2, and D p. 82.2, which provide a more intelligible reading than *Ā*ok and K: *gang la de ltar byang chub sems dpa' rnam de ltar kun tu rmongs pa'i dra ba chen po rab tu dral zhing de'i gnas ngan len thihs po chen po las yang dag par 'das te / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya ba'i bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub ji tsam du phan yon che zhing 'bras bu che ba ni ngo mtshar lags so*. *Ā*ok p. 118.5 and K p. 53a.8 read: *ji tsam du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub phan yon che zhing 'bras bu che ba dang / de ltar gti mug chen po'i dra ba bsal nas / gnas ngan len thihs po chen po las yang dag par 'das te / byang chub sems dpa' rnam bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya ba ngo mtshar ro*[K: *to*].

Concerning this passage, Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 15-16) states that it constitutes a praise of Bodhisattvas. The “great benefits” (*phan yon che ba*, *mahānuśamsā*) are “qualities that benefit others” (*gzhan la phan 'dogs pa'i yon tan*) and the “great fruits” (*'bras bu chen po*, *mahāphala*) are “qualities that benefit oneself” (*bdag la phan 'dog pa'i yon tan*). Also, the attainment of enlightenment and abandoning of obstructions are said to be “great benefits”, and the attainment of nirvāṇa and abandoning of afflictive obstructions

are said to be “great fruits”.

The thorough obscurations that prevent the attainment of enlightenment are like a “net” (*dra ba, jāla*) “because they serve to cover up and ensnare sentient beings”. The assumptions of bad states are compared to a “jungle” (*thibs po, gahana*) because there are many of them.

⁷⁷²Dok p. 118.7, K p. 53b.1: 'di rnam rnam par dag pa du zhig gis rnam par bkod pa lags; Lamotte p. 129, P p. 20c.4, D p. 82.3, N p. 61b.2, L p. 65a.2, V p. 100e.5, C p. 52b.8: [sa: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] de dag rnam pa dag pa du dag gis rnam par bzhaḡ pa lags.

⁷⁷³For a discussion of the unusual attitude, see note 726. Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 17.6) states that “purity of mind” (*sems rnam par dag pa, citta-viśuddhi*) refers to “purity of mind in general with respect to the eight absorptions”. He reports that the *Vibhāṣā* speaks of purity of mind with respect to the four concentrations. He quotes the *Yogācārabhūmi*: “Because one enters into true faultless clear realization of the noble truths, this is ‘training in surpassing mind’.”

“Purity of compassion” (*snying rje rnam par dag pa, karuṇā-viśuddhi*) refers to “immeasurable compassion from among the four immeasurables” (see note 541). He adds that this is different from, and inferior to, “great compassion” (*snying rje chen po, mahākaruṇā*), which is only attained by Bodhisattvas. On pp. 18-20 he goes into great detail on this topic, citing a wide variety of sources. He does not discuss the “purity of the perfections” (*pha rol tu phyin pa rnam par dag pa, pāramitā-viśuddhi*) other than to say that this term refers to the six and ten perfections that are discussed later in this chapter. See also *Somme* notes pp. 60-1*.

Citing a commentary on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, he states that “purity of perception and reverence for Buddhas” (*sangs rgyas mthong zhiḡ bsnyen bkur byed pa rnam par dag pa, buddha-darśana-paryupasthāna-viśuddhi*) refers to “viewing all Buddhas, revering all

of them, and worshipping all of them". Perceiving Buddhas involves perceiving Buddhas that are emanation bodies, complete enjoyment bodies, and truth bodies. Revering them involves: (1) offerings of goods, such as clothing, food, etc.; (2) offerings of respect, such as incense, flowers, banners, etc.; and (3) offerings of achievement, such as achievement of faith, ethics, etc. On pp. 21-27 he goes into detail concerning various aspects of this.

"Purity of thoroughly ripening sentient beings" (*sems can yongs su smin par byed pa rnam par dag pa, sattva-paripacana-viśuddhi*) refers to giving material things and to teaching doctrine to sentient beings. One "ripens" the virtuous qualities of sentient beings, their wisdom and so forth, through skill in means, giving teaching of doctrine and so forth.

"Purity of birth" (*skye ba rnam par dag pa, utpāda-viśuddhi*; p. 28.6) involves "Bodhisattvas taking various types of birth in order to benefit sentient beings". This means that Bodhisattvas take rebirth in various forms due to the pure motivation of wishing to bring benefit and happiness to sentient beings.

"Purity of power" (*mthu rnam par dag pa, prabhāva-viśuddhi*; p. 31.7) refers to three types of power of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*: (1) enhanced power, which is so called because Bodhisattvas who, in dependence upon cultivating meditative stabilizations, can accomplish all aims through their mere wishes, have serviceable minds, and have minds that have been very well cultivated; (2) power of doctrine, which refers to the great fruits and great benefits of doctrine, which is equated with the six perfections; and (3) innate power, which refers to "marvellous and wonderful innate qualities [resulting] from previous accumulation of great collections of merit of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas". On p. 32 he also quotes from the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which presents a five-fold division of: (1) power of clairvoyance; (2) power of doctrine; (3) innate power; (4) power that is held in common with [powers of] Hearers and Solitary Realizers; and (5) uncommon power. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 539.5) also comments that this refers to this five-fold division. See also *Compendium* pp. 167-8 for a discussion of a fourfold division of purities.

⁷⁷⁴According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 34.2), this means that the purities just mentioned are common to all the grounds, and (except for the purity of birth on the Buddha ground) are not surpassed on succeeding grounds. The "qualities individual to each ground" (*rang gi sa'i yon tan*), however, do have differences of superiority and inferiority. This is because on each ground one completes training in specific limbs, which one does not work at in other grounds and which are not present in the lower grounds. Thus, when one completes the training of a particular ground one has actualized a quality specific to that ground which did not exist prior to that ground, and so in that sense the qualities of later grounds are superior to those of former grounds.

Ālo-sang-dā-yang (p. 78), discussing this idea, states: "The division into the ten grounds is made by way of former good qualities, such as the number of one's good qualities, the majesty of one's power, the way one practices the ten perfections, and the way one takes fruitional rebirths, being surpassed by later ones. However, since there does not exist even a slight difference with regard to the mode of the ten ultimate grounds' seeing the pure nature — reality — divisions are not made by way of differences of dissimilar entities, objects of observation, or aspects [of these ultimate grounds]...Nonetheless, until the tenth ground there is the difference of seeing newly a factor not seen formerly of freedom from adventitious defilements which is with reality, the pure nature. This is because the exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise of the ten grounds have the greater and lesser vision of directly realizing the true cessations that were attained by the uninterrupted paths of the lower grounds and of not directly realizing the true cessations that will be attained by the uninterrupted paths of the higher grounds" [tr. Jules Levinson].

On p. 35.1 Wonch'uk states that on each ground one works at a particular perfection, and each is particularly important on its ground but not as important on other grounds. Thus, one works at the perfection of giving on the first ground and at the perfection of ethics on the second, but these are not as important on other grounds. The practices specific to each ground lead to actualization of the qualities of each ground, and each higher ground surpasses those below it in this regard.

⁷⁷⁵Lamotte p. 130, P p. 20d.2, D p. 83.1, as well as Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 36.6 and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 541.1 read: *dge ba'i rtsa ba*. *Dok* p. 119.7 and K p. 53b.8 read: *dge ba*.

⁷⁷⁶Lamotte p. 130, P p. 20d.3, D p. 83.1 and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 543.3 add *dang ldan pa*, but this is omitted in Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 36.7 and K p. 54a.1.

⁷⁷⁷Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 544.2) states that this means that Bodhisattvas have six kinds of skill in means by which they ripen other sentient beings: "(1) Bodhisattvas cause small virtuous roots of sentient beings to bring about limitless effects; (2) with little difficulty they produce and establish vast and limitless roots of virtue; (3) they eliminate the anger of those who wish to harm Buddha's teachings; (4) they cause ordinary [beings] to enter [into the path]; (5) they thoroughly ripen those who have entered; and (6) they liberate those who have been ripened."

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 37.1), citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, indicates that they "take rebirth through the power of consciousness" (*shes pa'i stobs kyis skye ba len pa*). They "take rebirth through the power of wishes" (*smon lam gyi stobs kyis skye ba len pa*). Due to their compassion, "Bodhisattvas who abide on the grounds take rebirth in order to thoroughly protect sentient beings" (*sa la gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa' dag sems can yongs su bskyab pa'i phyir skye ba yang dag par len pa*). He adds that the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* states that Bodhisattvas enter into cyclic existence for the benefit of sentient beings.

With respect to the fourth aspect, he states that Bodhisattvas who abide on the grounds eliminate the afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience and because of this are able to help others to do the same. He quotes the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* as stating: "If one is not even able to protect oneself from sickness, how can one protect others?" He also provides another quote from the same source stating that if one is bound one cannot help

others to get rid of their bonds.

He cites the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* to the effect that Bodhisattvas take birth in dependence upon [attaining mastery over] the power of karma, the power of wishes, the power of meditative stabilizations, and the power of clairvoyances. Because of these powers they are able to take rebirth according to their wishes. Compare this passage with *Somme* pp. 172-3.

⁷⁷⁸Lamotte p. 130, P p. 20d.4, D p. 83.3, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 544.7 add *dang ldan pa*, which is omitted in *Dok* p. 120.2, K p. 54a.2, and Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 38.6.

⁷⁷⁹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 545.1) states that all the wishes of Bodhisattvas can be condensed into five types: “(1) wishing for the arising of the mind [of enlightenment]; (2) wishing for births [that can benefit other sentient beings]; (3) wishing for [auspicious] objects of activity; (4) correct wishes; and (5) great wishes.” The words in brackets are inserted on the basis of his further comments from lines 3-5.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 38.7) comments that one person's opinion is that Bodhisattvas have “extensive wishes” (*smon lam rgya chen po, vistirṇa-praṇidhāna*) because they have an extensive object of observation, i.e., sentient beings. Their wishes are “auspicious” (*gya nom pa, praṇita*) because they seek enlightenment, which is an auspicious state of perfection. Their wishes are said to be “supreme” because they completely transcend those of Hearers and Solitary Realizers and those who have not yet entered the Bodhisattva grounds.

⁷⁸⁰*Dok* p. 120.3, K p. 54a.3: *mya ngan las 'das pa'i bde ba'i gnas par yang mkhas pa*; Lamotte p. 130, P p. 20d.5, D p. 83.3: *mya ngan las 'das pa'i bde ba la gnas pa la mkhas pa*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 547.1) comments: “They do not become frightened by nirvāṇa because [in] their practice — due to aspiring toward the Bodhisattva

emptiness — they do not become frightened by nirvāṇa, whereby they perceive the benefits of nirvāṇa and do not abandon the faith and belief that perceive the benefits existing in it, and not abandoning belief. Due to this, they have previously completed the collections of nirvāṇa, and so they are ‘skilled regarding the peaceful abode of nirvāṇa’.”

⁷⁸¹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 547.3) comments: “When Bodhisattvas apply themselves by way of that aspiration toward [realization of] emptiness, due to thoroughly understanding cyclic existence as it really is they are able to enter into surpassing equanimity of mind with respect to all thorough afflictions, desire, and so forth. When established in surpassing equanimity of mind with respect to those afflictions, they have no thorough afflictions of mind, and with this they cycle in cyclic existence and, having done so, they are able to thoroughly ripen the qualities of a Buddha and to ripen sentient beings, and are able to quickly attain the state of blissful nirvāṇa.”

⁷⁸²Dok p. 120.4, K p. 54a.4: *myur du 'thob pa de dang / bde bar gnas pa de yang spangs te / sgyu [sic; K: rgyu] med cing dgos pa med pa'i sdug bsngal yun ring po mang po sna tshogs 'byung yang sems can gyi don la yid kyis smon par byed pa ste*; Lamotte p. 130, P p. 20d.5, D p. 83.4: *myur [Lamotte: mgyur] du thob pa de dang bde bar gnas pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] spangs te / sems can gyi don rgyu ba med pa dgos pa med pa sdug bsngal mang po sna tshogs yun ring po 'byung ba la yid kyis smon par byed pas te*. Dok's spelling of *sgyu* should be corrected to *rgyu*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 547.5) adds: “When applying themselves to [realization of] emptiness, Bodhisattvas will not quickly pass beyond sorrow in seeking nirvāṇa. Due to not passing beyond sorrow [i.e., entering nirvāṇa,] they thoroughly ripen the qualities of a Buddha and thoroughly ripen sentient beings.” Although there are many sufferings in cyclic existence, “their minds do not become depressed due to cyclic existence. When Bodhisattvas apply themselves by way of aspiration toward [realization of] emptiness, since their minds do not become depressed due to cyclic existence they do not

quickly enter nirvāṇa.” This is because they want to work for the welfare of sentient beings.

On p. 39.7 Wonch'uk comments: “They do not pass beyond sorrow due to constantly generating great compassion.... They do not look for recompense and they produce minds of great compassion without looking for recompense.” He adds that they wish for the welfare of sentient beings despite the tribulations of remaining in cyclic existence because they have completely pacified desire.

On p. 243 n. 18, Lamotte speculates that “without purpose” (*dgos pa med pa*) should perhaps be read as “thoughtlessly” or “unintentionally” (*dgongs pa med pa*), but I think that this is unlikely and it is not supported by the other texts.

⁷⁸³Lamotte p. 131, P p. 20d.6, and D p. 83.5 insert *dang ldan pa*, which is omitted in *Ādok* p. 120.5, K p. 54a.5 and Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 39.1.

⁷⁸⁴The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 131, P p. 20d.7, D p. 83.5, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 548.5, which read: *byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyis bslab pa'i gzhi du mchis lags*, and Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 40.4, which reads: *byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyis bslab par bgyi ba'i gzhi du mchis lags*. *Ādok* p. 120.6 and K p. 54a.6 read: *byang chub sems dpa'i bslab pa'i dngos po du mchis*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 550.7) explains that these “bases of training” are methods for thoroughly ripening oneself and other sentient beings. He divides each of these into nine aspects, which are then further subdivided. See pp. 551-556 and *Siddhi* p. 631.

⁷⁸⁵These are the six perfections (*pha rol tu phyin pa, pāramitā*), the great qualities in which Bodhisattvas train. On the basis of these, Bodhisattvas progress toward the state of Buddhahood. Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 41.6), citing the *Yogācārabhūmi* as his source, states that they are called “perfections” “because their time and nature are pure, and one

attains supreme effects". Citing the same source, he adds: "Because one achieves [these] for a very long time during three periods of incalculable eons and because [one's virtuous roots] are superior in terms of natural purity to all of the virtuous roots of worldlings, Hearers, and Solitary Realizers...and because one thoroughly apprehends the fruit of supreme enlightenment, they are correctly established by way of supremacy of time, are pure by way of the supremacy of pure nature, and they bestow the supreme result, [and so] they are called 'perfections'." He then goes on to cite numerous other sources concerning why they are called "perfections".

On p. 44.1, citing the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, he states that "giving" (*sbyin pa*, *dāna*) is so called "because it eliminates poverty". On p. 47.5, citing the *Legs pa'i tshul khrims bstan pa'i mdo*, he divides ethics into three types: (1) ethics that follows from ethics; (2) ethics that follows from mind (i.e., meditative stabilizations); and (3) ethics that follows from wisdom. The first type is the perfection of ethics, the second is the perfection of concentration, and the third is the perfection of wisdom.

"Ethics" (*tshul khrims*, *śīla*) is so called "because it cools....This is because it thoroughly pacifies the burning afflictions [that result] from objects of activity." "Patience" (*bzod pa*, *kṣānti*) is so called "because it destroys anger". "Effort" (*brtson 'grus*, *vīrya*) is so called "because it causes engagement in virtue". "Concentration" (*bsam gtan*, *dhyāna*) is so called "because it stabilizes the mind; this is due to collecting the mind internally". "Wisdom" is so called "because it knows suchness; this is because it understands the ultimate". He also gives other explanations (pp. 44-46).

He also discussed them previously (vol. *thi* [119], p. 486-7) and gave other etymologies and explanations. He also linked this to chapter eight, explaining how the discussion of calm abiding and special insight in that chapter is connected with the discussion of the perfections in this chapter, and how this chapter is based on chapter eight. See also: *Compassion* pp. 127, 182, 188-9; *Siddhi* pp. 620-38; *Somme* pp. 180-195 and notes pp. 35*-38*.

⁷⁸⁶Dok p. 121.1, K p. 54a.8: *thog ma'i gsum po ni / lhag pa'i tshul khrims kyi bslab par shes par bya'o / bsam gtan ni lhag pa'i sems kyi bslab pa'o // shes rab ni lhag pa'i shes rab kyi bslab pa'o // brtson 'grus ni kun tu 'gro bar ngas bshad do*; Lamotte p. 131, P p. 20e.1, D p. 83.7: *dang po gsum ni lhag pa'i tshul khrims kyi bslab par rig par bya'o // bsam gtan ni lhag pa'i sems kyi bslab pa yin no // shes rab ni lhag pa'i shes rab kyi bslab pa yin no // brtson 'grus ni kun tu 'gro ba yin par nga smra'o*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 566.3) states: “Giving is the cause of correctly appropriating ethics; and while fearless giving is the very nature of ethics, ethics is of the very nature of surpassing ethics. Patience is the accompanier of ethics.”

Wonch'uk (p. 46.6) states that “surpassing mind” (*lhag pa'i sems*, *adhicitta*) refers to meditative stabilizations (*ting nge 'dzin*, *samādhi*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 566.4) explains that concentration is training in surpassing mind “because [concentration] is of the nature of mental one-pointedness.”

Wonch'uk (p. 46.7) states that “surpassing wisdom” (*lhag pa'i shes rab*, *adhiprajñā*) is non-conceptual exalted wisdom. He adds that in this passage “surpassing” “means supreme and excellent” (*mchog dang dam pa'i don yin te*). Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 566.5) explains that wisdom is a training in surpassing wisdom “because it is of the nature of thoroughly distinguishing phenomena.” For a bibliography of these terms, see *Somme* notes pp. 41-3*.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 566.5), effort is said to be “omnipresent” (*kun tu 'gro ba*, *sarvatraga*) “because [effort] is of the nature of applying oneself to all virtuous qualities (*dge ba'i chos thams cad la sbyor ba'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir*).” Wonch'uk (p. 46.2) explains that effort is omnipresent because “it completely pervades the other three groups because it serves to arouse those three trainings.”

⁷⁸⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 50.6) explains that from among the six perfections, the first three are included within the collection of merit, the last (i.e., wisdom) belongs to the collection of wisdom, and the other two belong to both collections. He cites a commentary

on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (p. 52.1), which states that the term “collection” (*tsogs, saṃbhāra*) has two meanings: (1) that which serves to assist enlightenment and (2) what serves to manifestly establish the nature of enlightenment. Since enlightenment is manifestly established due to the power of these, they are called “collections of enlightenment”.

He also cites Asvabhāva’s commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* to the effect that they are called “collections” because they have the meaning of accumulation. He then adds that this commentary expands on this statement by stating that one accumulates or works at these for a period of immeasurable eons.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 567.2) explains that training in surpassing ethics is called a collection of merit “because of being of the nature of the three things that are included within merit, that is to say, giving, ethics, and patience.” Due to giving, one attains excellent resources. Due to ethics, one attains an excellent body. Due to patience, one attains excellent companions. He adds: “Therefore, that collection of merit — the cause of excellent resources, body, and attendants — is the method of [attaining] high status....Exalted wisdom is unmistakable apprehension — with respect to objects of knowledge — of conventional truths, the varieties [of phenomena], and enumerations; and wisdom also is apprehension — which differentiates phenomena — of the ultimate truths, the mode [of being] of phenomena, and their character. Therefore — because one attains nirvāṇa due to knowledge and vision that non-mistakenly knows the two truths — the collection of wisdom is the attainment of definite goodness....The assumption and maintaining of giving and ethics and the cultivation of the immeasurables — giving and so forth — in dependence upon effort and concentration is the class of merit. In dependence upon those two, [the following] — (1) application to the three aspects of wisdom, (2) skill with respect to all skillful objects, (3) individual investigation of the two truths, (4) thoroughly differentiating and individually investigating, just as they are, virtuous and non-virtuous phenomena and so forth — [constitute] the class of exalted wisdom.”

⁷⁸⁸This passage is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.4, and D p. 84.2, which read: *rnam pa lngas te / pha rol tu phyin pa dang ldan pa'i dam pa'i chos bstan pa / byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod la thog ma kho nar shin tu mos pa dang / de'i 'og tu chos spyad pa bcu po dag gis thos pa dang / bsams pa dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab bsgrub pa*. *ĀDok* p. 121.5 and K p. 54b.4 read: *rnam pa lnga ste / pha rol tu phyin pa dang ldan pa'i dam pa'i chos bstan pa / byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod la de thog mar shin tu mos pa dang / de nas chos spyod pa rnam pa bcu dang / thos pa dang / bsam pa dang / bsgom pa las byung ba'i shes pas sgrub pa*. The translation reflects the use of an instrumental particle by Lamotte, P, and D in the first phrase. Also, Lamotte, P, and D make it clear that there is a temporal sequence here with the use of *de'i 'og tu*, while *ĀDok* reads *de nas*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül addresses this topic on p. 472.7 and on p. 458.6. Lamotte (p. 244) refers to the ten practices listed in chapter seven, p. 69. See note 728 and *Somme* notes p. 40*.

⁷⁸⁹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 57.7), they “safeguard the mind of enlightenment” (*byang chub kyi sems rjes su bsrung, bodhicitta-anurakṣaṇa*) in the sense that they safeguard it from becoming corrupted or degenerating.

Wonch'uk (p. 58.2), cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, which states that “spiritual guides” (*dge ba'i bshes gnyen, kalyāṇa-mitra*) are those who abide in the ethics of the Bodhisattva vows (*byang chub sems dpa' sdom pa'i tshul khriṃs la gnas*).

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 584.4), the “virtuous class” (*dge ba'i phyogs, kuśala-pakṣa*) consists of four things: “(1) performing well the limits of actions [i.e., differentiating the perfections, training in the perfections, and performing them without unseemliness]; (2) skill [with respect to the activities listed in note 777 and the corresponding section of the sūtra]; (3) benefitting others; and (4) thorough dedication [of the virtuous roots of past, present, and future that they have accumulated, are accumulating, and will accumulate, to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment by way of those

three practices from the depths of their hearts]". Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 59.3) quotes the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which states that training in the "virtuous class" involves "thoroughly completing cultivation of the six perfections in a manner that is constant, continuous, and uninterrupted".

⁷⁹⁰This passage is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.6, D p. 84.4 and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 2.2, which read: *ci'i slad du bslab pa'i gzhi de dag grangs drug tu gdags par rig par bgyi lags*. The wording of *Ḍok* p. 122.1 and K p. 54b.6 is ambiguous: *ci'i slad du / bslab pa'i dngos po 'di grangs drug tu bcas par 'tshal bar bgyi*. The major difference is in *Ḍok* and K's use of *'tshal ba*, which usually means "seek", "want", "ask", etc., but is sometimes used as "to know" etc. when it translates Sanskrit *pratyeti*, *vedita*, and combinations of the root $\sqrt{jñā}$. For a bibliography on the question of the number of the perfections, see *Somme* notes p. 36*.

⁷⁹¹*Ḍok* p. 122.2, K p. 54b.7: *sems can la phan gdags pa dang / nyon mongs pa'i gnyen po dang gnyis kyi phyir te*; Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.7, D p. 84.4: *rnam pa gnyis kyi phyir te / sems can la phan gdags pa dang / nyon mongs pa'i gnyen po nyid kyi phyir ro*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 61.3) comments that the first three perfections benefit sentient beings and the latter three serve as antidotes to afflictions.

⁷⁹²*Ḍok* p. 122.3, K p. 54b.8: *de la sbyin pas ni byang chub sems dpa' yo byad rab tu sbyin pas sems can rnams phan 'dogs pas phan 'dogs so // tshul khrims kyis ni 'phongs pa dang / gnod pa dang / gtse bar mi bya ba'i phan 'dogs pas phan 'dogs so // bzod pas ni 'phongs pa dang / gnod pa dang / gtse ba la mi mjed pas phan 'dogs te / 'di gsum gyis phan 'dogs so*; Lamotte p. 132, P p. 20e.8, D p. 84.5: *de la byang chub sems dpa' sbyin pas ni sems can rnams la yo byad nye bar bsgrub pa'i phan 'dogs pas phan 'dogs so // tshul khrims kyis ni phongs pa dang / gnod pa dang / rnam par tho 'tsham [D: 'tshams] pa nye bar mi sgrub pa'i phan 'dogs pa'i [P, D: pas] phan 'dogs so // bzod pas ni*

phongs pa dang gnod pa dang rnam par tho 'tsham [D: 'tshams] pa la ci mi snyam pas phan 'dogs te / de gsum gyis ni sems can la phan 'dogs so.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 62.1), citing the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, states that Bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings by way of giving “because they give them material goods and do not engage in harmfulness toward them, and because they are patient regarding harms caused by them and because they benefit them”.

⁷⁹³ĀDok p. 122.5, K p. 55a.2: *brtson 'grus kyis ni nyon mongs pa ma bcil ba dang / nyon mongs pa yang dag par ma bcom pa / dge ba' i phyogs la rab tu sbyor zhing nyon mongs pas de [dag: omitted in K] dge ba' i phyogs la sbyor ba dang bral bar mi nus so*; Lamotte p. 132, P p. 21a.2, D p. 84.7: *brtson 'grus kyis ni nyon mongs pa rnam par bcil ba dang / nyon mongs pa yang dag par bcom pa' i dge ba' i phyogs la sbyor bar byed de / de ni nyon mongs pas dge ba' i phyogs la sbyor ba las bskyod par mi nus so.*

Lamotte (p. 244 n. 23) states that the Tibetan text he consulted seemed corrupt, and his translation follows Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version. I think that ĀDok and K provide a clearer reading, but they seem different from the Chinese text Lamotte translates here. ĀDok and K differ from Lamotte, P, and D in inserting negative particles (*ma*) in front of the verbs *bcil* and *bcom*, which I think are required by the logic of this passage and which are found in Wonch'uk's citation of the passage (vol. *di*, [120], p. 62.2).

⁷⁹⁴This passage is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 132, P p. 21a.3, D p. 85.1, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 4.3. The differences noted in note 790 also apply in this passage. See also *Siddhi* p. 628 for a discussion of the members of this fourfold division.

⁷⁹⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 67.4) explains that this means that skill in means assists the first three perfections, wishing assists effort, power assists concentration, and exalted wisdom assists wisdom.

⁷⁹⁶Dok p. 123.1, K p. 55a.5: *de la pha rol tu phyin pa gsum gyis phan gdags pa'i sems can rnams la byang chub sems dpa' bsdu ba'i dngos pos yongs su zin pa'i thabs mkhas pas dge ba la rab tu gzhog ste / de'i phyir ngas thabs mkhas pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa ni / gsum gyi grogs su 'gyur bar bshad do*; Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21a.4, D p. 85.2: *de la pha rol tu phyin pa gsum gyis sems can rnams la phan btags nas byang chub sems dpa'i [P, D: dpas] bsdu ba'i dngos pos zin pa'i thabs la mkhas pas dge ba la 'jog par byed de / de'i phyir ngas thabs mkhas pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa ni gsum po dag gi grogs su gyur pa yin par yongs su bstan to*.

The four “means of gathering” (*bsdu ba'i dngos po*, *saṃgraha-vastu*) are methods used by teachers to attract students: (1) giving (*sbyin pa*, *dāna*), which involves giving away teachings of doctrine and material goods; (2) speaking pleasantly (*snyan par smra ba*, *priya-vāḍita*), which involves interesting them in one’s teachings of doctrine through pleasant words; (3) beneficial activities (*don spyod pa*, *artha-caryā*), which are activities that accord with what trainees want; and (4) concordant function (*don mthun pa*, *samanarthatā*), which involves making one’s actions accord with one’s words. These are described in *Tshig mdzod*, p. 1487. See also *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* p. 666 and *Mahāvvyutpatti* XXXV, 1-4.

⁷⁹⁷Dok p. 123.3, K p. 55a.6, Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21a.6, and D p. 85.3 read: *tshe 'di la*, which Lamotte equates with Sanskrit *dr̥ṣṭa-dharma*.

⁷⁹⁸Dok p. 123.3, K p. 55a.7: *nyon mongs pa mang ba dang / khamdang mos pa dman pa'i phyir / bsgom pa rgyun mi gcod [K: gcad] par mi nus shing lhag pa'i bsam pa nyam chung pa'i phyir / sems nang du gzhog par mi nus la*; Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21a.6, D p. 85.3: *nyon mongs pa mang bas rtag tu sgom mi nus pa dang / khamdang mos pa dma' ba'i phyir lhag pa'i bsam pa stobs chung bas sems nang du 'jog mi nus pa dang*. The word “power” is borrowed from Lamotte, P, D, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 5,

which use the term *stobs*.

⁷⁹⁹Ādok p. 123.4, K p. 55a.8: *byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod thos pa la dmigs pa yongs su bsgoms pa'i bsam gtan ma yin pa'i phyir*; Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21a.7, and D p. 85.4 reverse the word order of this phrase, which makes clear the intent of the passage: *byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod thos pa'i dmigs pa la bsam gtan yongs su ma bsgoms pas*.

⁸⁰⁰Ādok p. 123.5, K p. 55b.1: *spros pa phyi ma la nyon mongs pa chung ngu 'gyur bar yid kyis smon pa de ni des smon lam gyi pha rol tu phyin pa yin te*; Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21a.8, D p. 85.5: *gnas shing phyi ma la nyon mongs pa chung ba nyid du yid kyis smon par byed pa de ni de'i smon lam gyi pha rol tu phyin pa yin te*. I prefer the texts of Lamotte, P, D, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 5 in their choice of *de'i*, which indicates that this refers back to these Bodhisattvas, while Ādok and K read *des*, which is more ambiguous.

⁸⁰¹Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21b.1, D p. 85.6, Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 6: *des*; Ādok p. 123.7, K p. 55b.2: *de*.

⁸⁰²Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 70.2) quotes this passage in the sūtra as follows: "This is when Bodhisattvas — having overcome weakness with respect to the unusual attitude due to the causes and conditions of relying on excellent beings and properly taking excellent doctrines to mind after hearing them — achieve auspiciousness in terms of improving the unusual attitude and constituents."

⁸⁰³Ādok p. 124.1, K p. 55b.3: *dam pa'i kham la bsam pa'i stobs rab tu 'thob pas / de ni de'i stobs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yin te / des ni nang du sems 'jog nus par 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 133, P p. 21b.2, D p. 85.7: *kham gya nom pa las bsam pa'i stobs tho' par 'gyur ba de ni de'i stobs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yin te / des sems nang du 'jog nus pas*.

⁸⁰⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 72.3) explains: "That which enables them to hear the Bodhisattva canon is wisdom of hearing. That which enables them to observe it is wisdom of thinking. Meditating on it well is wisdom of meditation. Through those one is able to manifestly attain concentration."

⁸⁰⁵Dok p. 124.4, K p. 55b.6: *pha rol tu phyin pa drug po 'di rnam kyī go rims ci'i slad du nges par bstan par 'tshal bar bgyi*; Lamotte p. 134, P p. 21b.5, D p. 86.2: *ci'i slad du pha rol tu phyin pa drug po de dag gi go rim [P, D: rims] de ltar bstan par rig par bgyi lags*. This idea is also discussed in *Siddhi* p. 628 and in *Somme* notes p. 36*.

⁸⁰⁶Dok p. 124.5, K p. 55b.7: *de dag gong nas gong du bsgrub pa la brten du gyur pa'i phyir te*; Lamotte p. 134, P p. 21b.5, D p. 86.2: *de dag gong nas gong du 'grub pa'i rten nyid yin pa'i phyir te*.

In other words, later perfections depend upon former ones. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], 7.4) comments: "This is because (1) in dependence upon the former the latter arise, (2) the former are inferior while the latter are superior, and (3) the former are coarser while the latter are more subtle."

⁸⁰⁷Lamotte adds another phrase in his translation (p. 245) that he indicates is only found in Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version but not in the Tibetan versions. See Lamotte p. 245 n. 27.

⁸⁰⁸See Lamotte p. 246 n. 28 and *Siddhi* p. 620.

⁸⁰⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 78.4) quotes the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, which states that "giving of doctrine" (*chos sbyin pa, dharma-dāna*) involves "engaging in teaching doctrine non-erroneously, in teaching logically, and in causing [others] to take up the bases of training". "Giving of material things" (*zang zing sbyin pa, āmiṣa-dāna*) involves "giving what is good, what is clean, and what is suitable after having eliminated the stains of miserliness

and the stains of hoarding wealth". He adds Vasubandhu's commentary states that the first one aids in the establishment of virtuous roots in others, and that material things and fearlessness help others' bodies and minds. He also cites a commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* which states that "giving of fearlessness" (*mi 'jigs pa sbyin pa, abhaya-dāna*) involves "thoroughly protecting [sentient beings] from fear of lions, tigers, crocodiles, kings, robbers, water and so forth". Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 7.7) comments that it consists of: (1) protection from the conditions of suffering; (2) protection from loss of life; and (3) protection from the continuum of cyclic existence. See also *Siddhi* pp. 620-21.

⁸¹⁰According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 79.6, citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*), the first involves assuming the seven types of Bodhisattva vows of individual liberation. After they have assumed these vows, whatever virtues they accumulate by way of body and speech are the ethics that are "the composite of virtuous practices". The third type of ethics is "the ethics of helping sentient beings", which is comprised of any assistance given to sentient beings by Bodhisattvas. On p. 80.6, citing Asvabhāva's commentary, he states that the first has a quality of abandonment, the second has a quality of wisdom, and the third has a quality of kindness and is the cause of the four fearlessnesses. These three types of ethics are discussed in *Siddhi* p. 622, but the first is different.

⁸¹¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 81.1) cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, which states that "patience that endures injury" (*gnod par byas pa mi mjed pa'i bzod pa, apakāra-marṣaṇa-kṣānti*; Wonch'uk: *gnod la mi mjed pa'i bzod pa*) means that "when various continuous awful sufferings that arise from harming others arise for a long time a Bodhisattva trains as follows: 'This is a result of my own actions, and thus I am undergoing such fruits of suffering from non-virtuous actions that I myself have done'. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 8.2) states that a person who has this type of patience does not respond in kind to someone who insults or strikes him/her. On p. 8.5 he comments that when a Bodhisattva has this patience

“(1) although he is abused, he does not return abuse; (2) although he is beaten, he does not return the beating; and (3) although he is blamed, he does not return blame”.

Wonch’uk (p. 81.4), citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, states that “patience that does not think of [one’s own] suffering at all” (*sdug bsngal la ji snyam pa’i bzod pa, duḥkhādhivāsānā-kṣānti*) is the patience of a Bodhisattva who trains correctly and encounters suffering but is able to endure even great suffering that seems meaningless. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 8.6) explains that this as the patience of not being discouraged about acting in the future for the welfare of all sentient beings.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 8.6) states that “patience that definitely conceives doctrine” (*chos la nges par rtog pa’i bzod pa, dharma-nidhyāna-kṣānti*) has three aspects: (1) not being frightened by emptiness; (2) not being attached to the two extremes; and (3) being firm with respect to engaging in asceticism. See also *Siddhi* p. 621 and *Compassion* pp. 204-222.

⁸¹²Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 83.2), citing the *Yogācārabhūmi*, states that the first is “similar to putting on armor that precedes mental enthusiasm after abiding in the means of applying oneself to effort”. In doing this, Bodhisattvas think that they will work for countless eons to free one sentient being from even one particular type of suffering. This armor-like attitude enables one to work at attaining enlightenment for an immeasurably long time in order to benefit sentient beings and to overlook the sufferings one encounters along the way. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [205], p. 9.2) divides this type of effort into three types: (1) putting on the armor of great love (*byams pa chen po’i go bgo ba*); (2) steady force of great compassion (*snying rje chen po’i mthu brtan pa*); and (3) the steady force of great effort (*brtson ’grus chen po’i mthu brtan pa*). See also *Siddhi* p. 622 for a discussion of effort that is armor.

Wonch’uk (p. 83.6) quotes the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which states that the second type of effort is “from among the six perfections, applying oneself to a Bodhisattva’s ethics and achieving them”. According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül, the second type of effort is also divided into three types: (1) relying on the meaning with great faith (*dad pa chen pos don la rton*

pa); (2) engaging in virtue through great practice (*spyod pa chen pos dge ba la 'jug pa*); and (3) pervading sentient beings through great dedications (*bsngo ba chen pos sems can la khyab pa*).

On line 7 Wonch'uk quotes the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which states that the third type of effort is of eleven types, but he does not list them. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 9.3) also divides the third type of effort into three types: (1) making unexcelled effort with respect to equalizing and ethics (*snyoms pa dang tshul khrims la khyad par med par brtson pa*); (2) making effort at establishing [others] in the meanings of doctrines through the means of the four ways of gathering [students] (*bsdu ba rnam pa bzhi'i thabs kyis chos kyi don la 'jog par brtson pa*); and (3) making effort at means by way of undaunted wisdom (*gnyen po mi 'gong ba'i shes rab kyis thabs su brtson pa*).

⁸¹³Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [205], p. 9.6) gives a threefold division of the first type of concentration: (1) mind that does not conceive doctrine (*sems chos la mi rtog pa*); (2) doctrine that does not conceive mind (*chos sems la mi rtog pa*); and (3) a concentrated mind that does not conceive both (*btang snyoms kyi sems gnyi gar mi rtog pa*). Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 85.1) states that it is “non-conceptual” “because it is free from all conceptions of the unreal and assumptions of bad states”. He also cites the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* to the effect that “one generates physical and mental pliancy due to abandoning all conceptions”. This concentration, according to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, is “very peaceful” (*rab tu zhi ba*) because it “pacifies all signs by way of thoroughly abandoning experiences of the taste of cyclic existence”. He states that Asvabhāva comments that it is “non-unseemly” (*kha na ma tho ba med pa*) “because one attains purity through having separated from pride, [wrong] views, and craving”. On p. 85.5, Wonch'uk gives his own explanation, which states that “in this very lifetime one abides in bliss” because “one has a meditative stabilization that serves as an antidote to afflictive emotions and suffering and one attains mastery with respect to clairvoyances”.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 9.6) divides the second kind of concentration into three types: (1)

that which establishes bodily qualities (*sku'i yon tan mngon par sgrub pa*); (2) that which establishes qualities of exalted wisdom (*ye shes kyi yon tan mngon par sgrub pa*); and (3) that which establishes qualities of the powers and so forth (*stobs la sogs pa'i yon tan mngon par sgrub pa*). Wonch'uk discusses this topic beginning on p. 86.2.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 9.7) also divides the third kind of concentration into three types: (1) meditative stabilizations that are dedications (*bsngo ba'i ting nge 'dzin*); (2) pervasive meditative stabilizations (*khyab pa'i ting nge 'dzin*); and (3) unchangeable meditative stabilizations (*mi 'gyur ba'i ting nge 'dzin*). Wonch'uk discusses this concentration beginning on p. 86.4.

⁸¹⁴Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [205], p. 10.2) divides the first kind of wisdom into three types: (1) skill with respect to characteristics of compounded phenomena (*'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid la mkhas pa*); (2) skill with respect to the continuum of cyclic existence (*'khor ba'i rgyud la mkhas pa*); and (3) skill with respect to turning away from the continuum of cyclic existence (*'khor ba'i rgyud las ldog pa la mkhas pa*).

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (line 3) also divides the second kind of wisdom into three types: (1) [wisdom] that is non-abiding due to [understanding] emptiness (*stong pa nyid pas mi gnas pa*); (2) [wisdom] that is non-conceptual due to [understanding] signlessness (*mtshan ma med pas mi rtog pa*); and (3) [wisdom] that is non-attached due to [understanding] wishlessness (*smon pa med pas mi chags pa*).

On line 4 he divides the third kind of wisdom into three types: (1) [wisdom that is] application by way of meditative stabilizations with respect to natural suffering (*rang bzhin gyi sdug bsngal la ting nge 'dzin gyis sbyor ba*); (2) [wisdom that] eliminates the suffering of compounded phenomena by way of antidotes (*'du byed kyi sdug bsngal la gnyen pos gcod pa*); and (3) wisdom that extensively liberates one from the suffering of doubt (*the tshom gyi sdug bsngal la rgyas par 'grel pa'i shes rab*).

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 87.5ff.) has a lengthy discussion of the topic of wisdom in which he mentions a number of lists of types of wisdom, but the relation between these and

the list given in the sūtra is unclear to me. For other discussions, see *Somme* p. 192. Lamotte also discusses the other three-fold divisions of the other perfections. See also *Siddhi* pp. 620-23.

⁸¹⁵This topic is discussed in *Siddhi* p. 628 and *Somme* pp. 186-7 and notes p. 37*.

⁸¹⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 90.6) comments that "things that are contradictory with the perfections" whatever serves to obstruct the perfections. He divides these obstructions into six types, each of which corresponds to one of the perfections.

On p. 91.3 he states that "non-attachment" refers to "that which is non-attachment to all types of phenomena that serve as bases of giving and so forth". He adds that according to the *Mtshams rnam par grol ba'i mdo* "non-attachment" is [non-attachment to] exaggerated adherence to things that are discordant with the perfections".

He states (p. 91.7) that "not looking [for reward]" (*mi lta ba, anapekṣa*) refers to a mind that is not interested in the fruitional results (*'bras bu rnam par smin pa*; this sometimes refers to future lifetimes) of [cultivating] the perfections or in beneficial recompense and so forth. On p. 92.1 he adds that according to the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, "not looking [for reward]" refers to "a mind that is not interested in material things or the results of those".

"Non-unseemliness" (*kha na ma tho ba med pa, anavadya*) refers to "what is not mixed with qualities that afflict these perfections and abandons practices that lack method". He also cites the *Yogācārabhūmi* as stating that it refers to "whatever abandons all types of secondary afflictions". These are afflictions that interfere with giving and so forth.

"Non-conceptuality" (*rnam par mi rtog pa, nirvikalpa*; p. 94.2) refers to "absence of exaggerated adherence to the specific characteristics of these perfections as being literal".

In explaining "thorough dedication" (*yongs su bsngo ba, pariṇāma*; p. 95.2), Wonch'uk cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, which indicates that it refers to "prayer wishes that are planted in order to attain unsurpassable, complete, perfect enlightenment, which is the fruit of all [the perfections,] giving and so forth".

⁸¹⁷ĀDok p. 126.1, K p. 56b.1: *de la ma chags pa ni pha rol tu phyin pa dang 'gal ba'i dngos po rnams la gang ma chags pa'o*; Lamotte p. 135, P p. 21c.6, D p. 87.2: *de la chags pa med pa nyid ni pha rol tu phyin pa dang mi mthun [D: 'thun] pa'i dngos po la lhag par chags pa med pa gang yin pa'o*.

⁸¹⁸ĀDok p. 126.2, K p. 56b.2: *de la mi blta ba ni pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi 'bras bu rnam par smin pa dang / phyir bya ba la sems ma 'dzings pa'o*; Lamotte p. 135, P p. 21c.6, D p. 87.3: *de la mi lta ba nyid ni pha rol tu phyin pa'i 'bras bu rnam par smin pa dang / lan du phan 'dogs pa dang 'brel ba'i sems med pa gang yin pa'o*. I prefer the use of 'brel ba (Skt. *anubaddha*; ĀDok: 'dzings) and lan du phan 'dogs pa (Skt. *parihāra*; ĀDok, K: *phyir bya ba*) in Lamotte, P, and D to ĀDok and K's translations, and have translated these terms in accordance with the translations of Lamotte, P, and D.

⁸¹⁹ĀDok p. 126.3, K p. 56b.3: *de la rnam par mi rtog pa ni pha rol tu phyin pa 'di rnams kyi mtshan nyid sgra ji bzhin du gang mngon par zhen pa med pa'o*; Lamotte p. 135, P p. 21c.8, D p. 87.4: *de la rnam par mi rtog pa nyid ni pha rol tu phyin pa de dag gi rang gi mtshan nyid la sgra ji bzhin du mngon par zhen pa med pa gang yin pa'o*.

⁸²⁰ĀDok p. 126.4, K p. 56b.4: *de la yongs su bsngo ba ni pha rol tu phyin pa 'di dag byas shing bsags pa rnams kyis [K: kyi] byang chub chen po'i 'bras bur smon pa'o*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21c.8, D p. 87.4, N p. 65a.2, L p. 69a.4, C p. 56a.4, V p. 102a.8: "With respect to [the fifth,] thorough dedication [refers to] wishing for [Lamotte: ripening] the fruitional results of Bodhisattvas who practice and accumulate these perfections" (*de la yongs su bsngo ba nyid ni pha rol tu phyin pa de dag nyid byas shing bsags pa byang chub sems dpa'i 'bras bur smin [P, D, N, L, C, V: smon] pa'o*). Lamotte uses the term *smin*, but P, D, N, L, C, V, ĀDok, K, and Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 95.1) read *smoṇ*, which I think is preferable, since this fits the thought of the passage. I suspect that Lamotte's reading is a

misprint, since none of the other texts reflect it.

⁸²¹Ādok p. 126.4 and K p. 56b.5 read: *'gal ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.1, and D p. 87.5 read: *mi mthun pa'i dngos po*, which Lamotte equates with Sanskrit *viruddha-vastu*.

⁸²²Ādok p. 126.5, K p. 56b.5: *'dod pa'i dga' ba dang / longs spyod dang / dbang phyug la bdag bde bar gnas pa la yon tan gyi phan yon du lta ba*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.1, D p. 87.5: *'dod pa'i dga' ba dang longs spyod dang dbang phyug dang bdag nyid kyi bsod nams la yon tan gyi phan yon du lta ba*.

⁸²³This passage is translated on the basis of Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.2, and D p. 87.6, which read: *lus dang ngag dang yid ci 'dod dgur kun tu spyod pa*. Ādok p. 126.6 and K p. 56b.6 read: *lus dang ngag dang yid rang nyam du spyod pa*, “making use of body, speech, and mind in accordance with one’s feelings”.

⁸²⁴Ādok p. 126.6, K p. 56b.6: *mi brtson zhing bsod nyams su gnas pa*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.2, N p. 65a.5, L p. 69a.7: *mi brtson pas bsod nams*; D p. 87.6: *mi brtson pas bsod nyams*.

⁸²⁵The word “actions” is added in accordance with Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.2, and D p. 87.6, which read: *'du 'dzi dang 'jig rten gyi las sna tshogs dang rnam par g.yeng ba la 'jug pa*. “Engagement with” is also added on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which add *'jug pa*. Ādok p. 126.7 and K p. 56b.7 read: *'du 'dzi dang 'jig rten gyi sna tshogs la rnam par g.yeng ba'i rnam pa*, “the aspect of distraction in terms of commotion and various worldly [things]”.

According to Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary), “distraction” refers to laxity (*bying ba*) and excitement (*rgod pa*) at the time of cultivating meditative

stabilizations.

⁸²⁶Wonch'uk discusses "desirable happiness" ('*dod pa'i dga' ba, kāma-rati*), "resources" (*longs spyod, bhoga*), and "overlordship" (*dbang phyug, aiśvarya*) beginning on vol. *di*, [120], p. 99.6.

⁸²⁷Ādok p. 127.1, K p. 56b.8: *pha rol tu phyin pa 'di rnams kyi 'bras bu rnam par smin pa gang lags*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.3, D p. 87.7: *pha rol tu phyin pa de dag gi rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu gang lags*.

⁸²⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 102.3) comments that "great resources" (*longs spyod chen po, mahāsaṃbhoga*) are gained through the power of giving. One goes to "happy migrations" (*bde 'gro ba, sugati*) due to safeguarding ethics. One achieves non-enmity (*khon med, avaira*) and non-dissension (Ādok p. 127.2: *dbye med*; K p. 57a.1: *dbye ba med*; Lamotte p. 136, P p. 21d.4, D p. 88.1, Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 102.2: *dbyen med, abheda*) through cultivating patience, and one experiences much happiness and mental happiness. Through effort one achieves sovereignty over sentient beings. Due to concentration one attains physical non-injury which eliminates afflictions. Due to the perfection of wisdom one attains renown for great power by way of skill with respect to the five topics of knowledge (i.e., philosophy, logic, grammar, medicine, and arts and crafts).

⁸²⁹Ādok p. 127.3, K p. 57a.2: *pha rol tu phyin pa 'di rnams la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos dang rnam par 'dres pa gang lags*; Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21d.5, D p. 88.1: *pha rol tu phyin pa de dag la kun nas nyon mongs pa can gyi chos dang 'dres pa gang lags*.

⁸³⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 104.4) states that these obstruct four types of meditation and cites the *Abhidharmakośa* with respect to these four.

⁸³¹Ādok p. 127.6 and K p. 57a.3 differ from Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21d.6, and D p. 88.3, which read: *de la tshul bzhin ma yin pa'i sbyor ba ni 'di yin te / de las gzhan pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa dag la de las gzhan pa'i pha rol ru phyin pa'i sgom pa nyams pa gang yin pa'o*, "With respect to that, incorrect endeavor is when, with respect to perfections that are other than that, one degenerates in terms of cultivating perfections that are other than that." Ādok and K read: *de la tshul bzhin ma yin pa'i sbyor ba ni 'di yin te / gang de las gzhan pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa dag la de ma yin pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa gzhan dang mi ldan zhing bral bar sgom pa'o*.

⁸³²Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21d.8, D p. 88.4, and Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 106.1 insert the particle *na* here, which is omitted in Ādok p. 127.7 and K p. 57a.5.

⁸³³Ādok p. 127.7, K p. 57a.6, Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 106.1: *...nas bslangs* [K: *bslang*] *ste*; Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21d.8, D p. 88.4: *...las bslang ste*.

⁸³⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 106.2) comments that this refers to the first of the four means of gathering (students), which are discussed in note 796. He adds that one should not be satisfied by just giving material things, which may bring worldly happiness but does not truly benefit sentient beings. By giving them the gift of doctrine, however, one benefits them by raising them up from non-virtuous states.

⁸³⁵Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21e.2, D p. 88.5: *rnam grangs*; Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 106.5: *thabs*; Ādok p. 128.2, K p. 57a.7: *rnam pa*.

⁸³⁶This is one of the three types of suffering: (1) the suffering of misery (*sdug bsngal gyi sdug bsngal*, *duḥkha-duḥkhatā*), which includes physical and mental sufferings; (2) the suffering of change (*'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal*, *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā*), which includes all contaminated feelings of happiness; these are called sufferings because they are subject to

change at any time, which leads to suffering; and (3) compositional suffering (*'du byed kyi sdug bsngal, saṃskāra-duḥkhaṭā*), the suffering endemic to cyclic existence, in which sentient beings are prone to suffering due to being under the other-influence of contaminated actions and afflictions. See *ME*, pp. 286-7, Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyā-yukti* (Ōtani University Press *Sde dge*, Tokyo, 1981, *sems tsam* vol. 14.206.2), and *Compendium* pp. 49 and 62.

⁸³⁷Lamotte p. 137, P p. 21e.3, D p. 88.6: *rnam grangs*; Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 106.7: *thabs*; *Dok* p. 128.2, K p. 57a.8: *rnam pa*.

⁸³⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 107.1) explains that merely giving wealth, food and so forth does not truly benefit sentient beings, but establishing them in the virtuous qualities of a Bodhisattva's nirvāṇa is the supreme benefit.

⁸³⁹*Dok* p. 128.4, K p. 57b.2: *rnam pa 'di lnga ma yin par pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi rnam par dag pa gzhan du nga mi smra'o*; Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.4, D p. 88.7: *nga ni rnam pa lnga po de dag ma gtogs par pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi rnam [Lamotte: rnams] par dag pa gzhan yod par mi smra mod kyi*. According to Lamotte (p. 248), this refers to the five reasons cited on p. 126 (*Dok* pp. 126-27), "non-attachment" and so forth.

⁸⁴⁰*Dok* p. 128.4, K p. 57b.2: *'on kyang de nyid bzung ste / pha rol tu phyin pa'i rnam par dag pa bsdus pa dang / spros pa khyod la bshad do*; Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.4, D p. 88.7, N p. 66a.2, L p. 70a.5, C p. 57a.3, V p. 102c.6: *'on kyang de dag [nyid: omitted in V] la brten nas pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi rnam par dag pa bsdus pa dang / so so [P, V: sor; D, N, L, C: ba] [tha dad: omitted in P, D, N, L, C; V: phye] pa khyod la bshad par bya'o*; Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 107.6: *'on kyang yang dngos po de dag gis bsdus pa dang / so so ba la brten nas pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi ni rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid bshad par bya'o*. The words "in dependence upon" are translated in

accordance with Lamotte, P, D, N, L, C, and V, which read: *la brten nas*. The words “collectively and specifically” are also translated on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which read: *bdsus pa dang so so [tha dad] pa*. *Ḍok* and *K* would be translated as “in a condensed and elaborative [manner]”. Lamotte’s addition of *tha dad* in brackets is based on Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese text (p. 706b.7), but is not found in any of the Tibetan versions or in Wonch’uk. When P p. 21e.8 and D p. 89.3 refer back to this topic, however, they refer to it as *pha rol tu phyin pa’i rnam par dag pa so so tha dad pa*.

⁸⁴¹*Ḍok* p. 128.5, *K* p. 57b.3 *de la pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyi rnam par dag pa ni rnam pa bdun du shes par bya ste*; Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.5, D p. 89.1: *de la pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyi rnam par dag pa bdsus pa ni rnam pa bdun gyis rig par bya ste*.

⁸⁴²The translation of this phrase is aided by Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.5, and D p. 89.1, which read: *byang chub sems dpa’i chos de dag gis gzhan las shes kyi khe yongs su mi ’tshol [P, D: tshol] ba*, “they know the Bodhisattva doctrine from others and do not seek profit.” *Ḍok* (p. 128.5-6) and *K* p. 57b.4 read: *byang chub sems dpa’ pha rol las shes kyi khe mi tshol ba*.

⁸⁴³*Ḍok* p. 128.6, *K* p. 57b.4: *chos ’di rnams byang chub tu nges par ’byung ba yin nam ma yin zhes the tshom dang nem nur mi skyed pa*; Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.5, D p. 89.2: *chos ’di dag byang chub tu nges par ’byin pa yin nam ma yin snyam du yid gnyis dang the tshom skyed par mi byed pa*.

⁸⁴⁴*Ḍok* p. 128.7, *K* p. 57b.5: *cung zad kyis chog par mi ’dzin pa*; Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.7, D p. 89.3: *cung zad tsam dang ngan ngon tsam gyis chog par mi ’dzin pa*.

⁸⁴⁵The seventh member of this list is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 138, P p. 21e.7, D p. 89.3, and Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 109.2, which read: *chos de dag gis ser*

sna mi byed cing gzhan dag la phrag dog mi byed pa yin no. *Ḍok* p. 128.7 and *K* p. 57b.6 read: *chos de dag gis pha rol la 'jungs pa'i phyir phrag dog gis rnam par 'khrugs pa ma yin pa'o*, “not being disturbed by jealousy due to avarice toward others due to these doctrines”.

Wonch'uk (p. 108.5) states that the first purity entails not seeking fame or profit from others due to their understanding that one has practiced the six perfections. The second refers to practice in terms of the three wheels of thorough purification, i.e., viewing action, agent, and recipient as lacking self. He states that the third indicates [the strength of] their belief. The fourth indicates the character of their not praising themselves and not despising others, because these would be “serious faults” (*lci ba'i nyes pa*). The fifth is due to their having separated from laziness. With regard to the sixth, they avoid being satisfied with mere inferior attainments through engaging in extensive practices and being without discouragement. Regarding the seventh, Wonch'uk explains: “This is because — since Bodhisattvas practice doctrine themselves — when they perceive others who also practice, they do not engage in miserliness with respect to material things and doctrine out of miserliness and jealousy.”

⁸⁴⁶*Ḍok* p. 129.2, *K* p. 57b.7: *de ni 'di ltar byang chub sems dpa' gang ngas sbyin pa'i rnam par dag pa bdun du bshad pa yang dag par blangs shing spyod pa yin te / sbyin pa'i dngos po rnam par dag pas rnam par dag pa'i sbyin pa sbyin par byed pa dang / tshul khrims rnam par dag pa dang / lta ba rnar: par dag pa dang / sems rnam par dag pa dang / ngag rnam par dag pa dang / ye shes rnam par dag pa dang / dri ma rnam par dag pas / rnam par dag par sbyin pa sbyin par byed de / de ltar rnam pa bdun po 'di ni sbyin pa rnam par dag pa'o*; Lamotte p. 138, *P* p. 21e.8, *D* p. 89.4: *'di lta ste sbyin pa rnam par dag pa rnam pa bdun po sbyin par bya ba'i dngos po rnam par dag pas sbyin pa rnam par dag pa sbyin par byed pa dang / tshul khrims rnam par dag pa dang / lta ba rnam par dag pa dang / sems rnam par dag pa dang / ngag rnam par dag pa dang / shes pa rnam par dag pa dang / dri ma rnam par dag pas sbyin pa rnam par dag pa sbyin par*

byed do zhes ngas bstan pa gang yin pa de dag byang chub sems dpa' [P, D: dpas] yang dag par blangs te gnas pa de ni sbyin pa rnam par dag pa rnam pa bdun yin no.

The words “objects of” are added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which read: *sbyin par bya ba'i dngos po*. Dōk p. 129.2 and K p. 57b.7 read: *sbyin pa'i dngos po*.

The phrase “give gifts purely” has been translated in accordance with Lamotte, P, and D, which read: *sbyin pa rnam par dag pa*, indicating that *rnam par dag pa* should be understood as modifying *sbyin pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 110.2) comments that the giving of gifts, within having purified faults, is pure ethics. Not apprehending that ‘I am the giver and that what is given is mine’ and so forth is called purity of view. The giving of gifts with a mind of compassion is called purity of mind. Giving gifts with an honest face and speaking straightforwardly is called purity of speech. The giving of gifts with the correct name, nature, and so forth of the gift is called purity of knowledge. The giving of gifts after having thoroughly abandoned the defilements of laziness, desire, hatred, obscuration, etc. is called purity of defilements. Wonch'uk then discusses a ten-fold division of giving on p. 111.

⁸⁴⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 112.6) states: “With respect to the teaching of the “Ethics” chapter [of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*]: they have ethics due to not being overcome by gain, fame, others' disputes, the afflictions, or the secondary afflictions; and because [those things] are not able to captivate [those Bodhisattvas]. They “continually practice ethics” (*rtag tu byed pa'i tshul khrims*) because “they do not violate ethical training”. They have “ethical engagement” (*'jug pa'i tshul khrims*) “because even when [their ethics] are sundered, they mend them”.

⁸⁴⁸The conjunction is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.5, and D p. 90.1, which insert *dang*.

This passage is translated with the help of Wonch'uk's commentary (vol. *di*, [120], p.

113.4), which cites this passage as: *byang chub sems dpa' gang gis bdag nyid kyi las kyi rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu la shin tu mngon par yid ches pa la brten pas gnod pa thams cad nye bar gnas pa nang 'khrug pa mi skyed pa*. He comments that this means that they believe in the causes and effects of actions, and when something harmful occurs that seems unjust, they see it as the result of their own actions (see especially p. 114). As a result of this, they develop patience. He adds that harmful things are the objects of activity of the practice of patience and states that patience is important in that it prevents one from retorting angrily, which can eliminate the many benefits one accrues through religious practice.

Dok p. 129.6 and K p. 58a.3 read: *de 'di ltar bdag gis las rnam par smin pa la rton pas thams cad du thams cad las gnod pa nye bar gnas pa la mi 'khrugs pa*. Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.5, and D p. 89.7 read: *thams cad las gnod pa thams cad nye bar gnas pa na / bdag nyid kyi las kyi rnam par smin pa la rton pas mi 'khrug pa*.

⁸⁴⁹Dok p. 129.7, K p. 58a.4: *spyo ba dang / gshe ba dang / brdeg pa dang / sdigs [K: bsdigs] pa dang / mtshang [K: mtshang] 'dru ba gnod par bya bas / lan bya bar mi sbyor ba de'i khon gyi bag la nyal mi 'dzin pa*; Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.5, D p. 90.1: *lan bya ba'i phyir slar spyo ba dang / gshe ba dang / brdeg pa dang / bsdigs pa dang / mtshang 'dru [P: 'bru] ba'i gnod pa dag gis sbyor bar mi byed pa dang / khon gyi bsam pa mi 'dzin pa*. The conjunction particle *dang* in Lamotte, P, and D indicate that the phrases "...engage in these" and "do not hold onto..." should be separated.

⁸⁵⁰Dok p. 130.1 and K p. 58a.5 read: *bshags na nyon mongs par mi byed pa*. Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.6, D p. 90.1, and Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 115.6 read: *shad kyis chags [P, D: 'chags] pa na yongs su nyon mongs par mi byed pa*, which Lamotte translates (p. 249) As: "Sont-ils critiqués, ils ne s'irritent pas."

⁸⁵¹Dok p. 130.1 and K p. 58a.5 read: *bshags pa la mi sdod pa*. Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.6, D p. 90.1 read: *shad kyis 'chags pa la mi sdod pa*, which Lamotte (p. 249) translates as:

“*Eux-mêmes ne s’adonnent pas à la critique,*” but which I think is better translated as “they do not wait to confess.” Wonch’uk has almost the same reading as Lamotte’s Tibetan text, except that he omits the *la*. Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 116.1 comments: “A Bodhisattva who suspects that an enemy is about to harm that Bodhisattva quickly goes to that very enemy and confesses. It is not that he/she confesses upon waiting for the other [i.e., the enemy] to come to him” (*byang chub sems dpa’ ni dgra bos byang chub sems dpa’ nyid la gnod pa byed du dogs pas / byang chub sems dpa’ nyid myur du dgra bo de nyid du ’gro zhing bshags par byed gyi / pha rol ’ongs pa la bsdad nas bshags pa ni ma yin no*).

⁸⁵²Dok p. 130.1 and K p. 58a.6 read: *’jigs pa dang / zang zing can gyi sems kyis bzod pa ma yin pa*. The word “practice” is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.6, and D p. 90.2, which insert *byed*. These texts read: *’jigs pa dang zang zing gi sems kyis bzod par byed pa ma yin pa*.

Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 115.4 cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*: “When others harm them, they do not harm them in return, their minds do not become angry, and they do not conceive even a thought of an enemy.” On p. 116.4 he comments that they do not practice patience due to being afraid of kings and so forth, and they do not practice patience out of seeking food, drink, and so forth; rather, they cultivate patience out of concern for others.

⁸⁵³Dok p. 130.2, K p. 58a.6: *phan par bya ba la yal bar mi gzhog pa yin te*; Lamotte p. 139, P p. 22a.7, D p. 90.2: *phan gdags par bya ba la yal bar mi ’dor ba*.

Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 116.6) comments that Bodhisattvas constantly benefit sentient beings and do not abandon practice due to thinking that helping a sentient being once is sufficient. This means that they do not just help sentient beings once, but continually persevere in their efforts.

⁸⁵⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 117.3) comments that “sameness of effort” (*brison ’grus kyī mnyam pa nyid*, *virya-samatā*) refers to “moderated intentness” (*dam lhod ran par*

gyur pa; literally: “tightness-looseness that is moderate”).

⁸⁵⁵According to Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 118.5), this indicates “effort that is free from pride” (*nga rgyal dang bral ba’i brtson ’grus*). He adds: “This means that a Bodhisattva’s effort is primarily for the benefit of others; therefore, since it is for others, how can he/she give rise to pride?”

⁸⁵⁶Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 119.5-7) cites the *Vijñaptimātrā-siddhi*, which associates “having power” (*mtshu dang ldan pa*) with effort that is armor (*go cha’i brtson ’grus*; see note 813). He associates “having effort” with “effort of exertion” (*sbyor ba’i brtson ’grus*, *prayoga-vīrya*; see note 540). He associates “having enthusiasm” (*Ḍok* p. 130.3, P p. 22a.8, D p. 90.3, N p. 67a.1, L p. 71a.6, C p. 58a.2, Wonch’uk p. 119.6: *sbro ba, utsāha*; K p. 58a.8: *spro ba*; Lamotte p. 140: *sgro ba*) entails “non-slackness” (*zhum pa med pa*). He associates “firm discipline” (*rtul ba brtan pa*, *dr̥ḍha-vrata*) with non-disturbance, and he associates “not giving up effort with respect to virtuous qualities” with non-satisfaction.

⁸⁵⁷*Ḍok* p. 130.3, K p. 58a.8: *dge ba’i chos la brtson pa mi ’dor ba yin te*; Lamotte p. 140, P p. 22a.8, D p. 90.3: *dge ba’i chos rnams la brtson pa ma gtang [P: btang] ba*.

⁸⁵⁸Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 120.7) states that these refer to the first three concentrations. The first is “any meditative equipoise that understands well the signs of conventional truths.” Regarding the second, he states: “Any meditative stabilization that observes an object that is thoroughly complete suchness is thoroughly complete because its object is not attained from [another] object [translation doubtful].” The third refers to “any meditative stabilization that observes both conventional and ultimate objects”.

⁸⁵⁹The translation of this sentence is aided by Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 121.2), which reads: *shin tu spyangs ba byas pa dang ldan pa’i ting nge ’dzin la bsam gtan pa*. *Ḍok* p.

130.6, K p. 58b.2, Lamotte p. 140, P p. 22b.2, and D p. 90.5 read: *shin tu sbyang ba byas pa'i ting nge 'dzin la bsam gtan pa*. Lamotte (p. 140) translates this into Sanskrit as: *suparyavadāta-samādhī*. If Wonch'uk's reading were translated into Sanskrit, it would probably be *praśrabdhi-samprayukta-samādhī*.

Wonch'uk (p. 121.2) associates these three with "meditative stabilizations which are in association with the three, application, correct exalted wisdom, and exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment".

⁸⁶⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 121.5) states that this meditative equipoise [which he translates as "meditative equipoise that is endowed with immeasurable hearing, observation, and thorough meditation with respect to the Bodisattva canon (*byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod thos pa dang / dmigs pa dang / yongs su bsgoms pa dpag tu med pa dang ldan pa'i ting nge 'dzin*)"; *Dok* p. 130.6, K p. 58b.3: *byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod la dmigs shing bsgom [K: bsgoms] pa dpag tu med pa'i ting nge 'dzin*; Lamotte p. 140, P p. 22b.2, D p. 90.4: "immeasurable meditative equipoise that thoroughly meditates on an object of observation that is the Bodisattva canon (*byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod kyi dmigs pa yongs su bsgoms pa dpag tu med pa'i ting nge 'dzin*) "indicates wisdom at the time of application (*sbyor ba'i dus kyi shes rab bstan to*)."] This is a wisdom of hearing in the sense of being a meditative stabilization that is able to hear Mahāyāna teachings. This is a wisdom of thinking in the sense of abiding in meditative stabilization.

⁸⁶¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 123.4) quotes Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which states that "superimposition" is considered to be apprehending the non-existent as existent, and "deprecation" is denigrating the existent as non-existent. He adds that these are both "extremes" (*mtha'*), and this term has the sense of "falling down" (*ltung ba*) "because the occurrence of these two is a degeneration from the middle way (*dbu ma'i lam, madhyama-pratipad*). Imputations are only superimposed, and are not denigrated, because they are completely non-existent....Other-powered phenomena are not

superimposed, because their natures exists.... They are not deprecated, because they exist as only conceptualizations of the unreal. Thoroughly established natures are not superimposed because they exist in reality. [With respect to them] there is only deprecation."

⁸⁶²Dok p. 130.7, K p. 58b.3: *de 'di ltar sgro btags pa'i mtha' dang / skur pa'i mtha spangs nas / dbu ma'i lam gyis nges par 'byung bar 'gyur ba de ni de'i shes rab yin no // shes rab des kyang rnam par thar pa'i sgo stong pa nyid dang / smon pa med pa dang / mtshan ma med pa gsum la rnam par thar pa'i sgo'i don kyang yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin rab tu shes so*; Lamotte p. 140, P p. 22b.3, D p. 90.6: *'di lta ste / de'i shes rab de sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha' dang skur ba 'debs pa'i mtha' rnam par spangs te dbu ma'i lam gyis nges par 'byung ba dang / shes rab des stong pa nyid dang / smon pa med pa dang / mtshan ma med pa'i rnam par thar pa'i sgo gsum po dag la rnam par thar pa'i sgo'i don kyang yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes pa dang.*

For a discussion of the "three doors" see: *Kośa* ch. 8 p. 187; *Compendium* p. 135; and note 18.

⁸⁶³These are discussed extensively in chapters six and seven. Regarding this passage, Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 126.4) comments: "Due to being free from consciousnesses that view the two extremes, they know the meanings of the three natures just as they are in reality."

⁸⁶⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 126.7) quotes the *Bstan bcos shin tu rgyas pa brgya pa*, which states that conventional truths (*kun rdzob bden pa*, *saṃvṛti-satya*) include "whatever is produced from conditions, exists only imputedly, arises from conceptuality like illusory things, is expressible in words, and is like a dream is a conventional truth".

On p. 127.3 he discusses the "five topics of knowledge" (*rig pa'i gnas lnga*, *pañca-vidyā-sthāna*). The first, "insiders' knowledge" (*nang gi rig pa*, *ādhyaṭma-vidyā*), is

“whatever indicates correct causes and results and so forth”. The second, “knowledge of reasons” (*gtan tshigs kyi rig pa*, *hetu-vidyā*), i.e., logic, is “that which demonstrates other things and so forth”. The third, “knowledge of sounds” (*sgra rig pa*, *śabda-vidyā*), i.e., grammar, is “that which demonstrates the characteristics of skill with respect to speech and so forth”. The fourth, “knowledge of healing” (*gso ba rig pa*, *cikitsā-vidyā*), i.e., medicine, is “[knowledge of] the natures of sicknesses and the causes of sickness”. The fifth, “knowledge of crafts” (*bzo ba’i gnas kyi rig pa*, *śilpa-sthāna-vidyā*), is “objects of work and so forth”. See also *Mahāvvyutpatti* LXXVI.1-5.

⁸⁶⁵See chapter eight p. 86 and *Compendium* pp. 18-19.

⁸⁶⁶The words in brackets are inserted on the basis of Wonch’uk’s commentary (vol. *di*, [120], p. 129.4), which reads: *de bzhin nyid kyi tshul gcig pa*.

⁸⁶⁷Dok p. 131.5, K p. 58b.8: *tshad med pa’ dres pa’i chos [K: la] dmigs pa’i lhag mthong gis chos kyi rjes su mthun [K: ’thun] pa’i phyogs kyi nan tan yang dag par sgrub ste*; Lamotte p. 140, P p. 22b.7, D p. 91.2: *’dres pa tshad med pa’i chos la dmigs pa’i lhag mthong gis chos kyi rjes su mthun [P, D: ’thun] pa’i chos sgrub pa yang dag par sgrub par byed pa*.

“Doctrines that are immeasurably mixed” are discussed in chapter eight, pp. 80-5. Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 129.3) comments that its being non-conceptual etc. “indicates a nature of correct exalted wisdom” (*yang dag pa’i ye shes kyi bdag nyid bstan te*). That it observes doctrines that are immeasurably mixed “indicates exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment” (*rjes la thob pa’i ye shes bstan pa’o*).

⁸⁶⁸Dok p. 131.7, K p. 59a.2: *ma chags pas ni mthong ba’i chos la byang chub kyi sems dang / pha rol tu phyin pa rnams la rgyun mi ’chad [K: chad] pa dang / gus pa’i sbyor bas bag byed pa yin*; Lamotte p. 141, P p. 22c.1, D p. 91.3: “Because of being free from

attachment, in this lifetime Bodhisattvas are conscientious due to constant and intense application to the perfections” (*chags pa med pa nyid kyis ni byang chub sems dpa' tshe 'di la pha rol tu phyin pa rnams la rtag tu byed pa dang / gus par byed pa'i sbyor bas bag yod par byed do*).

⁸⁶⁹Dok p. 131.7, K p. 59a.3: *mi lta bas ni phyi ma la de la bag bya ba'i phyir / rgyu yongs su 'dzin par byed pa yin*; Lamotte p. 141, P p. 22c.2, D p. 91.4: “Due to being without [wrong] views, they thoroughly adhere to the causes of their being conscientious in the future” (*mi lta ba nyid kyis ni phyi mar de dag la bag yod pa'i rgyu yongs su 'dzin par byed do*).

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 132.3) comments: “Because there is no relation with [seeking] the fruitional results of the six perfections and with recompense, they thoroughly hold the causes of conscientiousness in the future; in the future, due to being endowed with conscientiousness, they increase the perfections by degrees.”

⁸⁷⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 132.6) states that they “cultivate the perfections very completely, very purely, and very proficiently” “due to separation from non-compassion, from improper application, from application that is always undifferentiated, and from non-devoted application”.

⁸⁷¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 133.2) states that non-conceptuality entails “not thoroughly grasping at signs”.

⁸⁷²Dok p. 132.2, K p. 59a.4: *yongs su bsngo bas ni / tshe rab [K: rabs] thams cad du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi bar du 'thob par bya ba'i phyir / 'dod pa'i 'bras bu rnam par smin pa dang bcas pa mi zad pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa rab tu 'thob bc*; Lamotte p. 141, P p. 22c.3, D p. 91.5: *yongs su bsngo ba nyid kyis ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi bar du tshe rabs thams cad du rnam par*

smin pa'i 'bras bu 'dod pa dang bcas pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa mi zad pa nyid 'thob par byed do.

The translation of this passage is aided by Lamotte, P, D, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül p. 23, all of which omit *thob par bya ba'i phyir*, which seems redundant to me.

Gan-den Tri-ba Jam-bel-shen-pen (oral commentary) equates “dedication” (*bsngo ba*, *pariṇāma*) with giving away (*gtong ba*). He adds: “Generally, you give away your body, your resources, whatever you have. In particular, here you give away your roots of virtue (*dge ba'i rtsa*). A Bodhisattva’s intention definitely to emerge from cyclic existence, meditation on death and impermanence, meditation on emptiness and so on are all marvellous virtues. In dependence upon them a good effect arises. Giving for the sake of the good things of this lifetime — food, clothing, wealth, comfort (*bde skyid*) and so forth — is not dedication, not giving. Giving away things for the sake of yourself alone is not dedication. You should give these things away for the sake of all sentient beings — yourself and others — having comfort. You should dedicate what you have to the flourishing (*rgyas pa*) of the Buddha’s teaching. That sort of thought is ‘dedication’” [tr. Jules Levinson].

⁸⁷³Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22c.5, D p. 91.6, and Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 133.7 clarify the reading of this passage by ending the passage with *gang yin pa*. Dōk p. 132.4 and K p. 59a.6 place *gang* at the beginning. Wonch’uk cites the passage as follows: “Whatever is non-attachment, absence of [wrong] views, and correct thorough dedication is very vast” (*chags pa med pa nyid dang / mi lta ba nyid dang / yang dag par yongs su bsngo ba nyid gang yin pa de ni / shin tu rgya che ba*).

⁸⁷⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 134.4) comments: “When one practices the perfections — because one is naturally without the afflictions and afflictions are thoroughly cleansed by non-conceptual exalted wisdom — this absence of thorough affliction is also associated with these levels.”

⁸⁷⁵Ādok p. 132.5, K p. 59a.7: *rab tu gsal ba, prasanna*; Lamotte p. 142: *spyangs pa nyid, niravadyatva*; P p. 22c.5, D p. 91.7, N p. 68a.3, L p. 72b.2, C p. 59a.2: *sbyangs pa nyid, viśodhanatva*; Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 134.5: *rab tu sbyangs pa*.

⁸⁷⁶Ādok p. 132.5: *gang shin tu so sor brtags pas byed pa'o*; Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22c.6, D p. 91.7: "it is individual investigation and activity (*so sor brtag cing bya ba nyid gang yin pa'o*)."

⁸⁷⁷Ādok p. 132.5, K p. 59a.7: *gang sa la rab tu zhugs pa rnams kyi mi 'dri ba'i chos nyid do*; Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22c.6, D p. 91.7: *sar chud pa rnams kyi yongs su ma [P, D: mi] nyams pa'i chos nyid gang yin pa'o*. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (p. 26) and Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 134.6) also use *mi nyams*, but Ādok and K use *mi 'dri*, which is probably a misspelling of *mi dri*, "stainless".

Wonch'uk (p. 134.7) indicates that this refers to the eighth and ninth grounds, "the Immovable" (*mi g.yo ba, acalā*) and "the Good Intelligence" (*legs pa'i blo gros, sādhumati*).

⁸⁷⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 135.1) comments: "The time of the tenth ground is distinctively superior by way of cause, and on the Tathāgata ground one is distinctively superior by way of effect, and this is the final purity."

⁸⁷⁹Ādok p. 132.7, K p. 59b.1: *byang chub sems dpa' rnams rtag tu pha rol tu phyin pa'i 'bras bu yid du 'ong ba rnam par smin pa mi bas pa dang / pha rol tu phyin pa mi bas pa lags*; Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22c.7, D p. 92.1: *byang chub sems dpa' rtag tu pha rol tu phyin pa'i rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu 'dod pa bas ma 'tshal ba dang / pha rol tu phyin pa bas ma 'tshal ba dang ldan pa lags*.

I have inserted the words "endowed with" in brackets on the basis of the phrase *dang*

Idan pa in Lamotte, P, and D, and have equated *mi bas pa* with *mi zad pa* (inexhaustible) on the basis of *Tshig mdzod* (p. 2075) and Wonch'uk's commentary (vol. *di*, [120], p. 135.7), which both gloss *mi bas pa* with *mi zad pa*. Lamotte (p. 251) also takes it this way, and translates it as "indestructible".

⁸⁸⁰ĀDok p. 133.1, K p. 59b.2: *byang chub sems dpa' rnam ci'i slad du / pha rol tu phyin pa rnam la dad pas rab tu gzhog pa de bzhin du / pha rol tu phyin pa'i 'bras bu yid du 'ong ba rnam par smin pa'i mos pa gzhog pa ma lags*; Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22c.8, D p. 92.2: *ci'i slad du byang chub sems dpa' rnam pha rol tu phyin pa rnam la ji ltar de ltar pha rol tu phyin pa'i rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu 'dod pa la dad pas gnas pa ma lags*.

⁸⁸¹ĀDok p. 133.2 and K p. 59b.3 read: *rnam pa lnga'i phyir te*. Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22d.1, D p. 92.3, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 27 read: "it is because of five causes (*rgyu lnga'i phyir te*)". Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 137.4 quotes this passage as: "Son of [good] lineage, it is because of five causes and conditions (*rigs kyi bu rgyu dang rkyen rnam pa lnga'i phyir te*)".

⁸⁸²Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 137.6) has a very different reading for the fifth member of this list: "Because the perfections are not finally changeable or transitory subjects" (*pha rol tu phyin pa ni mthar rnam par 'gyur zhing 'jig pa'i chos can ma yin pa'i phyir*). ĀDok p. 133.4 and K p. 59b.4 read: *rnam par mi 'gyur ba'i chos nyid kyi phyir ro*. Lamotte p. 142, P p. 22d.3, and D p. 92.4 read: *mi 'gyur ba'i chos nyid yin pa'i phyir ro*.

⁸⁸³ĀDok p. 133.6 and K p. 59b.6 read: *bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi tshogs su gyur pa*. Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22d.4, and D p. 92.5 read: *bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub tu 'gyur ba*. Lamotte (p. 143 n. 11) equates 'gyur ba with Sanskrit *parāvṛtti*, "transformation". Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 138.7) quotes this passage as follows: "When they meditate correctly, there is transformation into the

collections of unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment” (*de dag yang dag par bsgom pa na bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi tshogs yang dag pa nyid du 'gyur ba*).

⁸⁸⁴Dok p. 133.7 and K p. 59b.7 read: *mtshong ba'i chos la (dr̥ṣṭa-dharme)*, while Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22d.5, D p. 92.6, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 28 read: *tshe 'di la (ihatra)*, and Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 139.2) reads: *tshe 'di nyid la*. Wonch'uk quotes the rest of the passage differently: “When one cultivates these, in this very lifetime one brings together and benefits sentient beings” (*tshe 'di nyid la bdag nyid kyis sems can rnams sdud cing phan 'dogs par 'gyur ba*).

⁸⁸⁵Citing the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as his source, Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 139.4) states that these include: (1) attaining great resources (*longs spyod chen po thob pa*) and going to happy transmigrations (*bde 'gror 'gro ba*); (2) non-enmity (*khon med*) and non-dissension (*dbye ba med pa*); (3) much happiness and mental happiness (*bde ba dang yid bde ba*); (4) supremacy among sentient beings (*sems can gyi nang na gtso bor gyur pa*); (5) absence of physical harms (*lus la gnod pa med pa*); and (6) one is renowned as very powerful (*dbang che bar grags pa*). He adds that these are the respective fruits of cultivating the six perfections.

⁸⁸⁶Dok p. 134.1 and K p. 59b.8 read: *don gang lags*. Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22d.6, D p. 92.7 read: “What functions do they have?” (*don gang dang ldan pa lags*). Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 139.7) quotes this passage as: “What beneficial functions do they have?” (*phan yon gyi don gang dang ldan lags*).

⁸⁸⁷Dok p. 134.2 and K p. 60a.1 read: *pha rol tu phyin pa rnams ni rgyu snying rje las byung ngo*. Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22d.6, and D p. 92.7 have a clearer reading: *pha rol tu phyin pa rnams ni snying rje'i rgyu las byung ba dang*.

⁸⁸⁸ĀDok p. 134.3, K p. 60a.2: *gal te byang chub sems dpa' rnams longs spyod mi bas shing snying rje can lags na / [ci'i slad du: omitted in K] / 'jig rten na dbul po dag gda'*; Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22d.7, D 93.1: *gal te byang chub sems dpa' rnams longs spyod bas ma 'tshal ba dang ldan pa dang / snying rje can lags na ci'i slad du 'jig rten na dbul po gda' lags*.

⁸⁸⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 141.2) comments: "This means that Bodhisattvas have great resources and great compassion, but because of the faults of sentient beings' own karma it is not the fault of Bodhisattvas that those sentient beings are unable to partake of the resources of Bodhisattvas."

⁸⁹⁰"Perchance" translates *brgya la* (ĀDok p. 134.4, K p. 60a.3), which is omitted in Lamotte p. 143, P p. 22e.1, and D p. 93.2. Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 141.4) comments: "If it were the case that sentient beings were not [under the control of] the forces of their own karmas, then how could poor people be seen in the world, since Bodhisattvas constantly help others."

⁸⁹¹ĀDok p. 134.5 and K p. 60a.4 read: *'jig rten na sdug bsngal ba lta ga la snang bar 'gyur*. Lamotte p. 144, N p. 69a.3, and L p. 73b.5 read: *'jig rten sdug bsngal ba ltar snang bar ga la 'gyur*. P p. 22e.1, D p. 93.1, C p. 59b.8, and V p. 103c.8 read: *'jig rten [V: na] sdug bsngal ba lta snang bar ga la 'gyur*. Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 141.4) quotes this passage as: *'jig rten na dbul ba'i sdug bsngal ltar snang bar ga la 'gyur*.

⁸⁹²Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 141-5) comments on this passage at great length, undoubtedly because this reflects a fundamental problem for all religions, the existence of evil and suffering despite omnipresent goodness. In a Mahāyāna Buddhist context the problem centers on the fact that according to Mahāyāna tenets Bodhisattvas and Buddhas

have great compassion that extends to all sentient beings and wish to help them. In addition, the powers of Bodhisattvas are vast and those of Buddhas are unlimited, and so it is legitimate to ask how there can be any suffering at all. The Mahāyāna answer is that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas work tirelessly for the benefit of sentient beings, but those very beings undermine their efforts through their bad actions motivated by ignorance. In Wonch'uk's comments on this passage the main theme in the many sources that he cites is that Bodhisattvas and Buddhas do have great compassion and constantly work to help sentient beings, but the faulty actions of the sentient beings themselves counteract the good works of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas and lead to suffering. He adds (p. 144.2) that in the analogy comparing sentient beings with hungry ghosts water is analagous to the resources of Bodhisattvas. The resources, like clear water, are pure, but the karma of sentient beings distorts the pure gifts of Bodhisattvas into something distasteful to them, just as the karma of hungry ghosts is said to cause them to perceive clear water as blood and pus. Similarly, there is nothing wrong with the gifts of Bodhisattvas, but the bad karma of sentient beings causes them to misperceive these beneficial gifts. This analogy is also discussed in *Somme* (pp. 250-1), and the commentary discusses how various types of beings perceive the same water. See also *Compendium* p. 161.

⁸⁹³This passage is quoted by Kamalaśīla in his second *Bhāvanākrama*. See *Bhāvanākrama of Ācārya Kamalaśīla*, ed. Ācārya Gyaltsen Namdol, Varanasi, 1985, p. 211 for a Sanskrit restoration of the passage, and Lamotte p. 144, notes 1-3 for his Sanskrit restorations of some terms.

⁸⁹⁴Dok p. 135.2, K p. 60a.8: ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa de ltar / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas 'dzin du lags na / ngo bo nyid mchis pa'i rnam kyang ci'i slad du mi 'dzin; Lamotte p. 144, P p. 22e.5, D p. 93.5: gal te shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid 'dzin na [P: no] / ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid kyang ci'i slad du mi 'dzin lags.

⁸⁹⁵*Ādok* p. 135.3, *K* p. 60b.1: *ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la ngo bo nyid med par mi 'dzin par ni mi bshad de*; *Lamotte* p. 144, *P* p. 22e.5, *D* p. 93.6, *N* p. 69a.7, *L* p. 74a.4, *C* p. 60a.5: *nga ni ngo bo nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid 'dzin par mi smra mod kyī*; *V* p. 103d.5: *nga ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid 'dzin pa mi smra mod kyī*; *Wonch'uk* vol. *di*, [120], p. 149.5: *nga ni nam yang ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis / ngo bo nyid med pa nyid 'dzin par mi smra mod kyī*. Note the difference in placement of negative particles: *Ādok* and *K* place one negative particle with the first occurrence of *ngo bo nyid*, and also place a negative particle with *'dzin* that is omitted in *Lamotte*, *P*, *D*, *N*, *L*, and *C*.

⁸⁹⁶*Lamotte* p. 144, *P* p. 22e.6, *D* p. 93.6, and *Wonch'uk* vol. *di*, [120], p. 150.1 insert *'on kyang* here; this is omitted in *Ādok* p. 135.3 and *K* p. 60b.1.

⁸⁹⁷*Ādok* p. 135.3, *K* p. 60b.1: *ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni tshig 'bru med pa so sor [K: so] rang gis rig pa yin pas / tshig 'bru bstan pa ma gtogs par bshad mi nus te / de'i phyir de ni ngo bo med pas 'dzin ces bya'o*; *Lamotte* p. 144, *P* p. 22e.6, *D* p. 93.6, *N* p. 69a.7, *L* p. 74a.4, *C* p. 60a.5, *V* p. 103d.5: *yi ges bstan pa med par ngo bo nyid med pa yi ge med pa so so rang [V: gis] rig pa de bstan par mi nus pas de'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid [shes rab kyī pha rol tu phyin pas: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] 'dzin no [V: to] zhes de skad brjod do*. The translation follows *Lamotte*, *P*, *D* etc. in their reading of *med par*, “in the absence of”. *Ādok* and *K* read: *med pa*. The phrase that *Lamotte* adds in brackets is not found in any of the Tibetan texts (although it is found in *Wonch'uk*'s quotation of the passage, p. 151.2), and he adds it on the basis of *Hsüan-tsang*'s Chinese text, p. 707b.25.

In his comments on this passage, *Wonch'uk* (p. 150.2) refers back to *Buddha*'s teaching in the first four chapters, in which he explains that the ultimate is inexpressible, but that conceptual and analytical thought operate within the sphere of expressions, and that the ultimate is realized by Superiors individually by themselves, but in order to teach sentient beings about it they must resort to conventional expressions.

⁸⁹⁸These terms are also discussed in *Siddhi* p. 637.

⁸⁹⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 152.2) comments: "When they practice giving and so forth in the first period of countless eons [of practice], upon the arising of six types of discordances they are not able to overcome them, but instead are overcome by these six types of discordances."

⁹⁰⁰*Ā*Dok p. 135.7, K p. 60b.5: *tha ma*; Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.1, D p. 94.2, Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 32, Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 152.1: *chung ngu*.

⁹⁰¹This passage is translated with the aid of Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23d.1, and D p. 94.2, which read: *mos pas spyod pa'i sa la mos pa chung ngu dang 'bring la zhugs pa de ni*. See also Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 32) and Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 152.1), who have almost identical readings. *Ā*Dok p. 135.7 and K p. 60b.5 read: *mos pa dang spyod pa'i sa la mos pa tha ma dang / 'bring la gnas pa de ni*. See also *Siddhi* p. 637 for its discussion of this and the next two terms.

⁹⁰²*Ā*Dok p. 136.7, K p. 60b.6: *yang tshad med pa'i dus su dge ba'i chos de dag rab tu yongs su bsgoms pa dang ldan pa yang yin la / de'i nyon mongs pa dag kyang byung na / de zil gyis non te / des ni zil gyis mi gnan pa 'di lta ste / sa dang po nas bzung ba 'di ni / nye ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa'o*; Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.2, D p. 94.2: *yang dus dpag tu med pa nas ches yongs su bsgoms pa'i dge ba'i chos de dag nyid dang ldan zhing de la nyon mongs pa 'ang [P, D: yang] kun tu 'byung la / de zil gyis gnon cing des zil gyis gnon par mi 'gyur ba 'di lta ste / sa dang po nas bzung ba de ni nye ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa zhes bya'o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 152.6) comments: "This means that 'from the first ground on up the giving and so forth that are cultivated during a second period of countless eons

gradually become powerful; afflictions of desire and so forth arise, but one is able to overcome them and is not overcome by them.” Compare *Siddhi* p. 637.

⁹⁰³Ādok p. 136.2, K p. 60b.7: *yang tshad med pa'i dus su dge ba'i chos de [K: dag] nyid shin tu yongs su bsgoms pa dang ldan pa yang yin la / de'i nyon mongs pa yang thams cad kyi thams cad du mi 'byung ba'i chos can du gyur ba 'di lta ste / sa brgyad pa nas bzung ba 'di ni pha rol tu phyin pa chen po zhes bya'o*; Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.3, D p. 94.3: *yang dus dpag tu med pa nas ches shin tu yongs su bsgoms pa'i dge ba'i chos de dag nyid dang ldan zhing de la thams cad kyi thams cad du nyon mongs pa kun tu mi 'byung ba'i chos can du gyur pa 'di lta ste / sa brgyad pa nas bzung ba de ni pha rol tu phyin pa chen po zhes bya'o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 153.2) comments: “From the eighth ground on up — due to the fact of the cultivation [of giving] and so forth during a third period of countless eons and due to constantly engaging in meditation — none of the afflictions arise.” Compare *Siddhi* p. 637.

⁹⁰⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 154.7) cites various explanations of the meaning of the term “latency” (*bag la nyal, anuśaya*) by Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, and Mahāyānists. He states that in sūtras and in Mahāyāna treatises (*bstan bcos, śāstra*) they are equated with “seeds” (*sa bon, bīja*).

⁹⁰⁵This is inserted in accordance with Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 155.4), who inserts *snga ma*. His quotation of this passage reads: *snga ma'i sa lnga po dag go*. Ādok p. 136.4 and K p. 61a.2 read: *sa lnga rnams la*. Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.5, and D p. 94.5 read: *sa lnga po dag na*.

⁹⁰⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 156.1) states that all afflictions can be subsumed by two categories: (1) innate (*lhan cig skyes pa*) and (2) arisen from imputations (*kun brtags las*

byung ba). Innate afflictions are “afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [a path of] meditation”, and afflictions arisen from imputation are “afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [a path of] seeing”. He includes “assistors that are totally destroyed” (*groggs yang dag par bcom pa, sahāyotsarga*) within the latter category, and the other two types mentioned in the sūtra passage are included within the former category. Wonch’uk adds that prior to the level of a path of seeing these mutually accompany each other, but when one attains a path of seeing the non-innate afflictions that are objects of abandonment by (a path of) seeing are completely destroyed.

⁹⁰⁷Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.6, D p. 94.5, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 33 read: *bag la nyal stobs chung ba*; Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 157.2 reads: *nyams stobs chung ba’i bag la nyal*; *Ā*Dok p. 136.6 and K p. 61a.3 read: *nyam chung ba’i bag la nyal ba*.

⁹⁰⁸*Ā*Dok p. 136.6, K p. 61a.3 : *sa drug pa dang / bdun pa la ’byung ba shin tu phra ba dang / bsgoms pas non pas mi ’byung ba’i phyir ro*; Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.6, D p. 94.5, N p. 70a.3, L p. 75a.1, C p. 60b.7, V p. 103e.7: *sa drug pa dang bdun pa la cha phra mo kun tu ’byung ba nyid dang / bsgoms pas mnas pas kun tu [mi: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] ’byung ba nyid kyi phyir ro*. Lamotte inserts the negative particle *mi* in brackets on the basis of Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese text, p. 704e.17. It is present in *Ā*Dok, K, and Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 157.4), but is omitted in P, D, N, L, C, and V.

⁹⁰⁹The word “only” is inserted on the basis of Lamotte p. 145, P p. 23a.7, and D p. 94.6, which read: *shes bya’i sgrib pa tsam la gnas pa nyid*. *Ā*Dok p. 136.7 and K p. 61a.4 read: *shes bya’i sgrib pa rnam la gnas pa*.

Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 158.3) comments: “Since when one engages in meditation absorptions that eliminate even the concordant causes of these thoroughly arise, none of these afflictions arise.” The Bodhisattvas referred to in this passage only abide in the obstructions to omniscience.

⁹¹⁰Dok p. 137.1 and K p. 61a.5 read: *shun pa la yod pa lta bu'i gnas ngan len spangs pa*. Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23a.7, and D p. 94.7 read: *gnas ngan len lpags shun la yod pa lta bu spangs pa*, which Lamotte equates with Sanskrit *tvaggata-dauṣṭhulya-prahāṇa*. See also Lamotte p. 254 n. 40. On p. 161.3 Wonch'uk, citing the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, refers to this as *ldags spun*. On p. 161.5 he cites the *Ngo bo nyid bstan pa* by Paramārtha, which states: "Those afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [a path of] seeing — desire and so forth — are [like something existing in] epidermal skin and so forth. Those that are objects of abandonment by [a path of] seeing are [like] something existing in subcutaneous skin and marrow; these are explained as being 'just the predispositions of afflictions.'"

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 37.3) states: "Assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in epidermal skin are abandoned on the first ground. Those that are like something existing in subcutaneous skin are abandoned on the eighth ground. Those that are like something existing in marrow are abandoned on the level of a Tathāgata. That is also the exalted wisdom that purifies all obstructions. In that way — although on the first ground one abandons the assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in epidermal skin and are a class concordant with the obstructions to omniscience — the two — assistants of assumptions of bad states that have been completely abandoned and are a class concordant with the afflictive obstructions, and weak predispositions — still exist without being abandoned. Although on the eighth ground one abandons the assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in subcutaneous skin and are a class concordant with the obstructions to omniscience, the predispositions to assumptions of bad states that are a class concordant with the afflictive obstructions still exist without having been abandoned." Therefore, the assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in marrow still remain to be abandoned before the attainment of Buddhahood.

Beginning on p. 161.4, Wonch'uk gives a number of different opinions concerning these three kinds of assumptions of bad states.

⁹¹¹Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23b.1, and D p. 94.7 insert *spangs pa*, which is omitted but implied in *Dok* p. 137.2 and K p. 61a.6.

⁹¹²*Dok* p. 137.2, K p. 61a.6: *phri la yod pa lta bu*; Lamotte p. 146, N p. 70a.6, L p. 75a.3: *khri la yod pa lta bu spangs pa*; P p. 23b.1, D p. 94.7, C p. 61a.2: *pri la yod pa lta bu spangs pa*; Wonch'uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 161.2, V p. 104a.2: *spri la yod pa*.... Lamotte (p. 146) equates this with Sanskrit *phalgugata*. See also Lamotte p. 254 n. 41.

⁹¹³*Dok* p. 137.2, K p. 61a.6, Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23b.1, D p. 95.1: *snying po la yod pa lta bu*. Lamotte equates this with Sanskrit *sāragata*. On p. 161.2 Wonch'uk gives the same reading, but on p. 161.3 he has *rus pa la yod pa*. See also Lamotte p. 254 n. 42 and 43.

⁹¹⁴Compare this with p. 104 and note 680, in which the chronological progression goes in the opposite direction, i.e., from smallest to largest. See also *Kośa* ch. 3 p. 179 for a discussion of each of these.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 170.2) links this passage with the previous one discussing the three types of assumptions of bad states. He states that according to one explanation one abandons assumptions of bad states that are like something existing in epidermal skin during the first period of incalculable eons, during the second period one abandons those that are like something existing in subcutaneous skin, and during the third period one abandons those that are like something existing in marrow. According to another explanation (p. 170.5), one abandons the first type during the first two periods of incalculable eons (*bskal pa grangs med pa snga ma gnyis pa*), abandons the second type during the third period of incalculable eons, and abandons the third type after having entered the Tathāgata ground. Wonch'uk (p. 170.6) states that the second explanation accords with the words of the sūtra. See also Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (N. Dutt ed., Patna, K.P. Jayaswal, 1966, pp. 279-80), which discusses this topic. Asaṅga associates the third type of assumptions of bad states with the obstructions to omniscience and states

that when one eliminates these one attains “unsurpassed transformation of the basis” (*ni-ruttara āśrayaparivṛtti*) and that all other transformations of bases are “surpassable” (*sottara*).

The *Samdhinirmocana* indicates that a Bodhisattva’s training takes three incalculable eons. In other Mahāyāna sources, this is said to be the minimum amount of time needed to reach enlightenment in the sūtra system. This idea is discussed at length in *Tantra in Tibet* by Jeffrey Hopkins (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), in which the practices of the *tantra* system are compared with those of the sūtra system. See also: *ME* pp. 111-123; *Somme* pp. 209-211 and notes pp. 40-1*; and *Siddhi* pp. 731-33.

⁹¹⁵Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23b.4, D p. 95.3, Wonch’uk vol. *di*, [120], p. 177.6, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 43 read: *skyon*. *Ḍok* p. 137.5 and K p. 61b.1 read: *nongs*, which is probably a misspelling of *rmongs*.

⁹¹⁶*Ḍok* p. 137.6, K p. 61b.1: *mtshan nyid ni kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa ste*; Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23b.4, D p. 95.3: *byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyī nyon mongs pa skye ba ni kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa’ i mtshan nyid yin no*.

⁹¹⁷See note 29.

⁹¹⁸*Ḍok* p. 137.6, K p. 61b.2: *byang chub sems dpa’ i sa dang po la thog ma nyid du chos kyī dbyings thams cad rab tu rtogs te / de’ i phyir byang chub sems dpa’ i nyon mongs pa ni shes bzhin du skye’ i / mi shes par ma yin te / de bas na kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa ni mtshan nyid do*; Lamotte p. 146, P p. 23b.5, D p. 95.4: *byang chub sems dpa’ sa dang po la so sor nges pa kho nar chos kyī dbyings thams cad rab tu rtogs pa’ i phyir te / des na byang chub sems dpa’ i nyon mongs pa ni shes bzhin kho nar skye ba yin gyi / mi shes par ma yin pas de’ i phyir kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa’ i mtshan nyid yin no*.

Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 178.3) comments: “This is because they generate afflictions

within having having understood the faults of the afflictions; this is called 'the characteristic of absence of thorough affliction'." He adds that although there are afflictions, because they arise within one's understanding them there is said to be "absence of thorough affliction".

⁹¹⁹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 178.7), they afflictions but are not overcome by them; thus they cannot generate suffering, and so they are called "faultless" (*skyon med pa, nirdoṣa*). The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is quoted as stating: "Although these Bodhisattvas have not abandoned the afflictions, the faults of the afflictions are not generated, like poison that has been overcome through *mantras* and medicine."

⁹²⁰*Dok* p. 138.1, *K* p. 61b.3: *sems can gyi khams na / sdug bsngal rnam par bzlog pa'i rgyu'i phyir ro // byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyī nyon mongs pa skye ba ni / yon tan tshad med pa'o*; Lamotte p. 147, *P* p. 23b.6, *D* p. 95.5: *sems can gyi khams kyī sdug bsngal rnam par bzlog pa'i rgyu nyid yin pa'i phyir yon tan dpag tu med pa yin no*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 180.2) states that Bodhisattvas generate afflictions in order to destroy the sufferings of sentient beings, and this is also the cause of abandonment of sufferings in terms of the afflictions of Bodhisattvas. In other words, they are motivated by concern for sentient beings and use the arising of afflictions to improve their practice. This benefits both sentient beings and themselves. On p. 180.4 Wonch'uk adds that Bodhisattvas on the first through seventh grounds have two purposes: (1) in order to gain mastery over their own consciousnesses they generate afflictions in order to overcome and eliminate them; and (2) they receive a body with good attributes and benefit sentient beings, and due to this they are endowed with immeasurable good qualities. Because of their motivation to help sentient beings, they are even able to turn afflictions to their advantage.

⁹²¹*Dok* p. 138.3, *K* p. 61b.5: *de ma lags pa'i yon tan*; Lamotte p. 147, *P* p. 23b.8, *D* p. 95.5: *de las gzhan pa'i yon tan*.

⁹²²This topic has previously been discussed in chapter seven, pp. 53-61, and Wonch'uk's commentary (vol. *di*, [120], p. 184) mainly restates the explanations he provided at that point in the sūtra.

The phrasing of the question is significant: Avalokiteshvara asks Buddha what he was thinking of when he taught the doctrine of one vehicle and this implies that he is asking about the basis in Buddha's thought (*dgongs gzhi*) when he taught that, and hence implies that the teaching of one vehicle requires interpretation. If my interpretation of Avalokiteshvara's question is correct, then although in his answer Buddha seems to be indicating that there is indeed one vehicle, actually he is explaining the reason behind his teaching of one vehicle, and thus is in accordance with the passage in chapter seven which indicated that there is not just one vehicle.

⁹²³*Dok* p. 138.5, *K* p. 61b.7: *chos sna tshogs kyi rang bzhin*; Lamotte p. 147, *P* p. 23c.2, *D* p. 96.1: *chos sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid*.

⁹²⁴See note 29.

⁹²⁵*Dok* p. 138.6, *K* p. 61b.8: *de bas na theg pa sna tshogs su mi smra'o*; Lamotte p. 147, *P* p. 23c.3, *D* p. 96.2: *de'i phyir nga ni theg pa tha dad par mi smra'o*. See chapter seven verses p. 60, where this idea is discussed.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 44.3) explains: "In the Hearer Vehicle [Buddha] teaches in terms of phenomena, and in the Great Vehicle [Buddha teaches] in terms of reality. Because the phenomena that are taught and reality are not different, [Buddha] does not assert that the vehicles are different." He states that those who assert that all phenomena lack entityness deprecate all of the [three] natures and propound the idea that even one vehicle is utterly non-existent.

⁹²⁶Dok p. 138.7, K p. 62a.1: *de dag 'gal bar sems shing / phan tshun du rtsod pa 'di ni de'i dgongs pa'o*; Lamotte p. 147, P p. 23c.4, D p. 96.2: “Those who think that those are contradictory and debate among themselves are those of whom [I] was thinking” (*de gnyis ni mi mthun par sems shing phan tshun rtsod par zad de / de las dgongs pa ni de yin no*).

⁹²⁷Dok p. 139.2, K p. 62a.3: *ji bzhin sgra yi [K: sgra'i] don du rnam rtog cing // sgro gdags pa dang skur pa byas nas kyang // de dag 'gal ba snyam du sems gyur cing // rnam par rmongs pa sna tshogs blur 'gyur ro*; Lamotte p. 148, P p. 23c.5, D p. 96.4: *don la smra bzhin rnam par rtog byed pa // sgro btags byas shing skur pa btab byas nas // de dag 'gal ba snyam du sems pa na [P: ni] // rnam par rmongs nas blo gros sna tshogs 'gyur*.

⁹²⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 187.2) states that “collections of grounds” (*sa rnams bsdus*, *bhūmi-saṃgraha*) include the four purities and eleven limbs mentioned previously in this chapter (pp. 111-116). He adds that “collections of discriminations” (*'du shes bsdus*, *saṃjñā-saṃgraha*) are the names of the eleven grounds mentioned previously and that “discriminations” are “names” (*ming*, *nāma*). The “discordant class” (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs*, *vipakṣa*) of the grounds refers to the twenty-two thorough obscurations and eleven assumptions of bad states mentioned earlier in this chapter (pp. 117-119). The “distinctions of the grounds” (*sa rnams kyi khyad par*, *bhūmi-viśeṣa*; the sutra reads: “distinctive arisings”) refer to “the distinctive superiority of Bodhisattvas' births” (see p. 120). The term “aspirations” (*smon lam*, *praṇidhāna*) of the grounds refers to the three aspirations (see p. 120). Their “trainings” (*bslab pa*, *śikṣā*) of the grounds include “the various doors [of training] of the perfections” (see p. 120).

⁹²⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 189.2), citing the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* as his source, states that this meditative stabilization is so called “because in this [meditative stabilization] one arouses and clarifies the illumination of wisdom of the ultimate [truth] of the Great

Vehicle, its teachings, achievements, and fruits”.

⁹³⁰Mañjushrī (*'jam dpal*), whose name literally means “Soft Glory”, is one of the most important figures in Mahāyāna Buddhism. He is considered to be the embodiment of wisdom and is associated with inspired courage (*spobs pa, pratibhāna*). He is also sometimes referred to as “Soft Voice” (*mañjughoṣa*), “Lord of Speech” (*vāgiśvara*) and “Crown Prince” (*kumāra-bhūta*). He is strongly associated with the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and is often a main interlocutor in them, generally asking Buddha about the perfection of wisdom (*shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, prajñā-pāramitā*).

According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 193.6), he is named “Mañjushrī” because “his mind [that realizes] the truth of suchness is permanently peaceful and isolated, benefits all enemies and friends, and does not harm them.” Wonch'uk cites a commentary on the *Buddha-bhūmi-sūtra* as stating that he is “endowed with the meaning of ‘glory’ (*dpal, śriyas*) because he is revered and worshipped by all worldlings and is praised by everyone”. On p. 194.1 Wonch'uk adds: “In reality this Bodhisattva is a Tathāgata, but in order to teach Buddha's doctrine he displays the form of a Bodhisattva.”

According to Śer-ṣhul Ge-ṣhay (pp. 3a.6-3b.1), he is “smooth” due to being free from the roughness and coarseness of the afflictions (*nyon mongs pa, kleśa*). Jam-yang-shay-ba (in his *Dam pa'i chos mngon pa mdzod kyi don legs par bshad pa rin po che'i gru gzugs zhes bya ba'i gnas dang po* (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972, *Collected Works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, vol. 7.1), p. 6.6) states that he is called “Smooth Glory” “because he is smooth, possesses the attribute of smoothness, and is endowed with the glory of the two collections [of merit and wisdom]” (*'jam zhing mnyen pa'i gzung can tshogs gnyis kyi dpal dang ldan pas 'jams dpal*).

For more on this Bodhisattva, see: Étienne Lamotte's “Mañjuśrī” in *T'oung pao* 48, 1960, pp. 1-96; Raoul Birnbaum's *Studies on the Mysteries of Mañjuśrī*, Boulder, 1983; *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (tr. Étienne Lamotte; English tr. Sara Boin, London, 1976), p. 113 note 1; David Snellgrove's *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Boston: Shambala, 1987), pp. 59-

60 and 312-17; “The Litany of Names of Mañjuśrī” by Ronald M. Davidson in *Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honor of Professor R.A. Stein*, vol. 1, *MCB* 20, 1981, pp. 1-69.

⁹³¹Lamotte p. 149, P p. 23d.3, D p. 97.1, and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* [206], p. 46 insert *na*, which is omitted in *Dok* p. 140.2 and K p. 62b.1.

⁹³²Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 195.6) quotes the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, which states that the truth body (*chos kyi sku*, *dharma-kāya*) “is included within basis-transformations (*gnas gyur pa*, *āśraya-parāvṛtti*) that completely destroy the obstructions to omniscience”. On p. 196.1 he quotes the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*: “Due to attaining the basis-transformation of the path of definite emergence that thoroughly cultivates the ten grounds and the perfections one manifestly establishes a truth body.”

For discussions of the bodies of Buddhas, see: *Somme*, pp. 266-322 and notes pp. 49-50*; *ME*, pp. 117-123; *Siddhi*, Appendice III, “Notes sur les corps du Bouddha”, pp. 762-813; *Théorie*, pp. 275-6; and Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s bibliography in *MCB* I, pp. 399-400.

⁹³³Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 48.3) comments that the term “correctly established basis-transformation” (*gnas gyur pa yang dag par sgrub pa*, *āśrayaparāvṛtti-samudāgama*) refers to Tathāgatas, “who are of the character of the truth body, which is thoroughly established in the sense of being exalted wisdom of reality and suchness that is non-mistaken and changeless”. According to Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 195.4), this refers to “the characteristics of the truth body”. As Lamotte notes, these transformations of the basis have a double aspect of (1) abandoning afflictions and (2) achieving purification.

Asanga (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*, ed. Pradhan, p. 76.9-11) states that there are three types of transformation of the basis: (1) transformation of the basis of mind (*cittāśraya-parivṛtti*); (2) transformation of the basis of path (*mārgāśraya-parivṛtti*); and (3) transformation of the basis of bad states (*dauṣṭhulyāśraya-parivṛtti*). According to

Jinaputra's commentary on this passage (*Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*, ed. Tatia, p. 93.15), the first involves freeing the mind (which is of the nature of clear light) from all adventitious afflictions. The second involves transforming mundane paths into supramundane paths. By way of this process, one transforms the basis, which is the path, and brings the path to completion. The third type involves transforming consciousness in the sense of eliminating the obstructions to omniscience. See also: Ronald Davidson, *Buddhist Systems of Transformation* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1986); *Somme*, pp. 261-265, where six types are presented, and notes pp. 16-17* and 48*; *Siddhi*, pp. 610-12 and 661-667; *Compendium*, pp. 138 and 162; Sthiramati's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (IX.12-18, *Sde dge sems tsam* vol. *mi*, p. 113b.1-5), which links it with purification of consciousness; and *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga* (ed. Jōshō Nozawa, in Gadjin Nagao and Jōshō Nozawa, eds., *Studies in Indology and Buddhology, Susumu Yamaguchi Festschrift*, Kyoto, 1955, pp. 9-49), which outlines ten types of entry into transformation of the basis.

⁹³⁴This is inserted on the basis of Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 194.7), which states: "One 'definitely emerges' (*nges par 'byung ba, niḥsaraṇa*) by way of definitely emerging from afflictions through the power of cultivating the six perfections." He also cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* as stating that this means that one "has become concordant with nirvāṇa", and cites a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* as stating, "because it is a final path, this is 'definite emergence'."

⁹³⁵According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 197.2), the truth body is said to be "inconceivable" (*bsam gyis mi khyab pa, acintya*) because it lacks elaborations, i.e., arising, cessation and so forth and because "that character of transformation of the basis of the truth body is free from all obstructions, permanently abides in suchness, and is changeless; therefore, it lacks the manifest activity of actions and afflictions." He also cites another source that states that the truth body is "inconceivable" because it cannot be expressed by

words due to completely transcending generalities and objects, and because it completely transcends all mundane characteristics, since there is nothing in the world that compares with it.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 50.6) explains that “freedom from elaborations” has the following aspects: “(1) freedom from cessation; (2) freedom from birth; (3) freedom from permanence; (4) freedom from annihilation; (5) freedom from different meanings or one meaning; and (6) freedom from coming and going”. Wonch’uk (p. 196.7) states that “elaborations” refer to “the four types of elaborations of: existence, non-existence and so forth [i.e., the tetralemna or *catus-koti*] and elaborations such as, ‘Everything is permanent’; ‘[everything] is impermanent’ and so forth.”

⁹³⁶Dok p. 140.5, K p. 62b.3: *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi gnas gyur pa de la yang chos kyi sku zhes bgyi 'am / 'jam dpal mi bya'o*; Lamotte p. 149, P p. 23d.6, D p. 97.4: *ci lags / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi gnas [P: su] gyur pa gang lags pa de 'ang [P, D: yang] chos kyi sku lags [P: legs] par brjod par bgyi 'am / 'jam dpal brjod par mi bya'o*.

Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 198.3) comments that this question asks: “When those of the two vehicles [of Hearers and Solitary Realizers] attain [transformations of bases] due to abandoning afflictive obstructions, are these truth bodies or [not]”, and Buddha’s answer indicates that one does not attain a truth body through merely passing beyond sorrow [i.e., attaining nirvāṇa], since nirvāṇa is not a transformation of qualities.

⁹³⁷Dok p. 140.6, K p. 62b.4: *'o na ci'i sku zhes bgyi*; Lamotte p. 149: *'on ci lags par brjod par bgyi*; P p. 23d.7, D p. 97.4, N p. 72a.2, L p. 77a.5, C p. 62b.4: *'o na ci lags par brjod par bgyi*; V p. 104d.4: *'o na ci'i lus lags par brjod par bgyi*. Lamotte seems to have misread his text in his use of *'on* instead of *'o na*.

⁹³⁸Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 52.3) explains that “liberation bodies” (*rnam par*

grol ba'i lus, vimukti-kāya) are “bodies that are liberated from the arising of afflictive obstructions”. Tathāgatas are superior to Hearers and Solitary Realizers who have liberation bodies because they have eliminated even the subtlest traces of the predispositions of the obstructions to omniscience, whereas Hearers and Solitary Realizers have not.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 198.6) comments: “This means that [one achieves] a liberation body due to liberation from the bonds of afflictions.” He adds that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Tathāgatas are all similar in terms of abandoning afflictions and having attained individual realization, and that in dependence upon any of the three vehicles one can generate a superior path and attain nirvāṇa as a result of this. However, only Tathāgatas abandon the obstructions to omniscience and attain the immeasurable qualities and wisdom of Buddhas, and because of these attainments they are superior to Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

Asvabhāva (in his commentary to *Mahāyānasamgraha* I.48, Peking vol. 106, pp. 262b.6-263a.2) states that liberation bodies result from mere separation from the bonds of the afflictions. He provides an analogy of a common person who is released from metal shackles and as a result experiences a mere cessation of the suffering caused by them, but does not obtain the superiority of a sovereign (who is totally free from such constraints). The truth body is like a prince who is released from prison, who then is crowned king and has dominion over others. It is completely liberated from all afflictive obstructions and all obstructions to omniscience, along with their latencies, and as a result is endowed with the wondrous qualities of the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth. As a result, one is able to act according to one's desires, and has no bonds, like the freed prince who now rules his kingdom. The difference between the two prisoners is that the common man merely obtains a cessation of his suffering, whereas the prince also obtains sovereignty over the entire kingdom. See also *Somme* p. 69 for a discussion of the differences between the bodies of a Buddha and liberation bodies, and see Ronald Davidson, *Buddhist Systems of Transformation*, University Microfilms, 1985, chapter three, which contains an extensive

discussion of this topic.

⁹³⁹Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 52.7) explains that this is because the truth body is incomparable, and so nothing else remotely resembles it. Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 201.1) states: "Because the truth body is endowed with distinctive qualities, that which has immeasurable distinctively superior qualities is not to be known by way of examples and so forth." He cites a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (presumably Asvabhāva's; see previous note) as stating: "Liberation is simply mere freedom from the bonds of afflictions. For example, when a villager is freed from iron shackles and so forth he simply merely [obtains] a fruit of [elimination of] suffering, but one who has sovereignty over what transcends those [i.e., a ruler] is not like that. The truth body is liberated from the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience that are associated with predispositions; it is a state of all wealth adorned with many wondrous qualities, such as the powers, fearlessnesses, etc." He adds (line 5) that according to the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* liberation bodies are "states of thorough completion by those of the two vehicles [of Hearers and Solitary Realizers]", while truth bodies are "great subduers" (*thub pa chen po, mahāmuni*). He cites the *Mahāyānāvataṛa*, which states that the liberation of a Tathāgata is superior to those of the two vehicles because Tathāgatas abandon predispositions.

⁹⁴⁰Dok p. 141.1, K p. 62b.6: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyi skye ba srid pa'i mtshan nyid ji lta bur bstan par bgyi*; Lamotte p. 149, P p. 23c.1, P p. 97.6: "How should one know the characteristics of Tathāgata's births?" (*de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyi skye ba 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags*).

⁹⁴¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 202.5) quotes this passage as: *rigs kyi bu de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad sprul pa'i sku'i phrin las mngon par 'du mdzad pa ni 'jig rten gyi kham na rnam pa thams cad 'byung ba lta bu de bzhin gshegs pa'i yon tan sna tshogs kyis rgyan pa byin gyis rlabs pa'i mtshan nyid de*.

Compare *Ādok* p. 141.1 and *K* p. 62b.7: 'jam dpal sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid de 'jig rten gyi khams 'byung ba dang 'dra'o // sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid 'byung ba de ni / de bzhin gshegs pas yon tan bkod pa'i rgyan gyi rnam pa thams cad kyis byin gyis brlabs pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o. Lamotte p. 150, *P* p. 23e.1, and *D* p. 97.7 read: 'jam dpal sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid 'jig rten gyi khams 'byung ba dang 'dra'o // sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid 'byung ba'i de bshin gshegs pa'i yon tan bkod pa'i rgyan gyi rnam pa thams cad kyis byin gyis brlabs pa'i mtshan nyid du blta bar bya'o.

Wonch'uk (p. 203.1) comments: "When previously abiding in the practices of the grounds, Tathāgatas achieved various types of qualities for the sake of sentient beings." They completed the cultivation of these qualities and achieved the powers resulting from them. Through cultivating immeasurable good qualities and great power, they achieve the ability to benefit sentient beings by taking limitless forms in accordance with the training needs of sentient beings.

⁹⁴²The phrase in brackets is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 147, which reads: *sprul pa'i sku la ni skye ba 'byung ba yod kyi*. He notes that this is not found in his Tibetan text, but is inserted on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version, p. 708e.1. It is also omitted in *Ādok* p. 141.3, *K* p. 62b.8, *P* p. 23c.2, *D* p. 97.7, *N* p. 72a.6, *L* p. 77b.3, *C* p. 63a.1, and *V* p. 104d.7. It is present in Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 203.5), which reads: "The characteristics of emanation bodies have birth and arising" (*sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid ni skye zhing 'byung ba dang bcas pa'o*).

⁹⁴³Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 59.2) explains: "This is due to the truth body's permanence by way of its own nature." Wonch'uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 203.6) comments: "Because emanation bodies arise from causes they are associated with the characteristic of production. Because the truth body which is suchness is a permanent nature, it has a characteristic that is free from production." For a discussion of the differences between the functions of the three bodies of a Buddha, see M.P. Masson-Oursel, "Les Trois Corps du

Buddha”, in *Journal Asiatique*, 1913, pp. 605-608.

⁹⁴⁴Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 204.1) cites a commentary on the *Ārya-buddha-bhūmi[-sūtra]*, which states that this is called “skill” (*mkhas pa*, *kuśala*) “because the three types of actions that arise from exalted wisdom that accomplishes activities are in accordance with the faculties of sentient beings”, and it is called “method” (*thabs*, *upāya*) “because application is continuous”.

⁹⁴⁵This paragraph is translated with the aid of Lamotte p. 150, P p. 23e.3, and D p. 97.7, which read: *byams pa [D: bcom ldan ’das] sprul pa’i sku ston pa’i thabs la mkhas pa ni stong gsum gyi stong chen po’i sangs rgyas kyi zhing thams cad du bdag por grags pa ’am / sbyin gnas su grags pa’i khyim du mngal du ’jug pa dang / btsas pa dang / skye ba dang ’dod pa la longs spyod pa dang / mngon par ’byung ba dang / dka’ ba spyad pa cig car kun tu ston pa dang / de gtong ba dang / mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i rim pa kun tu ston pa yin par blta bar bya’o*. D p. 97.7 omits the question that precedes this statement. *Ādok* p. 141.3 and K p. 63a.1 read: *’jam dpal sangs rgyas kyi zhing thams cad kyi stong gsum gyi stong chen po dag tu bdag por kun gyis bkur ba’i rigs sam / sbyin gnas su kun gyis bkur ba yang rung ste / lhum su ’jug pa dang / btsas pa dang / skye ba dang / ’dod pa la spyod pa dang / mngon par ’byung ba dang / dka’ ba spyod pa thang cig tu bstan pa dang de btang ba dang / mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i rim pa bstan pa ni ’jam dpal sprul pa’i sku bstan pa la thabs mkhas pa’o*.

The phrase “you should view” is added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte p. 150, P p. 23e.5, and D p. 98.2, which read: *blta bar bya’o*. This is omitted in *Ādok* p. 141.6 and K p. 63a.3, but is implied by Mañjushri’s question on line 3, which ends with: *gang lags par blta*.

This passage is an outline of the career of the Buddha and is said to be paradigmatic for all emanation bodies of Buddhas. See A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp. 43-80; Michael Carrithers, *the Buddha* (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1983); Bu-dön's *History of Buddhism* (*Chos 'byung*, tr. Eugene Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1931, vol. II, pp. 7-72, which summarizes the *Lalitavistara*); *Somme* pp. 336-9; and *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle (Uttaratantra)*, tr. Eugene Obermiller, *Acta Orientalia* IX, p. 254.

With respect to the words "simultaneously displaying" (*Dok*, K: *thang cig tu bstan pa*; Lamotte, P, D: *cig car kun tu ston pa*), that these are called "displays" probably refers to the Mahāyāna idea that Śākyamuni Buddha was enlightened long before his career as a Buddha, but performed the activities of a Buddha for the benefit of those who would be helped by this. In other words, he appeared to take rebirth in a womb, leave home, seek enlightenment, etc., but he had really accomplished full Buddhahood before he did so. The phrase "in all areas" (*thams cad du*) probably refers to the Mahāyāna idea that he and his main disciples did not only take rebirth in this world, but also appeared simultaneously in all worlds of this world-system and enacted the career of a Buddha for the benefit of sentient beings.

The word "lineage" (*rigs*) is found in *Dok* p. 141.4 and K p. 62b.1, but is omitted in Lamotte, P, and D.

⁹⁴⁶*Dok* p. 141.6, K p. 63a.3: *de bzhin gshegs pa byin gyi rlabs kyi skus dbyangs su gsung ba gang gis 'dul ba'i kham yongs su smin pa rnams yongs su smin par 'gyur ba dang / yongs su smin pa rnams kyang dmigs pa de nyid kyi rnam par grol bar 'gyur ba'i dbyangs su gsung ba du zhig gsung*; Lamotte p. 150, P p. 23e.5, D p. 98.2: *de bzhin gshegs pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i byin gi rlabs [P, D: brlabs] kyi skus gsung gang dag brjod pas 'dul ba'i kham yongs su ma smin pa ni yongs su smin par mdzad la / yongs su smin pa ni dmigs pa de nyid kyi rnam par grol bar mdzad pa'i gsung brjod pa du zhig brjod par mdzad lags*.

My reading of the term *'dul ba'i kham* as "realms of trainees" is based on Wonch'uk's quotation of the passage (vol. *di*, [120], p. 220.2), in which cites this term as *'dul ba'i sems can*, which indicates that this should be taken as referring to persons rather than places.

Lamotte (p. 258 n. 7) notes that the term “bodies that are empowered” is discussed in *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Muséon, 1911, p. 163) and *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* ch. VII.

⁹⁴⁷Wonch’uk (vol. *di*, [120], p. 222.6) comments that “sūtras” (*mdo*) are so called “because they are condordant with reasonings and are concordant with the faculties of sentient beings”. On p. 222-3 he cites other explanations. See also vol. *thi* (118), p. 9.3, where he states that the *Samādhinirmocana* is called a sūtra “due to teaching a merely condensed meaning”.

“Disciplinary [instructions]” (*’dul ba, vinaya*) are so called (p. 223.4) “because they discipline seven types of faults by way of pure vows or because they discipline the six sense faculties”. He adds that according to the *Bstan bcos legs par mthong ba* they serve to discipline actions of body and speech.

“Schematic outlines” (*ma mo, mātrkā*) are so called (p. 225.5) “because of generating and thoroughly teaching the roots of all doctrines”. According to the *Bstan bcos yang dag pa’i rigs pa*, they “explain the meanings of other sūtras” and “generate understandings” by condensing the teachings of Tathāgatas. Wonch’uk (p. 226.2) quotes the *Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa*, which states that these are of definitive meaning (*nges pa’i don, nitārtha*). He also states: “If there were not a basic copy of the alphabet, then the letters would not be clear. Similarly, if presentations of characteristics of the natures of doctrines did not exist for the the twelve limbs of teachings [see the beginning of chapter eight] then doctrines would be unclear, but when there are [such] presentations, then the characteristics of doctrines are clear.”

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *cho* [205], p. 275.3) states that they are a type of *abhidharma* and that they condense Buddha’s teachings, particularly in terms of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. See also Wonch’uk vol. *thi* (118), p. 9.3. See also: *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* p. 528; and A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 10-11, 82, and 219.

⁹⁴⁸ĀDok p. 142.2, K p. 63a.6: *gang la chos rnams kyi dngos po bsdus pa tsam du bstan pa 'di ni mdo sde ste / 'di ltar dngos po bzhi 'am / dgu 'am / nyi shu [rtsa: omitted in K] dgu 'di dbang du byas pa'o [K: ba'o]*; Lamotte p. 150, P p. 23e.7, D p. 98.4: “My teachings that only condense categories of doctrines — that are done in terms of four categories, or nine [categories], or twenty-nine [categories] — are sūtras” (*'di lta ste / dngos po bzhi 'am / dgu 'am / nyi shu rtsa dgu'i dbang du byas nas chos rnams kyi dngos po bsdus pa tsam ngas gang du bstan pa de ni mdo sde yin no*).

⁹⁴⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 228.7), states that a commentary on the *Bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa*, indicates that the first category refers to obtaining the twelve types of teachings outlined at the beginning of chapter eight. The second refers to going for refuge to the three refuges: Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha. The third category refers to training in ethics, meditative stabilizations, and wisdom. The fourth refers to the enlightenments of the three vehicles (of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas).

⁹⁵⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 230.3) quotes the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, which states that “the category of designating sentient beings” (ĀDok p. 142.4, K p. 63a.7: *sems can gdags pa'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 151, P p. 24a.1, P p. 98.5: *sems can du gdags pa'i dngos po*) refers to the five appropriated aggregates (*nye bar len gyi phung po, upādāna-skandha*). “The category of their resources” (ĀDok, K: *de yongs su longs spyod pa'i dngos po*; Lamotte, P, D: *de'i longs spyod kyi dngos po*) refers to the twelve sense spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*). “The category of their births” (ĀDok, K: *de skye ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte, P, D: *de 'byung ba'i dngos po*) refers to the twelfth of the limbs of dependent-arising (*rten cing 'brel ba'i 'byung ba, pratitya-samutpāda*), i.e., aging and death (*rga shi, jaramaraṇa*). “The category of their abiding after being born” (ĀDok, K: *de skyes nas gnas pa'i dngos po*; Lamotte, P, D: *de 'byung ba gnas pa'i dngos po*), which Wonch'uk refers to as “the category of the four sustenances of birth”, refers to the four sustenances (see note 192). The fifth category refers to the four noble truths. The sixth category refers to “limitless

constituents” (*khams tshad med pa*). The seventh refers to “Buddhas and Hearers”. The eighth refers to “doctrines that are harmonious with enlightenment, the [four] mindful establishments and so forth”. The ninth refers to eight types of attendants: Kṣatriyas, Brahmans, householders, ascetics, those of the lineage of the four great kings (*rgyal chen bzhi*, *catur-mahārāja*), those of the Heaven of the Thirty-Three (*sum cu rtsa gsum*, *trayastrimśā*), Demons (*bdud*, *māra*), and Brahmās.

⁹⁵¹According to Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 232.6), the first category refers to phenomena that are included among compounded phenomena, such as the five aggregates, the constituents, and the sources. The second refers to the twelve limbs of dependent-arising. He adds that the word “them” refers to just the five aggregates. The third (Dōk p. 142.7, K p. 63b.2: *de dag nyid la gang zag gi ’du shes su byas nas phyi ma la ’byung ba’i rgyu’i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 151, P p. 24a.3, D p. 98.7: *de dag nyid la gang zag gi ming du byas nas phyi mar ’byung ba’i rgyu’i dngos po*) and fourth (Dōk, K: *chos kyi ’du shes su byas nas phyi ma la ’byung ba’i rgyu’i dngos po*; Lamotte, P, D: *chos kyi ming du byas nas phyi mar ’byung ba’i rgyu’i dngos po*) categories refer to conceptions of true existence: “Due to these very conceptions, through the power of conceiving the thoroughly afflicted aggregates as having a self [of persons] and conceiving them as having [a self of] phenomena this serves as a cause of engagement with cyclic existence in the future.” According to Wonch’uk (p. 233.6), these first four members are “categories of pure worldly phenomena”, and the next twenty-five are “categories of pure supramundane phenomena”.

⁹⁵²Dōk p. 143.1, K p. 63b.3: *dmigs pa la nye bar ’dogs pa’i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 151, P p. 24a.4, D p. 99a.1: *dmigs pa la nye bar gtod pa’i [P: gtong ba’i] dngos po*.

⁹⁵³Dōk p. 143.2, K p. 63b.4: *mtshong ba’i chos la* (Skt.: *dr̥ṣṭa-dharme*); Lamotte p. 151, P p. 24a.4, D p. 99.1, Wonch’uk vol. *di* [120], p. 234.5: *tshe ’di la*.

⁹⁵⁴Dok p. 143.2, K p. 63b.4: *sdug bsngal thams cad las yang dag par 'da' ba la dmigs pa'i thabs kyi dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.5, D p. 99.1: *sdug bsngal thams cad las yang dag par 'da' ba'i thabs kyi dmigs pa'i dngos po*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 234.6: *sdug bsngal thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i dmigs pa'i thabs kyi dngos po*.

⁹⁵⁵Dok p. 143.3, K p. 63b.5: *phyin ci log yongs su shes pa'i gnas*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.5, D p. 99.2, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 235.7: *phyin ci log gi gnas yongs su shes pa*.

⁹⁵⁶Dok p. 143.3, K p. 63b.5: *phyi rol gyi sems can rnams la log pa'i nan tan yongs su shes pa'i gnas pa*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.5, D p. 99.2, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 236.4: *phyi rol gyi sems can rnams la log par sgrub pa'i gnas yongs su shes pa*.

⁹⁵⁷Dok p. 143.4, K p. 63b.6: *nang gi mngon pa'i nga rgyal med pa yongs su shes pa'i gnas*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.6, D p. 99.2: *nang la mngon pa'i nga rgyal med pa'i gnas yongs su shes pas de 'ang [P, D: yang]*.

⁹⁵⁸Dok p. 143.4, K p. 63b.6: *bag chags kyi gnas kyi dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.6, D p. 99.3, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 237.3: *bsgom pa'i gnas kyi dngos po*.

⁹⁵⁹The word “yet” in brackets is added in accordance with Wonch'uk's citation of the passage (p. 238.3), which inserts *da dung*.

⁹⁶⁰Dok p. 143.6, K p. 63b.8: *bsgom pa la skyo ba sbyor bas bsal ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24a.8, D p. 99.4: *bsgom pa las yongs su skyob pa'i sbyor ba gsar ba'i dngos po*. Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 238.4) quotes this passage as: “the category of thinking of application that is thoroughly averse to meditation” (*bsgom pa las yongs su skyo ba'i sbyor ba bsam pa'i dngos po*).

⁹⁶¹The term “sovereignities” (*dbang phyug, aiśvarya*) refers to the eight or ten sovereign qualities that Superiors (*'phags pa, ārya*) develop. See *Tibetan-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology* by Tsepa Rigzin (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1986), p. 291 and *Tshig mdzod* p. 1934.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 240.3) quotes this phrase as: “the collection of objects of activity of Superiors” (*'phags pa'i spyod yul pa bsdu pa*). He adds (p. 240.4) that this and the next three categories refer to paths of no more learning (*mi slob lam, aśaikṣa-mārga*).

⁹⁶²*Dok* p. 143.7, K p. 64a.1, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 240.3: *'phags pa'i phyogs dang g.yog 'khor bsdu ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24b.1, D p. 99.5: *'phags pa'i phyogs dang 'khor bsdu ba'i dngos po*.

⁹⁶³*Dok* p. 144.1, K p. 64a.2: *mya ngan las 'das pa yang dag par 'thob par bya ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24b.2, D p. 99.5: *mya ngan las 'das pa yang dag par 'thob pa'i dngos po*. Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 240.4) has the same reading except for his spelling of *thob* instead of *'thob*.

⁹⁶⁴*Dok* p. 144.1, K p. 64a.2: *legs par bshad pa'i chos 'dul ba la 'jig rten gyi yang dag par lta ba yang 'di las phyi rol tu gyur pa'i yang dag par lta ba thams cad las sbyi [K: spyi] bor phyin pa'i dngos po dang / de ma bsgoms pas yongs su 'bri ba'i dngos po*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24b.2, D p. 99.6: “The category of superiority — of the correct views of worldlings with respect to the well-spoken disciplinary doctrine — to all of the correct views of those who are foreign to this [i.e., non-Buddhists], and, Mañjushrī, the category of thorough degeneration due to not cultivating that is: thoroughly degenerating due to not meditating on these disciplinary doctrines that are spoken well; it is not due to faulty views” (*legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba 'di las phyi rol pa*

thams cad kyi yang dag pa'i lta ba las sbyi [P: sbyi] bor gyur pa nyid kyi dngos po dang / de mi bsgom pas yongs su nyams pas [P: pa'i] dngos po ste / 'jam dpal 'di ltar legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la ni mi sgom pas yongs su nyams [P: nyam] par 'gyur gyi / lta ba'i nyes pas ni ma yin no).

Wonch'uk quotes the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth categories as follows: *legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba 'di las phyi rol pa thams cad yang dag pa'i lta ba las sbyi bor gyur pa nyid kyi dngos po dang / de mi bsgom pas yongs su nyams pa'i dngos po.*

Beginning on p. 234.3, Wonch'uk explains categories five through twenty-nine. The fifth category refers to “wisdoms [arisen from] hearing belonging to the Desire Realm”. These are mental designations with respect to teachings. He also gives an alternative explanation that states that they are “mental designations with respect to the meaning of what is expressed and objects of mindful establishments”.

The sixth category (line 4) “indicates the category of wisdoms [arisen from] thinking. This is taking to mind these very objects of wisdom [arisen from] hearing by way of ardent effort after having perceived them in terms of unitary truth”.

The seventh category “indicates meditative stabilizations of application. This is mentally abiding in meditative stabilizations of application through the power of wisdom [arisen from] thinking”.

The eighth category (line 5) “indicates actual meditative stabilizations. This is abiding peacefully in this life after having attained the six clairvoyances”.

The ninth (line 6) “indicates the twenty-one categories of types of things that transcend the world”. On p. 236.2 he discusses the three aspects of the tenth category: “These are due to (1) thoroughly knowing the bases [of suffering], beginning with error; (2) thoroughly knowing bases [of suffering caused by] mistaken establishment with respect to external sentient beings, beginning with conceiving them as sentient beings; and (3) thoroughly knowing bases [of suffering] due to separation from internal manifest pride”.

According to Wonch'uk (p. 237.3), “the category of the basis of meditation [Dok: “the

category of the basis of predispositions"], the category of actualization, and the category of meditation" respectively "indicate teachings concerning the categories of abandonment of [true] sources, actualization of [true] cessations, and cultivation of [true] paths". He adds: "Moreover, because true sources are two afflictions that are discordant with meditation, this is the category of basis of meditation. Because true cessations are uncompounded, this is the category of actualization. The paths of Superiors [comprise] the category of cultivation".

On line 5 he indicates that the next four categories (14-17) refer to teachings about paths of seeing. The fourteenth (line 6) refers to "correct paths" (*yang dag pa'i lam, samyag-mārga*) "because through the power of seeing the path as it really is, one does not degenerate from the two types of paths of seeing: (1) correct [paths of seeing] and (2) [paths of seeing] having signs". The fifteenth (p. 238.1) refers to "a path of seeing having signs" (*mtshan ma dang bcas pa'i mthong lam*). The sixteenth refers to "the category of objects that are objects of observation of a path of seeing having signs" (*mtshan ma dang bcas pa'i mthong ba'i lam gyi dmigs pa yul gyi dngos po*). The seventeenth (line 2) refers to "individually analyzing in terms of abandonment of afflictions that are objects of abandonment of [a path of] seeing by a path of seeing that has signs and afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [a path of] meditation that are not yet abandoned" (*mtshan ma dang bcas pa'i mthong ba'i lam gyis mthong ba'i spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs spangs pa*).

The next six (18-23) refer to "teachings about paths of meditation". He adds that there are differing explanations with respect to each of these, and that with respect to "the category of being distracted from that" one scholar's opinion is that from the time of having passed beyond the path of seeing up to the time of entering the path of meditation one can become mentally distracted although one is not thoroughly afflicted. With respect to the nineteenth and twentieth, he states (line 6): "These are activities of exertion that abandon afflictions that are objects of abandonment by a path of meditation of the Desire Realm when one abides in meditative stabilizations." The twenty-first (p. 239.1) refers to "unob-

structed paths abandoning afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [paths of] meditation of the Form and Formless Realms". He adds (line 2): "these four categories [refer to] uninterrupted paths that abandon afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [paths of] meditation of the three realms". On line 6 he states that the categories beginning with applying oneself to [counteracting] aversion by way of meditation (i.e., number 21 and up) are "uninterrupted paths and paths of release that abandon the afflictions that are objects of abandonment by Form Realm [paths of] meditation". The twenty-second (line 7) refers to uninterrupted paths and paths of release that abandon afflictions that are objects of abandonment by Form Realm [paths of] meditation". The twenty-third (which Wonch'uk refers to as "the category of teaching that", *de bstan pa'i dngos po*) refers to "an uninterrupted path that abandons afflictions that are objects of abandonment by a Formless Realm [path of] meditation, [that is to say,] the vajra-like meditative stabilization".

On p. 240.3, he states that the next three (24-27) refer to "teachings concerning paths of no more learning". The twenty-fourth (which he refers to as "the category of the collection of practices of Superiors", *'phags pa'i spyod pa bsdus pa'i dngos po*) includes "exhaustible and unproduced knowledges that are included among correct exalted wisdoms". The twenty-fifth includes "exhaustible and unproduced exalted wisdoms that apprehend [their objects] by way of exalted wisdoms of subsequent attainment". The twenty-sixth refers to "meditation on suchness when one is close to entering a [nirvāṇa] without remainder". The twenty-seventh refers to "the thorough passing beyond sorrow of that very basis-mind by way of meditative absorptions that are cessations — due to former meditative absorptions that are cessations — when one is close to entering a [nirvāṇa] without remainder" (translated in accordance with Peking vol. 106, p. 324.3.2: *lhag ma med par 'jug tu ne ba na sngar 'gog pa snyoms par 'jug pas 'gog pa snyoms par zhugs pas kun gzhi rnam par sems de nyid kyi yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa gang yin pa'o*).

The twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth (line 7) respectively refer to "distinctive superiority and absence of distinctive superiority". He adds that the "disciplinary doctrine that has been well explained" refers to the teachings of the three baskets (*sde snod gsum, tripiṭaka*,

i.e., *sūtra*, *abhidharma*, and *vinaya*). “Discipline” (*’dul ba*) refers specifically to *vinaya*. See also Lamotte p. 260 n. 9 for references concerning these twenty-nine categories.

⁹⁶⁵Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 242.1) states that this refers to the twenty-ninth category, involving non-cultivation of disciplinary doctrines.

⁹⁶⁶Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 242.7) states that “individual liberation” (*so sor thar pa*, *pratimokṣa*) refers to the seven types of vows of individual liberation.

On the subject of *pratimokṣa*, see: David Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Boston: Shambhala, 1987), p. 39-40; *Compendium*, p. 90; A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi, 1970), p. 59; M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, vol. 2, Calcutta, 1933, p. 22; and N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1930, p. 290.

⁹⁶⁷Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 242.6) states that the word “I” refers to the Tathāgata, who is conventionally designated to the five aggregates.

⁹⁶⁸Wonch’uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 247.2) comments: “These are teachings concerning the rites for adopting ethics.” He also cites other sources that indicate that this refers to adopting religious vows.

⁹⁶⁹Dōk p. 144.5, K p. 64a.6: *pham pa’i gnas kyi dngos po bstan pa*; Lamotte p. 153, P p. 24b.5, D p. 100.1, Wonch’uk vol. *di* [120], p. 247.5: “the category of what is like a source of defeat” (*pham pa’i gnas lta bu’i dngos po bstan pa*).

These “sources of defeat” (*pham pa’i gnas*, *pārājāyika-ssthāna*) are the four root offences resulting in expulsion from the *saṃgha*. The standard list is found in *Tshig mdzod* (p. 1707), which states that “these are the root offences of monks”. It gives the following list: (1) non-celibacy (*mi tshangs spyod*, *abrahma-caryā*); (2) taking what is not given (*ma byin len*, *adattā-dāna*); (3) killing (*srog gcod*, *prāṇātipāta*); and (4) lying (*rdzun*

pa smra ba, mṛṣāvāda).

Wonch'uk (p. 247.5) states that these are called sources of defeat "because when one the faults of these four weighty [offences] arise, without question they come under the influence of afflictions that defeat them and overpower Bodhisattvas."

He cites the *Yogācārabhūmi* as giving a different four-fold list: "(1) attachment to property and respect and elevating oneself and deprecating others; (2) not giving material goods and doctrine to sentient beings due to miserliness; (3) beating and speaking harsh words to sentient beings with a belligerent mind; and (4) deprecating the Bodhisattva canon and teaching false doctrines. On p. 248.1 he also gives a different ten-fold list that includes the first four-fold list. See: *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (ed. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930, p. 158); Charles S. Prebish, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), pp. 11 and 50-53; and N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 294.

⁹⁷⁰Dok p. 144.6, K p. 64a.6: *ltung ba'i gnas kyi dngos po bstan pa*; Lamotte p. 153, P p. 24b.5, D p. 100.1: *ltung ba'i gnas lta bu'i dngos po bstan pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 248.3) refers to a list of forty-eight of these in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*.

⁹⁷¹Dok p. 144.6, K p. 64a.6: *ltung ba'i rang bzhin bstan pa*; Lamotte p. 152, P p. 24b.5, D p. 100.2: *ltung ba'i ngo bo nyid bstan pa*.

⁹⁷²Wonch'uk discusses these beginning on p. 254.4.

⁹⁷³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 255.7), this category includes things that are objects of observation by the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, that is to say, the four mindful establishments and so forth.

⁹⁷⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 256.2) states that the term "aspects" (*rnam pa*, *ākāra*) refers to "aspects of consciousness" (*shes pa'i rnam pa*).

⁹⁷⁵ĀDok p. 145.2, K p. 64b.1: *rang bzhin gyi mtshan nyid*; Lamotte p. 153, P p. 24b.8, D p. 100.4, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 253.6: *ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid*.

⁹⁷⁶ĀDok p. 145.4, K p. 64b.3: *gang zag shin tu bstan pa*; Lamotte p. 154: *gang zag bstan pa*. See Lamotte p. 261 n. 12.

⁹⁷⁷See chapter eight p. 86; *Siddhi* pp. 534-535; *Compendium* p. 18; and *ME* pp. 218-19.

⁹⁷⁸See chapter eight, pp. 88-89.

⁹⁷⁹In his discussion of analytical procedure concerned with "truth" (*bden pa*, *satya*) Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 256.7) states: "that suchness that is actualized by the fundamental exalted wisdom and that does not discard [its nature] is 'truth'."

⁹⁸⁰The term "positings" translates ĀDok p. 145.6, K p. 64b.5: *gzdag pa*, *sthāna*, and Lamotte p. 154, P p. 24c.3, D p. 100.7: *gnas pa*.

⁹⁸¹With respect to "faults" (ĀDok p. 145.6, K p. 64b.5: *nyes pa*, *doṣa*; Lamotte p. 154, P p. 24c.3, D p. 100.7: *skyon*), Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 260.4) comments that Buddha is referring to teachings concerning the three contaminations (*zag pa gsum*, *āsrava-traya*), the four fetters (*mdud pa bzhi*, *catur-grantha*), the causes of thorough entanglements (*kun tu sbyor ba'i rgyu*, *saṃyojana-hetu*), the ten complete bindings (*kun nas dkris pa bcu*, *daśa-paryavasthāna*) and so forth.

⁹⁸²Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 260.6) comments that the term "qualities" (*yon tan*, *guṇa*)

refers to teachings concerning qualities such as clairvoyances, liberations, meditative stabilizations, powers, fearlessnesses, etc.

⁹⁸³Ādok p. 145.7, K p. 64b.5: *bsdus pa dang / rnam par spros pa'o*; Lamotte p. 154, P p. 24c.3, D p. 100.7: *bsdus pa dang rgyas pas so*.

⁹⁸⁴Ādok p. 146.1, K p. 64b.6: *dri ba'i lung bstan pa rnam par bzhag pa*; Lamotte p. 154, P p. 24c.4, D p. 101.1 have a clearer reading: *dris te lan gdab pa rnam par bzhag [P, D: gzhaḡ] pa*.

⁹⁸⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 259.3) makes reference to an unnamed scholar, who states that the teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras that all phenomena are empty and void is "secret" (*gsang ba*), and that the complete teaching in the *Sūtra Explaining the Thought* of the three natures that [teaches] what is and is not endowed with emptiness is "differentiation". Wonch'uk also cites several other explanations of these terms.

⁹⁸⁶This is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 154, P p. 24c.5, D p. 101.1, and Jangchup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 267, which read: *rnam par dbye ba la lan gdab pa rnam par bzhag [P, D: gzhaḡ] pa*. Ādok p. 146.2 and K p. 64b.7 read: *bsnyad pa lung bstan pa rnam par bzhag pa*. See also chapter eight p. 89 and *Kośa* ch. 5 p. 44.

⁹⁸⁷See note 89.

⁹⁸⁸Wonch'uk discusses these beginning on p. 261.3.

⁹⁸⁹Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 226.4) states that this refers to twelve types of explanation, which he describes at length.

⁹⁹⁰Wonch'uk divides abandonments into six types beginning on p. 268.5. See also Lamotte p. 262 n. 16.

⁹⁹¹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 269.5), this refers to six inconceivabilities, the inconceivability of (1) oneself; (2) sentient beings; (3) worlds; (4) the ripening of actions of sentient beings; (5) the spheres of activity of concentrations; and (6) the spheres of activity of Buddhas. He describes each of these beginning on p. 269.7. See also Lamotte p. 262 n. 17.

⁹⁹²According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 271.3), this refers to sixteen types of thought, which he describes at some length.

⁹⁹³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 273.5), these are: production (*skye ba, jāti*), abiding (*gnas pa, sthiti*), and disintegration (*'jig pa, vināśa*). Lamotte (p. 262 n. 20) cites a four-fold division from the *Kośa* (ch. 2, p. 222).

⁹⁹⁴See *Kośa* ch. 2, p. 299.

⁹⁹⁵*Dok* p. 146.5 and *K* p. 65a.2 read: "analytical procedure establishing reasons" (*gtan tshigs bsgrub pa'i rigs pa, hetu-sādhana-yukti*). Lamotte p. 155, *P* p. 24c.8, and *D* p. 101.4 read: *'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa (upapatti-sādhana-yukti)*. Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 274.2) reads: *'thad pa sgrub pa'i rigs pa*. Lamotte equates this with Sanskrit *upapatti-siddha-nyāya*, but the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* refers to this as *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* (see Susumu Yamaguchi ed. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-ṭikā*, Tokyo, 1934, p. 128.24).

⁹⁹⁶For a discussion of these, see *Compendium* p. 136 and Lamotte p. 262 n. 22.

⁹⁹⁷*Dok* p. 146.6, *K* p. 65a.3: *'du byed rnams skye ba dang / rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i*

phyir / gang dag rgyur gyur pa dang / gang dag rkyen du gyur pa de dag ni / ltos pa'i rigs pa'o; Lamotte p. 155, P p. 24e.8, D p. 101.4: *de la bltos [P, D: ltos] pa'i rigs pa ni 'du byed rnams 'byung ba dang / rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i rgyu gang dag yin pa dang [P, D: /] rkyen gang dag yin pa ste / de ni bltos [P, D: ltos] pa'i rigs pa yin no*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 271.1) comments that “analytical procedure [looking into] dependence (*ltos pa'i rigs pa*, *apekṣā-yuktī*) is concerned with the causes and conditions of the arising of phenomena and of subsequent conventional designations, and he adds that these are not autonomous. He adds (line 4) that “compounded phenomena are not autonomous with respect to production and subsequent designation of conventions; indicating their dependence upon causes and effects — by way of dependence upon their causes and conditions and their arising and subsequent conventional designations — is ‘analytical procedure [looking into] dependence’. With respect to ‘compounded phenomena’, there are two kinds: (1) external compounded phenomena and internal compounded phenomena. With respect to those, the six constituents, ranging from form to *dharma*s, are external compounded phenomena. Those ranging from the constituents of eye sense power and consciousness through to the constituents of mental sense-power are internal compounded phenomena. One should know that this includes any among: (1) all neutral phenomena, such as their worldly harvests and so forth; (2) all phenomena of the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena with the characters of affliction, action, and birth; and (3) all the phenomena of the class of purified phenomena, such as phenomena that are harmonies with enlightenment and so forth. ‘Production’ [refers to] the initial production of whatever has not been produced. ‘Subsequent conventional designation’ [refers to] imputing — in names and terminology — the aspects of entities or attributes to things.”

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 309.4) states that “analytical procedure [looking into] dependence” is analysis of “whatever compounded phenomena are produced in dependence upon causes”. An example is a sprout arising in dependence upon a seed, season, water, and a field, or a consciousness arising in dependence upon a sense power, an object, and a [former moment of] mind.

⁹⁹⁸Dok p. 146.7, K p. 65a.4: *chos rnam* 'thob pa'i phyir ram / 'grub pa'i phyir ram / *skyes nas kyang las su bya ba*'i phyir / gang dag rgyur gyur pa dang / gang dag rkyen du gyur pa de dag ni / bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa'o; Lamotte p. 155, P p. 24d.1, D p. 101.5: *chos rnam* 'thob pa'am / 'grub pa'am / *skyes pa rnam las byed par* 'gyur ba'i rgyu gang dag yin pa dang rkyen gang dag yin pa de ni bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa yin no.

According to Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 271.2), “analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions” (*bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa, kārya-kāraṇa-yukti*) refers to “indicating the functions of phenomena”. He then adds (p. 279.5): “What are the characteristics of analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions? Whatever are the causes and whatever are the conditions — in terms of which the attainment or birth of phenomena function — are [the subject matter of] ‘analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions’. With respect to that, ‘attainment or non-establishment’ are just differentiations of agent....Attainment refers both acting in order to gain something — obtaining a mere seed — and attaining the entity of the fruit. What is obtaining a mere seed? It is [obtaining] the virtuous roots for attaining the level of a Superior and its fruits; performing meritorious activity, which leads to attainment of the happinesses of men and gods; moral wrong-doing, which leads to experiencing the sufferings of bad transmigrations; and causes that are concordant with what is neutral and whatever has the predispositions that are seeds of those....Whatever is indicated as being the performance of functions of phenomena is [the subject matter of] ‘analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions’.”

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 275.4) comments that “attainment” refers to “the six objects that are perceived by the six sense powers”. “Establishment” refers to “whatever is a form that serves as a cause of the four great elements”. He adds that when phenomena are produced their individual performances of functions are, for instance, the mind's apprehending phenomena that have been seen by the eyes. This explanation equates *dharma*s (*chos*) with phenomena, but another explanation (line five) equates *dharma*s with the

attainment of nirvāṇa and the completion of (good) qualities. On p. 309.6 he adds that this type of analysis deals with “the individual performances of functions of phenomena that are different characteristics of persons”. An example is things that are bases of eye consciousnesses and so forth due to eye sense powers and so forth. This refers to the fact that eye consciousnesses are individual cognitions of form, etc.

⁹⁹⁹Dok p. 147.1, K p. 65a.5: *dam bcas shing bstan te smras pa'i don bsgrub pa dang / yang dag par shes par bya ba'i phyir / gang dag rgyur gyur pa dang / gang dag rkyen du gyur pa de dag ni / gtan tshigs sgrub pa'i rigs pa'o*; Lamotte p. 155, P p. 24d.2, D p. 101.5: *so so'i shes pa dang / bshad pa dang [P, D: /] smras pa'i don sgrub pa dang / legs par khong du chud par bya ba'i rgyu gang dag yin pa dang / rkyen gang dag yin pa de ni 'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa yin no*.

Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 271.2) states that “analytical procedure [looking into] correctness” (*'thad pa'i sgrub pa'i rigs pa, upapatti-sādhana-yukti*) involves “indicating the reasonings that establish individual meanings by way of the correctness of the three valid cognizers [*tshad ma, pramāṇa*, i.e., direct perception, inference, and believable scriptures]”. He adds (p. 280.7): “What are the characteristics of analytical procedure [looking into] logical correctness? Whatever are the causes and whatever are the conditions of individual understanding and explanation, establishing the meaning of propositions, and good understanding are [the subject matter of] analytical procedure [looking into] correctness. ‘Analytical procedure [looking into] correctness’ is indicating proofs of individual meanings by way of the correctness of the three valid cognizers — direct perception, inferential cognition, and believable scriptures.”

Wonch'uk discusses this topic beginning on p. 276.3.

¹⁰⁰⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 277.4) comments that the first type is “pure” (*yongs su dag pa, parisuddha*) “because it is faultless with respect to establishing meanings through reasonings”. The second type is “impure” (*yongs su ma dag pa, aparisuddha*) “because it

is associated with faults”.

¹⁰⁰¹Jang-chup-dzu-trül discusses these beginning on p. 312.3. For the Sanskrit equivalents of the members of this list, see *Mahāvīyapatti* CC 1-5.

¹⁰⁰²This phrase is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24d.6, and D p. 102.2, which read: *de lta bu dang mthun* [P, D: 'thun] *pa gang yin pa*. Ḍok p. 147.6 and K p. 65b.1 read: “what is like this aspect” (*rnam pa 'di lta bu dag*).

¹⁰⁰³Ḍok p. 147.7, K p. 65b.2: *mi rtag pa rigs pa*; Lamotte p. 156: *mi rtag par rags pa nyid*; P p. 24d.7, D p. 102.2, N p. 75a.7, L p. 81a.4, C p. 65b.6: *mi rtag par rigs pa nyid*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 281.5: *mi rtag pa'i rigs pa nyid*. Lamotte's reading of *rags pa* seems to be a misreading of *rigs pa*, since all the Tibetan texts, as well as Wonch'uk (p. 281.5), use *rigs pa*, except for V p. 105d.8, which reads *mi rtag pa rags pa nyid*.

¹⁰⁰⁴Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 281.5) comments that one directly observes analytical procedure [looking into] impermanence through “reasonings concerning the impermanence of a basis”. This means that one realizes something that subtle on the basis of understanding something that is coarse with respect to a particular basis. Thus, one understands subtle impermanence in dependence on first understanding coarse impermanence, one understands that there will be effects of karma in the future due to observing the varieties of suffering that are present now, one understands subtle selflessness in dependence upon understanding coarse selflessness.

¹⁰⁰⁵The negative particle *ma* is inserted in Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24d.8, and D p. 102.3, but is omitted in Ḍok p. 148.2.

¹⁰⁰⁶Ḍok p. 148.2, K p. 65b.4: *'di dang rnam pa 'di lta bu dag*; Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24d.8,

D p. 102.4: *de lta bu dang mthun* [P, D: 'thun] *pa gang yin pa de*.

¹⁰⁰⁷Compare this with the discussion of examples in *Compendium* p. 182.

¹⁰⁰⁸*Dok* p. 148.2, *K* p. 65b.4: *gang yang nang dang phyi'i 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa dang / skye bar dmigs pa 'jig rten thams cad la grags pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / skye ba la* [K: *las*] *sogs pa'i sdug bsngal dmigs pa'i nye bar sbyar ba dang / rang dbang med par dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / pha rol gyi phun sum tshogs pa dang / rgud par dmigs pa 'jig rten thams cad la grags pa nye bar sbyar ba 'di dang / rnam pa 'di lta bu dag ni / rang gi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba'i mtshan nyid* [K: *ni*] *du shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24e.1, D p. 102.4: *nang dang phyi rol gyi 'du byed rnams la 'jig rten thams cad la grags pa'i 'chi 'pho dang skye ba dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / skye ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsngal dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / rang dbang med pa'i dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / pha rol dag na 'ang* [P, D: *yang*] *'jig rten thams cad la grags pa'i 'byor pa dang / rgyud* [P, D: *rgud*] *pa dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba dang / de lta bu dang mthun* [P, D: 'thun] *pa gang yin pa de ni rang gi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba'i mtshan nyid yin par rig par bya'o*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 282.7) states that through giving examples based on what is widely known by worldlings concerning the birth, death, and rebirth, one can come to understand the subtle impermanence of phenomena.

On p. 283.3 he states that "associating [examples] concerning observations about the arising and so forth of suffering" refers to examples concerning the eight types of suffering of worldly existence (see *Tshig mdzod* p. 895).

¹⁰⁰⁹This phrase is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24e.4, and D p. 102.6, which read: *rig par bya'o*. *Dok* p. 148.6 and *K* p. 65b.8 read: "you should ascertain that..." (*nges par bya'o*).

¹⁰¹⁰Text (Dok p. 148.6, K p. 65b.7) corrected in accordance with Lamotte p. 156, P p. 24e.4, and D p. 102.6, which omit *des*.

¹⁰¹¹Dok p. 149.1, K p. 66a.2, P p. 24e.6, D p. 103.1, N p. 76a.1, L p. 81b.6, C p. 66a.8, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 284.4: *bsten par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 157: *bstan par bya'o*. Lamotte's reading of *bstan* appears to be a misreading of *bsten*, but may be based on V p. 105e.8.

¹⁰¹²Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 284.7) comments: "The masters of this country...state that whatever is an exalted wisdom that observes suchness is 'omniscience' (*thams cad mkhyen pa, sarva-jñā*). Whatever is an exalted wisdom that abides in conventions is an 'exalted knower of all aspects' (*rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa, sarvākāra-jñātā*)."

On p. 288.5 he states that another scholar's position is that "exalted knower of everything" refers to the "general characteristic" (*spyi'i mtshan nyid*), and "exalted knower of all aspects" refers to the "specific characteristic" (*bye brag gi mtshan nyid*). The first is cause, and the second is effect. Also, the first refers to "destruction of ignorance that is thorough obscuration with respect to all phenomena" (*chos thams cad la kun tu rmongs pa'i ma rig pa 'jig par byed*), and the second refers to "destruction of ignorance in terms of individual analysis of various types of phenomena" (*chos rnam pa sna tshogs la so sor rtog pa'i ma rig pa 'jig par byed pa*).

The phenomena that are known by exalted wisdom of all aspects are the twelve sense spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*). He cites the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* to the effect that "exalted knower of everything" refers to an unobstructed exalted knower of all realms (*kham*s, *dhātu*), things (*dnegos po, bhāva*), aspects (*rnam pa, ākāra*), and times (*dus, kāla*). "Realms" refers to two types of realms, "worldly realms" (*'jig rten gyi kham*s, *loka-dhātu*) and "realms of sentient beings" (*sems can gyi kham*s, *sattva-dhātu*). "Things" are also of two types, compounded (*'dus byas, saṃskṛta*) and uncompounded (*'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*). "Aspects" include divisions of general character (*spyi'i mtshan nyid*,

sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) and specific character (*rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa*), cause and effect (*rgyu dang rkyen, hetu-pratyaya*), realms (*kham, dhātu*), transmigrations (*'gro ba, gati*), and virtuous (*dge ba, kuśala*), non-virtuous (*mi dge ba, akuśala*), and neutral (*lung du ma bstan pa, avyākṛta*), and so forth. “Times” are the three times: past, future, and present.

¹⁰¹³Dok p. 149.2, K p. 66a.2: *su gang 'jig rten du thams cad mkhyen par sgra rnam par grags shing 'byung ba*; Lamotte p. 157, P p. 24e.6, D p. 103.2: *gang su 'ang [P, D: yang] rung ba zhig byung na / 'jig rten du thams cad mkhyen pa nyid du sgra rnam par grags pa*.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 291.5) cites the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, which states that this means that after a Buddha is born in the world the renown of his omniscience pervades everywhere. See *Compendium* p. 170; *Somme* p. 289; and *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.58.

¹⁰¹⁴These are listed in *Mahāvyutpatti* XVII; Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 291.5); Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 315.7; and *Somme*, notes pp. 54*-5*; the eighty-two minor marks are also listed there. See also *Somme* pp. 286, 295, and 302; and *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* XXI.57.

¹⁰¹⁵See *Somme* pp. 286, 296, and notes p. 59*; *Mahāvyutpatti* VII; and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 317.5.

¹⁰¹⁶See *Compendium* p. 169; *Somme* pp. 286, 298, and notes p. 59*; *Mahāvyutpatti* VIII; and Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 318.1), who gives the following list: (1) fearlessness with respect to being manifestly and completely enlightened with respect to all phenomena; (2) fearlessness with respect to knowing that all contaminations have been extinguished; (3) fearlessness with respect to teaching definitive scriptures that are

uninterrupted and (contain) unchangeable doctrines; and (4) fearlessness with respect to the nature of the path of definite emergence (from cyclic existence) in which one attains all wonders. See also Gyel-tsap's (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*) *Commentary on the Mahāyānottara-tantra* (entitled *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tikka*, blockprint from the Library of H.H. The Dalai Lama, n.p.d., pp. 183a.6-183b.6), in which he lists the four fearlessnesses as: "(1) fearlessness with respect to the assertion, 'I am completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to all phenomena'.... (2) fearlessness with respect to teaching that the afflictive obstructions are obstacles to liberation and that the obstructions to omniscience are obstacles to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena, and that, therefore, these are to be ceased.... (3) fearlessness with respect to teaching the paths of deliverance.... (4) fearlessness with respect to asserting that the contaminations have been extinguished" [tr. Jeffrey Hopkins, *Reflections on Reality*, unpublished manuscript, p. 78].

¹⁰¹⁷See Lamotte p. 264 n. 27.

¹⁰¹⁸Regarding the eight branches of the path of Superiors, see note 215. Regarding the four asceticisms (*dge sbyong bzhi*, *catur-śramaṇa*), see: *Somme* pp. 286, 296, and 302; *Kośa* ch. 4, p. 98; and Jang-chup-dzu-trül vol. *jo* (206), p. 318.2, where these are divided into four kinds: (1) conquest of the path; (2) teaching the path; (3) living the path; and (4) finding fault with the path. The first refers to Sugatas. The second refers to those who propound the doctrine. The third refers to entering the path well. The fourth refers to those who enter the path mistakenly. A Sugata is one who completely eliminates all desire, hatred, and obscuration. Such a person is able to teach doctrine correctly and to enter the path well due to eliminating them. Those who do not enter correctly and who find fault with the path do so because of their qualities of faulty ethics and moral wrong-doing.

¹⁰¹⁹*Dok* p. 149.6, *K* p. 66a.5: *gtan tshigs bsgrub pa'i rigs pa*; Lamotte p. 157, *P* p. 25a.1, *D* p. 103.4: '*thad pa'i [P: pas] sgrub pa'i rigs pa*.

¹⁰²⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 296.6) comments: "Because these seven characteristics have faults, they are 'not thoroughly purified'." See *Mahāvīyūtpatti* CC, 6-12.

¹⁰²¹The word "characteristics" (*mtshan nyid*) is added on the basis of Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25a.5, D p. 103.7, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 304.2, and is omitted in *Ḍok* p. 150.3 and K p. 66b.2.

¹⁰²²The term "nature" (*ngo bo nyid*) is omitted in *Ḍok* p. 150.3 and K p. 66b.2, but is present in Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25a.5, D p. 103.7, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 303.7.

¹⁰²³*Ḍok* p. 150.5, K p. 66b.4: *de ' grub par bya ba la gcig tu ma nges pas na*; Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25a.7, D p. 104.1: *de grub par bya ba la gcig tu ma nges pa' i phyir*.

¹⁰²⁴Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 343.3) explains that this is because they are "discordant with the mode of the meaning of suchness", and so they are not thoroughly purified and are mistaken with respect to their objects. Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 305.6) comments that this means that they are not renowned in the world, which means that they contradict common sense, and they also contradict believable scriptures. Thus, they are worthless as reasonings and are discordant with the correct reasonings described earlier and should not be used.

¹⁰²⁵*Ḍok* p. 150.7, K p. 66b.6: *de la lung shin tu rnam par ma dag pa' i mtshan nyid ni rang bzhin gyis ma dag pa yin par shes par bya'o*; Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25b.1, D p. 104.3, N p. 76b.7, L p. 82b.6, C p. 67a.5, V p. 106b.5: *de [la gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba' i mtshan nyid dang: omitted in P, D, N, L, C, V] lung shin tu rnam par ma dag pa bstan [L: bsten] pa' i mtshan nyid ni rang bzhin nyid kyis yongs su [ma: omitted in P, N, C] dag pa yin par rig par bya'o*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 306.6: *gzhan gyi rigs kyi*

dpes nye bar bsgrub pa gang yin pa dang / shin tu rnam par dag pa ma yin pa'i lung gi mtshan nyid de ni rang bzhin nyid kyis yongs su dag pa ma yin par rig par bya'o.

The phrase, “the characteristic of associating examples of dissimilar type” is added in brackets on the basis of Lamotte p. 158 and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 306.6, but is omitted in *Ādok*, K, P, D, N, L, V, and C. Lamotte bases his insertion of this phrase on Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text, p. 710a.15-16. The words “the teachings of” (*bstan pa*) are added on the basis of Lamotte, P, D, N, L, C, V, and Wonch'uk, but are omitted in *Ādok* and K.

Wonch'uk (p. 307.1) comments that “the characteristic of associating examples of dissimilar type” refers to “a discordant reason” (*mi mthun pa'i rgyu*) and states that an example of this is reasoning that sound is permanent because it is a product.

On p. 307.2 he comments that “the teachings of very non-correct scriptures” are “the incorrect teachings of Outsiders [i.e., non-Buddhists]”. He also cites an alternative explanation that states that these refer to incorrect theses, reasonings, and examples.

¹⁰²⁶*Ādok* p. 151.1, K p. 66b.7 *de la de bzhin gshegs pa rnam byung yang rung / ma byung yang rung ste / chos nyid dang / chos gnas pa'i dbyings 'dug pa de ni / chos nyid kyi rigs pa'o*; Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25b.1, D p. 104.3: *de la de bzhin gshegs pa rnam byung yang rung / ma byung yang rung ste / chos gnas par bya ba'i phyir chos nyid dbyings gnas pa nyid gang yin pa de ni chos nyid kyi rigs pa yin no.*

According to Wonch'uk (p. 310.1), “analytical procedure [looking into] the nature” (*chos nyid kyi rigs pa*, *dharmatā-yukti*) refers to analysis of what is renowned from beginningless time as the nature of phenomena that abides in specific characteristics and general characteristics. Examples are such things as stating that fire burns and water moistens, which are qualities that are renowned in the world concerning the natures of these.

¹⁰²⁷*Ādok* p. 151.2, K p. 66b.7: *de ltar bsdus pa dang / rnam par spros [pas: omitted in K]*

*mngon par bsdus te / chos kyi tshig gcig tu bstan pa la gong nas gong ma'i tshig gis shin tu phye ste / mthar gtug [K: gtugs] pa'o; Lamotte p. 158, P p. 25b.2, D p. 104.4: de la bsdus pa dang rgyas pa ni mdor bsdu [P: bsdus] ste / tshig gcig gis bstan pa'i chos tshig phyi ma phyi ma dag gis rab tu phye ste / mthar thug par byed pa gang yin pa'o; Wonch'uk vol. di [120], p. 310.4: sngar chos tshig gcig bstan pa'i tshig phyi ma phyi ma'i dpag tu med pa dag gis phan tshun rnam par phye nas mthar thug pa gang yin. The translation of this passage reflects the use of *byed pa* in Lamotte, P, and D with the words "dealing with".*

¹⁰²⁸Wonch'uk (vol. di [120], p. 311.5) comments: "The qualities of: (1) overwhelming afflictions by way of mundane paths; (2) nirvāṇa that achieves complete abandonment of afflictions by way of supramundane paths; and (3) compounded qualities that are manifestly established by those [constitute] the characteristic of results."

¹⁰²⁹Dok p. 151.5, K p. 67a.2: *de nyid rnam par grol ba'i ye shes kyi rab tu shes pa dang / gzhan la yang rgya cher bshad cing bstan pa de ni / de myong ba rnam par bsnyan [K: bsnyad] pa'i mtshan nyid do; Lamotte p. 159, P p. 25b.5, D p. 104.6: de nyid rnam par grol ba'i shes pas [P: pa'i] so so yang dag par rig pa gang yin pa gzhan dag la 'ang [P, D: yang] rgya cher sgrogs pa dang / 'chad pa dang / yang dag par ston pa de ni de myong ba rnam par bsnyad pa'i mtshan nyid yin no.*

¹⁰³⁰Dok p. 151.6, K p. 67a.3: *byang chub kyi phyogs su gtogs pa'i chos 'di dag nyid bsgom pa la bgegs kyi gnas nyon mongs pa can gyi chos de dag ni de'i bar du gcod pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid do; Lamotte p. 159, P p. 25b.6, D p. 104.7: byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun [P, D: 'thun] pa'i chos de dag nyid sgom [bsgom] pa la bar chad byed pa'i gnas lta bu nyon mongs pa can gyi chos gang dag yin pa de ni de'i bar du gcod pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid yin no.*

Wonch'uk (vol. di [120], p. 312.1) cites this passage as: "Phenomena that are thorough

afflictions that interrupt one's cultivation of qualities that are concordant with the harmonies with enlightenment constitute the characteristic of phenomena that are interruptors of that" (*byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pa'i chos bsgom pa las bar chad byed pa kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos gang yin pa de ni de'i bar du gcod pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid*). He states that this refers to apprehending a self of persons or a self of phenomena and the two obstructions.

¹⁰³¹Dok p. 151.7, K p. 67a.4: *de dag nyid la gang gces spras byed pa'i chos de dag ni / de dang mthun* [K: 'thun] *pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid do*; Lamotte p. 159, P p. 25b.6, D p. 104.7, N p. 77a.7, L p. 83a.7, C p. 67b.4, V p. 106c.4, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 312.2: *de dag nyid la gces spras* [P, D, N, L, C, V, Wonch'uk: *spras*] *byed pa'i chos gang dag yin pa de ni de dang rjes su mthun* [P, D: 'thun] *pa'i chos kyi mtshan nyid yin no*. The word *spras* in Lamotte's text seems to be a misspelling, since all the other texts read *spras*.

Wonch'uk (p. 312.3) states: "This means that whatever performs the activities of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment by way of the [eleven] root virtues and so forth that are harmonies with liberation is 'a quality that is concordant with that'."

¹⁰³²According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 312.5), "These are what serve to obstruct these characteristics: the afflictions that bring about transmigration, rebirth, etc."

¹⁰³³Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 350.7) comments that this refers to "the many benefitters at the level of the path of accumulation, the path of preparation, and the pure paths".

¹⁰³⁴With respect to "indirect thought", see *Somme* notes p. 23*.

¹⁰³⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 315.5) comments that this teaches that phenomena are empty in the sense that they are devoid of the functions of apprehending subjects and

apprehended objects as well as of various elaborations. The previous sentence referred to the emptiness of persons.

¹⁰³⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 316.7) comments that the term "thoroughly afflicted phenomena" (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos, sāmkleśika-dharma*) refers to [true] sufferings and [true] sources. The term "purified phenomena" (*rnam par dag pa'i chos, suvisuddha-dharma*) refers to [true] cessations and [true] paths.

¹⁰³⁷According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 317.4), these "childish ordinary beings" (*byis pa so so'i skye bo, bāla-prthag-jana*) are "persons who apprehend by way of obscuration" (*rmongs pas 'dzin pa'i gang zag*). "Ordinary beings" (*so so'i skye bo, prthag-jana*) are so named "because they are born from apprehension of different views" (*lta ba tha dad pa 'dzin pa las skyes pa'i phyir*).

¹⁰³⁸Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 352.3) comments that these assumptions of bad states abide in the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*). Abandoning them involves abandoning the basis-consciousness, which contains the predispositions of these.

¹⁰³⁹According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 317.7), these "predispositions" (*bag la nyal, anuśaya*) are synonymous with "seeds" (*sa bon, bija*), specifically seeds of the two types of mistaken apprehension: apprehension of a self of persons and apprehension of a self of phenomena. These are the two types of obstructions: afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience.

¹⁰⁴⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 318.4) indicates that this refers to thoroughly knowing both the emptiness of persons and the emptiness of phenomena.

¹⁰⁴¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 318.5) states that this refers to "thoroughly pacifying sufferings".

¹⁰⁴²Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 319.1) comments that this refers to "the characteristic of the transformation that is nirvāṇa".

¹⁰⁴³Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 319.4) states that this refers to "the attainment of the uncompounded truth body".

¹⁰⁴⁴This phrase is translated in accordance with Lamotte p. 160, P p. 25c.8, and D p. 106.2, which read: *rig par bya'o*. *Ḍok* p. 153.5 and K p. 67b.7 read: *spros par bya'o*.

¹⁰⁴⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 320.5) states that this verse restates the correct analytical procedures. The second verse restates the faults of apprehending by way of obscuration. The third restates the good qualities (i.e., benefits) of understanding. He also comments that in the first verse the first two lines "indicate the mode of the emptiness of persons" and the second two "indicate the mode of the emptiness of phenomena".

¹⁰⁴⁶*Ḍok* p. 153.7 and K p. 67b.8 read: *gnas ngan len gyi tshogs la bdag dang bdag gi zhes // bag la nyal ba'i lta la brten nas 'byung ba ni // mthong ngo za'o byed do zhes ni bya ba dang // nyon mongs rnam par byang bar gyur to snyam pa 'byung*. Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.2, D p. 106.3 read: *gnas ngan gyi lus la bag la nyal ba yi // lta la brten nas bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin byed de // des na mthong ngo za'o byed ces bya ba dang // nyon mongs rnam par byang bar 'gyur ro snyam pa 'ang 'byung*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 321.2 reads: *gnas ngan len lus bag la nyal ldang bas / dmigs pa byas pas bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin / des na brdzun du bdag gis mthong stsogs dang / bdag za'o byed dang nyon mongs rnam dag snyom*.

¹⁰⁴⁷Ādok p. 154.1, K p. 68a.2: *de ltar gang zhig yang dag ji bzhin rab shes te // gnas ngan len gyi tshogs ni rab tu spong byed pa // de ni nyon mongs rten med shin tu rnam dag gnas // spros pa med cing 'dus ma byas pa thob par 'gyur*; Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.3, D p. 106.4: *gang gis da ltar yang dag ji bzhin rab shes pa // de ni gnas ngan len lus rab tu spong byed cing // nyon mongs gnas min shin tu dag pa'i lus // spros pa med cing 'dus ma byas pa 'thob par 'gyur*.

¹⁰⁴⁸Ādok p. 154.2, K p. 68a.3: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems 'byung ba ji ltar 'tshal bar bgyi*; Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.4, D p. 106.5: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags*. The words in brackets are added on the basis of Lamotte, P, and D, which have *mtshan nyid*, which is omitted in Ādok.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 321.5) comments that Buddha's answer to this question "indicates the characteristics of the complete enjoyment bodies of Tathāgatas".

¹⁰⁴⁹Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.4, D p. 106.5, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 322.3 insert *'on kyang*, which is omitted in Ādok p. 154.3 and K p. 68a.4.

¹⁰⁵⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 322.6) states that "mind" (*sems, citta*) refers to the basis-consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*). "Mentality" (*yid, manas*) refers to "afflicted mentality" (*nyon mongs can gyi yid, klišṭa-manas*). "Consciousness" (*rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*) refers to the six consciousnesses, the five sense consciousnesses and mental consciousness. See note 247.

On p. 324.1 he adds: "Tathāgatas do not have conceptual mental activity, but due to the power of wisdom from the previous causal period mental phenomena arise without exertion, like emanations, for instance. Due to the power of meditative stabilization, they manifest [whatever is suitable] in accordance with their thought and not due to the power of conceptual mental activity." He states that according to a commentary on the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, Tathāgatas work for the benefit of sentient beings in the three times. Despite

the fact that they do not have any conscious motivation to do so, they bring about activities that benefit sentient beings, like a wish-granting jewel.

¹⁰⁵¹Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.5, D p. 106.6, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 325.4: *gal te*; *Ādok* p. 154.3, K p. 68a.4: *de ste*. That this should be read as a conditional passage is indicated by the use of *na* at the end of the *Ādok* and K passage and at the end of this passage in Lamotte, P, D, and Wonch'uk.

¹⁰⁵²Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 325.7) quotes this passage as follows: "Son of [good] lineage, due to the power of previous manifest activity of cultivating method and wisdom there will be arising of mind" (*rigs kyi bu sngon thabs dang shes rab bsgom pa mngon par 'dus byas pa'i dbang gi phyir sems 'byung bar 'gyur*). He states that "manifest activity" (*mngon par 'dus byas*, *abhisamṣkāra*) in general refers to the causal states of: (1) application (*sbyor ba*); (2) correct knowledge (*yang dag pa'i shes pa*); and (3) subsequent attainment (*rjes la thob pa*). This is because these "are associated with the effort of striving" (*'bad pa'i rtsol ba dang bcas pa*) and they arise from previously cultivating method and wisdom.

¹⁰⁵³*Ādok* p. 154.6, K p. 68a.6: *sems med par gnyid log pa'i tshe phyir sad pa mngon par 'du byed pa med kyang / 'on kyang sngon gyi mngon par 'du byed kyi dbang gis sad par 'gyur ba yang yod do*; Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.7, D p. 106.7: *gnyid log pa sems med pa la phyir sad par mngon par 'du bya ba med kyang sngon mngon par 'dus byas pa'i dbang gis sad par 'gyur ba dang*.

¹⁰⁵⁴Lamotte p. 161, P p. 25d.7, and D p. 107.1 insert the particle *la*, and Wonch'uk glosses this with the particle *las* in his explanation of this passage (vol. *di* [120], p. 326.5). *Ādok* p. 154.7 and K p. 68a.7 omit *la*.

¹⁰⁵⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 326.7), citing the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, states that the elements that constitute sentient beings of the Desire Realm are maintained during these meditative stabilizations by the material food (*khamṣ kyi zas*) consumed prior to entering into them. While one is in these absorptions, the body does not degenerate; however, when one emerges from them the body will degenerate. Desire Realm beings are said to be able to remain in such meditative stabilizations for seven days without harming their bodies because they have enough stored food to last for that length of time. Form Realm beings can remain in these meditative stabilizations for one eon or longer.

¹⁰⁵⁶For a discussion of Yogācāra views concerning re-emergence from meditative states, see Stefan Anacker, "Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* and the Problem of the Highest Meditations", *Philosophy East and West*, 22, 1972, pp. 247-258 And Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna* (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 18-33 and 197-207. On the idea of Buddhas being motivated by the force of past vows, see *ME* p. 117-123 and *Compassion* p. 36-39.

¹⁰⁵⁷Dok p. 155.2, K p. 68b.1: *de bzhin gshegs pa [K: pas] sprul pa la sems mchis sam ma mchis zhes bgyi*; Lamotte p. 162, P p. 25e.1, D p. 107.2, N p. 78b.7, L p. 85a.3, D p. 69a.2: *ci lags / de bzhin gshegs pas sprul pa'i [sku: omitted in P, D, N, L, C] sems mchis sam / ma mchis zhes bgyi*; V p. 106e.8: *ci de bzhin gshegs pas sprul pa sems mchis sam ma mchis zhes bgyi*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 330.2: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sprul pa'i sku la sems mchis zhes bgyi' am / sems ma mchis zhes*. Lamotte notes that his insertion of the word *sku* is based on Hsüan-tsang's Chinese text p. 710e.14. It is not found in any of the Tibetan texts, but is found in Wonch'uk.

¹⁰⁵⁸Dok p. 155.2, K p. 68b.1: *rang dbang med pa dang / sems gzhan gyi dbang gi phyir sems yod pa yang ma yin / sems med pa yang ma yin no*; Lamotte p. 162, P p. 25e.1, D p. 107.3: *sems yod pa 'ang [P, D: yang] ma yin / sems med pa 'ang [P, D: yang] ma yin te /*

sems rang dbang med pa nyid dang / sems kyi dbang nyid yin pa'i phyir ro.

Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 330.4) states that Buddha's answer entails that it is not suitable to say that these emanations have minds, and it is not suitable to say that they do not. That they are "not autonomous" (*rang dbang med pa, asvatantra*) means that they arise in dependence upon the seeds of types of views of different sentient beings in accordance with their natures. He adds that according to the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* complete enjoyment bodies and emanation bodies do not have real minds and mental factors, but do have phenomena that appear like minds and mental factors. The emanations of Tathāgatas are like things having minds, but the minds controlling them are external to them, and so the emanations themselves cannot be said to have real minds. They are also not said to be actually existent "because they lack the abilities of physical faculties of emanations and faculties in terms of phenomena that are minds and mental factors and so forth."

¹⁰⁵⁹See Wonch'uk p. 332.7.

¹⁰⁶⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 333.5), citing the *Yogācārabhūmi* as his source, states that "realms of sentient beings" (*sems can gyi khams, satva-dhātu*) are the sixty-four lineages of sentient beings. "Worldly realms" (*'jig rten gyi khams, loka-dhātu*) are immeasurable [realms] of the ten directions with immeasurable different names. "Realms of phenomena" (*chos kyi khams, dharma-dhātu*) are the virtuous (*dge ba, kuśala*), the non-virtuous (*mi dge ba, akuśala*), and the neutral (*lung du ma bstan pa, avyākṛta*). He adds: "You should know that these are immeasurable in terms of the modes of thoroughly differentiating doctrines."

"Realms of discipline" (*gdul ba'i khams, vinaya-dhātu*) can be taken as referring to all sentient beings taken together in the sense that all are objects of discipline. With respect to "realms of methods of discipline" (*gdul ba'i thabs kyi khams, vinayopāya-dhātu*), Wonch'uk (p. 334.6) states that "method" refers to skill in means used to discipline sentient beings. See also note 606.

¹⁰⁶¹Lamotte p. 162, P p. 25e.6, D p. 107.7, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 335.4 insert *yin*, which is omitted in *Ā*dok p. 155.7 and K p. 68b.5.

¹⁰⁶²See Wonch'uk p. 336.2.

¹⁰⁶³Lamotte p. 163, P p. 25e.8, D p. 108.2, Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 336.3: *kun tu ston pa*; *Ā*dok p. 156.2, K p. 68b.8: *yang dag par ston pa*. Jang-chup-dzu-trül (vol. *jo* [206], p. 356.2) comments that "Truth bodies are transformations of basis-consciousnesses. Because emanation bodies are imputational natures they do not exist at all."

¹⁰⁶⁴The words in brackets are inserted on the basis of Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 339.3), who inserts *ngos po de dag* at this point in his citation of the passage.

¹⁰⁶⁵Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 339.7), citing the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *bhāṣya* as his sources, states that water-crystals are associated with the moon and are of fifty types and that fire crystals are associated with the sun and are of fifty-one types. The *Tshig mdzod* (p. 811) states that the water-crystals are "clear crystals produced from stone" and are white jewels. Fire-crystals are produced from fire, shine brightly, and burn. They are radiant, hot and clear, and produce the light of the sun. Water-crystals produce the light of the moon, and are cold and clear.

¹⁰⁶⁶Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 340.5) comments that the great illumination of exalted wisdom and reflections that are emanations arise due to the fact that the truth body is "blessedly empowered due to being endowed with the great powers of a Tathāgata", and due to the fact that these are achieved through the common karmas of sentient beings that allow them to see Buddhas.

¹⁰⁶⁷Dok p. 157.1, K p. 69a.6: *rigs kyi bu nor bu las kyis byi dor byas pa'i nor bu rin po che las rgya'i gzugs brnyan 'byung gi / de ma yin pa'i gzhan gyis byi dor ma byas pa las ni mi 'byung ngo*; Lamotte p. 163, P p. 26a.5, D p. 108.6: *nor bu rin po che rigs dang ldan pa dang / las kyi byi dor legs par byas pa las rgya'i gzugs brnyan 'byung la / de las gzhan pa'i byi dor ma byas pa dag las ni mi 'byung ba*; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 341.1: *nor bu rin po che las byi dor legs par byas pa de dag las ni rgyu'i gzugs brnyan 'byung la / de las gzhan pa'i byi dor ma byas pa dag las ni ma yin*.

¹⁰⁶⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 341.3) comments: "Because the truth body which is suchness is the cause of innumerable qualities it is called the 'element of qualities' [see also note 29]." He adds that "method" (*thabs, upāya*) is so called "because having cultivated virtues by way of knowledge that observes the element of qualities it clarifies the truth body after having eliminated afflictions....Having purified the afflictions very well through method and wisdom that observe suchness one manifestly achieves the truth body from working at the six perfections; from the truth body the illumination of exalted wisdom arise and emanational images are displayed; but from the emanational bodies of those knowing [only] the emptiness of persons great illumination of exalted wisdom is not emitted and emanational images are not displayed."

¹⁰⁶⁹The words "and Bodhisattvas" are added on the basis of Lamotte p. 164, P p. 26a.8, D p. 109.2, and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 341.7.

¹⁰⁷⁰The words "such as" are added on the basis of Wonch'uk's quotation of this passage (vol. *di* [120], p. 341.7), which adds *lta bu*.

¹⁰⁷¹Lamotte (p. 269) interprets this as meaning that they are very wealthy.

¹⁰⁷²The word "appear" is added in brackets on the basis of Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p.

342.1), who inserts *snang*. *Ā*ok p. 157.3, K p. 69b.3, Lamotte p. 164, P p. 26b.2, and D p. 109.3 read: *gda'o*.

Wonch'uk (p. 342.4) states that this question asks why Buddha said that sentient beings acquire physical benefits from Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas, since this seems to contradict the fact that the power of their own actions creates concordant effects. Since what he said is contradictory on the literal level, Mañjushrī asks him what he was thinking of when he made this statement.

¹⁰⁷³Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 342.7) comments that Buddha's answer indicates that there is no contradiction between his teaching that sentient beings reap the rewards of their own actions and the teaching that they receive benefits from Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas. This is because sentient beings of the three realms receive physical benefits from putting into practice the teachings of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas concerning the path of the activities associated with the ten virtues and the practices of the three vehicles that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas give due to the blessings of their great compassion.

¹⁰⁷⁴I presume that "worldly realms that are not thoroughly pure" (*'jig rten gyi khams yongs su ma dag pa, aparīśuddha-lokadhātu*) are worlds like our own, in which there are afflictions, and are contrasted with such worlds as Tuṣita and Sukhāvatī in which the conditions are optimal for progressing toward enlightenment. These have been purified by the previous actions of the Buddhas associated with them.

¹⁰⁷⁵The translation of these two as "common" (*mod pa*) and "rare" (*dkon pa*) reflects Wonch'uk's gloss of the first (vol. *di* [120], p. 344.3) as "difficult to find" (*rnyed par dka' ba*) and the second (p. 344.4) as "easy to find" (*rnyed sla ba*).

¹⁰⁷⁶Text corrected per Lamotte p. 165 and Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 344.4: read *rgyud pa* for *rgud pa*. *Ā*ok p. 158.7, K p. 70a.3, P p. 26b.8, D p. 110.1, N p. 80b.6, L p. 87a.5, C p.

70b.7, and V p. 107d.2 all read: *rgud pa*, but the use of *rgyud pa* in Lamotte and Wonch'uk is more plausible.

¹⁰⁷⁷Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 344.5) states that this refers to "persons who have not taken correct vows and who engage in faulty actions".

¹⁰⁷⁸Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 344.6) states: "Those who have taken vows and who pass beyond the boundary of what they have vowed."

¹⁰⁷⁹These are births as animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings.

¹⁰⁸⁰Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 344.6) states that "Bodhisattvas of inferior thoughts" (*byang chub sems dpa' bsam pa dman pa, hināśaya bodhisattva*) are beginners prior to the level of the first ground who are weak in terms of generating the mind (of enlightenment).

¹⁰⁸¹Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 345.3) states that these pure realms are not included among the three realms, but are realms that transcend them and are produced from unsurpassable virtuous roots. Citing a commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom as his source, he adds that in these pure lands the three bad migrations do not exist, nor does anything called the three poisons, anything called "Hearers" and "Solitary Realizers", or anything called "man" and "woman". The Buddhas of these pure lands have the thirty-two marks of a great being and appear in worldly realms through the power of their luminescence, emanate innumerable bodies in each moment, and benefit sentient beings in worldly realms more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river, and then return to their former abodes.

¹⁰⁸²*Ḍok* p. 159.4, *K* p. 70a.5: *las*; Lamotte p. 165, *P* p. 26c.3, *D* p. 110.4: '*dir*'; Wonch'uk vol. *di* [120], p. 348.2: *gyi*.

¹⁰⁸³According to Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 349.5), this indicates the benefits of receiving this teaching: "From among those in the assembly, 75,000 Bodhisattvas — having attained the perfect truth body that is the cause of [becoming] a tenth grounder due to hearing this teaching — now attain the perfect truth body that is a result due to becoming wondrously, completely buddhified; but others do not [attain] the state of enlightenment in the sense of perfecting [Buddha] lands that are resources [for others]."

Joe B. Wilson (*The Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only*, pp. 55-6) reports that according to Gung-tang (p. 9), this chapter sets forth the attributes of the Buddha ground and indicates the activities of a Buddha.

¹⁰⁸⁴This passage is not found in *Ādōk* p. 159, *K* p. 70a, or *V* p. 107d, and is translated from Lamotte pp. 165-6, *P* p. 26c.5, *D* 110.6, *N* p. 81a.5, *L* p. 87b.4, and *C* p. 71a.5, which read: *bcom ldan 'das kyis de skad ces bka' stsal nas / 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa dang / thams cad dang ldan pa'i 'khor de dang / lha dang / mi dang / lha ma yin dang / dri zar bcas pa'i 'jig rten yi rang* [*P*: *yid rangs*; *D, L, C*: *yi rangs*] *ste / bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pa* [*D*: *ba*] *la mngon par bstod do*. Wonch'uk (vol. *di* [120], p. 348.7) cites this passage as follows: *dgongs pa zab mo rnam par dgrol pa'i mdo las ji skad du byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po 'jam dpal chos kyi rgyal po dang / lha dang mi dang lha ma yin dang bcas pa'i 'khor thams cad rab tu dga' o*.

This is a common ending of Mahāyāna sūtras, and is found at the end of the *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra*, the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (see Edward Conze's translation (Rome: Is.M.E.O., 1974, p. 92), the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* (see Leon Hurvitz, *Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 337 and 415), and the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* [see Étienne Lamotte, *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (London: Pāli Text Society, 1976), p. 273].

I. Bibliography of Indian Buddhist Texts and Commentaries

a. The Sūtra and its Commentaries

Samdhinirmocana-(mahāyāna-)sūtra ('phags pa dgongs pa nges pa 'grel pa (theg pa chen po'i) mdo)

Editions used in this study: (1) Stog Palace edition (in *The Tog Palace Edition of the Tibetan Kanjur*. Leh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978, vol. 63, pp. 1-160); (2) a photocopy of the *Them spangs ma* edition brought to Japan by Ekai Kawaguchi, now kept in the Tōyō Bunko Library in Tokyo; (3) *Sde dge* edition: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, vol. *mdo sde ca*; To. 106; (4) Peking edition: Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Suzuki Research Foundation, vol. 29, #774, 1958; (5) Lhasa edition: microfische distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. *mdo nga*; (6) Nār-tang edition: microfische distributed by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, vol. 51; (7) *Co ne* edition: microfilm copy obtained from the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., Kanjur vol. 5; (8) the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* (P 5539, vol. 110, p. 233 — vol. 111, p. 61; vol. 111, pp. 63-121; D 4038, *sems tsam* 8-9) quotes most of the sūtra, and has been used for text comparisons; (9) Stein Tib. 194 (a manuscript from Tun-huang containing most of the seventh chapter in the old translation (*skad gsar bcad*) style); (10) Stein Tib. 683 (another manuscript from Tun-huang in the old translation style that contains a different translation of a portion of the seventh chapter); (11) the Chinese translation of Hsüan-tsang (玄奘), entitled *Chieh shen mi ching*, 解深密經; T 676; (12) the Chinese translation of Bodhiruci (菩提流支), entitled *Shen mi chieh t'o ching*, 深密解脫經; T 675; (13) the Chinese translation of Paramārtha (真諦), entitled *Chieh chieh ching*, 解節經; T. 677)

CANONICAL COMMENTARIES:

Asaṅga (*thogs med*).

Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-bhāṣya ('*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa*): (1) Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, *Sde dge* vol. *ti* (118); To. 3981; (b) P. 5481, vol. 104, pp. 1-7.

Byang chub rdzu 'phrul.

Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtrasya-vyākhyāna ('*phags pa dgongs 'grel nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa*): (a) Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, 1985, vol. *cho* [205]; To. 4358; (b) P 5845, vol. 144, p. 191 - vol. 145, p. 89.

Jñānagarbha (*ye shes snying po*).

Ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtre-ārya-maitreyakevala-parivarta-bhāṣya ('*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe'i bshad pa*), by Jñānagarbha: (a) P. 5535, vol. 109, pp. 196-211; (b) To. 4033, Ōtani University Press, *sems tsam* vol. 2 (*bi*).

Wonch'uk (Tibetan: Wen tshigs; Chinese: Yüan-ts'e, 圓測).

Ārya-gambhira-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra-ṭīkā ('*phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa*): (a) P. 5517, vol. 106, pp. 1-345; (b) Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, *mdo 'grel*, vol. *ti* [118]; To. 4016.

b. Works by Indian Authors

Asaṅga.

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Bodhisattvabhūmi (*byang chub sems pa'i sa*): (1) ed. Wogihara, Unrai. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Leipzig: 1908 & Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyūkai, 1936 (Romanized Skt. text) (2 vols.).

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Śrāvakabhūmi (*nyan thos kyi sa*): (1) *Yogācārabhūmau Śrāvakabhūmi*, P 5537, vol. 110, pp. 35-130; (2) D 4036, *sems tsam* vol. 6; (3) Shukla, Karunesha. *Śrāvakabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, #16), 1973.

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Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (chos mngon pa kun las btus pa'i bshad pa): (1) P 5554, vol. 113, pp. 83-141; (2) D 4053, *sems tsam* 13.

Sthiramati (blo gros brtan pa).

Madhyāntavibhāṣikā (dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa): (1) P 5534, vol. 109, pp. 136-196; (2) D 4032, *sems tsam* vol. 2; (3) ed. Yamaguchi, Susumu. *Madhyānta-vibhāṣa*. Nagoya: Hajinkaku, 1934 and 1939; reprint, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966.

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Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (dbus cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye pa bshad pa): (1) P 5528, vol. 112, pp. 121-33; (2) D 4027, *sems tsam* vol. 2; (3) ed. Nagao, Gadjin. *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964.

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Triṃśikā-kārikā (sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa): (1) P 5556, vol. 113, pp. 231-33; (2) D 4055, *sems tsam* 14.

Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (rang bzhin gsum nges par bstan pa): (1) P 5559, vol. 113, pp. 236-237; (2) D 4058, *sems tsam* 14; (3) ed. and Eng. tr. Anacker, Stefan. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, pp. 464-466 and 287-298.

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Viṃśatikā-kārikā and **Viṃśatikā-vṛtti** (*nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* and *nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*): (1) P 5557, vol. 113, pp. 233-34; (2) D 4056, *sems tsam* 14; (3) ed. and Eng. tr. Anacker, Stefan. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, pp. 413-422 and 157-180.

c. Works by Tibetan Authors

Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (commonly known as Gung thang, 1762-1823, 21st abbot of Bkra shis dkyil Monastery, recognized as a reincarnation of the Throne-Holder of Dga' ldan Monastery).

Bstan bcos legs bshad snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba: (1) *Collected Works*. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975, vol. 1, pp. 725-876.

Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying: (1) Sarnath: Guru Deva, 1965.

Tāranātha. (tā ra nā tha, born 1575).

Dpal gyi byung gnas dam pa'i chos rin po che 'phags pa'i yul du ji ltar dar ba'i tshul gsal bar ston pa dgos 'dod kun 'byung, also called *Rgya gar chos 'byung*: (1) ed. Schiefner, Anton. *Tāranātha's Rgya gar chos 'byung* (Tib. text with German tr.). St. Petersburg: 1868; (2) tr. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya. *History of Buddhism*. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 1970; reprint Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi and Co., 1980.

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Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bris zab don gsal ba'i sgron me: (1) Mysore: Sera Byes Monastery, n.d.; Library of Congress #75-906392.

Dbus pa blo gsal (14th century).

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